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ABSTRACT
The present study tes ts  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  Prototype theory,  
selected among competing theore t ica l  frameworks, to a lex ica l  
semantic analysis of  verbs, with p a r t i c u la r  reference to the 
previously uncharted domain o f  Modern Greek verbs of  motion. A
number of  the c hara c te r is t ic s  which Prototype theory establ ished in
connection with cer ta in  types o f  nouns are demonstrated to perta in  to
verbs: t h e i r  meaning is not a matter of  necessary and s u f f i c ie n t
condit ions,  but ra ther  a matter o f  gradation; t h e i r  a t t r ib u te s  
combine in non-arb i t ra ry  ways to form categories with fuzzy  
boundaries the members o f  which are non-equivalent.  Two 
categor izat ions  of  motion verbs according to 'major c la s s i f i c a t o r y  
propert ies '  are discussed at length.  F i r s t ,  ' s t a t e s ' ,  'processes'  
and 'events '  are shown to const i tu te  a continuum, the focal points of  
which are i d e n t i f i a b l e  on the basis of  the in te rac t ion  o f  factors  
such as spatio-temporal  spec i f ica t ions ,  aspect, inherent semantic 
propert ies of  indiv idua l  verbs and the nature of  the 'theme' (moving 
o b je c t ) .  Second, ' c a u s a t iv i t y '  and 'a g e n t iv i t y '  are understood as 
d i s t i n c t ,  to some extent ,  c luste rs  of  scalar  propert ies  and d i f f e r e n t  
Modern Greek motion verbs are shown to e xh ib i t  these propert ies to a 
greater  or lesser degree. In seeking to determine which factors  may 
be responsible fo r  the formation of  verb categor ies,  i t  is  reca l led  
th a t  the v a l i d i t y  o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  ' fa m i ly  resemblance' and the 
method fo r  id e n t i fy in g  the 'bas ic '  level  .of abstraction cannot be 
tested in the case of  verbs. I t  is suggested that  other factors  may 
be operative,  such as the r e l a t i v e  's a l ie n ce '  o f  cer ta in  combinations 
of  propert ies ,  ' l i n g u i s t i c  markedness', f a m i l i a r i t y  and frequency.  
This te n ta t iv e  conclusion is re inforced with respect to Modern Greek 
verbs o f  motion by the resu l ts  o f  spec i f ic  te s ts .
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ABBREVIATIONS, NOTATION AND FORMAT OF EXAMPLES
A f u l l  l i s t i n g  o f  the abbreviat ions used in th is  te x t  is given below:
Adv. = adverb/adverbial
Adv.Phr. *■ adverbial  phrase
CA = c lu s te r  analysis
CAUS = causative
CC = c ro s s -c la s s i f ic a t io n
CL = change o f  locat ion
CP = change of  posit ion
DC = d i r e c t  causation/causative
EC = e x p l i c i t  causative
FS = Formal Semantics
HCS = h ierarch ica l  s tructur ing  scheme
IC = in d i re c t  causation/causative
I f .  « imperfect/ imperfective
INTR = i n t r a n s i t i v e
LC = le x ic a l  causative
LOC = lo c a t ive
MG -  Modern Greek
MGMV = Modern Greek motion verb
MV = motion verb
NC = natural  class
NON-CAUS -  non-causative
NP = noun phrase
N^ LOC “ noun phrase o f  locat ion
Pf. = p e r fe c t /p e r fe c t iv e
PP = preposit ional  phrase
Prep. = preposit ion
S = sentence
SM *  self-moving
s.o.  *  someone
S-P-E = s ta te (s ) -p ro ces s (es ) -even t (s )
SST = semantic s i m i l a r i t y  sort ing task





s.wh. = somewhere 
= t r a n s i t i v e  
= verb
= verb phrase
Phonologically iden t ica l  verbs appear as separate items with  
subscripts (e .g .  ' r o l l } ' ,  ' r o l l g ' ) .  The subscripts are used to 
f a c i l i t a t e  the descr ipt ion and are not meant as an ind ication  that  
d i f f e r e n t  items are involved ra ther  than a single polysemous one.
Modern Greek examples appear in broad phonemic t ra n s c r ip t io n .  The 
fol lowing conventions are adopted: p a la t a l i z a t io n  o f  / k / ,  / v / ,  / x /  
and / g/  before f ro n t  vowels is not marked; non-sy l lab ic  <i> is 
transcribed as / j / ; prenasal isat ion o f  voiced plosives is not marked 
systematica l ly .  T i t l e s  o f  Greek newspapers, magazines and books and 
authors' names are t r a n s l i t e r a t e d ,  as are also the terms 
' katharevousa' , ' d im o t ik i '  and 'Koine Nea E l l i n i k i ' .  Modern Greek 
examples are fol lowed by an English t ra n s la t io n ;  a word-by-word gloss 
is also provided whenever th is  is considered necessary.
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INTRODUCTION
This thes is attempts a lex ic a l  semantic analysis of  motion verbs, and 
in p a r t i c u la r  Modern Greek verbs o f  motion, w i th in  the framework of  
Prototype theory.  While the method of  approach adopted here has been 
extensively  tested in domains covered by nouns, i t  has not previously  
been applied systematica l ly  to verbal categories.  As a r e s u l t ,  the 
analysis is both theore t ica l  and d escr ip t ive ,  of  necessity touching 
upon psycholinguist ic  theor ies of  human categor izat ion and 
philosophical ' discussions o f  the re la t io n  between l in g u i s t i c  
expressions and e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c  r e a l i t y .
Prototype theory - which is adopted in th is  study as a more 
appropriate method than componential analysis and semantic f i e l d  
theories - has raised a number o f  in te res t ing  issues which are 
examined here in connection with Modern Greek motion verbs. The main 
pr inc ip les  involved are the fo l lowing:
- Word meaning is  not a matter of  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
condi t ions.
- Hyponyms are not equid is tant from t h e i r  superordinate; the members 
of a category are not equal ly representat ive  o f  th is  category.
- Semantic propert ies  are not a r b i t r a r i l y  combined to form 
categories.
The most important general issue,  in my opinion,  is gradation and the 
fuzziness of  boundaries between semantic categories.  Al l  these 
tenets o f  Prototype theory seem equally re levant to the descr ipt ion  
of  the semantic facts  o f  verbs as well as o f  nouns.
Motion verbs const i tu te  a f a i r l y  wel l -de f ined  semantic f i e l d  and 
e xh ib i t  a number o f  in te re s t in g  propert ies also re levant to other  
verbal domains. The f i e l d  has the addi t ional  merits of  being highly  
structured,  o f  containing many categories f a m i l i a r  to most native  
speakers and, what is more important,  of  involving categories more
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re ad i ly  describable in terms of perceptual and funct ional  propert ies  
than those o f  most other  verbal domains. This is perhaps the reason 
why a l o t  o f  l i n g u i s t i c  research has been conducted in th is  area of  
the vocabulary of  languages other than Modern Greek, espec ia l ly  
English and German.
Modern Greek verbs o f  motion have never been systematica l ly  examined, 
which has necessitated the inclusion in th is  study o f  a considerable  
volume of  data.  The pecu l ia r  so c io l in g u is t ic  s i tu a t io n  of  Modern 
Greek, namely the in termingling of  ' katharevousa' (the ' p u r i s t i c '  
language v a r ie ty )  and 'd im o t ik i '  ( the ' c o l lo q u i a l ' / ' p o p u l a r '  v a r ie ty )  
presents special problems in several areas, from the co l lec t ion  of  
data and the formation o f  taxonomic structures to the assessment of  
p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  judgments of  subjects.
Some o f  the tenets o f  Prototype theory,  such as the id e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
the 'bas ic level  o f  abstrac tion '  and the p r in c ip le  o f  ' fam i ly  
resemblance' fo r  category formation cannot be r e a d i ly  tested in the 
case of  verbs. A v e r i f i c a t i o n  of  these tenets presupposes the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e l i c i t i n g  a t t r ib u te s  (propert ies)  of  categories 
d i r e c t l y  from na tive  speakers, which is not evident in the case of  
verbs.
Nevertheless, i t  can be shown that  native speakers do make r e l i a b l e  
judgments on the r e l a t i v e  distance between the inc lus ive  category and 
i t s  hyponyms in those cases where such taxonomic organizat ion is well  
establ ished. An important point  is therefore  raised concerning what 
such judgments are based on, i . e .  what is responsible fo r  the 
formation of  categories in the case of  verbs, and in the area under 
invest iga t ion  in p a r t i c u l a r .  This study does not aspire to provide 
answers to such important problems, espec ia l ly  as i t  is a piece of  
l i n g u i s t i c  ra ther  than psycho!inguist ic  lex ica l  semantics. I t  
cannot, however, avoid tes t ing  the v a l i d i t y  o f  c er ta in  proposals 
concerning the formation of  categor ies,  such as semantic s i m i l a r i t y ,  
number o f  shared proper t ies ,  the r e la t i v e  sal ience o f  combinations of  
propert ies ,  and the nature o f  the 'b as ic '  leve l  of  abstraction for  
verbs.
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The structure  of  the present study is as fol lows:
Chapter I discusses at some length the search fo r  an appropriate  
theore t ica l  framework fo r  the descript ion to fo l low .  I t  also 
includes a section on the d e l im i ta t io n  of  the f i e l d  o f  motion verbs.
Chapters 2 and 3 contain an account o f  those propert ies  of  verbs 
which are here considered 'major c la s s i f i c a to r y  p ro p e r t ie s ' ,  namely 
states-processes-events,  c a u s a t iv i ty  and ag e n t iv i ty .
Chapter 4 discusses the re la t io n s  between Modern Greek verbs of  
motion and the 'minor propert ies '  considered re levant  for  the 
descr ipt ion o f  the verbs in question.  I t  provides an answer to the 
question of  how the f i e l d  is organized.
Chapter 5 reports the resul ts  of  tests  conducted with a view to 
checking the possible psychological r e a l i t y  of  cer ta in  propert ies and 
structures based on the 'pure ly  l i n g u i s t i c '  analysis carr ied out in 
the preceding chapters.  I t  also includes an attempt to id e n t i fy  some 
of the factors  responsible fo r  the formation of  prototypes in the 
domain o f  Modern Greek verbs of  motion.
An Appendix is included which contains six l i s t s  o f  Modern Greek 
motion verbs. L is t  I comprises 181 entr ies  which are ind ica t ive  of  
the material  the descr ipt ion is  based on. Besides motion verbs a 
number of  verbs of  posit ion  are also included, special  reference to 
which is made in Chapters 2 and 4. L is t  I I  contains f i v e  test-frames  
and the verbs of  L is t  I which can occur in each one of  them. L is t  
I I I  presents a c la s s i f i c a t io n  of  Modern Greek motion verbs along the 
'process-event '  continuum. Lis ts  IV and V show the r e la t i v e  degree 
of  a g e n t iv i ty  o f  a number of  causative and non-causative Modern Greek 
verbs of  motion. L is t  VI contains a l l  the taxonomic sets and natural  
classes i d e n t i f i e d  w i th in  the f i e l d  under inves t iga t ion .  Lists V I I  
and V I I I  present a c la s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  motion verbs based on the 'minor 
proper t ies '  they e x h ib i t .
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR A LEXICAL 
SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF MOTION VERBS
1.1 A case fo r  l i n g u i s t i c  l e x ic a l  semantics
In an area of  s c i e n t i f i c  investiga tion  where there is l i t t l e  
agreement on what the subject matter r e a l l y  is ,  i t  is  no wonder tha t  
there is no agreement on i t s  parts and t h e i r  content.  * Semantic 
theory lends i t s e l f  r e a d i ly  to such confusion by ly ing  at the 
crossroads of  'pure '  l i n g u i s t i c s ,  psychology and lo g ic .
Logical grammar or Formal Semantics (henceforth FS) understands and 
there fore  describes the semantics of  natural  language in terms of a 
theory o f  entai lments.  Consequently i t  sets i t s e l f  goals such as 
matching meanings to syntactic  categor ies,  describing sentences 
through t h e i r  t ru th -cond i t ions  or explaining how the meanings of  
individual  words contr ibute to the overal l  meaning of  the sentence 
they belong to .  So word meaning is not to be analysed in i t s  own 
terms but only in terms o f  th is  contr ibution .  This is a l l  very well 
fo r  ' l o g i c a l '  words (such as 'and ' ,  ' b u t ' ,  ' o r ' ,  ' n e c e s s a r i l y ' ) .  The 
vast major i ty  of  non-logical  words is ,  however, l e f t  out,  in the 
sense th a t  FS refuses to break into t h e i r  semantic content.  Lexical  
meaning is re legated to lexicography. This is very simply and 
e x p l i c i t l y  expressed in Thomason (1974:48):
"the problems of semantic theory should be dist inguished from 
those of  lex ic ography . . .  we should not expect a semantic theory 
to furnish an account o f  how two expressions belonging to the 
same syntactic  category d i f f e r  in meaning. 'Walk' and ' r u n ' ,  
fo r  in s t a n c e , . . ,  c e r t a in ly  do d i f f e r  in meaning, and we require  
a d ic t ionary  o f  English to t e l l  us how. But the making of a 
d ic t ionary  demands considerable knowledge of  the world".
Cresswell (1978:4)  considers the same example of  two d i f f e r e n t  but 
re la ted  words, namely 'walk'  and ' r u n ' ,  only to expla in that the 
speaker's knowledge tha t  the two verbs share a +movement component
*A notable exception is Dowty (1979).
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is  not to be incorporated in the model-theoretic  apparatus because i t  
is "already present in the functions describing 'walk '  and ' r u n ' " .
In simple terms, there is such a thing as purely l i n g u i s t i c  
knowledge, which is completely d i s t i n c t  from knowledge o f  the world 
and the l a t t e r  is the concern of  lexicographers,  not l in g u is ts .  A 
re la te d  notion is  th a t  i t  is  impossible to construct a theory of  word 
meaning in any s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  respectable form and there fore  tha t  
there is  no place fo r  ' l inguist ic  le x ic a l  semantics' .
Let us consider the v i a b i l i t y  o f  a l t e r n a t iv e  approaches to th is  
problem, s ta r t in g  with a rephrasing of Thomason's 'sweeping'  
statement.  I t  can be argued th a t  'walk '  and 'run '  d i f f e r  in meaning 
and we require  l i n g u i s t i c  le x ic a l  semantics to provide semantic 
representat ions fo r  them which should reveal  both how they d i f f e r  
from one another (and a number of  re la ted  items) and how they are 
in t e r r e la t e d .  We expect these semantic representat ions to be part  of  
the lexicon of a grammatical theory and a l l  the re levant  information  
to serve as input to lexicography. A d ic t ionary  of  English is the 
output of  lexicography and we expect i t  to t e l l  us how 'walk'  and 
' run '  d i f f e r  from one another as ' l i n g u i s t i c  expressions' ,  i . e .  as 
English words. We do not expect i t  to do anything more than th a t .  
A f te r  a l l ,  according to the standard d is t in c t io n  between the  
d ic t ionary  and the lexicon i t  is the l a t t e r  tha t  is assumed to be a 
'mental l e x ic o n ' ,  a r e f l e c t io n  of  a speaker's l e x ic a l  competence. 
Linguists are expected to f ind out about a speaker's 'mental 
grammar', i . e .  the in te rn a l i ze d  set of  rules which enable someone to  
understand and speak h is /he r  language. Lexicographers are not.
The r e la t io n  between a speaker's mental processes and grammatical
operat ions has been a problem o f  major concern fo r  psycholinguist ics
since the ear ly  s i x t i e s .  The goal o f  psychological semantics remains 
at least to some people. ... . . _ . , ,
c lea r ,  A l t  is to show how language and the world are re la ted  to one
another in the human mind" (Johnson-Laird 1982:7) .
In view of  the simple fac t  tha t  language and the world are  
necessari ly  re la te d  through the human mind and th a t  no grammatical
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model can be describing speakers' competence while at  the same time 
being psychological ly  unreal ,  the d is t in c t io n  between the goals of  
l i n g u i s t i c  and psychological semantics cannot be very c le a r -c u t .
This could be misinterpreted as implying tha t  there  is no place fo r  
le x ic a l  semantics except as part  o f  psycho!inguist ic  theory.  In fac t  
i t  should be understood as leading to the conclusion th a t  i t  is  
necessary to invest iga te  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  in teg ra t in g  some of the 
ins ights  of  the philosophy of language and psycholinguist ics  with in  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  le x ic a l  semantic theory.
The major i ty  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  recent work in le x ic a l  semantics is 
carr ied out w i th in  the framework of  ' d e f i n i t i o n a l '  systems. Some of  
the strongest attacks mounted against d e f in i t io n a l  systems are based 
on t h e i r  psychological u n re a l i t y .  I t  seems desirab le  at th is  point  
to consider a s pec i f ic  example in some d e t a i l .  This example concerns 
the psychological r e a l i t y  of  analysing causatives and defin ing them 
as complex verbs, i . e .  breaking them up into  a causative element and
some other element(s) also present in corresponding non-causatives.
for example
Fodor, G ar re t t ,  Walker and Parkes (henceforth FGWP) (1980),Areport  
resu l ts  of  tes ts  proving ( in  t h e i r  view) tha t  causatives are deep 
simplex verbs and there fore  undefined. The impl icat ion is that no 
psychological r e a l i t y  can be claimed fo r  any d e f i n i t i o n s ,  since 
causatives are by f a r  the 'b e s t '  cases for  d e f i n i t i o n a l  systems.
The method adopted by FGWP fo r  tes t ing  the psychological r e a l i t y  of  
analysing ' k i l l ' ,  fo r  instance, as 'cause to d ie '  can be summed up as 
fo l lows.  The sentences John b i t  Mary and John k i l l e d  Mary are 
compared, of  which only the l a t t e r  sentence is  considered as 
involving a causative verb,  and subjects'  judgments are sought on 
whether i t  is in the former or the l a t t e r  sentence tha t  'John' and 
'Mary' are more "c losely re la te d " .  The impl icat ion is tha t  i f  the 
l a t t e r  sentence does not get a lower score than the former one ( i . e .  
i f  i t  is  not considered that  'John' and 'Mary' are less c lose ly  
re la ted  as arguments o f  ' k i l l '  than o f  ' b i t e ' ) ,  the analysis of  verbs 
in to  components receives a mortal blow.
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Rather expectedly no corre la t ion  was found to ex is t  between 
causatives and r e l a t i v e  complexity in the sp ec i f ic  sense of  the 
experimenters' equation of  c a u sa t iv i ty  = complexity = loose l i n k  
between the verb 's  arguments. I t  is doubtful  whether r e la t i v e  
complexity can be checked through such methods. For i t  is  hard to 
imagine even the f i rmest  supporter o f  d e f in i t io n a l  systems expecting 
such a one-to-one correspondence between l i n g u i s t i c  and psychological  
phenomena. FGWP's method is reminiscent o f  experiments carr ied  out 
in the s ix t ie s  wi th a view to discovering whether der iva t iona l  
complexity corre la ted  with processing complexity. The hypothesis 
tested in those experiments was that the more complex the  
transformational  der iva t ion  of  a sentence is ,  the more d i f f i c u l t  i t  
would be to produce or comprehend. The resu l ts  o f  those 
investigations proved in essence th a t  no one-to-one correspondence 
should be expected between mental processes and grammatical 
operat ions.
Evidence in favour o f  the psychological r e a l i t y  o f  surface structures  
is reported in FGWP, summing up Leve l t 's  (1970) f ind ings  to the 
e f fe c t  th a t  subjects '  in tu i t io n s  respect the grouping of words into  
surface const i tuents .  A possible explanation of  subjects'  support of  
'standard surface order'  could be simply th a t  th is  is prec ise ly  the 
order to which they are most exposed. I t  can be argued th a t  th is  is 
even more so concerning le x ic a l  items. Information ' f i x e d '  and 
consolidated in the form of  a single lex ica l  item (e .g .  ' k i l l ' )  is 
c le a r ly  much more immediately accessible in th is  form than in any 
corresponding decomposition (e .g .  'cause to  d i e ' ) .  I f  ' k i l l '  were 
found to involve a looser l i n k  between i t s  arguments than ' b i t e ' ,  
tha t  would not have been proof of  the psychological r e a l i t y  of  i t s  
analysis as 'cause to d ie '  e i t h e r .  For ' b i t e '  also involves a 
complex in terna l  make-up. I t  might have consti tuted evidence against  
the psychological r e a l i t y  of  l e x i c a l i z a t i o n ,  i . e .  o f  the sal ience of  
le x ic a l  items as ( f ix e d )  un i ts .  I t  is undoubtedly appropriate to 
seek psychological  evidence fo r  any l i n g u i s t i c  hypothesis set up. 
The appropriateness o f  method, i s ,  however, a serious problem.
Be th a t  as i t  may, the fa c t  remains that the d is t in c t io n  between 
'b as ic '  and 'complex' concepts assumed in most d e f in i t io n a l  systems
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is  not w e l l -e s tab l ish e d .  There is no evidence in favour of  a 
hypothesis along the l ines :  'c ause - to -d ie '  is less complex than
' k i l l '  and ' k i l l '  is more complex than 'd i e '  simply because 'cause' 
and ' d i e '  are part  o f  the d e f i n i t i o n  of  ' k i l l ' .  Even i f  ' d i e '  is  
fu r th e r  analysed into 's im p le r '  un i ts ,  the problem w i l l  remain of  how 
these l a t t e r  units (whether they be p r im i t ive  or not) are 
in te rpre ted ,  i . e .  what f ixes  t h e i r  extensions.  Despite t h e i r  mer its ,  
which seem to me to l i e  elsewhere (and w i l l  be discussed in the  
fol lowing sect ion) ,  d e f in i t io n a l  systems have not as yet provided an 
answer to the overal l  problem o f  what re la tes  words to the world.  We 
are s t i l l  badly in need o f  extensive investigation  to throw l ig h t  on 
the process o f  categor iza t ion  that  converts what Labov (1978) c a l ls  
"the continua o f  the real  world" into the categories of the 
l i n g u i s t i c  system. Unless such conversion processes are be t te r  
understood no higher leve l  l i n g u i s t i c  semantic theory can be 
expected. The d is t in c t io n  between 'pure ly  l i n g u i s t i c '  information  
and 'knowledge of  the world'  is much less than a helpful  one.
Consider a s pec i f ic  example provided in i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  th is  famous 
d is t in c t io n  by a non-supporter o f  FS, Mereu (1983).  In te re s t in g ly  
enough the same verb 'walk '  is at  issue, also used as an example by 
Thomason (1974) and Cresswell (1978) as mentioned at the beginning of  
th is  section.  This time 'walk '  is said to have a le x ic a l  meaning 
approximately equivalent to "moving in a cer ta in  way by means of  
legs" and an encyclopaedic meaning, which involves,  among other  
things,  information to the e f f e c t  th a t  (a) " f ish  cannot walk".  But 
i f  ' l e g s '  is somehow included, then reference is i m p l i c i t l y  made to 
those e n t i t i e s  which possess th is  property.  I t  is hard to imagine 
th a t  the meaning of  ' l e g s '  is arr ived at  separate ly from the real  
world objects which have legs.  Therefore?- knowledge of 'walk'  and 
' f i s h '  implies knowledge of  ( a ) .  So the (a) type of  information need 
not appear e i t h e r  in the lexicon or in the d ic t io n ary .  We are l e f t  
exactly  where we were. At one end o f  the scale ( i . e .  no knowledge- 
of- the-wor ld  information a t  a l l )  'walk'  and ' run '  w i l l  receive  
ident ica l  semantic representat ions (as already mentioned in 
connection with FS). S im i la r ly  fo r  'c raw l '  and a l l  such change-of-  
location verbs, fo r  c le a r l y  i f  ' l e g s '  can be shown to  l i n k  d i r e c t l y  
with encyclopaedic information,  so can 'contact with ground',
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presumably, (or  whatever else w i l l  be needed to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between 
d i f f e r e n t  types of  motion).  To be consistent with the 'no knowledge 
of  the world'  doctr ine  i t  is conceivable th a t  even 'motion'  has to  
disappear from the semantic s pec i f ic a t ion  of  'w a lk ' ;  in short ,  tha t  
only log ica l  connectives and q u a n t i f i e r s  can be handled in a 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  acceptable manner.
One more view has to be considered b r i e f l y ,  which is advocated by a 
number of  people working in models of  l i n g u i s t i c  comprehension, 
a r t i f i c i a l  in te l l ig e n c e  and computational l i n g u i s t i c s .  I t  e n ta i ls  
e l im inat ing  the d i s t in c t io n  between l i n g u i s t i c  and encyclopaedic 
information and replacing the two leve ls  o f  analysis with a unique 
one. The underlying assumption is th a t  world-knowledge is the f i r s t  
and most important source o f  information in decoding the l i n g u i s t i c  
message. The 'pure ly  l i n g u i s t i c '  contr ibution o f  the word is 
r e s t r ic te d  to s tr ings of  sounds and a set o f  very simple syntactic  
ru les .  Quite c le a r ly  there is ,  in th is  case, no room fo r  a lex ica l  
level  o f  processing. L ingu is t ic  le x ic a l  semantics is  again accused 
of  adopting an e s s e n t ia l l y  ' s t a t i c '  d ic t ionary  view.
A f in a l  note has to be added concerning the r e la t io n  of  word-meaning 
to sentence-meaning. The lexicon is sometimes dist inguished from the 
d ic t ionary  by saying that  the former is sentence-oriented while the 
l a t t e r  is word-oriented.  The tenet that the semantic status of  
indiv idua l  lex ic a l  items is determined by the contr ibution  these 
items make to the meaning of the sentences in which they appear is  
too well known to require  e la bora t ion .  On the other hand, the view 
th a t  the meaning of  a sentence is a function of  the morphemes i t  
contains and the way in which those morphemes are s y n t a c t ic a l ly  
combined seems equally  p laus ib le .  The whole issue o f  whether 
sentence-meaning or word-meaning is more basic does not answer any 
more questions than i t  ra ises .
What seems to me a reasonable proposal in r e la t io n  to word and 
sentence meaning is combining the log ica l  form of a sentence with  
l e x i c a l l y  analysed words which belong to th is  sentence. The 
conditions under which the sentence would be t rue  are to be provided
^(See discussion in chapter 10 of Johnson-Laird 1983)
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by the t ru th - th e o ry .  This can take care of  the contr ibution of  
' l o g ic a l  words' and 'semantico-grammatical' s tructures.  I t  cannot do 
anything more than t h a t .  Al l  other 'n o n - lo g ic a l ' l e x ic a l  items have 
to be analysed separately  and d i f f e r e n t l y  and th is  is  exactly  the 
domain of  l i n g u i s t i c  l e x ic a l  semantics. Such items may be analysed 
on the basis of  the conditions of  t h e i r  app l ica t ion  to ext ra -  
l i n g u i s t i c  e n t i t i e s .  Actual l i n g u i s t i c  expressions and conditions of  
appropriateness of  appl ica t ion  are perhaps the only things to which 
we have immediate access.
The re s u l t  o f  such analyses w i l l  not amount to necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions.  I t  w i l l  be a c tu a l ly  argued in the fol lowing  
sections that  l e x ic a l  analysis should not have necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t  conditions as i t s  goal .  I t  can however, contain a l o t  
more necessary, i . e .  important,  information than simple entai lment  
re la t io n s  can allow f o r .
In any case, whatever is adopted as an appropriate framework for  
lex ic a l  analysis cannot be of  the same status as t ru t h  conditions
provided fo r  sentences. I t  may fo r  the most part  be language 
s p e c i f ic .  Comparison of  s im i l a r ly  carr ied  out analyses might one day 
y ie ld  conceptual e n t i t i e s  in the form o f  substantive semantic 
universals.  This I understand to be the end product; not the tool to 
carry out lex ic a l  analysis in the f i r s t  place.
What seems imperative in order to attempt any le x ic a l  semantic 
analysis which purports to contr ibute to an understanding of  what 
belongs to l i n g u i s t i c  l e x ic a l  competence is some v iab le  notion of
human categor iza t ion which can serve as a guide. What is  also 
necessary is some theory of  language and the world.
The fa c t  tha t  no such theor ies  are widely accepted and ready to be
applied fo r  the purposes o f  the analysis of  a sp e c i f ic  part  of  the 
vocabulary of  a natural  language does not imply that  they do not 
ex is t  in a tes tab le  form. Lexical  analysis cannot be postponed unt i l  
such theor ies are completed. Rather, i t  can be expected to  
contribute to t h e i r  completion by considering lex ic a l  semantic facts
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in d e ta i l  and providing empirical corroboration and l i n g u is t i c  
preciseness as best i t  can.
1.2 Exist ing th eo re t ica l  frameworks: a discussion
1 .2 .1  Componential analysis:  the 'major'shortcomings
Lexical  semantics has always concentrated on two areas of 
inves t iga t ion:  the in te rnal  semantic make-up of words and the
semantic re la t io n s  between them. Componential analysis and f i e l d  
theory have been developed to cover these areas.
Since the ear ly  seventies,  componential analysis (or lex ica l  
decomposition)1 has been accused o f  a number o f  shortcomings which 
cannot be overlooked. In f a c t ,  these attacks were meant to demolish 
the whole idea of  semantic components. The extent to which I believe  
these c r i t ic ism s to have succeeded in t h e i r  aim w i l l  emerge from a 
more or less d e ta i led  discussion o f  each one of  them.
1 .2 .1 .1  Nature of features
Abstractness as a c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  meaning components was probably 
inher i ted  from two d i f f e r e n t  sources: t r a d i t io n a l  philosophy and de 
Saussure's ' l a n g u e ' ,  but was attacked more severely than e i t h e r .
Notice th a t  abstractness is a problem in i t s e l f .  Few f i r s t  year  
undergraduates are happy with the notion o f  the 'phoneme' un t i l  they 
get to know what you use i t  fo r ;  c e r t i f y in g  about something that  i t  
is  abstract may simply amount to saying what i t  is not ( l i k e  saying 
th a t  the phoneme is  ne i ther  a sound nor a l e t t e r ,  fo r  instance).  
Besides th a t ,  however, one could claim th a t  the abstract uni t  s/he 
has set up is a useful the ore t ica l  construct and proceed to show what 
use s/he can make o f  i t .  I t  seems to me beyond doubt tha t  by set t ing  
up semantic components one can account in a ra th e r  neat way f o r  a 
number of  lex ica l  semantic facts such as synonymy, antonymy, 
redundancy, ambiguity,  anomaly, contradict ion: they have proved
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useful .  Theoretical  constructs are of  course attacked on what they 
cannot ra ther  than on what they can do. This is probably a much more 
f r u i t f u l  engagement than discussing the nature o f  the semantic 
components proposed by Katz and Fodor (1963) and l a t e r  redefined by 
Katz (1972) under the names 'semantic markers' and 'semantic 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s ' . Yet the c r i t i c i s m  of  both versions has centred on 
two points:  abstractness and the d is t in c t io n  between markers and
dis t inguishers .
What seems to me, however, to be much more important than e i t h e r ,  is 
whether semantic features can possibly be exhaustive o f  the meaning 
of  a word even when they are accompanied by arguments attached to the 
predicates and h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  s tructured.  Notice th a t  problems have 
cropped up even in the best cases of  lex ic a l  decomposition, e .g .  
' k i l l '  and ' c a u s e - t o - d i e ' . Although (1) John k i l l e d  Mary does en ta i l  
(2) John caused Mary to d i e , the mere fa c t  th a t  (2)  involves two
predicates ra ther  than one gives r is e  to the discrepancy between ( ! ' )  
and ( 2 ' ) :
( 1 ' )  *John k i l l e d  Mary on Saturday by stabbing her on Friday  
( 2 ' )  John caused Mary to die  on Saturday by stabbing her on 
Friday.
To ensure the required synchronic ity ,  time indices can be added to 
the predicates.  Yet the fa c t  remains th a t  b ic o n d i t io n a l i t y  cannot be 
expected to e x is t  between (1) and ( 2 ) ( F o d o r  1 9 7 0 ) .
Nevertheless some solutions are ava i lab le :
(a)  Lexical decomposition need not amount to providing necessary and
s u f f i c i e n t  conditions fo r  a given word to denote; and therefore
features are,  in pract ic e ,  s im i la r  to meaning postula tes.
(b) Words are ' t r a n s la t e d '  into a number o f  components which are 
again to be understood as other (simpler)  words of  the same 
language. C lear ly  each language is e n t i t l e d  to have i t s  lexemes
- 21 -
analysed into  terms drawn from i t s  own vocabulary (or from a more 
widely understood but c u l t u r a l l y  akin one) without pretending 
tha t  these are,  through magic, elevated to the status of  a 
metalanguage proper. Working wi th in  the l im i t s  o f  a spec i f ic  
language and the l im i t a t io n s  o f  a spec i f ic  cu l ture  and ignoring  
aspirat ions  at  u n iv e rs a l i t y  does not imply tha t  one is l e f t  with  
nothing at  a l l  as i t  is often suggested by c r i t i c s  o f  lex ica l  
decomposition. With a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  such analyses at 
hand, c ross -cu l tura l  and inter - language investigations could be 
attempted to y i e l d ,  at the le a s t ,  groupings of typological  
s ign if icance  and, at best, theore t ica l  ( i . e .  m eta l ingu is t ic )  
constructs arr ived  at as a re s u l t  of  the in te rac t io n  of  such 
analyses and pure ly theore t ica l  considerat ions.
(c)  Semantic features can become substantial  i f  they are adequately 
analysed and explained,  i r res pec t ive  of  how exactly  they are 
expressed (whether in English,  in Tagalog or in symbols)^ a 
good example o f  th is  is the extremely in te res t in g  attempt by 
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) to estab l ish  cogn i t ive ly  
p r im i t iv e  concepts. This is a way of  e l im ina t ing  the 
shortcomings o f  'a b s t rac t io n '  and s t i l l  being l e f t  with a 
semantic representa t ion.  Such approaches are not to be confused 
(as they sometimes are) with Katz (1972),  fo r  instance,  where 
semantic markers were said to represent 'conceptual components of  
senses' and dist inguishers  to mark 'pure ly  perceptual 
d is t in c t io n s '  without expla ining s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  the content of  
e i t h e r .
Lehrer (1974:176) seems to complain tha t  "in most treatments the 
features are l e f t  unexplained or l e f t  fo r  psychologists or  
philosophers to exp la in" .  Yet i f  the components are to acquire 
independent substance there are few other a l t e rn a t iv e s .  One attempt 
at establ ishing some of these notorious semantic primes instead of  
i n d e f i n i t e l y  theor iz ing  about them is Wierzbicka (1972).
Wierzbicka attacks the use of  formulae o f  symbolic log ic  in lex ic a l  
semantic representat ions as not being 'e x p l i c a t io n s ' ,  in the sense
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tha t  they would require  an explanation in t h e i r  tu rn .  Her own 
proposal amounts to constructing a paraphrase of  a sentence under 
analysis which she c a l ls  "the semantic representat ion" o f  tha t  
sentence by v i r tu e  o f  i t s  being made up of  words taken as primary and 
combined in accordance with grammatical rules o f  what she c a l ls  a 
"semantic language". The whole construct draws exc lus ive ly  from her 
own introspect ion and i n t u i t i o n :  "the method is in trospection ,  the 
evidence-facts o f  i n t u i t io n "  ( p . 24) .  Wierzbicka,  who attacks the 
formulae o f  symbolic log ic  as being themselves in need of  
exp l ica t ions ,  sets h e rse l f  the goal o f  establ ishing primes which w i l l  
be expressions which are themselves "impossible to s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  
expl icate"  ( p . 13) .  They are expressions in natural  language from 
which the meanings of  other expressions are b u i l t .  She proceeds to 
compile a l i s t  of  such ' indefinables '  which are supposed to be 
adequate to exp l ica te  a l l  utterances.  Apparently she assumes that  
her formulae are not in need o f  exp l icat ion  simply because they are 
drawn from natural language. In p ract ice ,  however, the actual  
formulae are even more obscure than most of  ' t e c h n ic a l '  metalanguage. 
Consider her d e f in i t i o n  of  " x  is moving" :
"x can be thought of  as becoming a part  of  d i f f e r e n t  parts
o f  tha t  part  of  the world" ( p . 97)
which is based on A. BogusTawski's idea that movement is "becoming 
somewhere". I t  is  not obvious th a t  such d e f in i t io n s  correspond to 
"ideas which everybody can f ind in himself" (p. 15) .  They may well  
correspond to ideas that  BogusTawski and Wierzbicka ' f i n d  in 
themselves'.  The re s t  of  us do need an e xp l ic a t io n .  So, making an 
appeal to " i n t u i t i v e  obviousness" does not seem to solve the problem. 
What can be less c o u n te r - in tu i t i v e  than exp l ica t ing  ' s a l t '  through 
' s a l t y '  and 'e a rs '  through 'h e a r in g ' ,  both o f  which Wierzbicka finds  
a 'compell ing temptation'? Notice that even CAUSE which is almost 
unanimously regarded as a major categorizing element fo r  verbs is not 
granted the status o f  a semantic p r im i t ive  by Wierzbicka, because " i t  
is  re la ted  to and paraphrasable in terms of  j f "  ( p . 17) ,  which is not 
considered a p r im i t ive  e i t h e r ,  needless to say. In short the problem 
is  not so much whether we need an expl icat ion  to understand the 
formulae or not,  as th a t  a l o t  of  de f in i t io n s  (a) are a r b i t a r y  and
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(b) cannot be put to the te s t .  We are thus l e f t  wi thout the grounds 
fo r  a f r u i t f u l  discussion even. Wierzbicka h e rs e l f  raises the 
problem of "sensual data" objecting to Locke's considering 
expressions re la te d  to such data indefinable .  Yet her own d e f in i t io n  
of ' l i g h t '  is based prec ise ly  on such an expression: "There is no 
l i g h t  here = This place is such tha t  being in th is  place one cannot 
see" ( p . 19) .  Id e n t i fy in g  semantic features with pr im i t ives  and 
seeking pr im i t ives  in such 'p h i lo s o p h ic -p h i lo lo g ic a l '  ways seems an 
impossible task.
Consider, however, a much b e t te r  founded attempt a t tes ted  in the work 
of M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976),  which shows th a t  an analysis in 
terms o f  features or conditions can be a useful tool  i f  i t s  elements 
are properly d e f in e d .3 M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird are not attempting a 
thorough explorat ion of  'cogn i t ive  and a f f e c t i v e  language' fo r  the 
areas they are examining. That could only be the goal o f  a mammoth 
pro jec t .  They have at least tried to develop a set of primitives 
ivated by the psychology, of perception and c o n c e p t i o n J h is  is c le a r l y  a 
safer way to t r y  and establ ish semantic units (whether they are 
cal led  features or condit ions) which have some substance than ju s t  
philosophizing about them. Their  s pec i f ic  proposals concerning 
'cause' and 'motion'  are discussed in some d e ta i l  elsewhere as they 
are p a r t i c u la r l y  re levant to the analysis of  Modern Greek motion 
verbs (henceforth MGMVs). Their  formal iza t ion  does borrow from 
symbolic lo g ic ,  but i t  is  expl icab le ,  adequately expl icated in the 
t e x t  i t s e l f  and informative.  A b r i e f  comparison between t h e i r  
understanding of causation in terms of  'perceived causes' and 
Ikegami's (1969) w i l l  hopeful ly show the advantages of  t h e i r  approach 
over a vague explanation (although I seem to f in d  f a u l t  with both 
analyses o f  CAUSE).
1 .2 .1 .2  Markedness
Markedness is also inher i ted  from s t r u c t u r a l i s t  phonology and usual ly  
attacked in connection with binary complementary features.  The 
question is often raised as to which member o f  an opposition should 
take the negation operator and by impl icat ion be a t t r ib u te d  the 
status of  the less 'b a s ic '  one.
*(ibid.:705)
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The usual ' l i n g u i s t i c '  evidence brought in support o f  markedness 
consists in observing, e .g .  tha t  How short is x? presupposes that x 
is  short ,  whereas How t a l i  is  x? is a neutral  question about x 's  
height,  from which i t  is concluded that 's h o r t '  is  the marked and 
' t a l l '  the unmarked member of  the opposit ion.  I be l ieve tha t  there  
is  quite strong l i n g u i s t i c  evidence of  th is  type w i th in  spec i f ic  
lex ic a l  f i e l d s  and that i t  is ac tu a l ly  one of  the merits of  the 
lex ic a l  decomposition and le x ic a l  f i e l d  theories to have drawn 
at ten t ion  to th is  phenomenon in connection with semantics. I t  can be 
extended to apply to d i f f e r e n t  inter- lexeme re la t io n s  and shown to  
play a ro le  in the organizat ion of  semantic subfie lds .  This point  
w i l l  be taken up whenever i t  ar ises in the course of  the present  
analysis .  Examples from Modern Greek (henceforth MG) compounds and 
semantic s i m i l a r i t y  tests  on MGMVs point to the d i rec t io n  of  
structures in pairs and at the same time the r e la t i v e  ' p r i o r i t y '  of  
one of the two members. There are a number o f  d i f f e r e n t  ways to 
account fo r  th is  r e la t i v e  p r i o r i t y .  Markedness is probably the most 
general of  them and the best establ ished one. So ra th e r  than 
considering i t  a problem s p ec i f ic  to le x ic a l  decomposition, i t  should 
be understood as a phenomenon o f  wide app l ica t ion .
1 .2 .1 .3  Atomicity and u n iv e r s a l i t y  o f  features
Features are supposed to stand fo r  atomic concepts, i . e .  unanalysable 
units .  This is not to be understood as necessari ly  implying the 
individual  and separate existence o f  e n t i t i e s ;  in fa c t  most work of  
the componential analysis type was ac tua l ly  in keeping with the 
genuine s t r u c t u r a l i s t  s p i r i t  of  emphasizing the interdependence of  
e n t i t i e s  and th is  i s ,  in my view, one of  the most essent ial  merits of  
any such prac t ice .  At the same t ime, though, features are also 
supposed to belong to a universal set from which indiv idual  languages 
select  and draw, making d i f f e r e n t  combinations in the process of  
l e x i c a l i z a t i o n .  This al leged u n iv e rs a l i ty  of  sense components has 
been e as i ly  (and fo r  obvious reasons) attacked ever since i t  
appeared. In f a c t ,  one method of  bringing the whole idea of  lex ica l  
decomposition into disrepute is through claiming tha t  in these 
aspirat ions to  u n iv e rs a l i t y  lay  most of  the a t t ra c t io n  of  
componential analysis (see Lyons 1981).  I have strong doubts about
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th is  claim but very few doubts that u n iv e rs a l i ty  and atomicity
const i tu te  the sorest points in semantic fea ture  th eor ies .  This is 
not to be understood as implying that  the search fo r  d i f f e r e n t  types 
of semantic universals is doomed to f a i l u r e .  D i f f e r e n t  thematic 
re la t io n s  as explored by Fi l lmore  as well as Gruber and Oackendoff 
might be thought of  as a step in establ ishing semantic un iversals .  
P ara l le l  to these,  investigations in quite s p ec i f ic  areas of  the 
vocabulary such as Ber l in  and Kay's (1969) well-known study o f  colour  
terms, Lehrer 's (1974) cooking terminology,  Greenberg's (1963) 
s t a t i s t i c a l  universals  are very in te res t ing  and qui te  successful
attempts in r e s t r i c t e d  domains, although, in a way, fol lowing the
American Anthropological  t r a d i t i o n .  Universal semantic features  
might some day grow out of  the resul ts  of  such inves t iga t ions .
Whether G. Frege is r i g h t l y  or wrongly 'accused' of  being responsible  
fo r  the 'com posi t ional i ty  p r in c ip le '  I am in no posit ion  to judge.  
What I do know, however, is tha t '  the p ara l le l ism  between decomposing 
chemical substances and words, i f  taken l i t e r a l l y  (as i t  often seems 
to be) is unsuccessful .4
There are,  however, some understandings of a tomici ty  which are
compatible with componential analysis and much less objectionable  
than the notion o f  un iversa l ,  inherent ly  unanalysable un i ts .
F i r s t  of  a l l ,  as i t  is  extremely d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  at a l l  possible,  to  
separate ' p r i m i t i v e '  from 'n o n -p r im i t iv e '  concepts and as there  is no 
agreement yet  on the c r i t e r i a  fo r  th is  d i s t in c t io n ,  'unanalysable'  
could be modified to imply: 'not f u r t h e r  analysed fo r  the time
being' ,  i . e .  a t  the present s ta te  of  knowledge. Now, whether th is  
knowledge is to be fur thered through a b e t te r  understanding of the  
rules governing perception,  or a wider and, at the same t ime, more 
deta i led  elaboration o f  functional  propert ies of  objects or,  in fa c t ,  
through the development of  an adequate theory of  the l i n k  between 
lex ic a l  competence and le x ic a l  performance w i l l  every time depend on 
the nature of  the domain under analysis and the basic phi losophical  
stand of  the analyst.
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Secondly, i f  one understands the purpose of  the analysis to be 
bringing out the re la t io n s  between c losely  connected le x ic a l  items 
through an inves t iga t ion  o f  t h e i r  in te rnal  s t ruc ture ,  i . e .  
concentrate on the interdependence o f  lex ic a l  units ( in  the standard 
s t r u c t u r a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n ) ,  the question of  a n a ly s a b i l i t y  in terms of  
an inherent property of  features does not even a r is e .  One posits as 
components those p a r t i c u la r  items which are contrast ive  and help in 
establ ishing a neat,  elegant,  economic and sometimes informative  
paradigm. N a tu ra l ly ,  no notice is taken o f  the nature of  the 
re la t io n  between one's constructs and e i t h e r  the world or the human 
mind; therefore  ' in fo rm a t iv e '  here is to be understood in th is  
r e s t r ic te d  sense, i . e .  burdened with these l im i t a t io n s .
So, Lounsbury's (1964) features used fo r  the analysis o f  kinship 
terms are the semantic dimensions of  the p a r t i c u la r  f i e l d  he 
invest igates and not fu r th e r  analysed. In tha t  sense they can also 
be understood as atomic, although Lyons (1981),  who equates 'atomic'  
with 'separate and independent' ,  contrasts the notion o f  atomicity  
with s t r u c t u r a l i s t  interdependence.
Coseriu's 'pr imary '  vocabulary - to turn to European structura l ism - 
consists o f  words which "do not imply other words, but correspond to 
immediate experience" (Coseriu and Geckeler 1981:56).  I t  is not,  
however, in the le a s t  obvious why the f r u i t  of  a t re e  (e .g .  'pomme' 
offered as an instance o f  a 'pr imary '  word) is more accessible to 
immediate experience than the t ree  i t s e l f  ( i . e .  'pommier' given as an 
example of  a 'secondary' word). Morphological der iva t ions  are one 
th ing,  immediate experience is another.  Structura l ism is at  i t s  best 
when i t  concentrates on functional  l i n g u i s t i c  oppositions and drops 
i t s  claims as to the re la t io n s h ip  between two d i f f e r e n t  systems, i . e .  
language and the world.
Yet, i t  must be admitted th a t  the commonest understanding of  
'pr imary'  is probably the one implying ( i f  not d i r e c t l y  s ta t ing)  
'psychological ly  and l o g i c a l l y  independent and corresponding to a 
primary conceptual u n i t ' ,  therefore  inherent ly  unanalysable and thus
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atomic. This is  p rec ise ly  the kind of  atomicity which is completely  
open to c r i t i c i s m .
1 .2 .2  Componential analysis and semantic f i e l d  theor ies viewed 
as s t r u c t u r a l i s t  theor ies
I have so f a r  concentrated on lex ic a l  analyses based on components 
but have on purpose also re fe rred  to semantic f i e l d  theory as I do 
not fee l  tha t  the two should be kept separate.  To s t a r t  w i th ,  most 
analyses of  semantic f i e ld s  are carr ied out with the aid of
categor iz ing units more often than not in the form of  components
( i . e .  both the American Anthropological  pract ice o f  analysing kinship 
terms using components l i k e  'male'  and the European s t r u c t u r a l i s t
t r a d i t i o n  of  using elements l i k e  'arms' or 'back' when analysing the 
s u b - f ie ld  of  ' s e a t s ' ) .
Secondly, to do j u s t i c e  to both types o f  analysis ,  i t  is important to  
see how they complement each other.  Any kind of  componential 
analysis w i l l  make use of  recurrent sense components. I t  therefore  
provides a tool  fo r  de f in ing  d i f f e r e n t  conceptual areas on the basis 
of such components.
Th i rd ly ,  i t  is my view tha t  both approaches have been extremely
harshly c r i t i c i z e d ,  often on the same grounds and to a point  where 
t h e i r  merits have been overlooked.
What has already been said in connection with universal  ism should not 
be understood as implying that  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  l i n g u i s t i c  theories  
cannot contr ibute  to the establ ishment o f  un iversa ls .  For instance,  
the fac t  that d i f f e r e n t  languages t r e a t  'space' d i f f e r e n t l y  and that  
th is  w i l l  necessari ly  give r i s e  to d i f f e r e n t  categor izat ions  as 
resu l ts  of  the appl ica t ion  o f  semantic f i e l d  theory does not 
in v a l id a te  the actual  analyses. Successful analyses of  s im i la r  
f i e ld s  in d i f f e r e n t  languages can lead,  at the le a s t ,  to typological  
categoriza t ions  o f  languages (as already mentioned) and, at best, to 
a b e t te r  understanding o f  how 'space' is conceptual ized,  provided
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issues o f  substance already discussed are also taken into  
considerat ion.  Admittedly the most successful analyses,  among those 
conducted w i th in  the framework o f  such methods, are probably the ones 
dealing with ' f u n c t io n a l '  areas o f  the vocabulary ( f o r  instance 
preposit ions) and th is  is to be expected in s t ructura l ism,  where 
' r e l a t i o n a l '  is p r a c t i c a l l y  equated with ' e s s e n t i a l ' ,  i . e .  where each 
item is i d e n t i f i e d  on the basis of  i t s  re la t io n s  with others.  There 
i s ,  however, no reason to suppose that  structura l ism is in p r in c ip le  
p ro h ib i t i v e  as to considerations of  substance. Besides, i t  remains 
to be seen whether i t s  major premise with respect to  word meanings, 
namely tha t  they are not independent o f  one another,  is ba s ic a l ly  
wrong as i t  is sometimes claimed (e .g .  Verschueren 1981:329).  I t  
seems th a t  there is qu i te  strong evidence from language acquis i t ion  
th a t  the meaning o f  one word is ac tua l ly  learned by simultaneously 
learn ing the meaning of other words. Moreover, i t  is  qu ite  evident  
th a t  semantic components involve dimensions of contrast and i t  is 
d i f f i c u l t  to be l ieve th a t  these contrasts have no bearing on the 
issue o f  conceptual izat ion.  This is a major issue which requires  
careful  considerat ion and w i l l  be taken up again in section 1.3 in 
connection with prototype and stereotype approaches to meaning.
F in a l l y ,  one o f  the most severe attacks mounted against lex ica l  
decomposition and semantic f i e l d  theor ies ,  namely th a t  they are not 
exhaustive analyses,  has to be seen in the l i g h t  of  what a l t e r n a t iv e  
solutions have to o f f e r  in th is  respect both from the theore t ica l  and 
the prac t ica l  point  of  view. So, meaning postulates which are 
supposed to' have fewer theore t ica l  problems, y ie ld  a t  le a s t  equal ly  
non-exhaustive analyses,  while t h e i r  proper domain is s t i l l  unclear.
1 .2 .3  The empirical v a l i d i t y  o f  componential analysis
A number of  arguments have been put fo r th  against the v a l i d i t y  of  
componential analysis as a pract ica l  tool  fo r  the study o f  word 
meaning. A b r i e f  consideration of  the arguments in Lyons (1981) is 
in order here, on the basis of  which Lyons concludes that  the 
empirical v a l i d i t y  o f  componential analysis is "more apparent than 
rea l"  ( p . 83 ) .  Lyons seems to object to analysing 'boy'  as 'human';
- 29 -
he a c t u a l ly  states th a t  th is  property is not an essentia l  component 
of  'b o y ' ,  since "the male o ffspr ing  of  the gods (e .g .  Cupid) are 
re g u la r ly  described as boys . . .  but . . .  they are not said to be 
human" ( p . 84 ) .  However, introducing into such a discussion the names 
fo r  the sons and daughters of  Greek gods does l i t t l e  more than touch 
on the important (ph i losophica l )  problem of  which c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  
an e n t i t y  are ' e s s e n t i a l ' ;  th is  issue is discussed in some de ta i l  in
1.3 in connection with Putnam's stereotypes which seem to me to 
contr ibute  a l o t  to i t s  re so lu t ion .  I t  has no bearing,  however, on a 
discussion of  the empirical  v a l i d i t y  of  componential analysis .  Greek 
gods were 'humanized' , i . e .  conceived o f  as 'human', sharing with 
ordinary human beings a number o f  'e s s e n t ia l '  p roper t ies ;  sharing in 
f a c t  a l o t  o f  t h e i r  ' s u p e r f i c i a l '  c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  which (as w i l l  
become obvious from the discussion of stereotypes) are the most 
' e s s e n t i a l '  in determining the meaning o f  words. Some of t h e i r  
'deeper'  c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  e .g .  t h e i r  immorta l i ty ,  were of  course 
special  to them, but they were not enough to 'de-humanize' them in 
other respects.  Hence t h e i r  male offspr ing  would be ca l led  'boys'  
fo r  exactly  the same reasons th a t  the male o ffspr ing  o f  non-gods were 
cal led  ' b o y s ' . 5 To my mind, such considerations prove ra ther  than 
disprove that 'boy' implies 'human'. Lyons implies tha t  meaning 
postulates avoid the problems of  componential analysis but he does 
not demonstrate a s a t is fa c to ry  analysis of  'boy' in meaning postulate  
terms which could do away with 'human' and 'non-adu l t '  and s t i l l  be 
in formative .
From a theo re t ica l  point  o f  view meaning postulates in h e r i t  the 
problems o f  semantic entai lment in general ,  the exact nature of  which 
we are s t i l l  f a r  from having understood. So the question seems to be 
ra th e r  whether i t  makes sense to  look fo r  exhaustive d e f in i t io n s  and 
also whether we should expect the components/features/condit ions/  
entai lments we posi t  to be 's im p ler '  than the terms we use them to 
define .  The answer to both seems to be negative.
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1 .2 .4  Componential analysis and semantic f i e l d  theor ies:
the 'minor' shortcomings
I have t r i e d  so f a r  to argue against the a t t i tu d e  of  c r i t i c i z i n g  
componential analysis and semantic f i e l d  theory too severely,  without  
r e a l l y  subst i tu t ing  anything th e o r e t i c a l l y  c le a r  and indisputable in 
t h e i r  place.  I t  i s ,  however, my view that both types o f  analysis  
suf fe r  from shortcomings other than the ones I have already discussed 
and which are considered 'major '  shortcomings in the l i t e r a t u r e .  
Before turning to these, i t  seems worth considering some 'minor'  
questions such as the d e l im i ta t io n  of  a semantic f i e l d ,  fo rmal izat ion  
and g e n era l i ty  of  appl ica t ion  in connection with semantic f i e l d  
theory.
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  de l im i t in g  a semantic f i e l d  seems to have been 
over-exaggerated as a problem. The question of  whether i t  is  in fac t  
possible to determine the boundaries o f  a given le x ic a l  area has been 
repeatedly put f o r t h .  A p a r t i a l  answer to th is  question is the 
existence ( in  fac t  or in p r in c ip le )  o f  crossing f i e l d s ,  open-ended 
f i e l d s ,  f i e l d s  with sets o f  items which bear paradigmatic or 
syntagmatic re la t io n s  to one another.  There is nothing in the theory 
i t s e l f  which prevents one from adopting the method best f i t t e d  to the 
re la t io n s  to which one wants to draw a t te n t io n .  I therefore  consider 
the matter a purely pract ica l  one and the f l e x i b i l i t y  of  the theory  
one o f  i t s  mer its .  In the present analysis,  an example of  a possible 
solution is provided in connection with a p a r t ic u la r  f i e l d ,  and th is  
is done with the understanding tha t  one could th ink  of  a number of  
d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  approaching exactly  the same problem with in  the 
framework of  the same theory.  That semantic f i e l d s  are not 
necessari ly  closed and w el l -de f ined  sets (as European structural ism  
viewed them) need not be a shortcoming of the theory i t s e l f  as some 
semantic f i e l d  theor is ts  consider (e .g .  Lehrer 1974). I t  is  probably 
to be expected as a r e f l e c t io n  o f  the nature of  natural  language. In 
my view, i t  only becomes a serious handicap i f  the goal is to 
adequately formal ize  the theory so tha t  i t  could serve as a component 
of  a formal grammar.
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As regards the absence of  such a fo rmal iza t ion  i t  seems ra ther  naive 
to consider i t  a mere 'omission'  (going along with Lehrer 1974).  By 
leaving the sentence out of  i t s  perspective (a t  le a s t  in i t s  so f a r  
ex is t ing  forms) semantic f i e l d  theory probably cuts i t s e l f  away from 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  having i t s  analyses ' t r a n s la t e d '  into e x p l i c i t  
formulae of  the kind required by formal grammar. I t  seems to me, 
however, tha t  the issue of  fo rmal iza t ion  has wrongly been given 
p r i o r i t y  ( in  comparatively recent years) over the l o g i c a l l y  p r io r  
issue of  adequacy. Formal grammar cannot scare away fuzziness i f  i t  
is  part  o f  the nature of  human language. A number of  a l t e r n a t iv e  
theor ies ,  already hinted a t ,  seem to ignore a l o t  of  i n t u i t i v e l y  
important lex ic a l  information fo r  the sake of  ' f o r m a l i z a b i l i t y ' . 
Paradoxical as i t  may sound, I r e a l l y  be l ieve (and w i l l  argue when 
discussing 'adequacy') tha t  European structura l ism has also lo s t  a 
great deal in descr ip t ive  adequacy and informativeness by imposing a 
ra ther  r i g i d  schema on the data i t  analysed and sometimes drowning 
i t s e l f  in a sea o f  ' te rm in o lo g ica l '  sub-d is t inct ions.
I t  can be argued th a t  f i e l d  theories have always depended on types of  
lex ic a l  material  which len t  themselves by t h e i r  very nature to such 
analyses. Whether a l l  meanings should or could be analysed in the 
same terms is of  course debatable.  Yet i f  a theory is  b u i l t  on the  
p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of  very few domains i t  may not be general enough in any 
in te res t ing  way. F ie ld  theories have produced successful resu l ts  in 
the analysis of  kinship terms and personal pronouns, fo r  instance; in 
general ,  sets o f  words th a t  contrast  paradigmatical ly  and can be 
shown to d iv ide what is usual ly  cal led  'conceptual space' .  I t  is 
probably at  i t s  best in those cases where a small number of  
components is s u f f i c i e n t  to contrast a large number o f  i tems. I t  i s ,  
however, the case tha t  not a l l  vocabulary is 's imple '  in the sense 
tha t  i t  can be analysed only in s tructura l  terms. I t  has been 
pointed out, fo r  instance,  th a t  notions such as promising, ordering 
and the l i k e  cannot be t rans la ted  into lex ic a l  decomposition formulae 
(see Verschueren 1981:324) because such formulae are inherent ly  
unable to capture the idiosyncracies of  speech act verbs.  S im i la r ly  
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) argue that important concepts such as 
PERSON do not have a coherent lex ic a l  f i e l d  associated with them. 
This l a t t e r  c r i t i c i s m  is probably eas ier  to handle than the former
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one. The domains into which 'conceptual space' is divided up are not 
given and 'person'  might not const i tu te  such a domain. M i l l e r  and 
Johnson-Laird put however, SPACE into the same basket as not mapped 
onto an " i n t u i t i v e l y  coherent lex ica l  f i e l d "  ( p . 375).  But 'space'  
can be ea s i ly  understood as a cover-term appl icable to very large  
nets including d i f f e r e n t  subsets (e .g .  d i re c t io n ,  loc a t io n ,  motion) 
some of which overlap; these are again s p l i t  into areas le x ic a l i z e d  
as spat ia l  locatives  (PPs and Advs f o r  instance),  motion verbs, e tc .  
In te r lock ing  f i e l d s  can const i tu te  quite  a coherent whole. I t  is not 
there fore  immediately obvious that 'space' does not const i tu te  an 
' i n t u i t i v e l y  coherent'  domain. Besides, i t  can be no accident th a t  
p a r t i c u la r  sub-areas belonging to the general notion o f  'space' have 
been analysed qu ite  successful ly with semantic f i e l d  and lex ica l  
decomposition techniques.
Precise ly  fo r  these reasons i t  is in te res t ing  to inves t iga te  what an 
a l t e r n a t iv e  approach to word meaning might o f f e r  in such an area.  
The d i rec t io n  in which to look fo r  an a l t e r n a t iv e  can only be 
dicta ted  by the prospect of  gaining in descr ip t ive  adequacy and 
informativeness,  as already stated.
1 .2 .5  Structura l ism, descr ip t ive  adequacy, and the case of  
motion verbs
I t  has been pointed out in recent years tha t  a number o f  lex ica l  
semantic facts  are not and cannot be accounted fo r  by any ' c h e c k l is t '  
semantic theory (F i l lmore  1975, 1978) but might be handled by
a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches commonly re ferred  to as 'p rototype '  ones. The 
main theore t ica l  assumptions of  Prototype and Stereotype theor ies and 
t h e i r  possible appl icat ion  to MGMVs are discussed separate ly .  Some 
points have to be made here, however, with the sp ec i f ic  aim of  
comparing Prototype theory to componential analysis and semantic 
f i e l d  theor ies (which are the sort o f  check l is t  approaches I am 
discussing).
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Most componential analyses seem to ascribe to  (or at le a s t  aspire to 
f u l f i l l i n g )  the 'minimal d e f in i t i o n  p r in c ip le '  (Bendix 1966),  which 
also implies what we could c a l l  'maximal g e n era l i za t io n '  as another 
goal o f  the ideal  d e f i n i t i o n .  The r e s u l t  o f  such a premise is tha t  
the d e f in i t i o n  of  a term (a)  accounts fo r  a l l  possible instances o f  
th is  term and (b) contains prec ise ly  those c o n d i t io n s / fea tu re s /  
components which are necessary and s u f f ic ie n t ^  to d is t inguish  i t  from 
every other term in the lex icon.  Anything extra  would be a case of  
what we could c a l l  ' s t r u c t u r a l i s t  redundancy'. I t  would be 
i n te re s t in g ,  however, to see i f  the appl icat ion o f  th is  'double'  
p r in c ip le  has succeeded in pract ice .  The two extreme a l te rna t iv es  
are c le a r :  i f  i t  has, we have an e xce l len t  method of a r r iv in g  at  
extremely neat and economic descript ions; i f  i t  has not, we could 
suspect something being wrong with the p r in c ip le  i t s e l f ,  i . e .  not 
corresponding to the facts  o f  natural  language.
There is evidence th a t ,  at l e a s t  fo r  cer ta in  types o f  lex ica l  
m a te r ia l ,  e .g .  speech act verbs,  lex ic a l  decomposition formulae are 
so incomplete as descr ipt ions th a t  f a r  from being in a posit ion to 
make e x p l i c i t  the f u l l  meaning o f  the terms they def ine ,  they cannot 
even d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between re la ted  items. Consider, fo r  instance,  
Verschueren's (1981) examples fo r  'argue'  and ' s t a t e ' .  His claim is 
th a t  l e x ic a l  decomposition formulae would be id en t ica l  fo r  these 
verbs (henceforth Vs) which are c le a r l y  non-synonymous:
s ta te  (x ,y ,P )  = SAY(x,y,Se)AINTEND(x,CAUSE([SAY(x,y,Se)],
COME ABOUT (KN0W(y,P)) ) )
argue (x ,y ,P )  = SAY(x,y,Se)AINTEND(x,CAUSE([SAY(x,y,Se)],
COME ABOUT (KN0W(y,P)) ) )
A l t e r n a t i v e ly  a l l  the basic components o f  a l l  speech act Vs would be 
confla ted into a s ingle  formula:
SAV(x ,y , (P ))=SAY(x ,y ,Se)AINTEND(x,CAUSE( [S A Y (x ,y ,S e ) ] ,
COME ABOUT (ACCEPT(y,SA') ) ) )
(Verschueren 1981:325)
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Notice also that  other complex Vs, e .g .  verbs o f  cognit ion,  are often  
analysed with the help of  conditions ra ther  than componential 
formulae, e .g .  Lehrer 's  (1974) 'b e l ie f - p r e d ic a t e s '  or M i l l e r  and 
Johnson-Laird's (1976) Vs of  communication (among o thers ) .  The 
conditions used look very much l i k e  ' f e l i c i t y / a p p r o p r ia t e n e s s '  
conditions o f  prototype semantics in form, but they are in fa c t  
entai lments - e i t h e r  e x p l i c i t l y  (Lehrer)  or i m p l i c i t l y  (my 
understanding of M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird) .
Semantic information which cannot be reduced to 'g enera l '  and 
' s imple '  one-word features creates serious problems fo r  check l is t  
theor ies .  The notorious d is t in c t io n  between 'markers' and 
' d i s t i n g u i s h e s '  which has convinced very few people as to i t s  
theore t ica l  v a l i d i t y  could be seen as an attempt to accommodate ( in  
the form of  d is t ingu ishers )  such 'u n s im p l i f ia b le '  m a te r ia l .^
In short,  when complex materia l  is involved,  e i t h e r  the 'minimal 
definit ion-maximal g e n era l i z a t io n '  p r in c ip le  is abandoned or 
descr ip t ive  adequacy. For even w i th in  domains which give evidence of  
inherent s t ruc tu r ing ,  information spec i f ic  to very few items cannot 
be included in a r i g i d  structure  without creating ' s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
redundancy'. Examples o f  analyses e xh ib i t ing  these ch arac te r is t ic s  
w i l l  be given in what fo l lows.  The main point is th a t  the 
combination o f  th is  p r in c ip le  and the 'nea t '  fo rmal iza t ion  goal have 
probably done more harm than the 'main shortcomings' discussed in 
th is  section.  This combination has weakened considerably the 
descr ip t ive  power o f  such analyses.
Contrary to c heck l is t  theor ies which seek to establ ish safe c r i t e r i a  
th a t  would guarantee membership in a category (necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t  condi t ions) ,  Prototype theor ies  seek c r i t e r i a  
(appropriateness condi t ions) f o r  id e n t i fy in g  the prototypical  ( i d e a l /  
best) instance of  a category.  This means tha t  the boundaries of  a 
category are not defined;  something can be a c le a r  case o f  th is  
category (prototypica l  instance) i f  a l l  the conditions are met; i f  
only some of  them are s a t is f i e d  the term may s t i l l  be appl icable,  
provided the deviat ion from the focal  point  (p rototyp ica l  case) is
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not too great .  Hence phenomena of  indeterminacy and gradation which 
are c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  natural  language can, in p r in c ip le ,  be 
accounted fo r  in terms o f  degree of  membership.^
Before engaging in a comparison and an evaluation o f  the important
theore t ica l  assumptions o f  the two types o f  approach, I would l i k e  to 
compare in d e ta i l  actual  pieces of  analysis of  check l is t  and 
'p rototype'  descr ipt ions respect ive ly .  The exact status or nature of  
the components/conditions plays no ro le  in th is  p a r t i c u la r  
comparison, so fo r  present purposes the terms ' fe a tures-cond i t ions -  
components-entailments' w i l l  be used as equivalent .
The aim of  th is  'ex erc ise '  is to show:
1. that prototypical  (s p e c i f i c )  and general conditions are 
intermingled in check l is t  (and some pro to typ ica l )  descript ions;
2. tha t  ' l i n g u i s t i c '  and ' e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c '  materia l  is equal ly  
intermingled;
3. that  there are d i f ferences not only in kind but also in
complexity between the various components appearing in 
componential formulae (e .g .  WITH used in the same formula as ATG 
which stands fo r  'always touching ground');
4. that  as a re s u l t  of  a l l  these,  componential theor ies  cannot
f u l f i l  the p r in c ip les  they set themselves to f u l f i l ,  even for
domains in which they have produced f a i r l y  successful ( in  the
sense of  i l lu m in a t in g )  analyses, such as the domain o f  motion 
verbs (henceforth MVs).
The s ta r t in g  point o f  th is  comparison is the c lassic  example o f  an 
a n t i -c h e c k l is t  approach, F i l lm ore 's  (1978) note on the semantics of  
' c l im b ' .  The t e n t a t i v e  d e f in i t io n  provided includes: (a) a
clambering component: locomotory action o f  movable body parts and (b)
an ascending component. I t  is hard to come across a less spec i f ic
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(or a more general) d e f in i t io n  fo r  'c l im b7, contrary to expectat ions.  
A standard le x ic a l  decomposition analysis o f  the term would probably 
include addit ional  components l i k e  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  of  the action  
( 'ag en t '  or ' a c t i o n ' )  and a spec i f icat ion  of  the medium: ' e a r t h /  
ground/supporting sur face ';  a l l  of  these I would have thought quite  
prototypical  too.  Consider the features proposed by actual  check l is t  
analyses fo r  ' c l i m b ' :
Wierzbicka (1972) is a good case because she is a fe rvent proponent 
of  the 'minimal d e f i n i t i o n '  p r in c ip le .  Although she does not o f f e r  
an analysis of  'c l im b'  i t s e l f ,  one can ra ther  safe ly  construct one 
within  the framework she uses on the basis of  her d e f in i t io n s  fo r  a 
number of  re la ted  motion verbs such as 'c ree p ' ,  'c raw l '  and 'moving 
up' which she defines as "becoming fu r ther  from the Earth" ( p . 104).  
Her proposal fo r  'creep'  involves movement of  an agent 's ' b e l l y ' ,  
while th a t  fo r  'c raw l '  includes movement of  'arms' and ' l e g s ' .  So, a 
possible (res tructured) analysis of:  A is climbing up x would be: "A 
causes movements o f  his arms and legs which cause his body to be 
becoming supported by fu r th e r  parts of  x and fu r th e r  from the Earth",  
I  have hinted at the shortcomings of the actual formal izat ion  
elsewhere. The main point here is to notice th a t ,  in pract ice ,  such 
a d e f in i t io n  is at leas t  ju s t  as 'p r o to ty p ic a l '  as F i l lm ore 's :  in 
actual f a c t ,  i t  is even more so, as i t  involves e x p l i c i t  reference to 
human body parts and the ' i n t e n t i o n a l '  component.
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) o f f e r  a d e f in i t io n  fo r  'c l im b'  of  the  
form: ACT (x,(UP(TRAVEL)) (x ,y )  where ACT (x) stands fo r
CAUSE(INTEND(x)) ,  i . e .  the ' i n t e n t i o n a l '  component and TRAVEL stands 
roughly fo r  the 'change-of - locat ion '  component. Leaving aside the 
fo rmal iza t ion  fo r  the moment, observe the inclusion of  ' i n t e n t i o n '  as 
well as the s p ec i f ica t io n  of  'ascending' as another condit ion fo r  
' c l im b ' .  Now M i l l e r  and Oohnson-Laird do r e a l i z e  that you can 'climb  
down'; yet  t h e i r  'genera l '  d e f in i t io n  includes UP (which leads once 
more toward the prototypical  understanding o f  ' c l i m b ' ) .  They choose 
to explain th is  in terms of 'c l imb'  being "used wi th  a greater  
v a r ie ty  o f  d i rec t io n a l  modif iers" ( p . 552) as compared to  ' r i s e ' ,  fo r  
instance,  which cannot col locate  with 'down'. Their  conclusion is  
th a t  " . . . t h e r e  are some verbs whose incorporated d irec t ions  can be
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overruled by e x p l i c i t  expressions to the contrary and other verbs fo r
which any addit ional  spec i f ic a t ion  o f  d i rec t io n  must be consistent
with the incorporated d i rec t ion"  ( p . 553).  This complete absence of
explanation fo r  the facts  seems to be the cost o f  l im i t in g  the 
semantic sp ec i f ic a t io n  to m eta l ingu is t ic  terms.
To f u l l y  appreciate the problem, one has to bear in mind th a t  M i l l e r  
and Johnson-Laird are a c tu a l ly  comparing 'c l imb'  to ' r i s e '  and 
consider tha t  the main d i f fe rence  between them is the condition of  
' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' . The actual 'manner' of  motion which is present in 
'c l imb'  and absent in ' r i s e '  is not l inked to the condition of  
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  in t h e i r  descr ip t ion ,  i t  is not discussed at a l l ,  
presumably because fo r  the d e f in i t i o n  to be 'g enera l '  enough no 
'c lambering'  condit ion can be included, since a snai l can be said to 
'c l imb up a f l a g p o l e ' ,  to use F i l lm ore 's  example.
A l te r n a t i v e ly  i t  cannot be mentioned because 'manner' cannot be 
e as i ly  reduced to 's imple '  one-word features.  I t  is c le a r ,  however, 
tha t  whether the condit ion of  in t e n t i o n a l i t y  is present or absent in 
' r i s e ' ,  the verb w i l l  s t i l l  be applicable  (and qu ite  l i t e r a l l y  be 
used too) ,  provided the condit ion of  'upward' motion is kept (e .g .  
"he rose to his f e e t " ) .  In order to id e n t i fy  the nuclear sense of  a 
term one must have access to removabil i ty  of  conditions and 
weightings of  indiv idual  c r i t e r i a .  I t  is quite  possible tha t  even i f  
the nuclear sense is understood as the maximally general one ( i . e .
corresponds to the check l is t  i d e a l ) ,  the way to a r r iv e  at  i t  is  
through weighing distance from focal points.  The condi t ion(s )  which 
' s u r v iv e ' ,  in the sense th a t  they prove unremovable, are probably the 
ones which have to be included in the minimal d e f i n i t i o n .  But i f  
there are only two candidates (say 'clambering'  and 'ascending')  and 
they both prove removable, the check l is t  d e f in i t i o n  has an 
unfortunate case: i t  w i l l  e i t h e r  contain nothing,  or contain ,a
dis junction or posit  two d i f f e r e n t  entr ies  (c l imbj and climb2 ) .  None 
of  these seems too good. The empirical  v a l i d i t y  of  prototype  
semantics seems to l i e  mainly in i t s  a b i l i t y  to  provide a framework 
w ith in  which one t r i e s  to establ ish the norm (prototypica l  case) fo r  
a category,  and account fo r  acceptable deviat ions from i t .  These are
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at le a s t  useful tools  in expla in ing,  ra the r  than ju s t  s ta t ing ,  
l e x ic a l  semantic fa c ts .
F i l lm ore 's  attempt a t  analysing 'c l imb'  is probably not the best
example of  prototype analysis ,  but i t  cannot lead to the
im p o s s ib i l i t ie s  ju s t  d i s c u s s e d .  ^ So, i f  a monkey can 'cl imb down a 
f lag p o le '  while a snai l  can only 'climb up' one, Fi l lmore can explain 
the a c c e p ta b i l i ty  o f  the former instance in terms of  the presence of  
the 'clambering'  condit ion despite the absence of the 'ascending'  
one, and the unacceptabi l i ty  o f  * A snai l  is climbing down the 
f lagpole  in terms o f  the absence of both proto typica l  conditions -
i . e .  'ascending' and 'clambering'  - which resu l ts  in th is  l a s t
instance of  'c l im b '  being too fa r  removed from the focal  point  
(comprising both condi t ions) .
Two things are absent from th is  sketchy presentat ion of  a 
' p r o t o ty p ic a l '  analysis o f  a term: the importance of  obtaining
speakers' judgments concerning prototypica l  propert ies o f  items and a 
discussion o f  the r e l a t i v e  importance of and the r e la t io n  between 
condit ions.  As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  the la s t  point  consider the case 
of  ' c l im b ' ,  ' run '  and 'w a lk ' ,  on the one hand, versus ' r i s e '  on the
other.  I  have already hinted at  the p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  the actual  
'manner' o f  motion of  the former set is c lose ly  l inked to the 
condit ion of  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' ,  while fo r  ' r i s e ' ,  which is unspecified  
as to 'manner',  the question of  in t e n t io n a l i t y  is  separate. A t h i r d  
case is exemplif ied by ' s l i p '  (as in He slipped and f e l l  down) which 
seems to e xh ib i t  a l i n k  between 'manner' and ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  in the 
opposite d i rec t io n  (absence of the property in the prototypical  
understanding o f  the term).  There is evidence from tes ts  tha t  
speakers associate (such) d iscre te  propert ies with l e x ic a l  items, 
although t h e i r  actual  nature and the extent to which they are aware 
of  them is an open question.  So, i f  prototype/stereotype analyses 
can be constructed so as to y ie l d  a f i n i t e  l i s t  o f  p ropert ies  fo r  a 
lexeme (which is doubtful  fo r  the moment), the main po int o f  contrast  
between the two approaches w i l l  be, in prac t ice ,  the issue o f  fuzzy  
boundaries. Otherwise, componential analysis often works with  
prototypical  conditions despite the the ore t ica l  adherence to the 
'maximal g e n era l i z a t io n '  id ea l ,  i . e .  to the requirement th a t  the
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d e f in i t io n  must be general enough to cover a l l  possible instances of  
the item.
To f u l l y  appreciate the negative ro le  th is  adherence has played in 
the construction o f  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  the confusion concerning l i n g u i s t i c  
and e x t r a ! in g u is t i c  information and the relevance o f  these problems 
to the descr ipt ion o f  motion verbs, a second example w i l l  be looked 
at in some d e t a i l ,  focusing on checkl is t  d e f in i t io n s  fo r  ' run '  and 
some re la ted  motion verbs.
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) give a general formula for  'walk'  of
the form: ACT ( x , S ' )  and CAUSE (S ' ,  DO (FEET,S)) and ALLOW
(S, TRAVEL(x)) .  Even i f  you add (ON(TRAVEL)) (x,LAND) you s t i l l  have 
at leas t  ' run '  and a l l  i t s  hyponyms plus a l l  the hyponyms of  'walk'  
sa t is fy in g  these condit ions.  So th is  is a general formula fo r  a l l  
' t r a v e l - o n - f o o t  Vs ' ,  as they ca l l  them, although i t  ac tua l ly  f i r s t  
appears as a te n ta t iv e  d e f in i t io n  fo r  'w a lk ' .  New, M i l l e r  and 
Johnson-Laird claim th a t  the basic d is t in c t io n  with in  a l l  ' t r a v e l - o n -  
fo o t '  Vs is between 'walking'  and 'runn ing ' .  So they consider 
incorporating a component 'RAPIDLY' in ' run '  which, however, they 
re je c t  on the grounds that  sentences such as He walked rap id ly  and I 
was forced to run slowly to keep up with him are not semantical ly  
anomalous. Hence t h e i r  f i n a l  proposal includes an operator ATG 
(FEET) fo r  'wa lk '  (ATG=always touching ground); ' run '  gets 'not ATG' 
and a l l  is s e t t le d .  We can reconstruct a d e f in i t io n  f o r  ' run '  on the 
basis they provide and get:
(WITH,(not ATG(ACT)))  (x,S,FEET) and CAUSE (S,(ON(TRAVEL))
(x,LAND).
The f in a l  component is considered omissible from the corresponding 
d e f in i t io n  fo r  'walk'  because we can understand 'walk on a i r ' :  "the 
conventional r e s t r i c t i o n  to land might be considered part  of  our 
general knowledge ra ther  than our l i n g u i s t i c  knowledge" ( p . 552) we
are to ld .  What we are not to ld  is th a t  ' f e e t '  is equal ly  a
'conventional  r e s t r i c t i o n '  and arguably also part  o f  our 'general  
knowledge'; and, besides, tha t  a person with a r t i f i c i a l  limbs or on
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crutches is most c e r t a in ly  'w a lk in g ' .  What is  worse, i f  we are 
r e a l l y  looking fo r  the most general (and 'unconventional ' )  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  then TRAVEL is also omissible,  since one can ' run '  on the 
spot, without advancing at  a l l ,  for  physical exerc ise - unless, of  
course, we would again l i k e  to have two e n t r ies  'run^'  and ' run 2 ' 
(where the second, in c id e n ta l l y ,  and not the f i r s t  one, w i l l  be 
speci f ied as lacking the TRAVEL component).
S im i la r ly  Wierzbicka (1972) c r i t i c i z e s  Wotjak (1971) and Baumgartner 
(1967) fo r  t re a t in g  'wa lk '  and 'run '  as ide n t ica l  except fo r  'speed'  
not ic ing tha t  you can walk fa s t  and run slowly.  Her argument is "The 
di f fe rence  in the r e l a t i v e  speed between walking and running is a 
consequence of the q u a l i t a t iv e  d i f ference between the two types of  
movement, and there fore  need not be marked at a l l ,  provided that the 
q u a l i t a t iv e  d i f fe re nce  i t s e l f  is captured" ( p . 107).  But Wotjak has 
to f ig h t  against s t r u c t u r a l i s t  redundancy and s t ic k  to one-word 
features (as best he can) at the same t ime. He is  working with  
semantic c r i t e r i a  - semantische K r i te r ie n  (Merkmale) - such as 
'an im ate ' ,  'a g e n t ' ,  'dynamic' ,  e t c . ,  and might be t ry in g  to avoid 
collapsing ' l a u fe n '  with ' rennen' and both with 'spaz ieren '  and t h e i r  
respective hyponyms. Conditions such as ' i n t e r m i t t e n t '  vs 
'continuous'  contact or ATG may not const i tu te  contrasts useful 
throughout the paradigm, while ' v e lo c i t y '  helps with hyponyms and, in 
his view at l e a s t ,  also with near synonyms ( ' l a u f e n '  gets + / -  fa s t ,  
while 'rennen'  gets + f a s t ) .  What is even worse, unless the motion 
is  speci f ied  as continuous, there seems to me to be no way o f  keeping 
' ru n '  separate from 'jump' or 'hop' even.
Far from t ry in g  to r i d i c u l e  serious attempts at sa t is fy ing  the 
c heck l is t  idea ls ,  I am only attempting to show the consequences of  
the adherence to these p r in c ip le s  in one of  the best cases fo r  
s t r u c t u r a l i s t  ana lysis:  'manner' specifying motion Vs. I f  one wants 
to impose st ructure ( t r y  to establ ish more complete patterns than 
there is evidence f o r ) ,  one can do i t .  I t  i s ,  however, un l ike ly  tha t  
the re s u l t  w i l l  be worth the e f f o r t .
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tI f  d e f in i t io n s  are to be in te res t ing  and i l lu m in a t in g  they must 
somehow account fo r  speakers' in t u i t io n s .  Semantic competence is not 
discovered by simply saying th a t  He was running slowly and I had to 
walk fa s t  . . .  (or the other way round) is not anomalous. One does 
not need 'b i z a r r e  contexts'  to r e a l i z e  th a t  v e lo c i ty  is a r e la t i v e  
matter.  And as f o r  the sentence i t s e l f ,  i t  only indicates tha t  
someone can be walking f a s t e r  than usual to keep up with someone who 
is  running more slowly than usual. I f  anything,  th is  p a r t i c u la r  
sentence implies th a t  the 'standard'  instances of  'walk'  are 
c e r t a in ly  slower than the standard instances o f  ' r u n ' .  Juxtapose a 
corresponding sentence without adverbs, e .g .  He was running and I had 
to walk to keep up with him and one sees immediately th a t  i t  requires  
considerable computing to understand l i t e r a l l y ,  prec ise ly  owing to 
the d i f fe rence  between 'wa lk '  and 'run '  in speed. And we do not 
r e a l l y  need special  sentences to t e l l  us th a t .  Under normal
'everyday'  circumstances people run i f  they want to  go (on foot )
somewhere fa s t .  Otherwise they walk.
Evident ly ,  a l l  th is  is e x t r a ! in g u is t i c  information but i t  may happen 
to be important information in dist inguishing between 'run '  and 
'w a lk ' .  As already mentioned, no property tha t  is necessary to 
keep these verbs apart  is necessari ly  'p u re ly '  l i n g u i s t i c .  I t  could 
of course be argued th a t  'speed' in ' run '  is a concomitant fac tor  of
the type of motion i t  describes.  But the argument could be reversed.
What is there to d ic ta t e  the order? I t  could also be the case that  
'manner' is a concomitant fac to r  of  the in tent ion  f o r  fa s t  movement 
in combination with the c a p a b i l i t i e s  o f  the human body. Notice also 
th a t  'manner' is not as r e la t i v e  to p a r t i c u la r  ind iv iduals  as 'speed'  
i s .  In tha t  respect i t  may be considered, more 'b a s ic '  or simpler.  
Be that as i t  may, MG ' t r e x o ' ( run) ,  at  l e a s t ,  arguably involves a 
speed component in i t s  commonest understanding; i t  is  f i g u r a t i v e l y  
used fo r  any kind o f  fas t  a c t i v i t y :  t a lk in g  f a s t ,  d r iv ing  f a s t ,  
working f a s t ,  and I take th is  to be 'p u re ly '  l i n g u i s t i c  evidence.  
Yet ' t r e x i  ( p o l i )  v r /vora '  (s/he runs (very)  f a s t )  is not redundant 
nor is the exact t ra n s la t io n  o f  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's sentence 
( He was walking f a s t . . . ) anomalous.
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Notice,  in th is  connection, that M i l l e r  (1972) also considers 
including v e lo c i ty  in the components o f  ' run '  and expresses doubts, 
on the basis o f  examples such as the existence o f  ' j o g ' ,  which equals 
'run s lo w ly ' .  I t  is quite  possible tha t  fo r  an adequate descript ion  
the taxonomic leve ls  need to be established f i r s t  and whatever 
structur ing there ex is ts  wi th in  each one separate ly discovered.  For 
since ' v e lo c i t y '  is a r e l a t i v e  matter,  ' j o g '  is not to be contrasted  
to 'w a lk ' ,  fo r  instance,  but to the other hyponyms o f  ' r u n ' .  Once 
r e l a t i v e l y  ' f a s t '  motion is establ ished fo r  ' r u n ' ,  ' j o g '  is to be 
understood as implying ' le ss  f a s t '  in connection to the 'high speed' 
of  ' r u n ' .
These facts  can be most n a tu r a l ly  explained only by reference to the 
prototypical  understanding of  ' run '  (or,  at lea s t  of  ' t r e x o '  fo r  
which I have more r e l i a b l e  evidence).  Only th a t  kind of  descr ipt ion  
can contain ' f a s t  movement' (or even the in tent ion  fo r  fas t  movement) 
as an appropriateness condition and accommodate the fac t  tha t  'run 
slowly'  is not anomalous, l i n k  i t  with some prototypical  
understanding o f  human motion and with the absence of a spec i f ica t ion  
of 'speed' fo r  'w a lk ' .  Other elements such as 'c o n t in u i ty /d u ra t io n '  
are also proto typica l  conditions fo r  'walk'  and ' r u n ' ,  as 
' instantaneous'  is fo r  ' jump'.  They are probably also necessary for  
a most general-minimal d e f in i t i o n  i f  the verbs in question are to be 
kept separate; the problem of redundancy does not ar ise :  She was 
walking continuously does not seem to be suffer ing  from redundancy.
Notice also tha t  non-prototypical  treatments of  ' jump' include OVER 
in the d e f i n i t i o n ;  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird expla in  instances of  
'jump under' as p a r t i c u la r  cases of  a general JUMP OVER. They also 
accept tha t  inanimate objects can 'jump' so tha t  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  and 
' i n s t ru m e n ta l i t y '  ( included in t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n )  could be omitted.  
So why do these features appear in the general formula in the f i r s t  
place? Because t h e i r  d e f i n i t i o n  is supposed to correspond to "the 
sense tha t  chi ldren learn f i r s t "  ( p . 557).  Such information is very 
important and cannot be overlooked. I t  might wel l  be the case that  
the 'unabbreviated' d e f in i t io n  is  also close to the most prototypical  
understanding o f  ' jump'.  For c er ta in  reasons i t  corresponds to the 
most 'n a tu r a l '  and stra ight forward instances o f  ' jump' .  S im i la r ly
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fo r  ' l e g s '  or ' f e e t '  in connection with 'walk'  and ' r u n ' .  Wierzbicka  
expresses reservat ions on the grounds that  "one can walk on one's 
hands" (1972:108) .  And she is r i g h t .  Within the system she is  
applying,  'most general '  has nothing to do with 'most n a t u r a l ' .  Even 
the standard paraphrase o f  'w a lk ' ,  i . e .  ' g o - o n - f o o t ' , is not v a l id .  
A l t e r n a t i v e ly  walk on one's hands w i l l  be t reated as a metaphor, 
which i t  is not exac t ly .  Now, i f  ' l e g s '  (or ' f e e t ' )  disappears from 
the d e f in i t i o n  o f  'w a lk ' ,  then 'walk on fo o t '  should not r e a l l y  be 
redundant (which i t  i s ) .
For a 'p r o t o ty p ic a l '  treatment of  'walk '  these facts  would not 
const i tu te  a problem. Inclusion of l e g s / fe e t  seems to be an 
obl igatory  condit ion fo r  'w a lk ' ;  hence the redundancy o f  'walk on 
f o o t ' .  On the other hand, walk on one's hands w i l l  be understood as 
a deviat ion from the prototype: ne i ther  anomalous, nor f ig u r a t i v e .
I t  seems to me tha t  F i l lm ore 's  (1975:129) comment: " introspect ion  
about appropriate language use in b izarre  contexts does not y ie ld  
highly dependable data fo r  semantic research" becomes more 
in te res t in g  i f  one considers the sort o f  data-base used fo r  
estab l ish ing most general-minimal d e f in i t io n s .  For I cannot think  of  
a goal tha t  would force the semanticist  to work on the basis of  more 
a ty p ic a l ,  unusual and ' b i z a r r e '  contexts.
I have so f a r  l im i ted  the comparison of what seem to me the most 
important approaches to le x ic a l  semantics to 'p r a c t i c a l '  issues, in 
an e f f o r t  to show tha t  a number of  important l e x ic a l  semantic facts  
could, in p r in c ip le ,  at l e a s t ,  be accounted fo r  w ith in  a 
' p r o t o ty p ic a l '  framework, espec ia l ly  since proto typica l  conditions of  
appl ica t ion  need not be stated in e l l i p t i c  and non-descript ive terms.  
Limit ing the semantic s pec i f ic a t ion  o f  lexemes to meta l ingu is t ic  
terms and 'n e a t '  formulae leads, in a number o f  domains, to  
uninformative s em i-de f in i t ions .
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1 .2 .6  S tructural ism vs Prototype theory: conceptual izat ion and
e x t r a ! in g u is t i c  r e a l i t y
I t  has already been pointed out tha t  s tructura l ism and Prototype
theory take a d i f f e r e n t  stand on the issue of  conceptual izat ion  
concerning word meanings and human categor izat ion in p a r t i c u l a r .  The 
cornerstone o f  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  semantic theor ies is probably the
interdependence of word meanings and therefore  semantic contrasts are 
the focus of  t h e i r  a t ten t ion .
Evidence from language acquis i t ion  may .: re in force  th is  view,
(Lyons 1983:63), Contrary to t h is ,  there are arguments for  the  
independence of word meanings favoured by some proponents of  
Prototype theory (e .g .  Verschueren 1981), as already mentioned. As 
evidence i t  is claimed that  people, when asked to define words, do 
not fee l  obl iged to r e f e r  to re la ted  items, but usual ly concentrate  
on the focal  c h ara c te r is t ic s  o f  the item in question,  i . e .  describe  
the prototype.  Accordingly,  only genuine s t r u c t u r a l i s t  d e f in i t io n s
are based on contrasts.  Yet any theory should be able to
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between words which are not synonymous fo r  the sake of  
elementary descr ip t ive  adequacy. Therefore the p o s s ib i l i t y  that fo r  
some words at lea s t  and at some leve l  at lea s t  the d is t in c t io n s  are
contrast ive ,  cannot be ruled out.  Besides, to do Prototype theory
j u s t i c e ,  one must emphasize tha t  words are not understood as iso lated  
e n t i t i e s  in the abstrac t.  They are understood as being re la ted  to  
other words and, qu ite  importantly,  as re la ted  to the world (ex t ra -  
l i n g u i s t i c  r e a l i t y ) .  Schematically one could say th a t  while
structura l ism is in te rested in the former ( i n t r a l i n g u i s t i c )  r e la t io n ,  
Prototype theory is in te rested in bringing out the l a t t e r  one through 
the recogni t ion o f  the cognit ive  patterns o f  ca tegor iza t ion .  The 
main premise in th is  respect has already been mentioned: word
meanings are to some extent indeterminate;  communication is achieved 
through concentration on the focal  po ints ,  i . e .  the most
c h a ra c te r is t ic  (p ro to typ ica l )  instances of  a category.
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I t  is very in te res t in g  to consider the s t r u c t u r a l i s t  stand on the 
issue o f  indeterminacy.  I t s  c le ares t  exposition is probably Coseriu 
and Geckeler (1981:49,  c i t in g  Coseriu 1966):
"les valeurs 1 inguist iques sont des valeurs conceptuel les qui se 
d6f in issent  par leurs oppositions et  par l e u r  fonctionneinent, et  
non pas par des c r i t e re s  ' r e e l s '  e t  par les l i m i t e s ,  precises ou 
imprecises,  entre les phenomenes de la  r e a l i t e " .
So, d i f f i c u l t i e s  in the separation o f  real  phenomena are e x p l i c i t y  
said not to a f f e c t  the d is t in c t io n  between the corresponding 
concepts:
"quite  the contrary:  such d i f f i c u l t i e s  show tha t  the concepts 
are c le a r l y  separated.  Thus, e .g .  the fa c t  that in 
e x t r a ! in g u is t i c  r e a l i t y  there are no c le a r  boundaries between 
day and night does not mean that the concepts 'day'  and 'n igh t '  
are unclear as concepts. Here, th ere fore ,  the precise 
d e l im i ta t io n  of  the concepts stands in opposition to an 
imprecise d e l im i ta t io n  of  the phenomena conditioned by the 
nature of  e x t r a ! in g u is t i c  data".
(Coseriu and Geckeler 1981:49)
Hence i t  is claimed that  language establ ishes boundaries in areas 
which e x is t  as a continuum and the s pec i f ic  example offered is  colour  
ad ject ives .  But Ber l in  and Kay (1969) and Kay and MacDaniel (1978) 
have shown th a t  there is a correspondence between the internal  
structure  of  r e a l i t y  and the laws determining the colour s e n s i t i v i t y  
of  the eye and that  the l i n g u i s t i c  choice ( the points of  
l e x i c a l i z a t i o n )  corresponds to the focal  points o f  the fuzzy (as to 
t h e i r  boundaries) areas of  the colour spectrum. Hence the apparent 
a rb i t ra r in e ss  o f  colour terminology is only apparent.  Now i f  the 
l i n g u i s t i c  choice is not completely a r b i t r a r y  but i t s  explanation  
rests with e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c  information,  then th is  information cannot 
be ignored and word meanings cannot have representat ions which are at  
odds with the real  world phenomena that  would explain them.
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Consider now Labov (1978:220) on the issue of  indeterminacy:
"In the most general sense, l i n g u i s t i c  analysis is the study of  
l i n g u i s t i c  categor ies.  The la rges t  part  of  our e f f o r t  is  devoted 
to discovering categories,  de fin ing them and set t ing  up rules fo r  
assigning membership in those categories.  The e n t i re  a c t i v i t y  is 
dependent on the existence o f  category boundaries i f  i t  is to be 
meaningful: i f  there are no e f f e c t iv e  boundaries between two 
categor ies,  the assignment of  members to one or another is 
obviously an a r b i t r a r y  and pointless exercise" .
Labov dist inguishes between domains in which features operate 
cate g o r ic a l ly  and others in which only p r o b a b i l i s t i c  or weighted 
features are operat ive .  His examples include,  on the one hand, 
kinship terms where he expects categorical  judgments "since they are 
ascribed statuses that  do not change over time" ( i b i d . :226) and, on 
the other,  'achieved statuses'  l i k e  ' a d u l t '  where weighted judgments 
are required.  I t  seems to me th a t  even with in  the same domain there  
are points le x ic a l i z e d  along a single axis (which is  probably the 
most obvious and simple 'breaking up' of  a continuum) and points  
scattered in d i f f e r e n t  d i rec t ions  but re la ted  to one another via  
cer ta in  dimensions. Some of these re la t ions  may be contrast ive  
almost in the s t r u c t u r a l i s t  d is t i n c t i v e  features sense. Phenomena of  
gradation and indeterminacy can be explained on the basis of  
p ro to typ ic a l /s te reo typ ic a l  approaches. S t r u c t u r a l i s t  methods can, 
however, also be useful in establ ishing a basic pat tern ,  without  
adhering to the view tha t  the value o f  a word is determined by the 
structure  of  the whole f i e l d .
In very concrete terms consider the examples o f  motion verbs 
previously  discussed. I f  some event is not exactly  an instance of  
' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  i . e .  not p r o to ty p ic a l ly  a ' t r e x o '  event but almost 
th a t ,  the deviat ion w i l l  not be completely unpredictable,  i . e .  in any 
d i re c t io n .  In the vast major i ty  of  cases i t  is  qu i te  predictably  
going to be in the d i rec t ion  o f  the nearest categor ies,  i . e .  in 
sp ec i f ic  d i rec t ions :  e i t h e r  a ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) event - but not 
exactly  th a t  - or a ' p i b a o '  (jump) one - but not exactly  th a t .  Other 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  might be 'hop' or 'dance' (and then the actual  distance  
from the prototype might be greater )  but c e r t a in ly  not ' s i t ' .  Focal 
points may be establ ished on the basis o f  the prototypica l
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c h ara c te r is t ics  o f  a category and at the same t ime a structured  
re la t ionsh ip  may be detected between re la ted  focal po ints .
So the prototypical  descr ipt ions o f  ' t r e x o ' ,  ' p e r p a t a o ' , ' p i b a o '  
would probably have to include as main points o f  contrast the 
conditions detected but sometimes misused by s t r u c t u r a l i s t  methods 
(e .g ,  cont inu i ty  of  motion, number of  fe e t  on the ground at given 
moments, e t c . ) .  They would pred ict  tha t  fo r  marginal instances 
subjects hesi ta te  to use ' t r e x o '  (run) and f i n a l l y  opt f o r  ' p i b a o '  
(jump) or ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) depending on which of  these conditions  
i s / a r e  absent, but do not use a fourth completely unrelated element.
An example of  what I ca l l  the simplest breaking up o f  a continuum is 
offered in the domain of  MGMVs by ' k s a p l o n o 2 r ( l i e  down) - '/faSome^' 
( s i t  down) - ' s i k o n o m e '  (stand up, r i s e ) .  Some o f  the in between 
stages are also le x ic a l i z e d :  ' \ / e r n o '  ( l e an ) ,  ' m isokaB om e '  ( h a l f - s i t ) ,
' m i s o k s a p l o n o '  ( h a l f - l i e ) ,  ' m i s o s i k o n o m e '  (h a l f - s t a n d ) .  Al l  these 
are points on a single  axis (points of  body touching supporting 
surface),  so no fu r t h e r  structur ing  needs to be evoked; the deviat ion  
from the focal points is in a single  d i re c t io n ,  the pattern is 
unidimensional.
The above considerations bear on the sort  o f  apparatus one needs for  
a p a r t ic u la r  descr ip t ion .  A prototypical  analysis o f  Vs l i k e  'buy'  
and ' s e l l '  might require  reference to scenes, scenarios,  frames and a 
number of  s im i la r  tools  used by prototypical  semantics, but quite  
d i f f e r e n t  considerations would be useful fo r  motion verbs. The 
prototypical  scene fo r  ' kaBome'  ( s i t )  might include a chair  and fo r  
' k s a p l o n o '  ( l i e )  a bed, but the ro le  these elements play in the 
appl icat ion o f  the terms in question may be less crucia l  than that of  
a condition such as 'knees bend' proposed by Dahlgren (1978) fo r  the 
stereotype of  ' c h a i r '  and equal ly useful fo r  the stereotype of  ' s i t ' .
i t  is  also ra th e r  c le a r  th a t  by t h e i r  very nature c e r ta in  features  
are graded, i . e .  they are a matter o f  more-or- less,  while  others are 
not, i . e .  they are a matter o f  yes-no.  Consequently i t  is qui te  
possible tha t  f o r  the descr ip t ion of  the semantic fac ts  o f  a single
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lex ic a l  item one needs to have recourse to both kinds of  c r i t e r i a  (as 
w i l l  be shown to be the case with MGMVs).
F in a l ly  ju s t  as one does not want a theory to a r b i t r a r i l y  and r i g i d l y  
impose schemata which do not r e f l e c t  r e a l i t y ,  one s im i l a r l y  does not 
want a model which allows fo r  anything at r i s k  o f  becoming 
superfluous.  Prototype theory is discussed in the fo l lowing section  
with a view to c la r i f y i n g  which o f  i t s  tenets are useful f o r  a 
descr ipt ion of  MGMVs. The overal l  p ic tu re ,  fo r  the moment, seems to 
be th is :  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  theor ies r i s k  imposing st ructure  and leaving  
out phenomena of  gradation and indeterminacy; Prototype theory r isks  
not accounting fo r  ex is t ing  structure  by providing open-ended 
d e f in i t io n s  c onf la t ing  semantic, associat ive  and in d i v i d u a l i s t i c  
information.  N a tu ra l ly ,  whether these apparently d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  
information can be kept separate is a matter o f  debate.
1.3 Prototype theory and human categor isat ion
1 .3 .1  On Putnam's stereotypes
In the previous section i t  was mentioned th a t  Prototype theory 
proposed id e n t i fy in g  the prototypical  instance of  a category and 
allowing fo r  other instances to be members of  tha t  category without  
e xh ib i t ing  a l l  the id e n t i fy in g  c r i t e r i a .  This theory has been 
juxtaposed to theor ies  of  word meaning which do not allow fo r  a 
spec i f ic  item to be a leg i t im a te  instance of  a category unless a 
number o f  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t io n s /c r i t e r ia  are f u l f i l l e d .  
I t  has not yet  been pointed out here tha t  the basis f o r  th is  radical  
di f fe rence  of  point  o f  view is ,  in e f f e c t ,  the controversy between 
extensionalism and in te n s io n a l i s m .^
In the present context only a couple of  points need to be discussed 
at some length,  s ta r t in g  with the issue o f  a n a l y t i c i t y .  Putnam's 
(1970, 1975) theory o f  stereotypes w i l l  be juxtaposed to those o f  
Quine and Katz with respect to th is  problem. The most convenient
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shortcut in doing th is  seems to be a consideration o f  the age-old 
examples o f  the type:
(a) cats are animals
(b) bachelors are unmarried.
Roughly speaking, whi le fo r  Quine ne i ther  (a) nor (b) is a n a ly t ic ,  
fo r  Katz they both are.  Putnam would claim tha t  type (a)  examples 
are not an a ly t ic  on the assumption tha t  the property o f  "animalhood' 
is  rev isab le  and tha t  in case i t  is ac tu a l ly  revised ( i . e .  absent or  
replaced by "mechanical object" fo r  instance) the meaning of "cat" 
does not change; what does change i f  i t  turns out th a t  "cats'  are in 
f a c t  mechanical objects,  fo r  instance, is our b e l ie fs  about them. 
Katz's stand on th is  point  is c le a r l y  tha t  in such a case e i t h e r  the  
meaning o f  "cat" changes, or we s t a r t  using a new name fo r  th is  kind 
of  "creature" (Katz 1975:98).
I t  is  f a i r l y  easy to demonstrate tha t  Katz is wrong about th is  l a t t e r  
claim, but his former one presents a much more serious problem. To 
put i t  very simply,  i t  seems quite  un l ike ly  tha t  the day we discover  
th a t  "cats'  are a c tu a l ly  mechanical objects we w i l l  coin a new name 
fo r  them; once the reference is f ixed (and named) the name (term)  
continues to be attached to the object .  Pulman (1983) o f fers  the 
example of  "whales" which were not renamed a f t e r  i t  turned out tha t  
they were not " f is h '  but 'mammals'. Perhaps th is  p a r t i c u la r  example 
is  not convincing enough because the distance between ' f i s h '  and 
'mammal' is not as great as the one between 'animal '  and "mechanical 
object '  (consider the common sense d i f fe rence  between higher and 
lower leve l  fe a tu re s ) ,  or because "whales' are probably among the  
poorest examples o f  'mammals' in the spec i f ic  p r o to t y p ic a l /  
stereotyp ical  sense already mentioned and discussed in more de ta i l  in 
the present section.  Consider, however, the example o f  "spaghet t i '  
which was apparently 'discovered" one day (1st  of  A p r i l )  to be not an 
" in dus tr ia l  product" but a . . .  "p lant".  I t  is qu i te  u n l ike ly  tha t  
the meaning of  "spaghett i" changed fo r  those speakers ( A p r i l ' s  fools)  
who were "informed" about i t s  actual nature,  and qui te  impossible
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tha t  they would have s ta r ted  th ink ing about a new name fo r  i t .  What 
must have changed, fo r  a whi le ,  was t h e i r  b e l ie fs  about i t .
This l inks  in an in te res t in g  way to Putnam's d is t in c t io n  between 
' s u p e r f i c i a l '  and 'e s s e n t ia l '  propert ies  and his claim tha t  knowledge 
of  the former ra ther  than the l a t t e r  is crucia l  to determining the 
meaning of an e n t i t y  f o r  the average s p e a k e r . I  take th is  
d is t in c t io n  to be an important contr ibution  of  Putnam's theor iz ing  to  
a be t te r  understanding o f  word meaning and there fore  worth looking at  
ra ther  c lose ly .  Putnam concentrates on natural  kind terms and claims 
tha t  t h e i r  s u p er f ic ia l  propert ies  are central  to t h e i r  meaning. 
These are juxtaposed to essent ial  proper t ies ,  inclusion of  which 
would guarantee membership in the extension of  a term, but which are 
not d i r e c t l y  l inked to an indiv idual  speaker's competence.
From a c er ta in  point  o f  view th is  may be understood as saying simply 
tha t  we have to abandon the search fo r  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
condit ions.  In f a c t ,  Putnam's ideas in th is  respect are 
d ia m e t r ic a l ly  opposed to those of  Katz and Fodor; the l a t t e r  are 
commonly understood as claiming that  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
conditions fo r  membership in the extension of a term such as those 
Putnam considers ( i . e .  ' g o l d ' ,  'a luminium',  'w a te r ' )  are ( i m p l i c i t l y )  
known by any speaker who uses the terms appropr iate ly :  i t  should be 
reca l led  tha t  both semantic markers and d is t in g u is h e s  were supposed 
to represent exhaustively a speaker's competence fo r  the respective  
term. Putnam, on the other hand, claims th a t  a speaker's competence 
which enables him/her to use a term appropr iate ly  cannot involve 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions fo r  membership in the extension,  
because these are not known to a l l ,  or even any s p ea k ers .^  He 
a c tu a l ly  suggests th a t  the indiv idual  speaker's competence includes 
everything except the extension.  A speaker can be said to know the 
meaning of ' c a t '  on the s ingle  condition th a t  s/he knows the 
s u p er f ic ia l  or standard, i . e .  ' s t e r e o t y p i c a l ' ,  ch a ra c te r is t ic s  of  a 
cat .  S/he can be said to use the term appropr iate ly  i f  h is /her  use 
"passes muster" and the extension o f  ' c a t '  in h is /h e r  i d i o le c t  is 
ac tu a l ly  the set o f  cats.  The extension is not f ixed  by what the 
individual  speaker grasps or not, but by the community, including the 
experts,  through a complex co-operat ive  process.
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So Putnam c r i t i c i z e s  other theor ies which, in his words, "leave out 
the contr ibution  o f  society and the contr ibution o f  the real  world" 
( p . 164),  i . e .  understand cognition as a purely individual  matter,  
ignoring i t s  social  dimension. Contrary to t r a d i t io n a l  philosophy,  
extension is to be determined s o c ia l ly  (contr ibution  o f  society)  and 
in part  in d e x ic a l ly  (contr ibut ion  of  the wor ld) .  I t  depends on the 
actual nature o f  p a r t i c u la r  e n t i t i e s ,  and th is  actual  "hidden" nature 
is  not f u l l y  known to the speaker. This does not imply tha t  
extension is not a component o f  meaning; i f  in using the same term we 
r e f e r  to e n t i t i e s  with d i f f e r e n t  extensions we ac tua l ly  mean 
d i f f e r e n t  th ings.  Nevertheless,  th is  d i f fe rence  in extension is not 
a r e f l e c t io n  o f  a d i f fe rence  in individual  psychological s ta tes,  i . e .  
accountable fo r  in terms of l i n g u i s t i c  competence.
Putnam's proposal f o r  the semantic representat ion o f  a natural  kind 
term involves a l i s t  of  's y n ta c t ic  markers' ,  'semantic markers' ,  
' s tereotypes'  ( i . e .  s terotyp ica l  propert ies)  and 'e x ten s io n ' .  These 
const i tu te  a hypothesis about the individual  speaker's competence 
with the notable exception of  the 'ex ten s ion ' .  This representat ion  
he c a l ls  the 'normal form descr ip t ion '  of  a term and the speci f ic  
example o f  such a descr ipt ion he o f fers  fo r  'water '  looks l i k e  th is :
A. syntactic  markers (box)
mass noun, concrete
B. semantic markers (box)
natural  kind,  l i q u id
C. s te reo typ e / 's te re o ty p ic a l  proper t ies '  (box)
colour less,  transparent ,  tas te less ,  t h i r s t  quenching
D. extension (box)
H2 O (give or take im p u r i t ie s ) .
(Putnam 1975:269)
This r e f l e c t s  qu i te  c le a r l y  the d is t in c t io n  between super f ic ia l  and 
essential  p roper t ies .  Superf ic ia l  propert ies ,  which are included in 
the stereotype,  are part  of  the common speaker-hearer 's understanding 
o f  the term and they can be "wi ld ly  inaccurate" or even 
" s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  wrong", since in Putnam's terms, a stereotype is a
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"conventional ( f requent ly  malicious) idea (which may be w i ld ly  
inaccurate) of  what an x  looks l i k e  or acts l i k e  or is . . . "  
( i b i d . :249).
Essential  proper t ies ,  which const i tu te  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
conditions fo r  membership in the extension,  are known to s p e c ia l is ts ,  
or experts,  but are said to be a l l  present in the l i n g u i s t i c  
community considered as a c o l le c t iv e  body; tha t  c o l le c t iv e  body 
divides the ' labour '  o f  knowing and using the parts o f  the meaning of  
a term, through a so c io l in g u is t ic  process Putnam c a l ls  "div is ion o f  
l i n g u i s t i c  labor" ( i b i d . :144) ,  without specifying how exact ly  i t  
operates ( leaving the matter to socio l inguists  apparently ) .  The 
whole hypothesis is of fered as an explanation of  the fa c t  that while  
only a minor ity  of  speakers has special ( s c i e n t i f i c  or other)  
knowledge concerning cer ta in  terms, a l l  or most speakers of  a 
l i n g u i s t i c  community understand and use these terms more or less 
appropr iate ly .
Putnam's contr ibution can perhaps be f u l l y  appreciated i f  one 
concentrates on his own examples: 'g o ld ' ,  'a luminium',  'w a te r ' .  In 
such cases the increase of  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge in r e l a t i v e l y  recent 
years has separated expert from non-expert understanding of the terms 
ra ther  dram at ica l ly ,  without these words having necessari ly  changed 
meaning in terms o f  ' ind iv idua l  l i n g u i s t i c  competence'; i t  is hard to 
imagine th a t  'water '  changed meaning for  the average speaker-hearer  
once i t  was discovered that i t  was ac tua l ly  HgO. Improvement of  
techniques brings society as a whole closer to a safer i d e n t i f i c a t io n  
of  the essential  proper t ies ,  the "hidden structure";  yet  the average 
speaker-hearer r e l i e s ,  at any given time, on the 'c u r ren t ly  
operational  d e f i n i t i o n '  of  a term. Two re la ted  questions arise at  
th is  point:
1. How to determine the minimum level  of  competence (so that i t  
covers the current ly  operat ional  d e f in i t io n  of  a term) vs 
information in the extension box.
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2. What happens with common terms which do not have a
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y / t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  v e r i f i a b l e  extension.
The common basis of  these questions/problems is probably tha t  Putnam 
does not provide anything l i k e  a de ta i led  theory of  stereotypes (nor 
does anyone else y e t ,  as f a r  as I know). His general view is tha t  
th is  'minimum leve l  o f  competence' depends on the c u l tu re ,  on the one 
hand, and the nature of  the object ,  on the other ,  but tha t  wi th in  
these vast l i m i t s  any native speaker i n t u i t i v e l y  knows what belongs 
to i t .  Hence what is central  to the meaning of a term is th is
s te reo typ ic a l ,  widely known, sometimes inconsistent and extensional ly  
incorrec t ,  but l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  ob l igatory  information.  So a l l  tha t
can be detected in his re levant  tex ts  in th is  connection is two
p a r t i a l  but very important answers:
(a)  The stereotype need not be correct or unchangeable ( i . e .
unrevisable or a n a ly t i c ) :  " l i n g u i s t i c  obl igator iness is not 
supposed to be an index of  u n r e v is a b i l i t y  or even of  t ru th .  
So, fo r  instance, we can hold that  ' t i g e r s  are s t r iped '  is 
part  of  the meaning of  ' t i g e r '  without being trapped in the 
problems o f  a n a ly t i c i t y "  ( i b i d . :177),  i . e .  without having to 
accept tha t  ' t i g e r s  are s t r iped '  is a n a ly t ic .
(b) For many words an extens iona l ly  correct  t ru th  d e f in i t io n  is 
in no sense a theory o f  the meaning of  the word. Hence,
discussing Davidson's theory,  Putnam c e r t i f i e s  th a t  " 'water '  
is true o f  x  i f f  x  is HgO" ( i b i d . : 180),  although
extens iona l ly  correc t ,  would t e l l  us nothing about the
meaning o f  'water '  i f  most speakers did not know that
'water '  is H2 O.
L ingu is t ic  explanation is at  leas t  disentangled from the
philosophical problems o f  a n a l y t i c i t y .  I f  the semantics of  a term is 
to be a representat ion of  the average speaker's knowledge of th is
term, i t  makes much more sense to concentrate on the notion of
l i n g u i s t i c  ob l igator iness ( i . e .  on specifying the 'minimum level  of  
competence') .
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Now the id e a l i z a t io n  im p l ic i t  in the notion o f  the 'average speaker'  
is  a problem in i t s e l f  as w i l l  be demonstrated in the course of  th is  
invest iga t ion  time and time again.  I t  seems that  fo r  d i f f e r e n t  kinds 
of  common terms, t h e i r  meaning w i l l  d i f f e r  depending not on a 
' l i n g u i s t i c  community' in the broad unqual i f ied  sense in which the 
term is frequently  used, but on what sort  o f  information is ava i lab le  
at any given time to a much more re s t r ic te d  subgroup of  a given 
l i n g u i s t i c  community. These subgroups might have to be defined on 
the basis o f  t h e i r  educational  l e v e l ,  s p e c i f ic  professional  or 
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge, local  c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  e t c . ^  Although th is  is 
mainly a s o c io l in g u is t ic  problem, i t  is  of  immediate concern fo r  th is  
kind of  semantic theory.  This is closely l inked to the issue of
communication regarding word meaning. I t  seems highly  desirable  to 
be in a pos it ion  to t e l l  at  which points communication breaks down 
and fo r  which reasons i t  does. This can be the object of  fu r th e r  
research in a number of  in te r r e la te d  d is c ip l in e s .  I t  seems to me, 
however, th a t  Putnam's theory,  incomplete as i t  is ,  points to the  
r ig h t  d i rec t io n  of  where to look fo r  answers. Stereotypical  
information,  which is responsible fo r  communication, depends on the 
nature of  the object fo r  which a term is used. I t  is therefore
predictab le  tha t  f o r  kinds of  terms other than those Putnam analyses,  
the sociol in g u is t ic  d iv is ion  of  labour may not e x is t  a t  a l l :  there  
may be no experts who can decide in case of  doubt, or they may have
d i f f e r e n t  opinions.  A good case in point  is a term l i k e  'democracy'
which involves d i f f e r e n t  social  theor ies .  I t  is  p red ictab le  tha t  
notions re la te d  to  such terms, f a r  from being accountable fo r  in 
terms o f  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions,  w i l l  const i tu te  
prec ise ly  points at  which communication may well  break down.
I t  must be noted, however, tha t  assert ing th a t  stereotypical  
information depends on the nature of  the object f o r  which a term is 
used is only a s ta r t in g  point.  I t  is ra ther  evident tha t  r e la t i v e  
sal ience o f  external  ( s u p e r f i c i a l )  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  has to be taken 
ser ious ly  into considerat ion.  So, even w i th in  the same semantic 
f i e l d ,  a s ingle  speaker's l i n g u i s t i c  competence w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t l y  
defined concerning 'beech' and 'elm t r e e s ' ,  on the one hand, and 
'palm t r e e s ' ,  on the other.  Nature of  the object is probably to be 
understood much more narrowly than Putnam seems to suggest. In
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addit ion to the nature of  the object ,  Putnam also recognizes that the 
ro le  an object plays in a p a r t i c u la r  society w i l l  a f f e c t  the type and 
amount o f  s tereotypical  information.  Yet even these parameters are 
not s u f f i c i e n t .  Compare 'elm t re es '  to ' t i g e r s '  fo r  instance.  
Neither is probably of  great importance to Western urban populations; 
in fa c t  the l a t t e r  category is  remoter than the former one. Yet 
' e lm - t rees '  w i l l  almost c e r t a in ly  have a 'weaker' stereotype than 
' t i g e r s ' . *4 One can consider th a t  e i t h e r  the decis ive  fa c to r  is the 
taxonomic leve l  o f  categories (e .g .  'animal '  may be a comparatively 
higher level  category than ' t r e e '  and on the same leve l  as ' p l a n t ' ,  
hence ' t iger '  may be higher than ' e l m - t r e e ' )  or tha t  r e l a t i v e  sal ience  
can only be determined in connection with the perceptual ly  nearest 
trees or animals in such a case. The important thing seems to be the 
recognit ion of  such things as the r e la t i v e  sal ience of  d i f f e r e n t  
propert ies of  an object ,  which Putnam does not seem to  be taking into  
considerat ion.
Another problem f o r  the theory is th a t  the stereotype is not 
r e s t r ic te d  as to the type of  information i t  may include,  so i t  can 
boil  down to everything we associate with a word that helps us 
understand i t .  Ways of coping with these problems w i l l  be discussed 
in the section on Rosch's prototypes.  One th ing ,  however, has to be 
pointed out here. There are two p i t f a l l s  we wish to avoid: one of  
them is allowing the stereotype to include expert  knowledge fo r  every 
term, i . e .  information const i tu t ing  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  
conditions fo r  membership in the extension; the other one is allowing  
i t  to include purely in d i v i d u a l i s t i c  information.  I t  is c lea r  from 
what has preceded th a t  the f i r s t  caveat is taken care of  (a t  least  in 
theory ) .  In Putnam's own words:
"A world in which everyone is an expert on every top ic  is  a world 
in which social  laws are almost unimaginably d i f f e r e n t  from what 
they now are.  What is the motivat ion of  taking such a world and 
such a language as the model fo r  the analysis of  human language?"
( i b i d . :187) .
I t  is not equal ly  c le a r ,  perhaps, how the second danger w i l l  be 
avoided. The stereotype is said to include information about the
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minimum s k i l l s  required fo r  entry into a l i n g u i s t i c  community (what 
Putnam c a l ls  " s ig n i f i c a n t  in formation") .
While necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions, or knowledge o f  the 
' e s s e n t ia l '  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  may be arr ived at ( f o r  some terms, at  
l e a s t )  without having recourse to the judgments o f  native  speakers 
(but only to the exper ts ) ,  ' s u p e r f i c i a l '  or s tereotypical  
chara c te r is t ic s  require  completely d i f f e r e n t  methods. Introspect ion  
w i l l  not s u f f ic e .  The importance of  e l i c i t i n g  information from 
native speakers becomes imperative.  Putnam's theory does not ra ise  
these issues d i r e c t l y .  My own in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the Stereotype  
approach to meaning and i t s  possible p ract ica l  impl icat ions consists  
of  the fo l lowing main points:
1, Obviously some stereotypical  information w i l l  necessari ly  be 
encyclopaedic or empir ica l;  some of  i t  w i l l  be also 
incorrec t ;  but the pos it ion: "whatever is revisab le  cannot 
be l i n g u i s t i c  but simply encyclopaedic, empir ica l ,  
s c i e n t i f i c " ,  which is s t i f l i n g  fo r  le x ic a l  semantics, is 
re fu ted .
2. Extremely subject ive material  (which can be detected in 
answers to lex ic a l  tes ts )  can be shown not to cover common 
ground and there fore  stay at the bottom as 'marg ina l ' :  
e i t h e r  l e f t  out of  an attempted normal form descript ion or  
included as optional  (notice tha t  Putnam dist inguishes  
between 'o b l ig a to ry '  and 'o p t io n a l '  s te reotyp ical  fe a tu re s ) .
The exact nature o f  the s tereotypical  information we w i l l  a r r iv e  at  
can only be discussed ( in  connection with the sp ec i f ic  terms we are 
inves t iga t ing )  a f t e r  a s u f f i c i e n t  amount o f  material  has been 
accumulated. For the moment we seem to have more knowledge of  what 
the stereotype should not contain and much less on what i t  should. 
What we fu r t h e r  know on the basis o f  Putnam's theory is that a 
d is t in c t io n  is to be drawn not only between stereotypical  and 
' e s s e n t i a l '  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  but also between these and semantic 
markers. Notice f i r s t ,  tha t  semantic markers involve information
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which is "centra l" to the term, "part  of  a widely used and important 
system of  c la s s i f i c a t io n "  ( i b i d . :189).  A semantic marker is  
therefore a higher level  property ( in  the taxonomic sense), i . e .  a 
more inc lus ive  one (e .g .  ' l i q u i d ' ,  ' an im al ' ,  e t c . ) .
The most important property of  semantic markers fo r  the descript ion  
of terms other than those Putnam has analysed (e .g .  motion verbs) is 
precise ly  th a t  they function as c lass i fy ing  un i ts .  This is 
reminiscent of  the t r a d i t io n a l  d is t in c t io n  between major and minor 
features and seems to me v a l id  fo r  the semantics o f  MGMVs. How 
exactly  major c la s s i fy in g  features fo r  MGMVs d i f f e r  from minor ones 
w i l l  hopeful ly  become evident in the course of  the present discussion 
of these verbs. I t  should be pointed out here,  though, tha t  very 
l i t t l e  is known about the kind of  namabil i ty p r inc ip le s  which are at 
work in the domain of  verbs in general and that  a r r iv in g  at  an 
overal l  s p ec i f ica t io n  of  such pr inc ip les  l i e s  c le a r l y  outside the 
scope of the present in v es t ig a t io n .  We do, however, know th a t  we are 
dealing with ra ther  abstract ontological  categories such as 
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  and the re la ted  notion of  a g e n t iv i ty ,  f o r  instance.  
In the domain of  motion verbs what are usual ly understood as high- 
leve l  propert ies are l inked with the fol lowing categor izat ions: (a)  
states vs processes vs events and (b) a gent iv i ty  and c au s a t iv i ty  ( in  
r e la t io n  to ac t ion s) .  There can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  such features  
are 'major c la s s i f y in g '  ones in Putnam's sense.
I t  w i l l  become obvious in the course of  the discussion of these
features that  I understand them as syntactico-semantic in nature.
Now the d is t in c t io n  between mass and count Ns is a l l o t t e d  to the 
' sy n tac t ic  markers' box by Putnam. I t  w i l l  be shown, however, tha t  
although one can draw a p a r a l le l  between th is  d is t in c t io n  and the
'event -process'  one (Leech 1971, Mourelatos 1978) the issue is much 
more complicated when i t  comes to Vs, the whole phenomenon being 
graded ra ther  than e x h ib i t ing  a simple dichotomy, much less c lea r -  
cut,  depending on syntactico-semantic frameworks and some purely  
semantic factors  requir ing  special  analysis.  So, to s t a r t  with,
compared to  the sharp d is t in c t io n  Putnam draws between syntactic  and 
semantic markers in his normal form descr ipt ions f o r  natural  kind 
terms, i t  would seem more appropriate to postulate a un i f ied  category
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of syntactico-semantic markers to accommodate 'major c la s s i f y in g '  
fea tures .  I t  should be fu r th e r  noticed that  no 'extension box' type 
of information can possibly go into the semantic descr ipt ion of  MGMVs 
at le a s t .  This is not due to 'absence of special  knowledge', because 
in the s t r i c t  sense of  the term, one can e as i ly  th in k  of  such 
knowledge being possessed by an a th le t ic s  committee, fo r  instance,  
concerning the d is t in c t io n  between ' run '  and 'w a lk ' .  I t  is  ju s t  tha t  
no such b i t  of  knowledge can amount to necessary and s u f f i c ie n t  
conditions fo r  is o la t in g  any motion verb from any other one in the 
' p r a c t i c a l '  sense already discussed and in the more th eo re t ica l  one 
presented in th is  section concerning the competence o f  the non-expert  
speaker.
1 .3 .2  On Rosch's prototypes
1.3.2.3.  Stereotypes and prototypes: common ground 
Psychol inguist ic  research usual ly  associated with E. Rosch and C. 
Mervis has also provided evidence that  the meaning of words is 
inherent ly  fuzzy and indeterminate and that  communication succeeds 
because we usual ly operate with prototypes.  I f  c a t e g o r ie s ^  were 
defined in mental representat ion by a set of  c r i t e r i a  (p ro p e r t ie s /  
a t t r ib u te s )  const i tu t ing  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions for  
membership, we would expect a l l  members to be equal ly representat ive  
of the category.  Rosch and her colleagues have shown however tha t  
some members are more c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  the category than others,
i . e .  more p ro to typ ic a l .  Their  hypothesis is tha t  categories are 
maintained as d iscre te  by being coded in cognit ion in terms of  the 
prototypes of  the most c h a ra c te r is t ic  members o f  the category.  Their  
experiments have produced evidence in favour o f  th is  hypothesis 
showing th a t  categories are coded in the mind by means of  a prototype 
of  a ty p ica l  category member, i . e .  a 'concrete image' of  an average 
category member. (Rosch 1977b:213-4, Mervis and Rosch 1981).
The basis o f  the common ground covered by Putnam's and Rosch's 
theories  seems to be that  categories are not speci f ied by necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions fo r  membership and th a t  t h e i r  boundaries 
are not wel l  def ined.  A reasonable combination o f  the two is that
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the stereotype could be understood as a c lu s te r  o f  a t t r ib u te s  of  the 
most proto typica l  member(s) o f  a category,  and that  word meaning can 
only be given through an imperfect and open-ended d e f in i t i o n  of the 
prototype.
Putnam is bothered by what he c a l ls  "the id e a l i z a t io n  of  supposing 
that  there is such a thing as the set o f  things of  which the term 
' t r e e '  is t r u e " . 16 Ful l recognit ion o f  the fa c t  tha t  membership in 
the extension is not necessari ly  a 'yes-no'  question is  also given by 
the prototype approach which ac tu a l ly  provides the means, or at  least  
attempts at working out a method fo r  measuring degree of  membership 
through a d i re c t  appeal to native speaker-1isteners.  This way, such 
fac ts ,  instead of  being only a piece of  phi losophical th eor iz ing  ( in  
the a b s t rac t ) ,  can become the object of  de ta i led  analysis and l inked  
to the 'average speaker-1 is tener '  whose in tu i t io n s  may be e i th er  
ignored or merely guessed at by phi losophy-of-language p ra c t i t io n e rs ,  
but not by descr ip t ive  l in g u is ts  who purport to t r y  and account 
precisely  fo r  these very in t u i t io n s .
Both approaches (Putnam's and Rosch's) recognize the importance of 
the ro le  played by the actual  nature of  objects in the semantics of  
terms and tha t  d i f f e r e n t  kinds o f  terms correspond to d i f f e r e n t  kinds 
of competence. This is in i t s e l f  quite s ig n i f ic a n t  as i t  may be used 
to predict  th a t  a l l  combinations o f  features are not equal ly 
probable.  (Other theor ies cannot exclude the conjunction of  a l l  
possible a t t r i b u t e s . )  Rosch observes that the perceived world does 
not contain random cluster ings of  a t t r ib u te s .  Some combinations are 
more expected than others and some are completely impossible.  So, 
fo r  instance, while ' f e a t h e r s ' ,  ' f u r '  and 'wings' are separate 
a t t r ib u t e s ,  ' f e a th e r s '  are more l i k e l y  to co-occur with 'wings' than 
' f u r '  is .  This is an empirical fa c t  perceived in the real  world and 
is  only compatible with an extens iona l is t  semantic theory such as the 
one Putnam out! ined.
Putnam does not specify at a l l  what kind of  information goes into the 
stereotype of  terms other than natural  kind ones (as already pointed 
out) ,  while Rosch maintains th a t  the information c onst i tu t ing  a
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prototype consists b a s ic a l ly  of  perceptual and functional  propert ies  
(e .g .  ' l e g s '  and 's i t -o n -ab le n e s s '  as a t t r ib u te s  of  'c h a i rs '  are 
examples o f  a perceptual and a functional  property re sp e c t iv e ly ) .  
Notice,  however, th a t  such propert ies are only specif ied in 
connection with concrete nouns and with respect to a p a r t i c u la r  level  
of  abstraction which Rosch c a l ls  'basic l e v e l '  and which w i l l  be 
given special  a t ten t ion  in what fo l lows.  L i t t l e ,  i f  anything,  is 
said by e i t h e r  theory regarding the nature o f  a t t r ib u te s  of  anything 
other than concrete nouns.
1 .3 .2 .2  Prototype theory as a theory o f  categor izat ion  
I have so f a r  concentrated only on how Rosch's approach reinforces  
the idea,  through p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  tes ts ,  tha t  there is no such thing 
as necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions fo r  membership. That subjects 
could make judgments concerning degree of  membership of  an item in a 
category,  thus accepting th a t  ' o l i v e s ' ,  'pineapples'  and 'apples'  are 
not equal ly  typ ica l  of  the category ' f r u i t ' ,  f o r  instance,  was 
reported by Rosch as ear ly  as 1973. The impl icat ion is that i f  the 
a l t e r n a t iv e  hypotheses were correct (those requir ing necessary and 
s u f f i c ie n t  condit ions) s im i la r  answers would be e l i c i t e d  fo r  a l l  
members of  an assumed superordinate / inclusive category.  This 
dif fe rence  in distance is computed with in  a given system, i . e .  
presupposes (as already mentioned) a previously establ ished taxonomy; 
but the re la t ions h ip  between inclusive category and included members 
is not simply a re la t ionsh ip  o f  inc lusion.  The category which 
consists of  a prototype or representat ive instance and other less 
representat ive or marginal instances around i t  is understood as 
i n t e r n a l l y  structured in th is  p a r t i c u la r  way.
Rosch e t  a l . (1976:383) recognize wi th in  concrete noun taxonomies one 
p a r t i c u la r  l e v e l ,  the 'basic level  of  a b s t ra c t io n ' ,  at which 
categories carry the most information and are maximally d i f f e r e n t  
from one another. Two more leve ls  are recognized, p a ra l le l  to those 
establ ished fo r  b io log ica l  taxonomies, fo r  instance, a most inclusive  
one (above the basic l e v e l )  containing superordinate categories (e .g .  
' f r u i t ' )  and a leve l  lower than the basic one containing subordinate
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categories (e .g .  go lden  d e l ic io u s '  fo r  the basic leve l  category 
' a p p l e ' ) .
1 .3 .2 .3  The basic level  of  abstraction
The basic leve l  o f  abstraction is claimed to be the primary l e v e l ,  
where 'c u ts '  are made in the continua o f  the environment, and 
const i tu tes the level  "at which the organism can obtain the most 
information with the leas t  cognit ive  e f f o r t "  (Rosch 1977b:213) ;  hence 
i t s  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  is of  extreme importance fo r  theore t ica l  reasons,  
but also qu ite  necessary even fo r  the p ra c t ic a l  purpose of  
establ ishing hyponymic re la t io n s .
Basic level  words were f i r s t  id e n t i f i e d  by Rosch on the basis of
questions l i k e  'What is th is ? '  while showing to  subjects an apple,
fo r  instance. The response was expectedly 'an ap p le ' ,  i . e .  ne i ther
the superordinate ( f r u i t )  nor the subordinate (a golden d e l ic io u s ) .
This is explained on the basis of  i t s  representing a ' c o g n i t iv e ly
e f f i c i e n t '  l e v e l ,  at which the information value of  a t t r ib u t e
clusters  is maximized (hence i t  is posited as the most fundamental
leve l  of  a taxonomy). Mervis and Rosch (1981:92) c i t e  a number of
studies in d i f f e r e n t  domains supporting the existence of  such a level
(e .g .  N. Cantor et  a l . ,  fo r  psychia tr ic  categories and B. Ber l in  et
1976,
a l . 1973 and C.H. Brown et  a l . , ^ w i x h  l i n g u i s t i c  and cu l tura l
evidence).  Psychological research,  in p a r t i c u la r ,  suggests that  
objects are recognized as belonging to basic leve l  categories more 
ra p id ly  than as members of  categories at  other leve ls  (Rosch et  a l . 
1976) and that  they are those l i k e l y  to be learned f i r s t  by the chi ld  
(Ber l in  et  a l . 1973).
Let us consider b r i e f l y  whether the c hara c te r is t ic s  o f  'spontaneous 
naming' and 'maximization o f  in fo rm at ion '17 are also appl icable to 
other areas o f  the vocabulary and in p a r t i c u la r  to  MGMVs.
I f  one points at  somebody walking in the s t re e t  ( in  a very ordinary  
way) and asks 'What is he doing?' ,  dupl icat ing Rosch's question fo r  
natural kind categories and a r te fa c ts ,  the response is more l i k e l y  to
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be ' p e r p a t a i ' (he is walking) than ' v i m t i z i '  (he is pacing,  
stepping) or ' s i y a n o p e r p a t a i '  (he is walking s lowly ) ,  which are 
hyponyms of ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) - provided, o f  course, one is asking 
about a (very)  good instance of  the category.  This is a l l  very well  
provided we a l l  agree that  ' p e r p a t a o ' (walk) is a basic level  
category.  The problem is th a t  i t  is  extremely d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  at a l l  
possible,  to discover a superordinate category which can be safe ly  
said to include verbs such as ' p e r p a t a o ' and ' t r e x o '  ( ru n ) .  The only 
candidate seems to be ' p i y e n o ' (go).  Notice an immediate
complication: i f  the goal is obvious, e.g .  someone walking to a near ­
by kiosk , the answer (as f a r  as I have checked) is :  ' p i y e n i  s t o  
p e r i p t e r o ' (he is going to the kiosk ) and not ' p e r p a t a i  ( p r o s  t o  
p e r i p t e r o ) '  (he is walking (to the kiosk ) ) .  In short ,  a l o t  
depends on what is assumed to be common knowledge. Context,  
presupposition and predominantly pragmatic reasons are involved in 
id e n t i fy in g  the various leve ls  of  abstraction on the basis of  
'Question and Answer' tasks. This has been most convincingly shown 
by Cruse (1977) fo r  nouns. Elaborating on the extra  complications  
fo r  Vs seems unnecessary here. The p a r t i c u la r  problems o f  verbs w i l l  
be discussed' at many d i f f e r e n t  points in the course of  th is  
inves t iga t ion .
Besides 'spontaneous naming' the basic leve l  is also ascribed the 
c h ara c te r is t ic  of  maximization of  information.  Evidence fo r  th is  
claim is provided by the experiments mentioned in Rosch et  a l . (1976) 
where subjects were asked to l i s t  a t t r ib u te s  fo r  categories  
d is t r ib u ted  over a l l  three taxonomic leve ls .  Counting the number of  
a t t r ib u te s  common to categories at the three leve ls  the experimenters 
found th a t  basic leve l  categories had many more shared a t t r ib u te s  
than superordinate ones (e .g .  fo r  ' f r u i t ' ,  superordinate: 3 shared 
a t t r ib u te s ;  basic:  8 .3  shared a t t r i b u t e s ) .  So the basic leve l
appears as more informative than the superordinate one. Subordinate 
categories were found to have more shared a t t r ib u te s  than basic leve l  
ones, but the ma jor i ty  were shared with the basic leve l  category  
including them and were there fore  common to most subordinates.  This 
implies less d i s c r i m i n a b i l i t y .  So the subordinate level  also appears 
as less informative than the basic one.
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These resu l ts  are extremely in te res t in g  in themselves, although the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  obtaining f u r t h e r  resu l ts  fo r  other kinds of  
categories in order to check the g enera l i ty  o f  the p r in c ip le  depends 
c r u c ia l l y  on being f i r s t  able to obtain l i s t in g s  of  a t t r ib u te s  
d i r e c t l y  from subjects.  The d i f f i c u l t y  of  the task w i l l  be discussed 
in the next section.
1 .3 . 2 .4  Category formation
There can be l i t t l e  doubt th a t  the world consists of  an i n f i n i t e  
number of  d i f f e r e n t  s t im u l i ;  and that  one o f  the most basic functions  
of  a l l  organisms is c la s s i fy in g ,  i . e .  d iv id ing  up the world in order  
to cope with th is  i n f i n i t e  d i v e r s i t y .  I t  has also become evident in 
recent years,  at l e a s t ,  tha t  th is  segmentation is not completely 
a r b i t r a r y .  I t  has already been mentioned in connection with  
' c o lo u r ' ,  fo r  instance,  that categories form around perceptua l ly  
s a l ie n t  points in a domain; one can l e g i t im a te ly ,  I th ink ,  consider  
such points as 'c ogn i t ive  prototypes'  o f  the domain. Yet the 
princ ip les  underlying categor iza t ion  are s t i l l  at an ear ly  stage of  
research.
Rosch formulates a hypothesis on the formation o f  categories based on 
a combination of  the two pr inc ip les  already hinted at in the previous 
sections: the p r in c ip le  of  'perceived world s t ruc ture '  (1978:29),  
confirming tha t  a t t r ib u te s  co-occur in spec i f ic  bundles, and the  
p r in c ip le  o f  'cogn i t ive  economy' (1978:28),  which ensures tha t  
categories are formed so as to maximize d is c r im in a b i l i t y  (and 
there fore  in fo rm a t io n ) .
The important issue of  how the in te rnal  structure  of  categories  
arises amounts, w i th in  the framework of  th is  theory, to establ ishing  
the pr inc ip les  responsible fo r  the formation of  category prototypes  
and gradients of  category membership, and has to be presented in some 
d e t a i l .  For categories with a physiological  basis (e .g .  colours)  
prototypes may be st imul i  which are s a l ie n t  p r io r  to formation of  the 
category and the very sal ience of  which determines the categoria l  
structure  of  such domains. For most other domains prototypes are 
understood as being formed through pr inc ip les  o f  learning and
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information processing from the items given in the category (Rosch 
and Mervis 1975:574).  One of the major s tructura l  p r inc ip les  which 
are said to govern the formation o f  the prototype structure  of  
semantic categories is tha t  o f  ' f a m i ly  resemblance',  borrowed from 
Wittgenstein (1953) .  I t  suggests tha t  i t  suff ices  fo r  each re fe rent  
of  a word to have at leas t  one property in common with one or more 
other re fe ren ts ,  while at  the same time i t  is possible fo r  few 
propert ies or no property at a l l  to be common to a l l  o f  them.
Rosch and Mervis (1975) bui ld on th is  notion t h e i r  hypothesis tha t  
members of  a category are understood as proto typ ical  to the extent  
tha t  they bear a fami ly  resemblance to other members o f  the category 
- i . e .  the higher the degree o f  family  resemblance, the greater  the 
number o f  propert ies  shared with other members o f  the same category.  
Conversely, items viewed as most proto typ ical  of  a p a r t ic u la r  
category are those with lea s t  family  resemblance to (or membership 
in)  other categor ies.  There is a strong co r re la t io n  between the  
score an item gets on the basis of  p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  judgments and the 
one i t  gets on the basis of  i t s  family  resemblance (number of  shared 
a t t r i b u t e s ) .  In p ract ica l  terms th is  means that  a prototypical  
member o f  the category ' f r u i t '  (e .g .  ' a p p le ' )  shares most a t t r ib u te s  
with other members o f  the same category (e .g .  'o range ' ,  'peach')  and 
fewest with members of  categories other than ' f r u i t '  but on the same 
level  of  abstraction with i t  (superordinate l e v e l ) ,  e .g .  ' f u r n i t u r e ' ,  
'musical instrument' .  In th is  sense prototypical  members of  
categories have the propert ies  of  maximal informativeness and maximal 
d is c r im in a b i l i t y .  The p r in c ip le  of  maximization of  information and 
d is c r im in a b i l i t y  is considered responsible both fo r  the sal ience of  
the basic level  of  abstraction and fo r  the sal ience o f  prototypes.
I t  is obviously o f  central  importance to the present analysis to be 
able to te s t  the v a l i d i t y  o f  these pr inc ip les  fo r  verbs. The major 
obstacle is the one stated fo r  the basic level  o f  abstraction:  the 
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  obtaining l i s t s  of  a t t r ib u te s  (compiled by subjects)  
comparable to the ones Rosch and her colleagues have been able to 
obtain fo r  concrete nouns. Far from being character izab le  in terms 
o f  'perceptual  and funct ional  p roper t ies '  such as those presented fo r  
the concrete nouns tested,  most verbs involve f a r  more complex
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c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  The problem is discussed in d e ta i l  in Pulman 
(1983).  Pulman reports  the resu l ts  of  experiments he conducted 
roughly dup l ica t ing  the ones reported by Rosch but replacing noun 
categories with verb ones. Subjects were asked to w r i te  down as many 
a t t r ib u te s  as they could th ink  of  (w ith in  90 sec. per item) as being 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  the spec i f ic  verbs they were presented with (or  
ra ther  of  instances of  the events or act ions these verbs stood f o r ) .  
The responses ranged from synonyms and d e f in i t io n s  to  connotations,  
the category name i t s e l f  and some a t t r ib u te s  of  the kind Rosch had 
obtained fo r  nouns (e .g .  'hug' = 'using both arms') .  What is much 
more serious,  i f  the a t t r ib u te s  obtained were to be edited in the way 
suggested by Rosch, over 50% of the or ig ina l  ones ( f o r  each item) 
would have to be discounted as c le a r ly  inappropr iate .  In view of a l l  
th is ,  i t  can be no surprise th a t  family resemblance was not found to 
be p o s i t iv e ly  corre la ted  with p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  (which was precisely  
the hypothesis put to the t e s t ) .  Pulman's conclusion is th a t  family  
resemblance cannot be therefore  said to const i tu te  a causal fac tor  in 
the formation of  prototypes (Pulman 1983:119-20).
Two things have to be noticed here. F i r s t l y ,  obtaining  
p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  judgments fo r  the same sets of  verbs and t h e i r  
respective subordinates was no problem fo r  Pulman. Such judgments 
were also easy to obtain from Greek subjects operat ing with MGMVs, 
The actual d e t a i l s  of these tes ts  w i l l  be discussed in the re levant  
chapter. I t  seems, however, in order to o u t l in e  r i g h t  at the outset  
what the th e o re t ica l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are (given the present state  of  
the a r t ) .  The question is not so much whether the p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  
e f f e c t  holds fo r  verbs, but ra ther  which p r in c ip le (s )  is (a re )  
ac tua l ly  at work the re .  This leads us to the second point.  Leaving 
subjects aside,  fo r  a moment, and the sort  o f  information we normally 
associate with verbs,  consider some complications which a r ise  before 
we s t a r t  looking fo r  a t t r ib u t e s .  Take the c lassica l  example of  
' k i l l '  which is probably a c le a r  case o f  a basic leve l  term and 
r e l a t i v e l y  easy to f ind subordinates f o r .  A possible set of  
subordinates would include 'murder' ,  ' e x ec u te ' ,  'a s sas s in a te ' ,  e tc .  
An equally p lausib le  set would consist  o f  ' s t a b ' ,  ' run over' (with a 
c ar ) ,  ' s t r a n g l e ' ,  e tc .  The members o f  the former set are 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  in terms of  'purpose' or 'm o t iv e ' ,  those of  the l a t t e r
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one in terms of 'manner'.  This gives r ise  to a number of
complications which run counter to the very idea o f  tes t ing  the 
p r in c ip le  o f  ' fa m i ly  resemblance': f i r s t l y  there are problems of  
category inclusion which are not comparable to those of  nouns, A
stabbing or a s trangling  event might be reasonably considered an
instance of  'murdering' .  This does not,  however, necessari ly  imply
th a t  'murder' is to  be considered a superordinate of  's tab '  or
' s t ra n g le '  and there fore  higher than or at the same leve l  as ' k i l l ' .  
For while 'murder' necessari ly  implies ' k i l l '  (and is therefore  
included in the category ' k i l l ' ) ,  's tab '  and 'run over'  may not
re s u l t  in a murdering or k i l l i n g  event at a l l ,  contrary to
's t r a n g l e ' .  Such problems of  c lass- inc lus ion  are not l i k e l y  to turn  
up with the kinds of  nouns Rosch and her col leagues studied.
Consider now the s i tu a t io n  with respect to spec i f ic  a t t r ib u te s  for  
these terms and the formation of  prototypes.  The members of  the
f i r s t  set  of  hypothesized hyponyms of  ' k i l l '  share the property of  
' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  unl ike  the category name i t s e l f  which is unmarked 
fo r  th is  fe a ture .  In addi t ion to t h is ,  they a l l  share what they 
in h e r i t  from the category name, i . e .  'c au se - to -d ie '  or something to 
th a t  e f f e c t .  They are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  in terms of  d i f f e r e n t  motives, 
the evaluat ion of  which cannot be expected to be unanimous: 
'execut ing'  may be a lawful  act ion but fo r  some speakers at leas t  i t  
may well carry the connotations associated with 'murdering' .  The 
second set of  hypothesized hyponyms contains only one term which is 
properly included in the higher class,  namely 's t ra n g le '  and a number 
of  others which are not properly included, i . e .  'run o v er ' ,  ' s t a b ' ,  
' s h o o t ' ,  e tc .  One term w i l l  stand out as unspecif ied fo r  
' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' , namely 'run o v er ' .  They are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  in 
terms of  d i f f e r e n t  'means' through which the respect ive  actions are 
carr ied  out,  e .g .  'w i th  a car '  fo r  'run o v e r ' ,  'w i th  a gun' fo r  
' s h o o t ' ,  'w i th  a k n i fe '  fo r  ' s t a b ' ,  ' through pressure exercised by 
hands, e t c . '  fo r  ' s t r a n g l e ' .  By the sheer fa c t  tha t  ' run over' is  
singled out fo r  not being specif ied  fo r  ' in ten t iona l  i t y '  i t  w i l l  
probably receive a lower fami ly  resemblance score than 's ta b '  fo r  
instance. The only category properly included in the higher one 
( i r re sp e c t ive  of  whether ' k i l l '  or 'murder' is considered the 
immediately higher category in th is  case),  namely ' s t r a n g l e ' ,  w i l l
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probably receive a lower family  resemblance score than the re s t ,  fo r  
the very reason which renders i t  the most ' l e g i t i m a t e '  subordinate of  
' k i l l '  or 'murder' ,  namely th a t  i t  normally involves 'cause- to -d ie '  
( i . e .  necessari ly  implies ' k i l l i n g ' ) .
At this preliminary stage 
k  these observations only touch on the problems involved and are simply
meant to show the messiness of  the data o f  a t t r ib u te s  for  verbs and
the f u t i l i t y  o f  counting a t t r ib u te s  and establ ishing family
resemblance as a p lausib le  explanation of  category formation fo r  such
categor ies.  I f  ' f requency'  and cul tural  ' s a l i e n c e ' ,  (mentioned in
Rosch and Mervis 1975:599 as factors  also contr ibuting to category
formation and in p a r t i c u la r  to the formation o f  prototypes) are also
considered very b r i e f l y  in connection with the above data,  the re su l t
is not much b e t te r  fo r  the family resemblance p r in c ip le .  The
assumption is tha t  the most f a m i l i a r  objects are named f i r s t  and are
basic level  (e .g .  cats,  c h a i rs ) .  Superordinates are then formed
around such basic level  terms which are already establ ished and which
become the prototypes o f  the superordinate (e .g .  o f  'animal '  and
' f u r n i t u r e '  re s p e c t iv e ly ) .  I t  seems i n t u i t i v e l y  correct tha t
compared to ' s t a b ' ,  'run over' is more f a m i l i a r  and somehow more
c u l t u r a l l y  s a l ie n t  and more frequent ( in  terms of 'frequency of
c o n t a c t ' ) ,  yet  t h e i r  respect ive  family resemblance scores are not
very l i k e l y  to account fo r  th is  in t u i t io n .
F a m i l i a r i t y  and r e l a t i v e  sal ience,  although in bad need of an 
accurate explanation or at  lea s t  of  some e laboration,  look l i k e  more 
promising factors  in the case of  abstract categories such as those of  
verbs. They w i l l  there fore  be looked at in considerable de ta i l  in 
the chapter discussing p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  tests fo r  MGMVs.
I t  has to be pointed out once again tha t  there is  no reason to  expect
semantic competence fo r  verbs to be s im i la r  to th a t  fo r  nouns.
Moreover, i t  is p lausib le  to expect d i f f e r e n t  a t t r ib u te s  in d i f f e r e n t
verb domains. In general what subjects seem to grasp as verb 
a t t r ib u te s  can be shown to be more 'vague' and ' inaccura te '  ( in  
Putnam's sense) than the 'perceptual '  and ' f u n c t io n a l '  propert ies of  
the nouns Rosch and her col leagues investigated,  even wi th in  domains
*(For detailed discussion see chapters 4 and 5).
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involving r e l a t i v e l y  'concrete'  material  such as th a t  of  motion 
verbs. None of  these considerations inva l ida tes  Rosch's hypothesis 
fo r  category formation in the spec i f ic  areas she has examined. The 
observations made in th is  section do not bear on the issue of  whether 
cer ta in  events are more prototypical  of  an inc lus ive  event or not.  
They simply ra ise  questions concerning class inc lus ion,  the v a l i d i t y  
of  the ' fa m i ly  resemblance' p r in c ip le  and the f e a s i b i l i t y  of  the task  
of  a r r iv in g  at  comparable (and therefore  also countable) a t t r ib u te s  
by d i r e c t  appeal to na tive  speakers in the case of  verbs (or ra ther  
in domains other than the ones Rosch has been concerned w i th ) .
What seems to be completely indispensible in Rosch's theory is that  
categories are i n t e r n a l l y  structured by gradients of  
representat iveness and category boundaries are not d e f i n i t e .  The 
p r inc ip les  of  category formation fo r  d i f f e r e n t  types o f  categories  
can probably be best explored a f t e r  considerably more experimental 
work has been done in d i f f e r e n t  areas, checking f i r s t  whether the 
prototype e f fe c t  is of  as wide a p p l i c a b i l i t y  as i t  is expected to be 
(on the basis of  th e o re t ica l  and experimental work done so f a r ) .  
Most of  Rosch's more recent work concentrates on 'degree of  
membership' ra ther  than the nature of  the prototype as a mental 
construct.  So d e f i n i t e  answers on the p r inc ip les  governing i t s  
formation are ra the r  premature. Yet even as a piece o f  exploratory  
work, i f  not a complete theory o f  ca tegor iza t ion ,  Rosch's 
invest iga t ion  raises a number of  s t imulat ing questions and suggests 
some possible answers. Besides, as i t  depends heav i ly  on speakers' 
judgments, i t  a t t ra c t s  a t ten t ion  to the tremendous s ignif icance of  
tests  even fo r  descr ip t ive  l i n g u i s t i c  purposes.
I t  is possible th a t  tes ts  d i f f e r e n t  from the ones Rosch has used are 
more appropriate fo r  other domains (such as the semantic s im i la r i t y  
tes ts  discussed here in the re levant chapter ) .  Although explanation  
of experimental resu l ts  may be 'a poor su b st i tu te '  fo r  understanding 
human m enta l i ty  (Johnson-Laird and Wason 1977:2) ,  i t  seems quite  
indispensable fo r  a semantic descr ipt ion which wishes to take into 
consideration 'o th e r  people and the wor ld ' .
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1.4 D e l im i ta t ion  of  the f i e l d  o f  motion verbs
I t  is wel l  known th a t  a l i s t  containing a l l  and only verbs o f  motion 
is "an impossible ideal"  ( M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird 1976:530).  I t  is 
not in e f f e c t  obvious that  such an ' i d e a l '  should be posited in the 
f i r s t  place,  given the nature o f  language and the fuzziness of  the 
boundaries of  semantic f i e l d s ,  which was recognized long before 
Prototype theory: Schweidenweiler (1942),  among others,  already
notices th a t  the boundaries of  semantic f i e ld s  are not c le a r .
I t  seems p lausib le  to accept th a t  the c leares t  case of  a motion V is 
one which describes the change of location of  an object .  This means 
tha t  what is common to a l l  the Vs we wish without he s i ta t ion  to cal l  
motion Vs is tha t  they describe (among other things) the fac t  tha t:  a 
cer ta in  object A which at a given time t  was at  some point x is at  
point y  at a l a t e r  time t ' .  So, Mar iet ta  came home implies that the 
subject was away from home at  time t - 1  and that  she was at home at  
some l a t e r  time t .
In addi t ion to the class of  Vs describing a change-of- locat ion of  an 
object ,  verbs involv ing a change-of-posit ion not of  the object as a 
whole but of  parts o f  i t  may be also understood as MVs. This 
category might include Vs describing change of  shape, o r ie n ta t io n /  
ro ta t io n  or o s c i l l a t io n .  So, in Mar ie t ta  bent down, the motion 
described by the V does not involve a change-of- locat ion of  
' M a r i e t t a ' .  The change in the sub ject 's  sta te  described here is a 
change in shape resu l t ing  from her going from the standing posi t ion,  
f o r  instance, to the one re ferred  to by 'bend' .  Motion but no 
change-of- locat ion of  the whole object is involved.
Some l i n g u is t s ,  such as Ikegami (1969) and M i l l e r  (1972),  use the 
term 'V o f  motion' to r e f e r  only to Vs which describe a change-of- 
location  (o f  the whole o b je c t ) .  Others, l i k e  Nida (1975),  consider 
as motion Vs also those re fe r r in g  to categories such as the ones ju s t  
discussed above (without recognizing them as d i f f e r e n t  categories  
e i t h e r ) .  Nida re fe rs  to such Vs in English as involving motion of  
'major parts o f  the body',  which he contrasts with Vs describing
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motion of 'minor parts of  the body', such as 'w in k ' ,  ' s m i le ' ,  etc.  
In his analysis i t  is  hard to see: (a) how one would d is t inguish  
'major '  from 'minor' parts (consider fo r  instance the case of  'wave')  
and (b) how he excludes Vs describing a c t i v i t i e s  o f  various sorts 
such as ' w r i t e ' ,  ' c u t ' ,  ' p i e r c e ' ,  e t c . ,  since a l l  a c t i v i t i e s  involve  
motion o f  some part  o f  the object performing them. No d is t in c t iv e  
c r i t e r i a  are o ffered .  Besides, no explanation is given fo r  excluding 
so-cal led 'contact Vs' such as: ' to uch ' ,  ' h i t ' ,  ' k i c k ' ,  e tc .
In •wechanics the motion o f  a body is analysed in terms o f  a 
' t r a n s l a t io n '  (change-of- location) of  i t s  centre o f  g ra v i ty ,  on the 
one hand, and a ro ta t io n  or change of  shape or o s c i l l a t io n ,  on the 
other.  The l a t t e r  type is re levant as regards the motion of  parts of  
the body r e la t i v e  to the centre of  g ra v i ty  or the pos it ion  of  
equil ibr ium (considered as a point  of  re fe rence ) .  This d is t in c t io n  
between change-of- locat ion and a l l  other kinds of  motion may be said 
to be re f lec te d  in language at leas t  to the extent th a t  r a d ic a l ly  
d i f f e r e n t  frames are compatible with motion verbs which f a l l  into a 
'change-o f - locat io n '  category and those which do not.
Two major categories are there fore  recognized: the f i r s t  category
contains verbs describing the t ra n s fe r  of  an object from one place to
another. Al l  the Vs th a t  belong here are change-of- locat ion
(henceforth CL) verbs and they give r is e  to a contrad i t ion  i f  
inserted in a frame l ike.:
(A) A _ _  -ed (B),  but (B) did not change lo c a t io n /p lace .
Examples of  such verbs are 'g o ' ,  ' t r a v e l ' ,  ' e n t e r ' ,  'wander',  
' b r i n g ' ,  'send ' ,  e tc .
The second category comprises verbs already re fe rre d  to as describing  
kinds of motion involving parts o f  the object  changing location but 
not the object as a whole. These verbs are change-of-posit ion
(henceforth CP) verbs and give r i s e  to a contrad ict ion  i f  inserted in
a frame l i k e :
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(B) A -ed (B) ,  but (B) did not move.
Examples of  such verbs are ' t r e m b le ' ,  ' t u r n ' ,  ' l e a n ' ,  ' s i t  down', 
etc .
I t  is obvious th a t  a great number of  Vs describing a c t i v i t i e s  of  
various sorts w i l l  d isplay the same behaviour concerning frame (B) as 
the verbs ju s t  discussed, e .g . :
(3) * the man wrote/was w r i t in g ,  but he was not moving.
The same holds fo r  ' p i e r c e ' ,  ' c u t ' ,  'break'  and a lo t  more. What is 
bas ica l ly  described here is  the re s u l t  tha t  the motion of  the subject  
has (also on the ob ject ,  i f  there  is one), ra the r  than the actual  
motion as such. The action o f ' w r i t i n g ' ,  fo r  instance, can be 
performed by hand, by mouth or by foot even ( in  the case of  
handicapped people) ,  and by machine; the point  i s ,  however, th a t  
mimicking the movements that  remind one of w r i t in g  without anything 
resu l t ing  from i t ,  w i l l  not be re fe rred  to as ' w r i t i n g ' .  So none of  
the Vs describing a c t i v i t i e s  of  various sorts but not motion as such 
need be considered motion Vs. The same could be said to apply to  
what M i l l e r  (1972) c a l ls  'contac t '  Vs. The category would comprise 
Vs such as: ' h i t ' ,  ' b e a t ' ,  'push' ,  ' s l a p ' ,  ' to u ch ' .
The issue of  what const i tutes a verb of  motion and what does not 
seems to present problems even to those l in g u is ts  who equate motion 
with change-of- locat ion o f  the whole object .  Thus Ikegami (1969) 
considers a verb as a verb of  motion i f  the feature  o f  motion is the  
pr inc ipa l  and not a subordinate element o f  i t s  meaning. He also  
allows fo r  the p o s s i b i l i t y  tha t  a verb may cease to be a motion verb 
"when we can no longer assign the feature  o f  movement to i t "  (p .87) ,  
and mentions 'escape ' ,  ' v i s i t '  and 'e lope '  as examples o f  verbs where 
features other than motion ones have become so prominent as to  
overshadow the movement fea tu re .  'Assemble' is quoted as an example 
of  a V which "ceases" to be a motion verb in We are assembled vs We 
have assembled (where, he would claim, the motional uses are f e l t  to  
be or ig ina l  and the non-motional ones d e r iv a t i v e ) .  Besides, Ikegami
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holds that  the reverse process is also possible,  in the sense that  
the feature  of  movement may s t a r t  o f f  as a subordinate element (or  
even non-existent )  and become prominent. On th a t  basis he analyses 
' throw' in:
(4)  He threw the bal l  ski 1 f u l l y
as "make a cer ta in  movement of  the arm" + "cause something to go
through the a i r "  ( p . 89) whi le in (5 ) ,
(5) He threw the bal l  over the fence
he analyses i t  as "cause something to go through the a i r "  + "by
making a cer ta in  movement of  the arm" ( i b i d . ) .
F i r s t  of  a l l ,  i t  is qu ite  unclear how Ikegami decides when a feature  
is prominent or primary and when i t  is  subordinate.  Besides, i t  is
not c lear  tha t  two d i f f e r e n t  analyses have to be proposed, unless a 
system of  descript ion is presented which provides the pr inc ip les  on 
the basis of  which such d is t in c t io n s  are v a l id .  I t  is  p lausib le  to 
assume that d i f f e r e n t  contexts w i l l  involve d i f f e r e n t  ( to some 
extent)  understandings of a verb. Once the s terotyp ica l  propert ies  
of  a verb have been establ ished, the r e la t i v e  sal ience of  such 
propert ies may be discussed in connection with spec i f ic  instances of 
the event,  act ion ,  e t c . ,  described.  In the absence of such l o g ic a l l y  
p r io r  steps, decisions on the appearance and disappearance of 
features seem unwarranted and probably premature. For the moment we 
are concentrating,  best as we can, on whether the fea ture  of  motion 
can be said to belong to the meaning of  cer ta in  Vs in an i n t u i t i v e  
ra the r  than a t h e o r e t i c a l l y  wel l -es tab l ished sense. This means that  
i f  a verb can be seen as describing how an object changes from a 
place p  at  time t  to another place p '  at a l a t e r  time t '  i t  is  a very 
good candidate fo r  the semantic f i e l d  under considerat ion.  At th is  
stage nothing more can be said about ' throw' except th a t  in most of  
i t s  uses as well  as in i t s  most c h a ra c te r is t ic  instances i t  seems to  
involve th is  fe a tu re .  The 'most general '  and the 'most p ro to typ ic a l '  
understanding seem to coincide as regards the central  property of
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th is  f i e l d  ( i . e .  'motion' )  fo r  the vast m ajo r i ty  of  the verbs 
included here. Hence ' throw' does not seem to const i tu te  a 
border l ine case.
The s i tu a t io n  is more complicated in the case of  verbs such as 'push'  
and ' p u l i ' .  A sentence l i k e :
(6) He pushed the car t  up the h i l l
is analysed by Ikegami as involving " 'go'  + ' a t  the same time as 
pushing'" (1969:89,  161) and on th a t  basis 'push' is regarded as a V 
of  motion. I assume that  in a d i f f e r e n t  context,  as fo r  instance:
(7)  He was pushing the wall in vain
the V would be regarded as not being a motion verb.  I t  can be 
argued, however, tha t  the impl icat ion of  motion in (6) is the re su l t  
of  knowledge to the e f f e c t  tha t  i f  an impulse is exercised on 
something movable, provided cer ta in  factors  are favourable (e .g .  the  
impulse is s u f f i c i e n t l y  strong and there is no obstac le ) ,  the  
re c ip ie n t  of  the impulse moves. A fu r th e r  im pl ica t ion  is that one 
pushes something i f  one's in tent ion  is to make i t  move away. In 
terms of  the most general understanding o f  'push' i t  cannot be 
considered a motion verb as such. I t s  proto typica l  image may, 
however, be c loser  to the s i tu a t io n  presented in (6)  than the one 
presented in ( 7 ) .  This is one of  the many instances which show that  
even w i th in  f a i r l y  w e l l -de f ined  subfie lds ,  such as 'change-of-  
locat ion verbs' the borders are expectedly fuzzy.
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976),  who also r e s t r i c t  the domain of  
motion verbs to those o f  change-of- locat ion,  consider verbs such as 
'b r e a th e ' ,  'shrug ' ,  'cough' ,  ' s m i le ' ,  'sneeze ' ,  e t c . ,  as border l ine  
cases, since no change-of- locat ion is exactly  involved.  They apply a 
te s t  o f  the form He shrugged, but he changed location  and He 
shrugged, but he d i d n ' t  change locat ion ( p . 529).  Since both Ss are 
acceptable,  the 'b u t '  t e s t  excludes the set of  verbs in question from
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the f i e l d .  They note,  however, that  He shrugged his shoulders, but 
they d id n ' t  change location  is odd, which goes to show tha t  motion is 
involved somewhere. Their  conclusion is th a t  i f  the above set is to 
be included, then one should also include verbs such as ' o s c i l l a t e ' ,  
' r o t a t e ' ,  ' s p i n ' ,  ' t u r n ' ,  and s im i la r  verbs describing ro ta ry  
changes. Besides, they consider that verbs such as 'absorb' ,
'ex ten d ' ,  ' f i l l ' ,  'grow',  'widen' and others implying 'change in 
shape or s iz e '  would also have to be included ( i f  'b r e a t h e ' ,  's hrug ' ,  
e t c . ,  are not excluded) as involving "movement of  boundaries" 
( i b i d . ) .
Since a l l  such decisions are in e f fe c t  subject ive and a r b i t r a r y ,  
nothing is i l l e g i t i m a t e .  I t  seems, however, important to id e n t i fy ,  
even at such a pre l iminary  stage, verbs which are f e l t  to belong
together ,  i . e .  which form a natural  class,  on i n t u i t i v e  grounds. 
Evidently 'shrug'  consti tutes a special problem, because causative  
'shrug'  (e .g .  'he shrugged his shoulders')  does involve change-of- 
location o f  the ob ject ,  while i n t r a n s i t i v e  'shrug'  does not involve  
t ra n s fe r  of  the subject as a whole. In th is  sense i t  is s l i g h t l y  
misleading to base decisions on the status of  the natural  class of ,  
say, 'minor bodily-movement specifying verbs' on t h is  id iosyncra t ic  
fea ture  o f  a single member o f  the set .  (Notice th a t  th is  s i tua t ion
does not ar ise with any of  the remaining verbs M i l l e r  and Johnson-
Laird include in the set in quest ion.)
A second remark has to be made concerning verbs o f  ' r o t a r y  motion'
( ' r o t a t e ' ,  ' t u r n ' ,  e t c . ) .  I t  seems that  a decision as to whether 
they are to be included or not is  independent o f  tha t  fo r  the 
previous group. They const i tu te  a f a i r l y  e a s i ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  class:  
they seem to involve some change of  o r ien ta t ion  of  the whole object  
(as in t r a n s i t i v e s )  probably with a f ixed po int.  I f  the f i e l d  is
re s t r ic te d  to change-o f- locat ion verbs, they are a border l ine  case. 
I f  the f i e l d  involves motion verbs in general ,  they are indisputable  
candidates.
The t h i r d  set o f  verbs mentioned in M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird includes 
'absorb ' ,  ' e x te n d ' ,  ' f i l l '  and the l i k e  and is said to  involve
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'movement of  boundaries' .  Notice tha t Ikegami (1969) considers verbs 
such as these ( 'expand' ,  ' s t r e t c h ' ,  ' s w e l l ' )  as involving part  of the 
object moving while the res t  remains in the same place.  In th is  
understanding he lumps them together  with 'stand up' ,  ' f a l l '  and 
'shake ' .  One might object to the inclusion of indiv idual  items in 
e i t h e r  categor iza t ion  but,  as already stated,  the most important 
thing at th is  stage seems to be id e n t i fy in g  whole groups ra ther  than 
individual  items. I t  seems more p lausib le  to consider 'change of  
shape/size '  verbs as a class apart  and a borderl ine  case o f  motion 
verbs. Others such as 'stand up' and 'shake ' ,  which do not involve  
change-of- locat ion of  the whole object ,  are c e r t a in ly  with in  the
f i e l d  of  motion verbs.
'Contact '  verbs,  already mentioned in connection with verbs 
describing various a c t i v i t i e s ,  are an even more problematic case as 
they necessari ly  imply motion (and usual ly change-of- locat ion even) 
of at leas t  one of  the objects involved.  Owing to th is  impl icat ion  
such verbs are included at th is  stage: they are f e l t  to be nearer to
the 'c e n t re '  o f  the f i e l d  than 'movement of  boundaries' verbs or the 
class comprising ' s m i le ' ,  'cough' ,  'b re a th e ' ,  e tc .  Yet the majori ty  
of the verbs that  belong to th is  group e xh ib i t  quite id iosyncrat ic  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s ,  which do not seem to r e la t e  to other propert ies  
which play a central  ro le  in establ ishing inter-group re la t ionsh ips .  
Hence no use w i l l  be made of such verbs.
The c r i t e r i a  discussed above can be employed to categorize MG verbs
of motion into CL and CP verbs.  The major i ty  of  CL verbs imply 
covering a c er ta in  distance.  Therefore in order to confirm the
correctness o f  a CL c a tegor iza t ion ,  one can consider as a suitable
syntactic  tes t  the co m p a t ib i l i ty  of  a p a r t i c u la r  verb with a phrase
describing that  distance.  One possible test-environment involving a 
measure phrase which is suggested in M i l l e r  (1972) takes the form:
A _____  PAST (£) U a ) 10 p o n t u s / m e t r a / x i l j o m e t r a
A _____  -ed (B ) ( f o r )  10 centimetres/metres/k i lometres.
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Examples of  MG CL verbs which pass the above te s t  are ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  
' k i l a o '  ( r o l l ) ,  ' s i k o n o '  ( r a i s e ) ,  e tc .  There are,  however, verbs 
which are i n t u i t i v e l y  f e l t  to describe CL although they cannot occur 
in such an environment. Further syntactic  tests  are therefore  
necessary to secure t h e i r  inclusion.  Four appropriate environments 
are proposed, concentrat ing on the points where the motion s tar ts  
(source) and/or ends (goa l ) .  L is t  I I  contains a l l  f ive  te s t -  
environments (a) to  (e) and the verbs which can occur in each one of  
them. There is a natural  hierarchy in these te s ts ,  in tha t  most 
verbs which are compatible with a cer ta in  environment are also 
compatible with any subsequent one. The l a s t  environment included in 
L is t  I I ,  namely (e ) ,  allows also for  the inclusion o f  CP verbs. 
Examples of  th is  l a s t  category are: ' t a l a n d e v o w e '  ( o s c i l l a t e ) ,
' s k i v o ' (bend), ' ka Bom e '  ( s i t ) ,  e t c . ^
In the present study only physical motion of  concrete objects and a 
l i t e r a l  understanding of MVs are taken into  considerat ion.  
Discussing the boundaries of  ' l i t e r a l '  understanding l i e s  outside the 
scope of the present analysis ,  although the problem is in fac t  very 
acute in connection with MVs. Cases l i k e  (9) or (10):
(9) o 5romos o b i v i  s t o  x o r j o
the road leads to the v i l l a g e
(10) o k i s o s  s k a r f a l o s e  m e x r i  t o  p a r a B i r o  
the ivy (has) climbed up to the window
involve concrete objects and (10) describes also physical motion
( re la ted  to growing).  Yet the verbs ' o b i y o '  ( lead) and ' s k a r a f a l o n o '
(cl imb) are not indisputably  ' l i t e r a l l y  understood' in such contexts.  
Such cases w i l l  be mentioned separately  when the analysis depends 
c r u c ia l l y  on whether a p a r t i c u la r  use is l i t e r a l  or not; the whole 
issue w i l l  be discussed in Chapter 3.
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Notes on Chapter 1
1. The terms 'componential analysis '  and ' l e x i c a l  decomposition' are 
used interchangeably in th is  thesis ,
2. Some l in g u is ts  have also used a mixture of  two d i f f e r e n t
languages in t h e i r  representat ions.  So, Talmy (1972) uses the  
Spanish preposi t ion POR in combination with English words to  
represent what he c a l ls  "the deep morpheme" corresponding to  
"through".
3.  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) use log ica l  formulae in t h e i r
representat ions with abstract operators introduced by ' i f '  
clauses (they discuss, however, the r e la t io n  of these operators  
to p a r t i c u la r  senses of  the corresponding English words). From 
th is  point  of  view t h e i r  semantic elements are a cross between 
t r a d i t io n a l  features and conditions (unspecif ied as to t h e i r  
nature ) ,  I f e e l ,  th ere fore ,  free to r e fe r  to them using e i th er  
term,
4. I am re fe r r in g  to Frege's well known and frequently  quoted
passage on ' l o g i c a l l y  simple' elements:
"One cannot require th a t  everything shal l  be decomposed any 
more than one can require th a t  a chemist shal l  decompose 
every substance. What is simple cannot be decomposed and
what is lo g i c a l l y  simple cannot have a proper d e f i n i t i o n .
Now something l o g i c a l l y  simple is no more given us at the 
outset than most o f  the chemical elements are; i t  is reached 
only by means o f  s c i e n t i f i c  work".
(Geach and Black 1966:43).
5. I t  is qu i te  possible tha t  i f  these gods were conceived of as
having the ' s u p e r f i c i a l '  c h ara c te r is t ic s  o f  cows for  instance,  
t h e i r  o f fspr ing  would not be ca l led  ' b o y s ' / ' g i r l s ' . Notice th a t  
the Minotaur, which lacked a number o f  the ' s u p e r f i c i a l '
chara c te r is t ic s  o f  human beings, is never ca l led  'boy'  (as fa r  as
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I know), although he shared with humans the property of  being 
mortal despite being the offspr ing of  a god.
6. Whether word meanings should be equated with necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t  conditions is o f  course an extremely important issue 
which deserves (and w i l l  be given) special  considerat ion in 
subsequent sections.
7. I must admit tha t  I am one of  those few people who bel ieve there  
is some value in th is  d is t in c t io n ,  although I agree th a t  the 
attempts at de fin ing the nature of  e i t h e r  markers or 
dist inguishers  have never been s a t is fa c to ry .
8. In s t r u c t u r a l i s t  theor ies ,  gradation is usual ly  r e s t r i c te d  to  
spec i f ic  types o f  vocabulary,  e .g .  the 'hot-warm-cold'  kind of  
paradigm.
9. Lacking a na tive  speaker's in tu i t io n s  on the semantics of  'c l imb'
I w i l l  consider the data of  these analyses correct and reserve  
stronger claims fo r  my MGMVs, fo r  which I also have supporting 
evidence from the semantic s i m i l a r i t y  and p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  tests I 
have carr ied out.
10. Extensional is t  theor ies of  meaning (e .g .  Putnam 1970, 1975 Kripke 
1972) are often juxtaposed to 'm e n t a l is t i c '  ones (Dahlgren 
1978:58).  This term w i l l  not be used here as i t  might create  
confusion regarding the ul t imate  goal o f  le x ic a l  l i n g u i s t i c  
invest iga t ion  which is undoubtedly th a t  o f  charac te r iz ing  the 
'mental '  lex icon.  I can see no discrepancy between 'm e n ta l is t ic '  
and 'n o n -m en ta l is t ic '  theor ies o f  meaning concerning th is  goal,
i . e .  a r r iv in g  at  a descr ipt ion of  semantic competence: of  
whatever is  in the mind of  an individual  which enables him/her to  
use a p a r t i c u la r  word appropr iately .
11. I am d e l ib e r a te ly  r e s t r i c t i n g  th is  short discussion o f  the theory  
of  stereotypes to Putnam (1975),  as most points o f  in te res t  to
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the present inves t iga t ion  (also analysed in Putnam 1970 and 
Kripke 1972) are covered there .
12. This point  needs c l a r i f i c a t i o n .  To s ta r t  with ,  what Putnam says 
in th is  connection is not s t r i c t l y  t rue  wi th in  the framework of  
his own system: s p ec ia l is ts  could well possess what consti tutes  
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions fo r  a term f a l l i n g  w i th in  
t h e i r  domain, since they also have information f i x in g  the  
extension of  the term. So Putnam's claim that  knowledge 
s u f f i c i e n t  to f i x  the extension is not possessed by a l l  or any 
speakers does not apply to a l l  terms. What he is probably r ig h t  
about is that the 'psychological  s ta te '  of  the indiv idua l  speaker 
does not determine the extension.  I therefore  tend to understand 
th is  ra the r  sweeping statement as an attempt at drawing at tent ion  
to the fa c t  th a t  meaning is not a function of  the psychological  
state  of  any indiv idual  speaker, in other words that  knowing the 
meaning of a term is not a matter of  being in a cer ta in  
psychological s ta te .  Another impl icat ion,  however, is completely 
consistent with his theory,  although not wel l  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the 
terms ju s t  mentioned. Putnam claims tha t  the id e a l i z a t io n  of  
supposing th a t  there is such a thing fo r  which the descr ipt ion  
' t r e e '  is t rue  ( i . e .  the proposit ion 'This is a t r e e ' )  is very 
severe. This cannot, however, be equal ly the case fo r  terms such 
as 'go ld '  or 'water '  which have an indisputably  i d e n t i f i a b l e  
extension (accessible to s c ie n t is ts )  at lea s t  concerning 'current  
s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge'.
13. I am obviously ta lk in g  about the lexicon of  the same language. 
Besides t h is ,  the lexicon of  each language w i l l  necessari ly  
r e f l e c t  in large  part  both cul ture  and language spec i f ic  
information (see also Pulman 1983:168).
14. I am using 'weak' here in Putnam's sense, where roughly speaking, 
the stronger the stereotype the nearer one is to ac tua l ly  
possessing necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions,  or ,  at  any ra te ,  
enough information to dis t inguish the item in question from a l l  
re la ted  ones.
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15. A 'category'  is understood as a number of  objects which are 
considered equivalent and designated by a name, e .g .  ' c a t ' ,  
' c h a i r ' .
16. The actual  passage reads as fol lows:
" . . .  words in natural  language are not genera l ly  'yes-no ':  
there are things of  which the descr ipt ion ' t r e e '  is c le a r ly  
fa ls e ,  to be sure, but there are a host of  border l ine cases. 
Worse, the l in e  between the c lear  cases and the borderl ine  
cases is i t s e l f  fuzzy.  Thus the id e a l i z a t io n  involved in 
supposing th a t  there is such a thing as the set of  things of  
which the term ' t r e e '  is true - is ac tua l ly  very severe".
(Putnam 1975b:133)
17. By th is  term I am re fe r r in g  to a c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  the basic 
level  already mentioned, namely that i t s  categories contain the 
most information.
18. For the c o l le c t io n  o f  m a te r ia l ,  standard d ic t io n a r ie s  o f  MG have 
been used: Bostanjoglou (1962) and Dimitrakos (1969).  For
special purposes, e .g .  d is t inguishing between basic leve l  and 
subordinate terms, the 'corpus' was supplemented with material  
from three f i c t i o n  books: Tzortzoglou N. "Otar i  O r g i z e t e  i  G i "
(When the Earth Gets Angry),  Kazantzaki N. "Megas A l e k s a n d r o s "  
(Alexander the Great) ,  Sari Z, " o t a n  o i l i o s  . . . "  (when the sun 
. . . ) .  These were chosen simply because they contain a l o t  of  MVs 
in extensive descr ipt ions .  Three newspapers ' V im a ' ,  
' K a t h i m e r i n i ' ,  and ' E t h n o s ' were searched fo r  supplementary 
material  from September to December 1983 and two magazines 
' I k o n e s '  and ' G i n e k a ' in 1985, to secure inclusion of more recent  
uses. My personal in tu i t io n s  concerning th is  material  were 
constantly checked against those of  other native speakers of  
standard MG. I t  is there fore  assumed tha t  the sample o f  MGMVs 
used in the present analysis is at  least  representa t ive .
- 81 -
2. THE 'STATES - PROCESSES - EVENTS' CATEGORIZATION 
AND ITS APPLICATION TO MOTION VERBS
2.1 Prel iminar ies
I t  is genera l ly  assumed and sometimes e x p l i c i t l y  stated (Lyons 
1977:482-4) tha t  our perceptions of  the physical world are organized 
and described wi th in  a conceptual framework which provides fo r  the  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  (a) s t a t e s - o f - a f f a i r s  and (b) processes, events,  
actions.  Hence the 'a rchetypa l '  d is t in c t io n  between s t a t i c  and 
dynamic s ituat ions  is almost unanimously accepted in most attempts at  
a semantic classif icat ion of  verbs. However, th is  is about a l l  tha t  
there is s ig n i f ic a n t  agreement on. As w i l l  be seen in what fol lows,  
there is no agreement on what 'dynamic' includes,  nor on what the 
d is t in c t io n  is a d is t in c t io n  o f .  Sentences, predications and verbs 
are the usual candidates but also s itua t ions  at la rg e .  Somewhat 
d i f f e r e n t  posit ions are adopted by Vendler (1957),  Kenny (1963),  
S e i le r  (1968),  Leech (1969),  Coseriu (1971),  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird
(1976),  Lyons (1977),  Mourelatos (1978).  No single approach, though, 
can const i tu te  an adequate basis fo r  the descript ion of  the facts of  
MGMVs, so the main points of  controversy have to be looked at  in some 
d e t a i l .
I t  is important to invest iga te  the extent to which the d is t in c t io n  
bears on the semantics o f  indiv idua l  Vs or character izes verb-forms,  
or grammatical categor ies,  since there is some t ru t h  in d i f f e r e n t  
claims, e .g .  with regard to associat ions with ' a s p e c t ' ,  with the verb 
versus ad jec t ive  d is t in c t io n  as well as with the semantic features of  
ind iv idua l  Vs (durat ion vs ins tan tane i ty  of  a c t io n ) .  Besides the 
in te ra c t io n  o f  these fac to rs ,  addi t ional  ones can be detected in the 
area of  MGMVs, such as the ro le  of  the nature of  the 'theme' (moving 
o b j e c t ) .
In English the d is t in c t io n  is assumed to l e x i c a l i z e  in the opposition  
between 'be '  and 'h a v e ' ,  on the one hand, and 'become' and ' g e t ' ,  on
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the other.  In the domain under invest iga t ion  one can consider MG 
'p o s i t io n '  Vs such as: ' /me'  ( b e ) / ' v r i s k o m e '  (be found, located) ,
' s t e k o ' / ' s t e k o m e '  (s tand),  ' k a B o m e j ' / i m e  k a B i s m e n o s - i  ' (be seated),  
' y e r n o / i m e  y e r m e n o s - i ' ( l e a n ) ,  ' k s a p l o n o j / i m  k s a p l o m e n o s - i ' ( l i e )  as 
candidates fo r  the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  of  s t a t i v i t y  and a l l  MGMVs as 
dynamic verbs, i . e .  candidates fo r  the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  o f  the absence 
of s t a t i v i t y .  Everything else is controvers ia l .
The major issues th a t  w i l l  hopeful ly  be i l luminated are:
1. Whether the d is t in c t io n  into two categories ( ' s t a t e s '  and 
everything else)  is adequate.
2. Whether the boundaries between the categories are c le a r -cu t  or 
fuzzy and the d is t in c t io n  a matter of  gradation ra ther  than a 
categorical  'yes-no'  phenomenon.
3. What is the 'o b je c t '  of  the d is t in c t io n .  (Does i t  a f fe c t  verbs, 
predications or both?)
4. Which p a r t i c u la r  c h arac te r is t ics  of  verbs or whole predications  
contribute  to the d is t in c t io n  - semantic chara c te r is t ic s  and 
aspect of  individual  verb forms, presence and type of  PP, 
semantic chara c te r is t ic s  of  the theme (such as 'c o untab i . l i ty ' )  
being the most obvious candidates.
2.2 An overview o f  the standard tes ts  fo r  d is t inguishing between 
states - processes - events and how to  f a i l  them
Before ta ck l ing  the problems 1 to 4 (section 2 .1 )  i t  is important to 
draw a t te n t io n  to two points .  F i r s t l y ,  the d is t in c t io n  between 
states and events is  usual ly  understood as an i n t u i t i v e  one, ra re ly  
defined and more often exemplif ied by means of  sentences o f  the type:
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Mariet ta  understands Quantum Mechanics (s ta te )
vs Mar ie t ta  arr ived at 5 o 'c lock  (event ) .
Secondly, a number of  syntactic  tests  have been used by a number of  
l in g u is ts  to help id e n t i f y  s ta t iv e  and non-s ta t ive  verbs, at  leas t  in 
English.  A consideration of  these tests  seems in order here, as i t  
has a bearing on a l l  four problems.
The standard tes t  fo r  id e n t i fy in g  s ta t ive  Vs in English is to apply 
the ru le  fo r  creating progressive forms: s ta t ives  normally re je c t  the 
progressive aspect, hence th is  method is extensive ly  applied (Kenny 
1963, M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird 1976, among o thers ) .  As the 
progressive aspect covers (among other things) the need to represent
a s i tu a t io n  as happening or developing through t ime, i t  is n a tu ra l ly
incompatible with ' s t a t e '  denoting verbs. Anderson (1973),  re la tes  
constructions exh ib i t ing  progressive aspect to  ' p a r a l l e l '  ones
involving "be in the process of  Ving", e .g . :
John is f a l l i n g  - John is in the process of  f a l l i n g
*John is knowing the t ru th  - *John is in the process of  knowing
the t ru th .
This te s t  could be used as a natural  te s t  fo r  s ingl ing out English 
sta t ives  or ,  at l e a s t ,  fo r  dis t inguishing between states and
everything e lse .  Notice,  however, tha t  problems a r ise  already: I 'm 
understanding more about Quantum Mechanics as each day goes by is 
offered by Mourelatos (1978:419) as an example o f  "semantic 
t ransposi t ion" ,  which causes 'understand' to function in an a c t i v i t y  
context unl ike  He understands the real  nature o f  the problem which is
given as an instance o f  a ' s t a t e ' .  Yet even Mourelatos,  who
recognizes that  we are a c tu a l ly  deal ing with a categor iza t ion  of  
predications ra th e r  than words, and moreover th a t  aspectual
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di fferences are a l l  important,  accepts that the special  a f f i n i t y  of  
'understand' or 'know' with states is beyond doubt.
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) suggest tha t  the stat ive-dynamic  
d is t in c t io n  might be 'p r i m i t i v e '  and that although i ts  l i n g u i s t i c  
representat ion by means o f  s ta t iv e  vs non-stat ive  verbs may not be 
universa l ,  i t  is present in English verbs at  l ea s t .  Their  suggestion 
seems to stem from Brown's (1973) observations to the e f f e c t  tha t  
both the progressive ' - i n g '  and the Imperative are present in the 
e a r l i e s t  sentences chi ldren u t t e r ,  but never with s ta t iv e  verbs, 
although a number of  other constructions are overgeneral ized and 
therefore  used wi th unsuitable stems. Notice,  there fore ,  tha t  the 
v a l i d i t y  o f  the progressive and Imperative tests  is not questioned.  
The occurrence o f  verbs with the progressive and the Imperative is  
not even understood as a simple te s t  but ra ther  as the decisive  
fac tor  on the basis o f  which an i n t u i t i v e  d is t in c t io n  can acquire a 
' fo rmal '  status.  Thus ??Know the answer and ??Be seven fee t  t a l l  are 
offered by M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:474) as examples of the 
incom pat ib i l i ty  between s ta t ives  and the Imperative.  I t  is not,  
however, immediately obvious that  such iso lated ' fo rm al '  means w i l l  
necessari ly y ie ld  unquestionable resu l ts .  Notice,  fo r  instance, that  
although Know t h y s e l f  is not what textbooks ca l l  'good Modern 
Engl ish ' ,  is by no means as obviously unacceptable as the previous 
two examples. S im i la r ly  Be there at seven o'c lock  sharp seems quite  
acceptable.  In short ,  inc om pat ib i l i ty  with the Imperative w i l l  
obviously depend on whether the addressee is in a posit ion to carry  
out the order (issued through the Imperative) in the f i r s t  place.  
Hence the unacceptab i l i ty  o f  Be seven feet  t a l l  provides no argument 
concerning s t a t i v i t y  in general and the semantics o f  'be'  in 
p a r t ic u la r  as M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird intend i t .  I t  can obviously 
be argued tha t  we are deal ing with two d i f f e r e n t  'be' verbs or with a 
' p o s i t io n a l '  vs a 'n o n -p o s i t io n a l ' sense of  'b e ' .  The point is ,  
however, tha t  the ambiguity is c l a r i f i e d  on the basis of  the 
predication as a whole and tha t  the Imperative te s t  is  natural  only 
i f  i t  checks things, l i k e  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' , the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a verb 
to display  a 'vo lu n ta ry '  vs a 'non-voluntary'  c h a r a c te r is t ic ,  e tc . *  
Notice also that  the progressive te s t  is not much safer .  Verbs such 
as ' f i n d '  (used n o n - i t e r a t i v e l y )  do not take the progressive any more
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than s ta t iv e  verbs, although they are i n t u i t i v e l y  understood as 
' event '  ra th e r  than s ta t i v e .
The s i tu a t io n  is even less promising when one turns to MG Vs of  
posit ion  and motion. The progressive tes t  is obviously inapplicable  
in the case o f  MG as i t  does not have th is  p a r t i c u la r  formal means of  
representing s i tua t ions  developing through t ime. Besides, the 
' p a r a l l e l '  method o f  e x p l i c i t l y  using phrases l i k e  ' i n  the process 
o f ' ,  ' i n  a s ta te  o f '  (which has been proposed fo r  English) would 
y ie ld  qu ite  b iza rre  MG sentences which should not be considered by 
the semanticist  (as already argued in Chapter 1) .  Rather expectedly,  
the Imperative te s t  stands no chance as a formal c r i t e r i o n ;  consider  
the case of  ' k s e r o ' (know) which is probably the s ta t iv e  'par  
exce l lence ' :  ' k s e r e  t o  p os  6a f i y i '  (know i t ,  tha t  s/he w i l l  leave)  
or the equivalent ' n a  k s e r i s  pos  8a f i y i 1 are p e r fe c t ly  good 
sentences. S im i la r ly  ' na i s e  s i n e x o s  ksa p lom e no s  j a  na k a l i t e r e p s i s 1 
(be continuously ly ing  ( in  bed) to  get b e t te r )  is f in e ,  although '/me 
k s a p l o m e n o s '  looks l i k e  a s ta t iv e  predication to me.
I t  would seem, at f i r s t  s ight ,  that  tests  based on the observation 
th a t ,  unl ike  events,  states do not 'happen' would y ie ld  safer  
re su l ts .  Hence M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird ( i b i d . )  use a te s t  question 
of the form: What happened? predict ing that ' s t a t e '  predications  
cannot q u a l i f y  as answers. Their  example is :  ??He believed in Santa 
Claus. Yet the nature of such tests  (Question and Answer) is such 
th a t  one would require  a p r io r  analysis of  conversational  p r inc ip les  
at work in each p a r t i c u la r  case, before using them as safe,  formal 
diagnost ics .  Notice th a t  He knew everything by heart  does not need a 
very elaborate supporting scenario to pass as a p e r fe c t ly  acceptable 
answer to What happened? although 'know' and 'b e l ie v e '  are 'model' 
s ta t iv e s .  Possible counter-arguments to the e f fe c t  th a t  the ' r e a l '  
answer to the question is in fac t  something about the logica l  
subject 's  performance, fo r  instance, which is  a c tu a l ly  implied by He 
knew everything by heart are beside the point;  the fa c t  remains tha t  
'pure ly  l i n g u i s t i c ' ,  ' fo rm a l '  and 'verb -centred '  tes ts  are,  fo r  the 
most p a r t ,  inappropr iate  or,  at best, misconceived as heur is t ics  fo r  
the 's ta t ive-d ynamic '  d i s t in c t io n .  So, quite  expectedly: ' t i  s i n e v i /  
t i  e y i n e ? '  (what happened?) can t r ig g e r  a number o f  answers with what
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seem to me s ta t iv e  predications ,  e.g .  '  k a Q o t a n / k a Q e t e / i  ne kaQismenos  
meres o l o k l i r e s  a k i n i t o s  se  m ia  k a r e k l a '  (he was s e a t e d /s i t s / i s  
seated fo r  days on end motionless on a c h a i r ) .  Apparently 'happen' 
is so general th a t  even i f  i t  is used in conjunction with the 
predication whose status we seek to id e n t i f y ,  the ambiguity is not 
solved through formal means. Hence He happens to understand the real  
nature o f  things is p a ra l le l  to I t  so happens tha t  he understands the 
real nature of  things and even i f  one is not too happy about e i t h e r  
sentence, one only has to consider He happens to be seven fee t  t a l l  
to r e a l i z e  th a t  even in English we are back where we s t a r t e d . 2
I have discussed the standard te s t  I happen to be aware of  in some 
de ta i l  in the hope of showing:
(a)  That simple or isolated ' fo rm a l '  c r i t e r i a  are not as adequate as 
they are sometimes expected to be even with respect to the major 
d is t in c t io n  between s ta t ives  and non-sta t ives .
(b) That the problem cannot be adequately approached through 
concentration on verb-forms alone. M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's 
remark th a t  although, s t r i c t l y  speaking, i t  is the predicate as a 
whole tha t  is s ta t iv e  or non-s ta t ive  " i t  is tedious to keep such 
subt le t ies  always in mind" ( p . 475) seems ra th er  unwarranted in 
th is  p a r t i c u la r  case.
I t  seems more l i k e l y  tha t  the s ta t iv e /n o n -s ta t iv e  d is t in c t io n  
af fec ts  verbs through predicat ions; hence a number of  d i f f e r e n t  
factors have to be taken into considerat ion (such as those 
mentioned in 4 o f  the previous section).  I t  also seems important 
to look fo r  acceptable attempts at defin ing the content o f  the 
d i s t in c t io n ( s )  in question and then t r y  to ' p a i r '  d e f in i t io n s  
with formal syntactic  c r i t e r i a  (e .g .  what the verb is in 
construction w i t h ) .
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2.3 Further c r i t e r i a  fo r  the d e f i n i t i o n  of  states-processes-events
A number o f  l in g u is t s ,  e .g .  Coseriu (1971),  Leech (1969),  S e i le r  
(1968) and Langacker (1975),  operate with a dichotomous 
categor izat ion  of  predications into 's ta te s -eve n ts '  or 's ta te s -  
processes'.  In what follows i t  w i l l  become obvious tha t  we need more 
than a two-way c la s s i f i c a t i o n .  A f a i r l y  concise account of  what the  
notions ' s t a t e ' ,  'p rocess ' ,  'event '  involve is of fered in Lyons
(1977) and can be used as a f i r s t  step towards defin ing these 
notions. Lyons accepts the major d is t in c t io n  between s t a t i c  and 
dynamic s i tuat ions  and then proceeds to specify the content of the  
di s t inc t ion :
”A s t a t i c  s i tu a t io n  (or s t a t e - o f - a f f a i r s ,  or s ta te )  is one that  
is conceived of  as e x is t in g ,  ra ther  than happening, and as being 
homogeneous, continuous and unchanging throughout i t s  durat ion.  
A dynamic s i tu a t io n ,  on the other hand, is something that happens
(or occurs, or takes place):  i t  may be momentary or enduring; i t
is not necessari ly  homogeneous or continuous, but may have any of  
several temporal contours; and, most important o f  a l l ,  i t  may or 
may not be under the control  of  an agent. I f  a dynamic s i tua t ion  
is extended in t ime, i t  is a process; i f  i t  is momentary, i t  is
an event; and, i f  i t  is under the control  of  an agent, i t  is an
act ion.  F in a l l y ,  a process tha t  is under the control  of  an agent 
is an a c t i v i t y ;  and an event that is under the control  of  an 
agent is an ac t ."  ( p . 483)
This d e f in i t io n  juxtaposes ' e x is t in g '  to 'happening' and 'momentary' 
to 'endur ing ' .  These oppositions can be used as a working hypothesis 
to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between sta tes ,  processes and events. The 
addit ional  notions o f  ' c o n t r o l ' ,  ' a g e n t ' ,  ' a c t '  and ' a c t i v i t y '  are 
only important in a discussion o f  what I consider a separate issue,  
namely a g e n t iv i ty ,  and are d e a l t  with in d e ta i l  in the fol lowing  
chapter. As I have already re ferred  to ' a c t i v i t i e s ' ,  however, ( in  
the understanding tha t  the term is more widely used and eas ier  to  
in te rp re t  on the basis of  common everyday use) i t  seems necessary to  
show schematical ly where ' a c t i v i t y '  stands in r e la t io n  to Lyons' 
remaining categories.
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Process + agent = a c t i v i t y  
Event + agent -  act  
A c t i v i t i e s  and acts are actions
Having iso la ted  the fac to r  of  ' c o n t r o l ' ,  we can concentrate on the 
content of  the t r i p a r t i t e  d iv is ion  into s ta tes ,  processes and events.  
The only fea ture  which dist inguishes states from everything else is 
tha t  they cannot be said to 'happen' or 'o c c u r ' .  Processes are 
dist inguished from events as being enduring ra th e r  than momentary. 
Events and processes can be said to mark a change o f  s ta te ,  i . e .  a 
t r a n s i t io n  from an i n i t i a l  s ta te  to a f in a l  one. I f  th is  t r a n s i t io n  
has some duration i t  is a process; i f  not, an event.
I t  is ra ther  obvious tha t  in order to categorize  predications (and 
u l t im a te ly  sp e c i f ic  verbs) we need fu r th e r  elaboration of  what the 
re levant notions involve.  Philosophers of  language such as Vendler 
(1957),  and Mourelatos (1978) have discussed these d is t in c t io n s  in a 
ra the r  i l lu m in a t in g  way. The main points of  these accounts w i l l  be 
looked at b r i e f l y  and connected to the facts  of  MGMVs.
Vendler (1957) observes that  while ' running'  has no set terminal  
point,  ' running a mi le '  has a 'c l imax'  which has to be reached i f  
"the action is to be what i t  is claimed to be" ( p . 145); i . e .  running 
a mile has to be f in ished to be true .  Neither Vendler 's  terminology  
nor his categor iza t ion  w i l l  be adopted here, but i t  is important to 
notice fo r  a s t a r t  tha t  the d is t in c t io n  between a changing s i tua t ion  
(running) and a s im i la r  one involving a culmination,  e .g .  running a 
mile (or an end point presumably, e .g .  running to the kiosque) is 
recognized f o r  what i t  is ;  the former is not a r b i t r a r i l y  named a 
' s t a t e '  and ' run '  does not r i s k  acquiring the fe a ture  [+ s ta t iv e ]  as 
in S e i le r  (1968).  The immediate impl icat ion fo r  a sentence l i k e  (1):
(1) t a  p e b j a  t r e x u n  s t o n  k i p o
the chi ldren run/are  running t o / i n  the garden
is th a t  i t  cannot be b as ica l ly  considered as involving a s ta te .  I f  
i t  is understood as involving a goal,  i t  can be in te rpre ted  as being
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a kind of  event ( in  Vendler 's terms an 'accomplishment' );  i f  i t  is 
understood as involving a lo c a t iv e ,  i t  can be in terpreted  as being a 
kind of  process ( in  Vendler 's terms an ' a c t i v i t y ' ) .  Vendler is not 
responsible fo r  these in te rp re ta t io n s ,  but I consider tha t  they are 
in keeping with his (1957) account o f  what processes are,  i . e .  
homogeneous in th a t  t h e i r  time stre tch is inherent ly  in d e f in i t e  and 
in tha t  there is no culmination and no antic ipated r e s u l t .  We w i l l  
return to the in te rp re ta t io n  of  examples such as (1) a f t e r  completing 
the presentat ion of  the re levant  notions.
A f u r t h e r  d is t in c t io n  is drawn between 'accomplishments', which 
involve time periods,  and 'achievements' which involve time instants  
(e .g .  reaching the h i l l t o p ) .  The implicat ion fo r  sentences (2) and
(3 ) :
(2) a n e v i k e  s t i n  k o r i f i  mesa se mi  a o ra  
he went up to the top w i th in  one hour
(3) e f t a s e  s t i n  k o r i f i  mesa se mi  a o ra  
he reached the top wi th in  one hour
is tha t  although they are s im i la r  in many respects,  the former one is 
an 'accomplishment' and the l a t t e r  an 'achievement' .  While (2) 
implies tha t  whatever is involved in ' a n e v e n o '  (go up) took one hour 
(a time period) to complete, i . e .  tha t  'going up' went on for  an 
hour, (3) does not imply tha t  whatever is involved in ' f t a n o '  (reach)  
went on fo r  one hour; ' reaching '  takes a time instant ( i . e .  a point  
and not an i n t e r v a l )  to complete.
The d i f fe rence  between (2) and (3) can u l t im a te ly  be a t t r ib u te d  to  
the inherent semantic features of  the two verbs involved and in 
p a r t i c u la r  to some fea ture  'momentary' vs 'endur ing ' .  Notice,  
however, tha t  durat ion (by i t s e l f )  is not s u f f i c i e n t  in 
dist inguishing between events and processes, as i t  appears to be in 
Lyons (1977).  I t  is  used here to dis t inguish between 'achievements'  
and 'accomplishments' which are both subsumed under events by Kenny 
(1963) and Mourelatos (1978).  Mourelatos notices th a t  both
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categories in question ('developments' and 'punctual occurrences' ,  
respect ive ly ,  in his terminology) take d e f i n i t e  time but while the 
former are i n t r i n s i c a l l y  characterized by duration and r e f e r  to the 
whole of  the time segment, the l a t t e r  cannot occur over/throughout a 
temporal s t re tch ,  but only at a single moment (w i th in  a temporal 
s t r e t c h ) .
Hence the main points at  which events d i f f e r  from processes are: (a) 
homogeneity (which everybody seems to accept as character iz ing  
processes only ) ,  i . e .  the p rerequ is i te  that any part  o f  a process be 
of the same nature as the whole and (b) tha t  the time stretch of  
processes ( ' a c t i v i t i e s '  in Vendler) is i n d e f i n i t e .  Contrary to 
these, events involve some culmination or an ant ic ipa ted  re s u l t  and 
d e f i n i t e  t ime. States,  f i n a l l y ,  are general ly  understood as not 
const i tu t ing  a change, although “they may ar ise  or be acquired as a 
re s u l t  o f  change" (Mourelatos 1978:416).  C lear ly  they may also 
endure or pers is t  over stretches of  t ime.
Adopting Mourelatos' terminology,  where processes and events are 
understood as 'occurrences' ,  contrary to states which do not occur/  
happen ( c f .  Lyons 1977) and developments and punctual occurrences are 
subcategories of events, we can present the re levant c r i t e r i a  
schematical ly as fol lows:





The fa c t  tha t  states do not const i tu te  a change is understood here as 
saying l i t t l e  more than th a t  they do not happen/occur, hence a single 




k Lpunctual Occurrences + 
note: a= occurrences,  
b= events
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the fa c t  tha t  events have d e f i n i t e  times is understood here as l inked  
to the p re req u is i te  tha t  there be no culmination and no ant ic ipated  
r e s u l t ,  hence the l a t t e r  propert ies  are not a l located  a separate 
column. So i f  we wish to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between 'running'  and 
' runn ing -a -m i le '  (Vendler 's  examples o f  an a c t i v i t y  and an 
accomplishment re spe c t ive ly )  homogeneity by i t s e l f  is  not adequate. 
As Mourelatos observes ( f o r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes):
"the generic a c t i v i t y  o f  running can be fu r t h e r  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
into  a species (one among i n d e f i n i t e l y  many) o f  running-a-mile  
without i t s  losing i t s  character as an a c t i v i t y .  In other words, 
regardless of  whether a mile is or f a i l s  to  be run, any 
substretch of  running-a-mile a c t i v i t y  divides homogeneously into  
sub-stretches of  the same" ( i b i d . :420)*
The r e s t r i c t i o n  imposed on the a c t i v i t y  of  running by 'a mi le '  is 
comparable to th a t  of  a goal s p e c i f ic a t io n ,  e .g .  running to the 
kiosque. Unlike both, though, running in the garden can be l inked to  
the unrestr ic ted  and open-ended a c t i v i t y  o f  ' running'  in the sense 
tha t  there is no forseeable and stated terminat ion .
With these spec i f ica t ions  in mind we can now exemplify the re levant  
notions with MGMV predications and present them schematical ly as 
fol lows:
States
(4) k aQ e te  s i n e x i a  b r o s t a  s t o  p a r a Q i r o




(5) t r e x i  mesa s t o n  k i p o  
s/he runs / is  running 
in (w i th in )  the garden
developments punctual occurrences
(6) s k a r f a l o s e  s t i n  (7) v u t i k s e  s t o  p o t a m i  
k o r i f i  t u  vunu  s/he dived into
s/he climbed to the r i v e r
the top of  the 
mountain
2>4 Adverbials of  time and goal vs locat ive
In order to see more c le a r l y  the implicat ions of  examples ( 4 ) - ( 7 )  i t  
is useful to see what sorts o f  time adverbial  phrases they are 
compatible w i th .  Four kinds of  such adverbials need to be 
dist inguished fo r  the present purposes:
(a) those re fe r r in g  to the duration fo r  which a s i tua t ion  is
v a l id ,  e .g .  ' e p i  m ia  o r a '  ( f o r  one hour);
(b) those re fe r r in g  to the frequency of periods of  time during
which a s i tu a t io n  is v a l id  (usual ly  ca l led  'frequency  
adverb ia ls7) ,  e .g .  ' kaQe m e r a '  ( e v e r y d a y ) ,  ' s i x n a '  (o f te n ) ;
(c) those r e fe r r in g  to a point  in time at  which a s i tu a t io n  is
v a l id ,  e .g .  ' s t i s  6 '  (a t  6 ) ;
(d) those re fe r r in g  to the number of  times a s i tu a t io n  (which is
repeated) is v a l id  (u s a l ly  ca l led  7cardinal  count
adverb ia ls7) ,  e .g .  ' 4  f o r e s '  (4 t imes) .
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Notice,  f i r s t ,  tha t  i f  (4) is to be understood as a s ta t ive
predication i t  cannot accept any of  the adverbials ( a ) - ( d )  s t r i c t l y
speaking. The moment (a)  or (b) type of  phrases replace ' s i n e x i a '
the impl icat ions o f  an unl imited ex is t ing  s i tu a t io n  are removed.
(C lea r ly  (c) and (d) are completely in a p p l ic a b le . )
The pattern  which emerges i f  ( a ) - ( d )  are attached to examples ( 5 ) - ( 7 )  
looks l i k e  th is :
(a) (b) (c) (d)
e p i  m i  a o r a  kaQe mera s t i s  6 4 f o r e s
fo r  one hour every day at 6 4 times
Process
(5)  t r e x i  mesa s t o n  k i p o  + +
s/he runs / is  running 
with in  the garden
Event: Development
(6) s k a r f a l o s e  s t i n  k o r i f i  -  ? +
t u  vunu
s/he climbed to the top 
of  the mountain
Event: Punctual Occurrence
(7) v u t i k s e  s t o  p o t a m i  - + +
s/he dived into the r i v e r
The combination o f  (6) with (c) results  in (6a):  ' s k a r f a l o s e  s t i n  
k o r i f i  t u  vunu s t i s  6 '  (s/he climbed to the top of  the mountain at 6) 
which is not a completely acceptable sentence. I f  the goal 
expression is replaced wi th a d i f f e r e n t  one, e .g .  ' s t o  t r a p e z i '  (on 
the ta b le )  there is no problem with a sp ec i f ica t ion  o f  the point  in 
time the event took place fo r  obvious common sense reasons: the event 
can be understood as a punctual occurrence and w i l l  behave exact ly  
l i k e  ( 7 ) .  Hence (6)  is used. as a more or less c le a r  case of  a 
development. As already pointed out,  however, i f  a t ime period 
adverbial  such as 'mesa se m ia  o r a '  (w i th in  one hour) is  used, the
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di f fe rence  between sentences such as (6)  and (7) is brought out most 
c le a r ly :
(6b) s k a r f a l o s e  s t i n  k o r i f i  t u  vunu mesa se m i  a o r a
s/he climbed to the top of  the mountain wi th in  one hour
(7a) v u t i k s e  s t o  p o t a m i  mesa se m ia  o ra
s/he dived into the r i v e r  wi th in  one hour.
In these ra ther  c a r e f u l l y  chosen and oversimpli f ied  cases (examples
(4)  to (7 ) )  d i f f e r e n t  verbs have been used in the hope of gett ing as 
' accura te7 an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  the main points of  the d is t in c t io n  as 
possible.  Notice how dramat ica l ly  the overal l  p ic ture  changes i f  
d i f f e r e n t  verb forms of the same verbs are used:
(a) (b) (c) (d)
e p i  m ia  o ra  kaQe mera s t i s  6 4 f o r e s
fo r  one hour every day at 6 4 times
(8) e t r e k s e  mesa s t o n  k i p o  
s/he ran wi th in  the garden
(9) s k a r f a l o n e  s t i n  k o r i f i  ?? + ??
t u  vunu
s/he climbed/was climbing 
to the top of  the mountain
Two main things have to be noticed: f i r s t l y ,  tha t  the new fac tor
brought into play is 'a s p ec t ' .  The d i f fe rence  between (6)  and (9) is
an aspectual one; the time remains constant,  i . e .  past.  A b r i e f
presentat ion of  the main facts  o f  MG Vs ( in  th is  respect)  w i l l  be 
given shor t ly ,  focusing on the few points necessary fo r  an 
appreciat ion o f  the d is t in c t io n s  under considerat ion.  Secondly, i t  
must be noticed th a t  we have already moved into  an area where
s i tuat ions  (contrary  to the c a r e fu l ly  chosen example sentences ( 4 ) -
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(7 ) )  are much less easy to id e n t i fy  and consequently match accurately  
with the 'process' - 'event '  labe ls .
A combination of  (8) with (a)  may be acceptable.  I f  a goal 
expression i s ,  however, substi tuted fo r  the lo c a t iv e ,  the resu l t ing  
sequence is completely unacceptable, i . e . :
(10) e t r e k s e  s t o  p e r i p t e r o  e p i  m ia  o ra  
s/he ran to the kiosque fo r  one hour.
This is a fu r th e r  ind ica tion  that  goal const i tu tes  an addit ional  
obstacle to the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a s i tua t ion  being understood as a 
process; the predication ' e t r e k s e  s t o  p e r i p t e r o '  is  completely 
incompatible with the notion o f  durat ion.  For the same reason, a 
combination o f  ' e t r e k s e  s t o  p e r i p t e r o '  with (c) ( i . e .  a point  in 
t ime) is qui te  acceptable.  This new s i tua t ion  is probably understood 
as a f a i r l y  c lear  case o f  an event,  as w i l l  be shown a f t e r  a 
discussion of  the aspectual change also involved.
A combination o f  (9) with (a) is problematic only owing to the fac tor  
of  goal .  I f  a loc a t iv e ,  e .g .  ' t o  v u n o '  (the mountain) is substi tuted  
fo r  i t ,  the resu l t ing  sentence is p e r fe c t ly  acceptable:
(11) s k a r f a l o n e  t o  vuno e p i  m ia  o ra
s/he climbed/was climbing (up) the mountain fo r  one hour.
Once the o b s ta c le / r e s t r ic t io n  imposed by the sp ec i f ica t io n  of  the 
goal is removed, ' s k a r f a l o n e '  is ' n a t u r a l l y '  combinable with duration  
and the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  understanding the various resu l t ing  
predications as processes are increased.
As a f in a l  remark on examples (8)  and (9) notice tha t  a combination 
of (9) with (c)  needs an elaborate scenario to in te r p r e t  even for  
those speakers fo r  whom i t  is margina l ly acceptable.  I t  appears that  
the combination of  a goal r e s t r i c t i o n  with a point  in time adverbial
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is  a strong fa c to r  of  ' e v e n tu a l i z a t io n '  and clashes with the 
'process' impl icat ion o f  the verb.
An exhaustive analysis of  the impl icat ions  of  a l l  possible  
combinations of  examples (5)  - (10) would require  a previous de ta i led  
analysis of  time adverbia ls and possible goal expressions,  ne i ther  of  
which l i e s  w i th in  the scope of the present in ves t ig a t io n .  Besides, 
considerably more elaboration would be required i f  combinations of  
various time adverbia ls were taken into considerat ion,  e .g .  '/ca0e 
mera s t i s  6 '  (every day at 6 ) ,  ' 4  f o r e s  t o  m i n a '  ( four times a
month). Therefore,  th is  b r i e f  presentat ion is to be understood as 
simply in d ic a t iv e  of  the ro le  of  goal and an introduction to that of  
aspect in determing how predications are understood with respect to 
the 's ta te -process -event '  (henceforth S-P-E) d is t in c t io n .
2 .5  Aspect, states-processes-events,  and Modern Greek motion verbs
Despite the fa c t  th a t  aspect in MG has been the object of  probably 
more a t te n t ion  than any other area of  MG l in g u i s t i c s ,  there is s t i l l  
no uniformity  of  opinion even on the basic d is t in c t io n s ,  i . e .  on 
whether 'P e r fe c t '  should be included together with 'P e r fe c t iv e '  and 
' Imper fective'  as a t h i r d  aspect or not.  As most l in g u is ts  seem to 
accept, however, th a t  Perfect is not as crucial  as the other two, the 
matrix which is presented here (a shortened version of  that presented 
in Babin io t is  and Kontos (1967:148))  adopts a b i p a r t i t e  d iv is ion .
Aspect
PAST 
' Imperfect '  
' e t r e x a 'Imperfect ive Duration
Tense
PRESENT 
' Present'  
' t r e x o '
Non-duration 'A o r is t '
' e t r e k s a ‘ [ ' t r e k s o Non-Past]
Per fec t ive
( P f . )  Complete Present Perfect  a ' ( P r . P f . a ' )  
' e x o  t r e k s i '
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Future, Subjunctive and Passive forms are d e l ib e r a te ly  omitted as the 
points th a t  have to be made do not require addit ional  information  
from other tenses,  voices or moods (except fo r  Perfect b' which w i l l  
be mentioned separate ly when i t  needs to be juxtaposed to Present 
Perfect a ' ) .  The Pf.  non-Past form [ ' t r e k s o ' ]  has been added to the  
shortened Babin iot is  and Kontos' Table which is used fo r  the Aorist  
Subjunctive,  Perfective  Future,  Pr .P f .  and P luperfect.
There is more or less general agreement th a t  by using the I f .  the 
speaker sees the verb as re fe r r in g  e i t h e r  to a continuous s i tu a t io n  
in progress, i . e .  as a s i tu a t io n  which is 'progressive'  or 'd u ra t iv e '  
or to a series of  repeated s ituat ions not viewed as a whole, i . e .  
' i t e r a t i v e '  s i tua t ions  (Mackridge 1985:105, Babin io t is  and Kontos 
1967:147). A possible combination of  the d i f f e r e n t  views expressed 
fo r  the Pf.  would be that  by using the ' P f . -non-durat ive '  the speaker 
is viewing the verb as re fe r r in g  to a s i tua t ion  which is momentary or 
the duration of  which is not considerd important; i t  is  viewed as a 
completed whole, a single 'event '  whose r e p e t i t io n  or durat ion are of  
no s ign i f icance .  By using the ' Pf . -complete'  (Babin io t is  and Kontos 
i b i d . )  or the 'P e r fe c t '  (Mackridge 1985:116) the s i tu a t io n  is viewed 
as a complete whole, as an event which took place in the past and is 
completed at the time of utterance (Tzartzanos 1946:277).^
The relevance of aspectual d is t inc t ions  in MG fo r  the S-P-E 
categor izat ion  should be quite  evident.  Lyons (1963),  fo r  instance,  
recognizes the interconnection between aspect and the S-P-E 
d is t in c t io n  (or some form of th is  d i s t i n c t io n ) ,  on the one hand, and 
semantic features o f  individual  verbs, on the other.  On the basis of  
such considerations verbs are categorized into two main classes: one 
comprising 'a c t io n -e v e n t - s t a te '  verbs, the other including 'event-  
s ta te '  verbs.
I t  is conceivable th a t  MGMVs could be c la s s i f ie d  into  those which are 
genera l ly  understood as involving some fea ture  'n o n - d u r a t iv e ' /  
'momentary', e .g .  ' v u t a o j '  (d iv e ) ,  ' t i n a z o '  (shake up), 'p/Sao'  
( jump), and those which imply 'd u r a t io n ' ,  such as: 'x o r e v o ' (dance),  
' a n e v e n o '  (go up), ' t r e x o '  ( run ) .  The Imperfective forms of  the
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verbs belonging to the former class describe i t e r a t i o n  of  events,  
e .g . :
(12) v u t u s e  kaBe l i y o  s t i  B a las a  ( I f . +  Past) 
s/he dived/was div ing every now and then into the sea.
Their  Perfective  forms describe punctual occurrences (example ( 7 ) ) .  
The Perfective  forms of  the verbs o f  the l a t t e r  class describe events 
which do, however, have some duration,  e .g . :
(P f .+  Non-duration + Past)
(13) x o r e p s a n  m on i  t u s  s t i n  p i s t a  e p i  b i o  o r e s
they danced alone on the f lo o r  fo r  two hours
I t  is evident th a t  (13) is a development ra the r  than a punctual 
occurrence owning to the inherent semantic fea ture  o f  duration of  
' x o r e v o ' (dance).
I t  has to be noticed that  the verbs of  ne i ther  category can produce 
predications with the ch arac te r is t ic s  o f  a t r u l y  s ta t iv e  s i tua t ion  
(with very few possible exceptions which w i l l  be discussed s h o r t ly ) .  
The only means ava i lab le  with in  the aspectual system of  MG which can 
impose a more-or-less s ta t iv e  understanding on predications involving  
such verbs is Perfect b ' .  Unl ike Perfect  a 7, which re fers  to  
'completed events ' ,  Perfect b' describes the re s u l t  o f  an action ,  or  
a state  "not severed from the time of  utterance" (Babin io t is  
1972:44).  This explains why only the l a t t e r  tense is incompatible 
with (d) type time adverbia ls .  Consider as an example sentence (14):
(14) i n e  ane vasmen i  s t o  b en d ro
she is 'gone up' a t / t o  the t ree  
she is on the t r e e .
Such predications r e f e r  to the posit ion ra th e r  than the motion of  an 
object ,  but can be said also to incorporate (through the 'root
meaning' o f  the verb involved in each case) a reference as to how the
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object arr ived at the posit ion  i t  held at the time o f  utterance.  In 
my understanding, the resu l t ing  predications receive as s ta t iv e  an 
i n te rp re ta t io n  as the inherent meaning of  the verb can al low fo r .  
Therefore P f .b '  is the l im i t in g  case of  verbals and on the border 
with ad jec t iva l  phrases.
Verbs of  motion which describe 'c h a n g e -o f -p o s i t io n ' , such as 
/ ka&ome2 / ( s i t  down), ' ksap lonc>2 '  ( l i e  down), ' k r e m a o '  (hang),  can be 
said to correspond to  what Lyons (1963) c a l ls  ' e v e n t -s t a t e '  verbs.4 
Consider as an example ' k s a p l o n o ' :
(15) 7 m a r i e t a  k s a p l o n i
Mariet ta  l i e s / i s  ly ing (down)
can be understood ( in  one in te rp re t a t io n )  as a punctual occurrence: 
the change-of-posit ion is taking place at the moment of  utterance.  
In an a l t e r n a t iv e  in te rp re ta t io n  (15) is durat ive  and homogeneous:
' k s a p l o n o ' has s ta r ted at some unspecified moment before the time of  
utterance and may continue a f t e r  i t .  In th is  understanding (15) is 
not unl ike  (16) which has a number of  ' s t a t e '  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .
(16) 7 m a r i e t a  i n e  k s a p l o m e n i  ( P f . b ' )
Mar ie t ta  l i e s / i s  lying
Mar ie t ta  is in bed
Notice,  however, tha t  (16) is more l i k e l y  to be said of  an inva l id  
confined to bed than (15 ) .  This may well imply tha t  (15)  even in i t s  
s ta t iv e  in te rp re ta t io n  is less s ta t iv e  than (1 6 ) :  P res .Pf.b '
introduces an element o f  permanence as compared to I f . +  durat ion,  a l l  
other things being equal .
We have so f a r  discussed the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  id e n t i fy in g  'event '  verbs 
( i . e .  those which can only appear in punctual occurrences), 'process-  
event ' verbs ( i . e .  those which can appear in processes or in 
developments), ' e v e n t -s t a t e '  verbs ( i . e .  those which can appear in 
events - punctual occurrences, in e f f e c t  - and 's t a t e s '  o f  varying
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degrees). This ideal  s i t u a t io n ,  which matches 'event '  verbs with a 
semantic feature  'momentary', and 'process-event '  verbs with a 
corresponding fea ture  'd u r a t i o n a l ' ,  plus an ' i n  between' category,  
does not take us very f a r .  Even wi th in  the grave l i m i t s  a r b i t r a r i l y  
applied to th is  presentat ion,  a great  number of  cases cannot be 
accomwMed in such a frame. F i r s t  of  a l l ,  i t  is not as easy as i t  
may seem to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between sta tes,  processes and simple 
i t e r a t io n  o f  punctual occurrences. Consider the s i tu a t io n  wi th in  the 
area o f  durat ional  MGMVs. One p a r t i c u la r  verb / t r e m o / ( tremble)  does 
not have a Pf.  form at  a l l .  In my understanding i t  is  processual par 
excel lence.  I t  could be also understood, however, as i t e r a t i v e :  as 
involving  a ser ies o f  uninterrupted punctual occurrences. Verbs such 
as ' t a l a n d e v o m e ' ( o s c i l l a t e ) ,  ' e o r u m e '  (sway, swing), which do have 
Pf.  forms, present a s im i la r  problem to ' t r e m o '  in predications where 
they appear with I f .  aspect. An even more in te re s t in g  case can be 
exemplif ied with ' y i r i z o ' ( t u r n ) .  Compare (17) to (18) and (19 ) .
(17) 7 y7 v i r i z i  y i r o  apo t o n  i l j o  ( I f . +  durat ion + Pres.) 
the earth turns around the sun
(18) o m i l o s  y i r i z e  apo t o n  a e ra  apo ( I f .+ durat ion + Past)
t i s  5 os t i s  7
the windmill  turned/was turning  
by the wind from 5 to 7
(P f .+  Non-duration + Past)
(19) Y7r i s e  k s a f n i k a  ke  t o n  k i t a k s e  
s/he-turned suddenly and at-him looked 
s/he suddenly turned and looked at  him
There is  no need fo r  a d e ta i led  analysis o f  the s p e c i f i c  factors  
responsible fo r  the d i f f e r e n t  understandings o f  ( 1 7 ) - ( 1 9 )  here.  The 
example is  used to point  out two th ings.  F i r s t l y ,  on the basis of  
the chara c te r is t ic s  discussed at  length in the previous section (17) 
seems more processual than (1 8 ) ,  although i t  is  undoubtedly the same 
verb and the same aspect in both cases. In my understanding (17) is
very much l i k e  a s ta te  predication and (18) is not p r o to typ ic a l ly
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processual ( l i k e  ( 5 ) ,  fo r  instance) but has some of the
ch ara c te r is t ics  o f  a development. Once again the borders are not
c lea r .  Secondly, (19) is a punctual occurrence, as are also possibly 
most predications with ' y i r i z o '  + Pf,  aspect. This is not the case 
with e i t h e r  ' x o r e v o '  (dance) or ' t r e x o 1 (run) which are also 
durational  verbs. On the other hand, the solut ion of pos it ing  two
d i f f e r e n t  ' y i r i z o '  verbs, a 'd u ra t io n a l '  one corresponding to (17)
and (18) and a 'momentary' one corresponding to (19) seems rather  
unsat is fac tory .  More important ly ,  one can get a s im i la r  overal l  
picture  from a number of  MGMVs, both i n t r a n s i t i v e  and t r a n s i t i v e .
2.6 Nature of  the theme
I t  is in te re s t in g  to notice th a t  one more fa c to r  crucia l  to the S-P-E 
d is t in c t io n  can be f a i r l y  e as i ly  id e n t i f i e d  in the case o f  t r a n s i t i v e  
causatives; i t  bears on the ch arac te r is t ic s  of  the object  of  these 
verbs (and the subject o f  t h e i r  corresponding i n t r a n s i t i v e s ,  i f  such 
correspondences happen to e x i s t ) .  As a c h a ra c te r is t ic  example, 
compare (20) to (21) and (22 ) ,
(20) ?evaze t o  v i v l i o  s t o  t r a p e z i  ( I f . +  Past)
s/he put/was put t ing the book on the table
(21) evaze  p e t r e J e o  s t i  beksa meni  ( I f . +  durat ion + Past)
s/he put/was put t ing o i l  in to  the tank
s/he was pouring o i l  in to  the tank
(22) e vaze  t a  v i v l i a  s t o  t r a p e z i  ( I f . +  durat ion + Past)
s/he put/was putt ing the books on the tab le
(20a) e v a l e  t o  v i v l i o  s t o  t r a p e z i  (P f .+  Non-duration + Past) 
s/he put the book on the tab le
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(21a) e v a l e  p e t r e l e o  s t i  beksameni  (P f .+  Non-duration + Past) 
s/he put o i l  into the tank 
s/he poured o i l  into the tank
(22a) e v a l e  t a  v i v l i a  s t o  t r a p e z i  (P f .+  Past)
s/he put the books on the table
Unlike (21) where ' e v a z e '  is c le a r ly  durat ional  and where the 
resu l t ing  predication has a number of  the c h ara c te r is t ic s  o f  a 
process, (20) can only r e f e r  to a series of  'punctual occurrences'
(or unsuccessful attempts).  Moreover, the s i tu a t io n  re ferred  to in
(21) is d i f f e r e n t  from that corresponding to (22 ) ,  although the 
aspectual element o f  durat ion is l i t e r a l l y  applied to both cases. I t  
seems that  (21) is a more typ ica l  case of  a process than (22 ) ,  as i t  
is f e l t  to imply more homogeneity. Be that as i t  may, (20a) can only 
involve a punctual occurrence, (21a) is a f a i r l y  typ ica l  case of a 
development and (22a) may be interpreted e i t h e r  as a development or 
as a punctual occurrence (on the assumption th a t  a l l  the books were 
put on the tab le  together,  at one stroke) .
S imi lar  things can be noted fo r  ' s i k o n o  s k o n i  ' ( I  ra ise  dust) 
compared to ' s i k o n o  t o  v i v l i o  apo t o  p a t o m a '  ( I  l i f t  the book from 
the f l o o r ) ,  or ' v y e n i  k a p n o s '  ( ' r i s e s  smoke', i . e .  smoke is r is in g )  
versus ' v y e n i  apo t o  s p i t i  t i s '  (she is coming/going out of  her
house). The impl icat ions  fo r  the S-P-E d is t in c t io n  of  'mass' vs
'count ' Ns and 's in g u la r '  vs ' p l u r a l '  const i tu te  only one, f a i r l y  
stra ight forward,  fa c to r .  Other factors which are less c lear  and 
eas i ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  have a s im i la r  e f fe c t  to tha t  ju s t  hinted at .  
For instance ' evaze  t i  r o b a  s t o  a f t o k i n i t o '  (s/he put/was putt ing the 
wheel on the car)  is more l i k e l y  to behave l i k e  (21) than (20) ,  
although the ' fo rm a l '  charac te r is t ics  of  ' ro5a '  (wheel) are more
s im i la r  to those of  ' v i v l i o '  (book) than those o f  ' p e t r e l e o '  ( o i l ) .
The descr ipt ion o f  the facts  w i l l  be a r b i t r a r i l y  brought to an end at 
th is  point  fo r  the reasons already given in e a r l i e r  sections of  th is  
chapter: th is  presentat ion is re s t r ic te d  to a few points which have
seemed (a)  p a r t i c u l a r l y  re levant and (b) f a i r l y  stra ight forward and
- 103 -
consequently manageable with in  the space ava i lab le .  These points  
have focused on factors  such as presence or absence and type o f  goal ,  
aspect and tense and type o f  t r a n s i t i v e  verb object (or  in t r a n s i t i v e  
verb subject) with respect to 'count ' / 'm ass '  Ns. The in te rp lay  of  
such factors  with s pec i f ic  verbs has been shown to be decis ive in how 
re la ted  predications are understood regarding the S-P-E d is t in c t io n .  
I t  remains to be seen whether these observations can be used in order  
to establ ish possible correspondences between a character isa t ion  of  
predications and a character isa t ion  of  s pec i f ic  MGMVs.
2.7 Concluding remarks on the re d e f in i t io n  of  states-processes-  
events
I t  has been suggested at various points in th is  chapter that  ne i ther  
situat ions in r e a l i t y  nor spec i f ic  sentences or verbs can be neatly  
dist inguished as possessing a l l  and only the c h ara c te r is t ics  usual ly  
a t t r ib u ted  to s ta tes,  processes and events. They seem, ra th e r ,  to be 
located along some sort  of  a S-P-E continuum. On the assumption that  
the central /most c h a ra c te r is t ic  points along th is  continuum can be 
i d e n t i f i e d ,  s p ec i f ic  predications involving MGMVs have been offered  
as c h a ra c te r is t ic  ' r e a l i z a t i o n s '  o f  these points in the area o f  MGMVs 
(examples ( 4 ) - ( 7 ) ) .  I t  can be claimed th a t  w i th in  th is  area of 
inves t iga t ion ,  predications of  type (5 ) :  ' t r e x i  mesa s t o n  k i p o '  (s/he  
is running/runs wi th in  the garden) are instances of  prototypical  
processes; and predications of  type (7 ) :  ' v u t i k s e  s t o  p o t  a m i ' (s/he  
dived into  the r i v e r )  are instances of  proto typ ical  events. I t  also 
seems p lausib le  th a t  processes looked at 'a p o s t e r io r i '  ( i . e .  Past- 
tensed) w i l l  be less processual, since what they describe has been 
somehow accomplished and i t s  time is more d e f i n i t e  than otherwise 
( i . e .  past ) .  More serious factors  'pushing' predications towards an 
'event '  ra ther  than a 'process'  understanding are p e r fe c t ive  aspect 
and a s pec i f ica t ion  of  goal,  since these involve an 'an t ic ipa ted  
r e s u l t '  or a 'c u lm ina t ion ' .  I t  is in te res t in g  to notice at  th is  
point th a t  verbs which require a goal s p ec i f ic a t io n ,  e .g .  ' p i y e n o '  
(go) are even less l i k e l y  to be understood as processual ones than 
others which may be equal ly  durat ional  and appear in s im i la r  
environments. This may explain why (23):
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(23) * p i y e n e  s t o  s x o l i o  e p i  mi  a o r a  ( I f . +  durat ion + Past) 
s/he was going to - th e  school fo r  one hour
is fo r  some speakers even worse than (24) or (25):
(24) ? s k a r f a l o n e  s t i n  k o r i f i  t u  v r a x u  ( I f . +  durat ion + Past)
e p i  mi  a o r a
• s/he climbed to the top o f  the rock 
fo r  one hour
(25) I m e t a k o m i z e  s t o  k e n u r j o  s p i t i  ( I f , +  durat ional  + Past) 
e p i  b i o  meres
s/he moved/was moving to  the new house 
fo r  two days
I t  may be th a t ,  a l l  other things being equal, ' p l ^ e n o *  incorporates  
an 'a n t ic ip a te d  r e s u l t ' ,  i . e .  is ' in h e r e n t ly '  less processual (or  
more e v e n t - l i k e )  than other durat ional  verbs. I t  is therefore  
suggested th a t  the most prototypical  intances of  a process ( in  th is  
area) involve a motion verb with I f .  aspect, Present-tensed, not 
supplemented with a goal sp ec i f ic a t io n .
The l i n k  between the Aor is t  of  Greek (both Classical  and Modern) and 
events seems f a i r l y  wel l establ ished. This is a ra the r  natural  
consequence of the fa c t  tha t  non-duration,  d e f i n i t e  time and an 
accomplished s i tua t ion  character ize  both the Aor is t  and events. I t  
has been shown, however, tha t  cer ta in  MGMVs al low a co l location  of  
Aoris t  forms with typ ica l  durat ional  adverbia ls ,  while others do not,  
e .g .  'x o r e v o ' (dance) vs ' s k a r f a l o n o ' (c l imb):
(26) x o r e p s a n  e p i  b i o  o r e s  (A or is t )
they danced fo r  two hours
(27) * s k a r f a l o s a n  e p i  b i o  o r e s  (Aoris t)
they climbed fo r  two hours.
- 105 -
I t  is suggested, the re fo re ,  tha t  verbs which behave l i k e  ' x o r e v o '  in
th is  respect are more p r o to ty p ic a l ly  processual than others which
%behave l i k e  ' s k a r f a l o n o ' } The equation of  MG Aor is t  with absolute 
absence of durat ion seems unwarranted. I t  seems, however, p lausib le  
to expect tha t  the most prototypical  instances of  an event would 
involve a motion verb in the Aor is t  with a goal and a p o in t - in - t im e  
sp ec i f ic a t io n ,  since ty p ica l  events are expected to be temporal ly and 
lo c a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d .  The reason why punctual occurrences are 
understood here as more ty p ica l  events than developments is l inked  
with the discussion of prototypes and the assumption that the most 
prototypical  instances o f  a category are expected to be maximally 
d i f f e r e n t  from those o f  any other category. Within the l im i t s  of  
th is  rough S-P-E d i s t in c t io n ,  punctual occurrences are evidently  
fu r th e r  from processes (and states)  than developments.
I t  can be argued tha t  even s ituat ions  characterized here as punctual 
occurrences par excel lence,  such as those represented by example (7) 
' v u t i k s e  s t o  p o t  a m i ' (s/he dived in the r i v e r ) ,  can be said to have 
some durat ion.  I t  is qu ite  conceivable tha t  fo r  some speakers, at 
l ea s t ,  ' v u t i k s e '  is  v a l id  from the moment the d iv e r 's  fee t  leave the 
ground, to the moment h is /h e r  whole body is under water.  For others,
' v u t i k s e '  is v a l id  only the minute the d iv e r 's  body touches the 
surface of  the water and s ta r ts  submerging: the in te rva l  is zero.  
This is in e f f e c t  the in te rp re ta t io n  adopted here fo r  ( 7 ) .
I t  has already been pointed out that the notion o f  ' s t a t e '  is ,  
s t r i c t l y  speaking, incompatible with motion verbs as such. I t  has 
also been mentioned tha t  P res .P f .b '  verb forms are on the borders of  
verbal and a d je c t iv a l  phrases. I t  is as i f  some property is 
a t t r ib u te d  to the subject o f  the predication which is  regarded as 
more or less permanent. Comparing I f .  and P res .P f .b '  forms of MG 
verbs o f  pos it ion  (see examples (1 5 ) - (1 6 )  and subsequent discussion),  
i t  was suggested th a t  s i tua t ions  described by means of the l a t t e r  
form of the verb are probably viewed as more permanent than 
otherwise.  This implies th a t  wi th in  the area under inves t iga t ion  the 
most prototypical  instances o f  states involve verbs o f  posit ion in a 
P res .P f .b '  form and a temporal ly unrestr ic ted environment, e .g .  
without reference to the ' in g ress ive '  stage, ( the beginning of the
-^(possibly because "xorevo” is not goal orientated).
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s t a t e ) ,  there fore  , k s a p l o n o 2 > ( l i e )  ra ther  than ' a n e v e n o '  (go up),  
although the l a t t e r  verb can also appear in a predication describing  
pos i t ion .  I t  has to be emphasized tha t  th is  is only to be understood 
within  the l im i te d  area of  the verbs under in v es t ig a t io n .  The 
general assumption th a t  I f .  forms are more typ ica l  o f  s t a t i v i t y  than 
Pf.  ones is not chal lenged. In f a c t ,  ' k s e r o '  (know) which is a 
classica l  example of  a s ta t iv e  verb does not have a Pf.  form at  a l l ;  
i f  reference has to  be made to the beginning of  the s ta te ,  i . e .  the 
ingressive stage,  a d i f f e r e n t  verb must be used, e .g .  ' y n o r i z o '  
(know), ' k a t a l a v e n o '  (understand), 'maBeno '  ( l ea rn ,  f in d  ou t ) .
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  central  instances of  s ta tes ,  processes and 
events implies th a t  most predications are in general to be understood
not as belonging or not belonging to one o f  these three categories,
but ra th e r  as being more or less prototypica l  (or marginal) instances 
of  the re levant  categories.  This view is chal lenged by an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  in t e r p r e t a t io n  of  phenomena such as those described 
throughout th is  section.  According to th is  a l te rn a t iv e  
i n te rp re ta t io n  a predication may be viewed as containing dynamic 
elements embedded inside s t a t i c  ones, fo r  instance, and the S-P-E 
status o f  tha t  predication as a whole is tha t  o f  the top-most
construction (D. Bennett,  p . c . ) .  The two views do not seem to me to
be incompatible.  An example such as:
(28) t o  v i v l i o  i n e  va lmeno s t o  r a f i  ( P f . b ' )  
the book is (put )  on the shelf
may be said to involve 'event '  material  (pu t t ing )  embedded wi th in  an 
overal l  s ta t iv e  environment. The suggestion made here is tha t (28) 
is  not a ty p ica l  instance of  a ' s t a t e '  precisely  because i t  also 
involves 'event '  elements (p u t t in g ) .  A more s ta t iv e  descript ion of  
an otherwise s im i la r  s i tu a t io n  would be:
(29) to v i v l i o  i n e / v r i s k e t e  s t o  r a f i  ( I f . +  Pres.)  
the book i s / ' i s  found' on the shel f
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where no reference is made to the change of s ta te ,  i . e .  the event 
which resulted in the book's pos i t ion .  S im i la r ly ,  an example such 
as :
(30) t o  v i v l i o  a f t o  e x i  b i  s t o  r a f i  apo t o  1912  (P re s .P f . a ' )  
th is  book has 'ente red '  on-the she l f  since 1912. 
th is  book has been on the she l f  since 1912
can be in te rpreted as representing a s i tua t ion  even less s ta t iv e  and 
more ' e v e n t - l i k e '  than th a t  described in (28 ) .  Looked at from a
d i f f e r e n t  angle i t  is again a case of  an event embedded inside a
state  (although MG P re s .P f .a '  is not usual ly l inked with ' s t a t e s ' ) .
2.8  Test frames
This chapter has up to the present point  presented the view that  
whole predications can be characterized as more or less prototypical  
instances of  s t a t i v e ,  processual and 'event '  s i tuat ions  depending on 
a number of  d i f f e r e n t  elements present in them. Some o f  the re levant  
elements have been id e n t i f i e d  (aspect,  goal,  e t c . ) .  I t  is thought
tha t  com p at ib i l i ty  o f  d i f f e r e n t  MGMVs with d i f f e r e n t  combinations of 
some of these elements may give a p ic ture  (however inaccurate)  of  the 
r e la t i v e  ' s t a t i v i t y ' ,  'p ro ce ssu a l i ty ' and ' e v e n t - l i k e  nature'  of  the 
verbs under in ves t ig a t io n .  Clear ly  the number of  'co m p a t ib i l i ty  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s '  is great .  For reasons of  space and 'manageabi l i ty '  of
the m a te r ia l ,  however, only f i v e  such p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are considered 
and used j o i n t l y  as a h e u r is t ic .  Far from being a fu l l -b lo o d e d ,
categor iza t ion ,  the resu l t ing  schema which appears in L is t  I I I  
consists simply of  ' frames'  used as test-environments fo r  some MGMVs. 
Posit ion verbs are not tested,  ne i ther  are ' s t a t i v e '  verb-forms (e .g .  
Perfect tenses) .  The reason is ra ther  obvious: i f  a formal
d is t in c t io n  is to be made anywhere, " i t  is more log ica l  fo r  i t  to be 
made wi th in  descr ipt ions of  dynamic s itua t ions  than wi th in  
descr ipt ions o f  s t a t i c  s ituations"  (Comrie 1976:51).
The ' frames'  used are as fol lows:
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I .  I f .  aspect + Present + [ e p i  m ia  . . .o ra ]P P
fo r  one . . .hour
(Continuous motion)
I I .  Aor is t  ( i . e .  Pf .+  'non-duration '  + Past) + [ e p i  m i a . . . o r a ] P P  
(Motion understood as continuous but completed ( d e f i n i t e  t ime))
I I I . A o r i s t  + [a po  NPlqc se  Np|_0C mesa se w /a . . .o ra ]P P
from NPloc to NP|_qc in one. . .hour  
(Motion understood as re s t r ic te d  both l o c a l l y  and temporally)
Each verb is put in one or more of  the resu l t ing  columns B,C,D,E,F,G 
according to which frames i t  is compatible wi th .  Thus, column B 
contains those verbs tested which are compatible with a l l  three
frames ( I ,  I I  and I I I ) .  Column C contains the verbs which allow I
and I I I  but block I I  (hence the box corresponding to I I  is b lack).
Column D verbs al low only frame I I I .  The remaining two columns (E
and F) contain verbs which normally block a l l  three p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
The ir  d i f fe rence  l i e s  in tha t  while E verbs may appear in frames I 
and I I  i f  the impl icat ion is ' i t e r a t i o n '  ra the r  than 'continuous
motion' (which the frames are meant to imply) ,  F verbs do not allow
I I  at a l l  ( i . e .  even i f  we wish to attempt an ' i t e r a t i v e '
understanding).
I t  is assumed th a t  the fu r th e r  to the l e f t  in L is t  I I I  a verb appears 
the more processual i t  i s ,  and the fu r th e r  i t  appears to the r ig h t ,  
the more ' e v e n t - l i k e '  i t  i s .  I t  can be said th a t  roughly speaking E 
and F verbs are 'event '  verbs. P ro to typ ica l ly  processual MGMVs are 
also excluded from the te s t  and const i tu te  column A. These are: 
' t r e m o ' ( t remble ) ,  ' p e r i f e r o '  (take s . t h .  here and th e re ) ,  
' p e r i f e r o m e '  and ' t r i y i r i z o '  both meaning 'roam around',  
' k i k l o f o r o j  ( c i r c u l a t e ) .  The reason is tha t  they e i t h e r  do not 
have a Pf.  form at  a l l  ( ' t r e m o ' )  or ,  i f  they do, i t  is o f  re s t r ic te d  
use, so they cannot be r e a l l y  submitted to tes ts  making use of  the 
A or is t .  Besides, as they are incompatible with the notion of a 
' journey'  ( i . e .  ' from one point to a n o th e r ' ) ,  they cannot be 
submitted to the t e s t  fo r  frame I I I .  I t  seems i n t u i t i v e l y  correct to
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posit  ' t r e m o '  as the most prototypical  instance of  a processual MGMV
and consider the others in between categories A and B. An addit ional
candidate fo r  such an in between category which also blocks I I I  ( f o r  
reasons other than the combination of  Aor is t  plus a ' journey'  
specifying PP) is the set of  verbs: ' a n a k a t e v o j p - o m e j ^ j p '  ( s t i r ,
to ss) ,  ' a n a t a r a s o j f t - o m e j N j f t '  ( s t i r  up, shake), ' t a r a k u n a o j p - j e m e j ^ j p '  
(shake up).  The verbs of  th is  set present a special  problem, namely 
th a t  i t  is  not immediately obvious whether i t  is  'c o n t in u i ty '  or
' i t e r a t i o n '  tha t  they imply. A s im i la r  problem is present in verbs 
appearing at  the other end of th is  's c a le '  of  frames (categor ies)  and 
is discussed in tha t  connection under Comment 12. Notice tha t  each 
column includes also the numbers re fe r r in g  to the comments which
accompany sp ec i f ic  sets of  verbs or individual  verbs. These comments 
on L is t  I I I  fo l low immediately.
2.9 Comments on L is t  I I I
1, ' p e r i k i k l o n o j p - o m e j ^ j p '  ( e n c i rc le )  can pass I I ,  but with the
impl icat ion: 'performed the act and then stayed there fo r
o n e . . .h o u r ' .  Since th is  is c le a r ly  not the intended impl ica t ion ,  
i t  appears in category C. The same applies to a number o f  other  
Vs belonging to d i f f e r e n t  categories (e .g .  ' k a d i z o j p - k a B o m e j p j p '  
( s i t ) )  and w i l l  not be marked every time i t  occurs as i t  does not
a f f e c t  the issue at hand,
2a. The main point in r e la t io n  to th is  set o f  Vs is tha t  i f  the goal
is specif ied they move to category D, i . e .  become less processual 
(and consequently more ' e v e n t - l i k e ' ) .  Dif ferences between 
individual  Vs as to the type o f  goal expression each of  them 
allows are o f  no concern here (e .g .  ' t r e x o  s t o  p e r i p t e r o '  ( I  run 
to the kiosque),  vs * ' p e r p a t a o  s t o  p e r i p t e r o '  ( I  walk to the 
kiosque).  Obviously,  the same environment would al low the Aor is t  
provided we have NP|_qc instead of  goal,  i . e .  a sp ec i f ica t io n  of  
the place i n / a t / w i t h i n  which the motion described by the V takes
place: e .g .  ' t r e x i  s t o n  k i p o  e p i  m ia  o r a '  is  f in e  only i f  i t  is
understood as 's /he  runs/ is  running in /w i th in  the garden fo r  one 
h o u r ' .
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2b. This set is again characterized by a transposi t ion  to the r ig h t  
(from C to D),  thus giv ing r is e  to ra th e r  ' e v e n t - l i k e '  
predications ,  with a goal s p e c i f ic a t io n ,  e .g . :
* anevenume s t i n  k o r i f i  t u  k a b a n a r j u  e p i  m i  a o r a  
we go/are going to the top of  the b e l l - to w er  fo r  one hour.
3. One of  the major problems o f  th is  ca tegor iza t ion ,  and a c lear  
example of  indeterminacy,  in my view, is exemplif ied by 
' s k a r f a l o n o ' (cl imb) and ' p i b a o '  ( jump). Both o f  them could 
conceivably ( in  other words, fo r  some speakers) behave l i k e  B 
category/frame Vs i f  they are understood as implying 'continuous 
physical a c t i v i t y / e x e r c i s e '  in a context concatenating d i f f e r e n t  
'manner-of-motion'  instances o f  physical exercise,  e .g .  ' e t r e k s e  
e p i  m ia  ora, s k a r f a l o s e  e p i  m i s i  ora,  p e r p a t i s e  e p i  b i o  o r e s ,  
p i b i k s e  e p i  m i s i  o r a ,  . . . '  (he ran fo r  an hour, climbed fo r  h a l f  
an hour, walked fo r  two hours, jumped fo r  h a l f  an h o u r , . . . ) .
4. I t  seems in te res t ing  to compare ' v u t a o ' (dive)  to ' p i b a o '  (jump); 
i t  appears tha t  the only reason why the former could not appear 
in category E is th a t ,  although i t  can be also in terpreted  as an 
instance of  'physical e x e rc is e ' ,  i t  is more momentary than the 
former and even less homogeneous,
5. This set allows C environments (C frame) with an NPlqc ( as above, 
specifying the place where/on/within which the motion takes 
place) or without any lo c a t iv e  sp ec i f ica t io n  (e .g .  ' anevenume e p i  
m ia  o r a '  (we go/are going up fo r  an hour) ,  ' anevenume t i  s k a l a  
e p i  m ia  o r a '  (we go/are going up the s ta ircase fo r  an hour).
6. As already discussed in connection with the nominal izat ions te s t ,  
these Vs present a special  problem. To s t a r t  w i th ,  ' m e t a f e r o '  
(ca r ry / t ra n s p o r t )  has no d i s t i n c t  p er fec t ive  aspect (hence Aorist  
and Imperfect are morphological ly i d e n t i c a l ) .  Therefore only the 
passive form ( ' m e t a f e r o m e ' )  can be submitted to the te s ts .  They 
also seem to block I I  i f  goal is spec i f ied ,  but I have been 
unable to get. agreement from native speakers as to whether they
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also block I or not.  I t  seems to me tha t  the in te rp re ta t io n  
corresponding to English 'c a r r y '  behaves more 'processua l ly '  than 
the ' t r a n s p o r t '  use. In e i t h e r  case they both seem to become 
more ' e v e n t - l i k e '  with an e x p l i c i t  sp ec i f ica t ion  of  goal (e .g .  
* ' 7  v a l i t s a  m e t a f e r Q i k e  s t o  staQmo e p i  m ia  o r a ' ( the suitcase was 
carr ied to the s ta t ion  fo r  one hour)) .
7. A ra ther  in te res t ing  case is exemplified with ' s i k o n o j p - o m e j p j p '  
( r a i s e / l i f t ,  r i s e ) .  The commonest understanding o f  these verbs 
seems to be the one focusing on the source, e .g .  ' s i k o s e  t o  
v i v l i o  apo t o  p a t o m a '  (s/he l i f t e d  the book from the f l o o r ) .  
This is the most r e s t r ic te d  in te rp re ta t io n  temporally (and 
perhaps also l o c a l l y )  of  these verbs; hence they are l i s t e d  under 
F, together  with t y p i c a l l y  'event '  verbs, with the proviso that  
I I I  is  inapp licab le ,  s t r i c t l y  speaking, since i t  e x p l i c i t l y  
re fe rs  to both source and goal.  I f ,  however, the focus moves to  
the goal or the ' journey'  of  the theme, these verbs behave much 
less l i k e  'event '  verbs and are l i s t e d  under C and D, e .g .  ' o  
y e ra n o s  s i k o n i  t o  p j a n o  s t o  t e t a r t o  p a t o m a '  (the crane is ra is ing  
the piano to the fourth f l o o r ) .
8. A vast number of  the verbs appearing in th is  l i s t  change
category depending on the nature of  the theme (moving o b je c t ) ,  a
general issue already discussed b r i e f l y  in the re levant section
which w i l l  be explained th e o r e t i c a l l y  at g reater  length in the 
next one. What needs to be noted here is th a t  i f  the theme is  
'mass' or ' p l u r a l ' ,  the verbs marked fo r  Comment 8 in category C 
move to category B, while those marked fo r  the same comment in 
categories E and D move to C. An addi t ional  but re la ted  point  
has be made in connection with ' s t e l n o ' (send).  Notice the 
dif fe rence  between (a) and (b) below:
(a) * s t e l n o  yrama s t i  y e r m . n i a  e p i  m ia  o r a
I send/am sending a l e t t e r  to Germany fo r  one hour
(b) s t e l n o  m in im a  me t o n  a s i m a t o  e p i  m ia  o ra
I  am sending a message by radio fo r  one hour.
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On the basis of  the (a) type of  examples ' s t e l n o ' is l i s t e d  under 
F, while the (b) type of  sentences with the same verb point to 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  i t s  moving to category C. I t  is mentioned 
separately  in order to indicate  tha t  'count '  vs 'mass' has to be 
fu r t h e r  analysed in connection with cer ta in  e n t i t i e s  (e .g .
' m i n i m a ' is grammatically 'c o u n t ' ) .  A s im i la r  point  has been 
raised in connection with ' vazo t i  r o b a '  ( I  put/am putt ing the 
wheel (on the ca r ) )  in section 2 .6 .  The whole issue is taken up 
in the fol lowing section.
9. The case of  verbs such as ' y i r i z o j ( turn) has already been 
discussed in the section on aspect and i t  should be quite c lear  
by now that  such verbs can cover almost the whole range of S-P-E 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  They appear here under F with the proviso that  
th is  applies only to t h e i r  'non-dura t iona l ' i n te rp re ta t io n .  A 
s im i la r  s i tua t ion  is presented by ' k u n a o j '  (move) which (qui te  
c h a r a c t e r is t i c a l l y )  can appear in almost any category depending 
on a number of  d i f f e r e n t  fac tors .  A more serious problem arises  
with ' k u n a o ? '  (move) which belongs together with a number of  Vs 
implying motion without change-of- location - in p a r t i c u la r  (a) 
' t a l a n d e v o j p - o m e j N Y p '  ( o s c i l l a t e ) ,  ' e o r u m e '  (sway), (b) ' s k i v o '  
(bend),  ' y e r n o ' ( lean) and (c) ' s a l e v o j ^ j p '  ( s t i r ,  move 
s l i g h t l y ) .  Al l  these w i l l  normally block a ' journey '  expression 
(as they are not change-of- location Vs); those in subset (a) pass 
I ' o f f i c i a l l y '  but i t  is almost impossible to decide whether we 
are deal ing with 'continuous'  and 'homogeneous' motion, or with 
i t e r a t i o n .  Neither ' s a l e v o j p j p '  ( s t i r ) ,  nor ' k u n a o j p '  (move) 
allow fo r  an i t e r a t i v e  understanding in I I  environments, unl ike  
the verbs o f  subset ( a ) .  These la s t  verbs resemble the ones 
already mentioned at the beginning of these comments: ' a n a k a t e v o '  
( s t i r ,  tos s ) ,  ' a n a t a r a s o ' ( s t i r  up, shake) and ' t a r a k u n a o '  (shake 
up) which pass both I and I I ,  but fo r  which i t  is once again 
d i f f i c u l t  to decide whether 'c o n t in u i ty '  or ' i t e r a t i o n '  is 
implied.  Hence the main reason fo r  c la ss i fy in g  only ' t a l a n d e v o '  
( o s c i l l a t e )  and ' e o r u m e ' (sway) under E is th a t  they c le a r ly  
involve a regular  type of  motion, so th a t  the ' i t e r a t i o n '  
i n te rp re ta t io n  seems more natura l .
- 113 -
10. Notice,  th a t  'petao^'  (throw) w i l l  accept a ' journey '  expression 
(from NPlqc to NPlqc) but the time expression fo l lowing i t  counts 
the time which fol lows the act of  throwing.
11. These Vs [ ' x o r e v o ' ,  ' x o r o p i b a o ' , ' k i l j e m e ' )  are incompatible with  
e i t h e r  a goal or a ' journey'  expression,  but th is  does not a f fe c t  
the issue at hand and w i l l  be therefore disregarded here.
12. I t  has seemed b e t te r  to consider ' g r e m i z o '  (pu l l  down) 
separately .  'Nature of  theme' is again at  issue,  though in a 
sense d i f f e r e n t  from the 'mass' vs 'count '  noun d is t in c t io n .  
Notice the d i f fe rence  between (a) and (b) below. Example (a ):
(a) g r e m i z o  t o  s p i t i  e p i  b i o  meres
I am pu l l in g  down the house fo r  two days 
I have been pu l l ing  the house down fo r  two days
involves c le a r l y  a C category verb, while ( b ) :
(b) * g r e m i z o  t o n  a nd ro p o  apo t i n  k o r i f i  t u  l o f u  e p i  b i o  l e p t a
I ' throw down' the man from the top of  the h i l l  fo r  two
minutes
shows that  we are in the area of  category F verbs.  N a tura l ly ,
(b) would be acceptable i f  the durat ive expression were absent.
The d i f fe rence  between the (a)  and (b) occurrences of  ' g r e m i z o '
seems to l i e  in the nature of  the theme; the d i f f e r e n t  
understandings o f  the two motions involved can be viewed as a 
contingent f a c t ,  i . e .  as depending on the type o f  object  
undergoing ' g r e m i z o ' .  Posit ing two d i f f e r e n t  verbs seems ra ther  
unwarranted. The verb appears in category C ra the r  than F simply 
because the use exemplif ied in (a) is much commoner than the one 
exemplif ied in (b ) .
13. The crucia l  f a c to r  fo r  the extreme ' e v e n t - l i k e '  nature o f  these 
Vs seems to be 's p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  source'.
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14. Notice that  ' o b i y o j ' (d r ive ,  e.g .  a car) and 'ob/yo^'  ( lead s.o.  
s.wh.) are understood here as d i f f e r e n t  verbs although they are 
obviously re la te d ,  otherwise ' o b i y o j '  would not have been 
included.
15. The case of  ' y l i s t r a o ' is d i f f e r e n t .  For the moment, the two 
main in te rp re ta t io n s  of  the verb are marked a s ' y l i s t r a o j ' ( s l i p )  
and ' y l  i s t r a c >2 ' ( s l i d e ) .  I t  w i l l  be shown (on the basis of  the 
t e s t  resu l ts  discussed in Chapter 5) tha t  there is good reason to 
believe that  ' s l i p '  is by f a r  the most immediate in te r p r e t a t io n .
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Notes on Chapter 2
1. The only apparent exceptions to th is  are wishes expressed in the 
form o f  an Imperative,  e .g .  Sleep well or Have a nice t im e .
2. The only method I am not prepared to discuss is de fin ing HAPPEN 
on the basis of  the ' s ta te -p rocess-event ' d is t in c t io n  and then 
using i t  fo r  fu r th e r  tes t ing  other verbs, as I f ind  i t  ra ther  
c i r c u la r .
3. None of  these accounts of  MG aspect seems to take notice of  
Comrie's d is t in c t io n  between 'complete' and 'completed' ,  but as 
i t  seems an important one i t  w i l l  be presented here in f u l l :
"A very frequent characte r isa t ion  of  p e r f e c t i v i t y  is that i t  
indicates a completed act ion.  One should note tha t  the word 
at issue in th is  d e f in i t io n  is 'completed' ,  not 'complete' :  
despite the formal s i m i l a r i t y  between the two words, there  
is an important semantic d is t in c t io n  which turns out to be 
crucia l  in discussing aspect. The per fec t ive  does indeed 
denote a complete s i tu a t io n ,  with beginning, middle, and 
end. The use o f  'completed' ,  however, puts too much 
emphasis on the terminat ion of  the s i tu a t io n ,  whereas the 
use of the pe r fe c t iv e  puts no more emphasis, necessar i ly,  on 
the end of  a s i tu a t io n  than on any other part  of  the 
s i tu a t io n ,  ra the r  a l l  parts o f  the s i tu a t io n  are presented 
as a s ingle  whole." (Comrie 1976:18)
4, A reasonable in te rp re ta t io n  o f  the status of  such verbs is tha t  
adopted by Comrie fo r  ' s i t '  namely th a t  i t  can in general be 
e i t h e r  s ta t iv e  ("be s i t t i n g " )  or ' in g ress ive '  ("adopt a s i t t i n g  
posi t ion")  (1976:20).
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3. THE 'CAUSATIVITY - AGENTIVITY' CATEGORIZATION AND
ITS APPLICATION TO MOTION VERBS
3.1 How separate can the notions of  ' c a u s a t i v i t y '  and ' a g e n t iv i t y '  
be kept?
Despite years of  phi losophical and l i n g u i s t i c  work on c aus a t iv i ty
major problems r e la t in g  to th is  issue remain unsolved. This analysis
does.not purport to tack le  them. But 'cause' being undoubtedly one 
of the main c la ss i fy in g  semantic features fo r  verbs, i t  has to be
examined in d e ta i l  in an analysis of  a verbal domain such as tha t  of
MGMVs.
In order to invest iga te  the behaviour of  MGMVs in r e la t io n  to the
propert ies in question,  i . e .  c au s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty ,  a number of  
issues have to be discussed:
the extent to which the notions of  ' c a u s a t i v i t y '  and 'a g e n t iv i t y '
can be kept separate;
the r e la t io n  o f  c au s a t iv i ty  to t r a n s i t i v i t y  and the notion of  
' p a t i e n t ' ;
the r e la t io n  o f  a g en t iv i ty  to the d is t in c t io n  between d i re c t  
and in d i re c t  causatives.
Two categor izat ions  of  MGMVs w i l l  be attempted, one on the basis of  
ca u s a t iv i t y  at  the end of  the f i r s t  section and a separate one on the 
basis o f  a g e n t iv i ty  at the end of the f i n a l  section.  These 
categor izat ions require  a p r io r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the notions of
'cause' and ' e f f e c t '  and an understanding of  ' a g e n t i v i t y '  as a 
c lu s te r  o f  propert ies  ( ra th e r  than as a single  fe a t u r e ) .  I t  w i l l  be 
shown th a t  ju s t  as fo r  the S-P-E d is t in c t io n  (discussed in the
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previous chapter ) ,  whole predications w i l l  have to be examined fo r  
presence or absence o f  the r e la t i v e  propert ies and tha t  individual  
verbs can be ca l led  'a gent ive '  to a greater  or lesser  extent ( i . e .  
th a t  presence or absence o f  th is  property is not a yes-no question).  
Although c a u s a t iv i t y  seems to be more obviously a yes-no matter,  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  that,  i t ,  too,  might have a gradient nature seems worth 
i n v e s t ig a t in g .
Probably one of  the le a s t  controversia l  and most concise accounts of  
a causative construction is tha t  offered in Shibatani (1976a:239-40) , 
Causat iv i ty  is stated as a r e la t io n  between two events which holds i f  
the fol lowing conditions are s a t is f i e d :
"a. The r e la t io n  between the two events is such t h a t  the speaker 
believes tha t  the occurrence o f  one event, the 'caused 
event ' ,  has been re a l i z e d  at which is a f t e r  t j t the time 
of  the 'causing even t ' .
b. The r e la t io n  between the causing and the caused event is 
such tha t  the speaker believes th a t  the occurrence of  the 
caused event is wholly dependent on the occurrence of  the 
causing event; the dependency of  the two events here must be 
to the extent tha t  i t  allows the speaker to  en te r ta in  a 
counterfactual  inference that the caused event wouldn't have 
taken place at tha t  p a r t i c u la r  time i f  the causing event
hadn't taken place,  provided that  a l l  else had remained the 
same."
This is e n t i r e l y  in keeping with the common philosophical  view tha t  
in order to assert  th a t  an ob jec t 's  act ions caused some event to 
happen, a speaker must bel ieve th a t  the event happened and that i t  
would not have happened on th a t  p a r t i c u la r  occasion i f  the object had 
not acted and a l l  else had been the same ( c f ,  also Stalnaker 1968, 
Dowty 1972a, M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird 1976).
This is perhaps as f a r  as agreement on th is  issue goes. The
re la t io n s h ip  between c au s a t iv i ty  and a g en t iv i ty  is ph i losophica l ly  
controversial  and l i n g u i s t i c  discussions o f  causative verbs ignore
the d is t in c t io n  between causers and agents in p ra c t ic e ,  even when 
they recognize i t s  existence in theory.  Before providing s pec i f ic
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examples o f  th is  claim i t  is worth digressing b r i e f l y  to look for  an 
explanation of  the confusion.
I t  is often assumed th a t  the perceptual mechanism fo r  causation is 
innate and that visual  causation provides the point of  o r ig in  fo r  
l a t e r  conceptual ref inements. M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:489 
f f . )  consider also the p o s s ib i l i t y  tha t  the perceptual  predicate  
CAUSE may o r ig in a te  with the in tent iona l  movements of  the ch i ld ,  
genera l ize  to other persons and f i n a l l y  to inanimate objects.  Lyons 
(1977:482 f f . ,  drawing on Piaget) accepts a s im i la r  account of  the 
c h i ld ' s  conception o f  c ausa l i ty  o r ig in a t in g  in act ion .  I f  th is  is  
the case, the concept of  causation may be the re s u l t  of  f a i r l y  long- 
l a s t in g  cogni t ive  development along the l ines  already mentioned: 
'ego' is replaced by 'person ';  other people's in tentions are in ferred  
through t h e i r  perceived behaviour; and the end o f  th is  process is the 
average a d u l t 's  notion of  in tent ion  and the re la ted  notions of  
animacy and agency. I f  cause and in tent ion  are so c lose ly  re la ted  
ontogenetical ly  we have an explanation fo r  the confusion between 
ca u s a t iv i t y  and a g e n t iv i t y ,  since there has never been any doubt tha t  
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  is at  leas t  one of  the main propert ies  of  an agent 
(and on most accounts i t  is understood as an agent 's sole property ) .
Be that as i t  may, i t  is also well known that although i t  takes at  
leas t  ten years fo r  an average ch i ld  to get h is /h e r  ideas about 
causation and animacy sorted out, s/he is a competent speaker o f  h is /  
her language long before th is  is  accomplished ( M i l l e r  and Oohnson- 
Laird 1976:491). The fac t  also that  agents are interchangeable with 
other kinds of  causers (e .g .  The umpire stopped play or Rain stopped 
pi ay) is brought as evidence fo r  the existence o f  a "natural  and 
perhaps universal tendency to id e n t i f y  causa l i ty  with agency" (Lyons 
1977:490).
In short ,  col lapsing the notions of  a g e n t iv i ty  and c a u s a t iv i ty  is ,  to 
some extent ,  j u s t i f i a b l e .  I t  seems, however, th a t  a c lear  
understanding o f  the points at which they in te rse c t  and those at 
which they are d i s t i n c t  is necessary before any attempt at 
categor iz ing verbs along these dimensions is made. In p a r t i c u la r  i t
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is important to recognize tha t  c au s a t iv i ty  hinges on the re su l t  
( e f f e c t )  or the s i tu a t io n  o f  the rec ip ien t  o f  an action,  not on the 
q u a l i t i e s  o f  the causing event as such. The extent to which the 
causing event involves an agent, i . e .  an animate, v o l i t i o n a l ,  
responsible e n t i t y  who is in control  o f  the s i tu a t io n  and has 
author i ty  over i t  w i l l  be decis ive in considerat ions of  the 
' a g e n t i v i t y '  of  a predication (and f i n a l l y  of  the verb i t  involves) .  
Although these observations are not contradicted in theory in any 
analysis tha t  I know of,  i t  can be shown tha t  spec i f ic  
categor izat ions of  predications (and verbs) in re la t io n  to these 
basic propert ies confla te  them in pract ice  and are consequently more 
confusing than i l lu m in a t in g .  The c le ares t  examples of  th is  
conf la t ion  are probably Lyons (1977) and M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird 
(1976) as both works provide exce l len t  theore t ica l  accounts of  the 
re levant notions and r e la t io n s .  They w i l l  be there fore  considered 
here in some d e t a i l .
Lyons' (1977:491-4)  categor iza t ion  of verbs in re la t io n  to 
ca u s a t iv i ty  resu l ts  in a t r i p a r t i t e  d iv is ion  into  ' f a c t i t i v e ' ,  
'o p e ra t ive '  and ' o p e r a t i v e - f a c t i t i v e '  verbs.  In his system 
' f a c t i t i v e '  verbs are said to denote a s i tu a t io n  where a cause 
produces an e f fe c t :
(a) PRODUCE (CAUSE, EFFECT)
'Operat ive '  verbs are said to denote an operation performed by an 
agent and a f fec t in g  a p a t ie n t :
(b) AFFECT (AGENT, PATIENT)'
'O p e r a t i v e - f a c t i t i v e '  verbs are character ized by a combination of  the 
elements appearing in (a) and ( b ) :
(c) PRODUCE (AGENT, EFFECT)
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Al l  three schemata are said to be re levant in "paradigm instances of 
agentive s ituat ions  ( i . e .  those in which the action resu l ts  in a 
change in the physical condition or location of  the pa t ien t )"  
( i b i d . :491) .  A d is t in c t io n  is drawn, however, between instances of 
' k i l l '  where the cause is a f i r s t - o r d e r  nominal ( John k i l l e d  B i l l ) 
and those where i t  is a second-order nominal ( Excessive drinking  
k i l l e d  B i l l ) .  In the former case ' k i l l '  is  understood as closer to
(c) while  in the l a t t e r  i t  is a ' f a c t i t i v e '  verb,  i . e .  i t  re la tes  
d i r e c t l y  to (a ) .  F in a l l y ,  since the proposit ion expressed by f x  
k i l l e d  y '  can also be understood as saying t h a t  x  did something to y  
" i t  can be understood as an instance o f  AFFECT (AGENT, PATIENT)" 
( i b i d . :492) ,  i . e .  ' k i l l '  can be also an 'o p e ra t ive '  verb.  This sort  
of categor izat ion resul ts  in two d i s t i n c t  understandings of ' k i l l ' :  
an agentive one corresponding to (b) and (c) and a non-agentive 
in te rp re ta t io n  corresponding to (a ) .  Besides, in so f a r  as a f fec t ing  
a pat ien t  is not equivalent to producing an e f f e c t ,  an agentive but 
n o n - f a c t i t i v e  understanding is also predicted as a p o s s i b i l i t y  for  
' k i l l ' .  I t  seems to me that the facts in connection with ' k i l l ' ,  
ca u s a t iv i ty  and a g en t iv i ty  can be accounted fo r  in a simpler way, 
provided the two notions are kept separate.  What we know to be true  
of a l l  instances o f  ' k i l l '  is tha t  i t  is a causative verb.  He was 
k i l l e d  in a bomb explosion and He was k i l l e d  during the la s t  
earthquake involve p e r fe c t ly  l i t e r a l  instances o f  ' k i l l ' .  An 
external  cause is unequivocal ly required (un l ike  in the case of  
' d i e ' ,  fo r  instance) .  In th is  respect, i . e .  in anything that  
concerns c au s a t iv i ty ,  both examples belong together with John k i l l e d  
B i l l  where unl ike  e i t h e r  a genuine agent is involved.  Therefore,  
' k i l l '  is undoubtedly a causative,  but i t  is  not equal ly  cer ta in  that  
i t  is also 'completely'  agentive,  since i t  does not necessari ly  
require  an animate v o l i t io n a l  causer, being responsible fo r  the 
s i t u a t io n ,  having author i ty  and control  over i t .  Such factors  (which 
w i l l  be discussed separately in the re levant section) have to  be 
taken into considerat ion only in order to decide the extent  to which 
' k i l l '  is an agentive verb and i t  is easy to see th a t  i t  w i l l  not 
fe a ture  at  the top of  an agent iv i ty  scale,  un l ike  a verb such as 
'murder' ,  fo r  instance.
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I t  looks as i f  a t r i p a r t i t e  categor iza t ion  is at  the same time both 
redundant and in s u f f i c i e n t  to account fo r  the facts  o f  ' k i l l ' .  For, 
besides the examples already discussed, the same verb may receive  
addit ional  in te rp re ta t io n s  in cases l i k e :  John k i l l e d  B i l l  by
accident and John k i l l e d  B i l l  in order to steal  his cocaine. None of  
these in te rp re ta t io n s  hinges on the e f f e c t ,  the re s u l t  of  the causing 
event,  i . e .  none of  them a f fe c ts  the 'c a u s a t i v i t y '  issue. They a l l  
bear on the extent to which the causer is an agent, i . e .  they a l l  
depend on propert ies  o f  the causing event and a f fe c t  the ' a g e n t iv i t y '  
i ssue.
Consider also the case of  ' h i t '  and Lyons' explanation o f  why the 
verb is not ' o p e r a t i v e - f a c t i t i v e ' .  His s p ec i f ic  example is John h i t  
B i l l  and the explanation is worth looking into  ra ther  c a r e fu l ly :
"we can, o f  course, say th a t  in so f a r  as some change is wrought
in the condition of  B i l l ,  John's act ion resu l ts  in a new s ta te .
But English does not provide us with a monovalent predicator
denoting such states" ( i b i d . :492) .
This means tha t  while in the case of  ' k i l l '  there  ex is ts  an 
i n t r a n s i t i v e  verb 'd i e '  which re fe rs  to the re s u l t  brought about, no 
such i n t r a n s i t i v e  verb ex is ts  in the case of  ' h i t ' .  Therefore,  fo r  
Lyons ' e f f e c t '  equals ' l e x i c a l i z e d  new s ta te '  and consequently
'absence of  l e x ic a l i z e d  new s ta te '  implies 'no e f f e c t ' .  In short,  
' h i t '  is not ' o p e r a t i v e - f a c t i t i v e '  fo r  the same reason tha t  i t  is not 
j u s t  ' f a c t i t i v e '  e i t h e r ,  presumably (since ' f a c t i t i v e s '  also require  
that  an e f f e c t  be produced). What is ' h i t '  then? Lyons does not 
t e l l  us how i t  is  to be character ized,  but we may attempt to  ca l l  i t  
an 'o p e ra t ive '  verb.  'O p e ra t iv e s ' ,  however, involve a ' p a t i e n t ' .  In 
an example l i k e  John h i t  the wall  with his f i s t  and hurt himself
nothing happens to the w a l l .  I t  is not there fore  evident tha t  the
prototypical
wall is  indeed a /^ ' p a t ie n t ' . Is i t  consequently true  th a t  we do not 
know anything about ' h i t '  in connection with a g e n t iv i ty  and
causat iv i ty?  The answer is negative,  because we do know tha t  in both 
examples ' h i t '  is  an agentive verb.  The extent to which the subject  
possesses the re levant  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  to q u a l i f y  fo r  an 'agent '  can 
be worked out ( in  a spec i f ic  way which w i l l  be presented l a t e r ) ,  but 
the fa c t  remains tha t  some of these re levant c h a ra c te r is t ic s  are
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always present in a l l  instances of  ' h i t ' .  I t  can be argued, of  
course, tha t  ' p a t i e n t '  is to be defined as the e n t i t y  which is on the 
receiving  end of  an action and in that case the wall in the ' h i t  the 
w a l l '  example is a pa t ie n t .  Notice,  however, tha t  the crucial
element once again is ' a c t i o n ' ;  i f  that  notion is  also absent we are
saying nothing more about ' h i t '  than that i t  is a t r a n s i t i v e  verb and 
that  is not much o f  a categor izat ion .  C lear ly  'a c t io n '  implies  
presence of an ' a g e n t ' .  Hence, ir respect ive  of  the exact d e f in i t io n  
of ' p a t i e n t ' ,  the decis ive  fa c to r ,  which remains constant in the 
examples of  ' h i t '  j u s t  discussed, is a g en t iv i ty ,  A categor izat ion  
which mixes up elements crucia l  fo r  c ausa t iv i ty  and elements crucial  
fo r  a gent iv i ty  seems to miss the point.
In the case o f  MVs presence or absence of c a u s a t iv i t y  seems to be a
f a i r l y  s tra ight forward matter,  provided one st icks to the t ra d i t io n a l  
notion of  a causat ive,  requir ing  causative verbs to be t ra n s i t i v e s ,  
fo r  a s t a r t .  Motion verbs seen in th is  l i g h t  would be causative i f  
they describe the motion of  an object which can be safe ly  a t t r ib u te d  
to the in ter ference  (or act ion) o f  some other e n t i t y .  This simple 
view is not as widely adopted in pract ice  as one might have expected.  
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's (1976) characte r iza t ion  of  MVs with
respect to c a u s a t iv i ty  rests on an a l te rn a t iv e  view which seems to
also add to the confusion of the notions o f  c a u s a t iv i ty  and
ag en t iv i ty .  On t h e i r  account, i f  the moving object and the one 
responsible fo r  i t s  motion are one and the same, the verbs describing  
the motion in question are also understood as 'c a u s a t iv es ' .  C lear ly  
these verbs are not t r a n s i t iv e s  any longer but in t r a n s i t iv e s  of  
motion; moreover the issue of  c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  ( i . e .  whether the 
moving object and the one responsible fo r  i t s  motion are one or not) 
can only be raised in those cases where the moving object is an
agent. In the understanding o f  the proponents of  th is  view, the 
moving object must in such cases be capable o f  voluntary act ion.  As
an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th is  point ,  i t  is  s u f f i c i e n t  to notice tha t  in the
l i g h t  of  th is  approach The car rose is non-causative whi le John rose 
is vague. I f  John is  also an agent ( in  the sense o f  v o lu n ta r i l y
causing his own motion) the sentence receives a causative
in te rp re ta t io n  (along with an agentive one); i f  not,  i t  receives a 
non-causative in t e r p r e t a t io n  (along with the non-agentive one).  How
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is  th is  conclusion arr ived at? Within th is  system, causative verbs 
are understood as expressing a re la t io n  between two events, "the 
f i r s t  o f  which is something tha t  an agent does, the second an event 
tha t  his act ion causes" ( i b i d . :475) .  This is prec ise ly  the point  at 
which ca u s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty  are conflated with what seem to me 
to be undesirable re s u l ts .  This assumption ( i . e .  th a t  the causing 
event involves an agent) is used in order to d is t ingu ish  between 
' k i l l '  which implies bringing about a change in the condit ion o f  i t s  
logica l  object and 'see'  which does not imply any such th ing.  The 
d i s t in c t io n  in question is re la ted  to c a u s a t iv i ty ,  not a g en t iv i ty .
So, invoking the l a t t e r  notion as w e l l ,  in t ry ing  to account fo r  i t ,  
is  ra th e r  misleading.  The fa c t  that 'see'  does not q u a l i f y  as a 
causative has nothing to do with the i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  or non- 
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  of  the event.  Notice, at any ra te ,  th a t  even i f  i t
involves a v o l i t io n a l  subject in a case such as He saw the f i lm  in
order to decide fo r  himself whether the new actor was an.y good, 
nothing changes concerning c ausa t iv i ty :  the f i l m ' s  condit ion remains 
the same.
These facts  are too simple to have been overlooked by such a thorough 
analysis as the one under discussion.  The question th ere fore  arises  
as to the reason why M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) opt fo r  the 
a l t e r n a t i v e  approach ju s t  mentioned. I t  seems to be the case that  
neat fo rm a l iza t ion  l i e s  behind t h e i r  analysis .  The most economic 
solution fo r  causative/non-causative members o f  pa irs  is c e r ta in ly  
the one which incorporates the in t r a n s i t i v e  schema into the 
t r a n s i t i v e  one and o f fe rs  a single formula in the case of  
phonological ly  ident ica l  pa irs ,  e .g .  TURN ( ( x ) ,  y ) . The f i r s t
argument (x) being optional  in th is  formula, the schema allows both 
fo r  causative and non-causative uses. Consequently, in the case of  
phonological ly non- identica l  pa irs ,  a s im i la r  method can be applied.  
Hence sentences such as He raised the car and The car rose are lumped 
together as describing "the same event" ( i b i d . :475) .  Since the 
motions described are prec ise ly  the same in both uses, M i l l e r  and 
Johnson-Laird postulate one sense o f  the verb. The causative  
component is said to appear when there is an agent at  leas t  
i m p l i c i t l y  present and to disappear when s/he is  absent. But t h e i r  
diagnostic question fo r  s ingl ing out causatives from non-causatives
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"What propert ies  o f  y  are changed by x 's act ion" cannot be asked in 
the case of  The car rose, they claim, "because the verb is 
i n t r a n s i t i v e " .  Now th is  is e i t h e r  fa lse  or in contradict ion to t h e i r  
other claim that in t r a n s i t iv e s  may well be causatives.  Notice that a 
causative understanding is postulated both fo r  The man rose and fo r  
Melissa t r a v e l le d  although the verbs involved are also in t r a n s i t i v e .  
So in r e a l i t y  The car rose cannot be submitted to the diagnostic tes t  
because o f  a p r io r  (unadmitted) recognit ion of  the fa c t  tha t  the 
subject is inanimate and therefore  no candidate fo r  an agent ( in  
t h e i r  own understanding of the term at  l e a s t ) .  This being so, the 
question of  c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  cannot be raised as i t  is raised in the 
case of  The man rose and Melissa t r a v e l l e d . I t  is th is  th a t  is at  
issue and not i n t r a n s i t i v i t y  as is claimed. So in essence the 
d i f fe rence  between The car rose and The man rose is c le a r ly  a 
question of  a g e n t iv i ty  ( i . e .  propert ies of  the subject-causer)  and 
not c a u s a t iv i ty  ( i . e .  p ro p e r t ie s /s i tu a t io n  o f  the object of  change).
The undesirable re su l ts  of  th is  approach consist  in d is t inguishing  
between d i f f e r e n t  in te rp re ta t io n s  of ' r i s e 7 (a causative and a non­
causative one) fo r  the sake ( i t  seems to me) o f  bringing together  
' r a i s e '  and ' r i s e '  as causatives.  Consider a case l i k e  Smoke rose 
from the chimney. There is c le a r ly  no co rresponding t r a n s i t i v e  
sentence ^Somebody raised smoke from the chimney. Ne ither does the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  vagueness ex is t  as i t  does in the case of  The man 
rose . Since smoke is incapable of  "voluntary act ion" the question of  
c o r e f e r e n t i a l i t y  cannot be ra ised.  I f  we adhere s t r i c t l y  to the 
p r inc ip les  of  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird we can only conclude tha t  we 
are faced with a t h i r d  kind o f  ' r i s e '  th is  t ime. This solut ion seems 
more c o u n te r - in tu i t i v e  than d is t inguishing between a causative  
' r a i s e ' ,  and a non-causative ' r i s e ' ,  the r e la t io n  between which 
cannot re s t  on considerations bearing on a g e n t iv i ty .  D i f fe re n t  
in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  ' r i s e '  which depend on the sort  o f  subjects i t  can 
accept ( ' t h e  c a r ' ,  ' the  man', 'smoke', e t c . )  need to be investigated  
separately to discover where the verb stands as to a g e n t iv i ty .  The 
r e la t io n  between ' r a i s e '  and ' r i s e '  const i tu tes an important problem 
which requires special a t ten t ion  but i t  is a problem of  caus a t iv i ty  
and cannot be solved by reference to the propert ies of  the causing 
event and the extent  to which i t  involves a genuine agent.
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I  have argued so f a r  tha t  c ausa t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty  can be 
considered separate ly to some extent .  This can be e ffec ted  i f  
ca u s a t iv i t y  is understood as centr ing around the question o f  whether 
something tha t  happens (event or process) is due to some external  
in te rvention  or not,  i . e .  is brought about by an external  cause. 
Approaches a t t r ib u t in g  a causative component to sentences l i k e  
Melissa t r a v e l le d  on the grounds that "she did something that caused 
he rse l f  to move" ( M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird 1976:544) are here 
considered inappropr iate  as b lurr ing the d is t in c t io n  between 
c au s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty .  Melissa using her own forces to t ravel  
can be hardly cal led  an ' e x t e r n a l '  fa c to r ,  so the verb in question is 
no candidate fo r  a causative.  The suggestion made here is that  
c au s a t iv i ty  depends c r u c ia l ly  on ' p a t i e n t i v i t y '  o f  the object ra ther  
than a g e n t iv i ty  of  the subject,  i . e .  on the e f f e c t  ra ther  than the 
nature o f  the cause. Therefore the degree o f  a g e n t iv i ty  of  the 
causer is not d i r e c t l y  decis ive  in character iz ing a s i tu a t io n  as more 
or less t y p i c a l l y  causative.  Nevertheless, the notion of  a gent iv i ty  
plays a ro le  in the d is t in c t io n  between d i r e c t  and ind i rec t  
causatives in the sense th a t  the degree of  p a t i e n t i v i t y  of  the causee 
is to some extent (or in c e r ta in  cases) re la ta b le  to the degree of  
a g e n t iv i ty  of  the causer. These claims w i l l  be discussed in de ta i l  
fol lowing an account of  the re levant notions: the notion o f  'a gen t ' ,  
the notion of  ' t r a n s i t i v i t y '  and the d is t in c t io n  between d i r e c t  and 
in d i re c t  causatives.
The main idea underlying a l l  th is  discussion is tha t  c a u s a t iv i ty  can 
be l inked with a g en t iv i ty  through gradation.  The assumption is made 
tha t  m a n ip u la t ive /d i rec t  causation (e .g .  M ar ie t ta  put the book on the 
s h e l f ) is  the c en t ra l ,  most c h a ra c te r is t ic  causative s i tu a t io n .  In 
such a case the causer const i tu tes  the only fa c to r  responsible fo r  
the change-of- locat ion of  the causee, hence the causee has no active  
ro le  at a l l  to play in the caused s i tu a t io n ,  i . e .  the causee is a 
ty p ica l  p a t ie n t .  In th is  sense the p a t i e n t i v i t y  o f  the causee can be 
considered a function of  the a g e n t iv i ty  o f  the causer. But even 
d i re c t  causation does not necessari ly  imply th a t  the agent is the 
most ty p ica l  one. Animacy and v o l i t i o n  which are genera l ly  
understood as the ch ara c te r is t ic s  o f  a genuine agent need not be 
present (e .g .  The earthquake pul led down the house) .  On the other
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hand, in d i rec t  causation (e .g .  The gaoler marched the pr isoners ) 
r e f l e c t s  s i tuat ions  where the causer is a t t r ib u te d  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  
the caused event,  yet  the causee also p a r t ic ip a te s  a c t iv e ly  in i t ,  
i . e .  s/he is no typ ica l  p a t ien t .  Evidently ,  the mere fa c t  th a t  the 
p at ien t  is les s - th a n - typ ic a l  indicates th a t  the causer is also less-  
t h a n - t y p i c a l ; fo r  i f  the caused event requires the act ive  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  of  the causee as w e l l ,  the causer cannot be said to be 
in absolute control  of  the s i tu a t io n .  Yet even in the case of
in d i re c t  causation,  the causer possesses (almost necessar i ly )  the 
propert ies  of  animacy (s/he is ac tu a l ly  human in most cases) and 
v o l i t io n .  Once again there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
the propert ies o f  the causer and those o f  the causee. This b r i e f
o u t l ine  of  the main facts  of  d i rec t  and in d i re c t  causatives and t h e i r
r e la t io n  to a g e n t iv i ty  (which simply foreshadows a de ta i led  account 
of these re la t ionsh ips )  is meant to show a possible point  of
in te rsec t ion  o f  the notions o f  a g e n t iv i ty  and ca u s a t iv i ty  and to
indicate  that fo r  a c le a re r  understanding o f  these problems we need a 
reconsiderat ion of  the notion o f  'a g e n t ' .
The other point  of  in tersect ion  of  a g e n t iv i ty  and c au sa t iv i ty  is
t r a n s i t i v i t y  (as already mentioned). T r a n s i t i v i t y  is also understood 
here as a graded phenomenon involving more and less typ ica l  instances 
ra ther  than a s t r i c t  dichotomous d iv is ion  between t r a n s i t i v e  and non­
t r a n s i t i v e  events.  In th is  understanding t r a n s i t i v i t y  is not a 
formal syntactic  category but has sp ec i f ic  semantic content
r e la t a b le ,  on the one hand, to the degree o f  a g en t iv i ty  of  the
subject and, on the other,  to the degree of  p a t i e n t i v i t y  of  the 
object .  Therefore i t  can only be discussed fol lowing a c l a r i f i c a t i o n  
of the notion of  agent. The extent ,  however, to which i t  is correct  
to claim tha t  a categor iza t ion  of  causatives does not necessitate  
recourse to the notion of  a gent iv i ty  w i l l  be discussed in what 
fol lows immediately, namely an account of  MG causatives o f  motion.
3 .2  Id e n t i fy in g  Modern Greek causatives o f  motion
Within the area under invest iga t ion  i t  seems r e l a t i v e l y  easy to 
i d e n t i f y  those verbs which are causatives provided one accepts the
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t r a d i t i o n a l  l i n k  between causatives and t r a n s i t i v e s ,  i . e .  the 
requirement tha t fo r  something to q u a l i f y  as a causative i t  must at 
l eas t  be a t r a n s i t i v e  verb.  As already noted in the previous
section,  causatives o f  motion are here understood as describing a 
change-o f - locat ion /pos i t ion  e x p l i c i t l y  a t t r ib u te d  to external  
in te rven t ion .  The pre requ is i te  can be there fore  stated in very
simple terms: causatives o f  motion are expected to give r i s e  to a 
contrad ict ion  i f  they appear in a sentence of  the form ' x  Ved y  but y  
did not move'. Three main points have to be discussed at  th is  stage:
whether the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  o f  the resu l t in g  s ta te  (pos i t ion )  of
the object which is caused to move plays a ro le  in id e n t i fy in g  
causatives of  motion;
whether there is any evidence fo r  claiming th a t  the i n t r a n s i t i v e  
(non-causative)  or the causative i t  corresponds to  is more basic 
( in  those cases obviously where such a correspondence can be
estab l ished) ,  i . e .  whether there is reason to bel ieve th a t  one is 
derived from the other;
whether we can t a l k  about r e la t i v e  prominence of  the causative  
element in cer ta in  verbs (or sets of  verbs) and i f  so what is the 
nature o f  the phenomenon.
As was pointed out in the previous section,  Lyons (1977) suggests 
tha t  i f  a verb implies th a t  an e f fe c t  is unequivocal ly brought about, 
i . e .  i f  i t  is a c le a r  case of  a causative ( in  my understanding),  
th is  e f f e c t  must l e x i c a l i z e .  The v a l i d i t y  o f  th is  observation fo r  
a l l  causatives implying a change-of-condition o f  t h e i r  object cannot 
be tested here. I t  is worth, however, examining whether such a 
requirement is at  a l l  necessary in the case o f  the MGMVs which are 
here t e n t a t i v e l y  posited as causatives o f  motion.
Four groups of  t r a n s i t i v e  MGMVs can be dist inguished on the basis of  
whether and how the change-o f - locat ion /pos i t ion  o f  the object  
l e x i c a l i z e s .  Those most e a s i ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e  as causatives are 
perhaps the ones which happen to have a phonological ly ident ica l
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i n t r a n s i t i v e  counterpart .  In the f i e l d  under considerat ion the  
category includes verbs such as:
I .  ' k i l a o 2 ' (rol  1 *j-r), ' p l i s i a z o g ' (approachyp), ' s t r i v o z '  ( turnyp) ,  
l y i r i z o 2 / ( t u r n y p ) , ' v u l j a z o 2 ' (drownyp), ' a k u b a o 2 ' (make s . t h .
touch s.wh.,  pu t ) ,  ' \ o n a t i z 0 2 ' (make s .o .  knee l ) ,  ’ xami
( lo w e r jp ) ,  ' e p i s t r e f o 2 ' ( re turnyp) ,  ' y i r i z o  piso2 > ( r e t u r n jp ) ,
' y l i s t r a o 2/ t s u l a o 2 r ( s l ip y p ) ,  'p/yeno^' ( take s . t h .  s .w h . ) ,
' p a r a m e r i z o 2 l ( p u l l ,  put aside),  , k i k l o f o r o 2 ' (put in to  
c i r c u l a t i o n / c i r c u l a t e y p ) .
I t  must be pointed out th a t  th is  group includes verbs which are very 
d i f f e r e n t  semantical ly,  accepting d i s t i n c t  kinds o f  causers and 
causees and describing a v a r ie ty  of  motions. There is no uniformity  
as to the exact contr ibution of  the causer/causing event.  So the 
pr iv i leged  status such 'double purpose' verbs are sometimes accorded 
in analyses o f  English causative/non-causative pairs o f  verbs cannot
be accepted fo r  MGMVs, at  le a s t ,  on the basis o f  semantic c r i t e r i a .
The reasons of fered fo r  English 'double purpose' verbs are not very 
c le a r -c u t  e i t h e r .  As a f a i r l y  stra ight forward example, consider the 
sort  o f  sentences used in accounts o f  the character of  sentence 
pronominal izat ion:
(1) John f i n a l l y  melted the metal but i t  took him years to bring  
i t  about.
(2) *John f i n a l l y  k i l l e d  Mary but i t  took him years to bring i t  
about.
Ignoring in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  the type John t r i e d  over and over again 
as i r r e le v a n t ,  the fa c t  remains tha t :  (1) is  acceptable and (2) is  
not. Lakoff and Ross (1972) attempt an explanation o f  these facts  
along the fo l lowing l in e s :  the a c c e p ta b i l i ty  of  (1)  is a t t r ib u te d  to  
the morphological r e la t io n  between causative and i n t r a n s i t i v e  verb 
(e .g .  harden, melt e t c . ) ,  while the unacceptab i l i ty  o f  (2) is claimed 
to be due to the fa c t  tha t  "the lex ica l  item and the antecedent are 
not morphological ly re la ted"  ( p . 122).  Notice,  however, tha t  (3) is
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acceptable while (4) is not, although the opposite fac ts  hold in 
connection with 'phonological  i d e n t i c i t y ' :
(3) John f i n a l l y  transported the trunks to Afganistan but i t  took 
him years to bring i t  about.
(4) ??John f i n a l l y  turned the switch l e f t  but i t  took him years 
to bring i t  about.
In short ,  even in English such phenomena are probably be t te r  
accounted fo r  in terms o f  the 'processual '  or 'event '  character of  
the predications in question ra the r  than id e n t i t y  of  form between 
causative and non-causative members of  verb pa i rs .  Be tha t  as i t  
may, no special  semantic c h arac te r is t ic s  can be a t t r ib u te d  to group I 
MGMVs. Al l  th a t  can be safe ly  said about them is th a t  t h e i r  meaning 
can be most d i r e c t l y  computable on the basis o f  the meaning of t h e i r  
i n t r a n s i t i v e  counterparts plus a causative element ( in  i t s  broadest 
understanding).  In the case o f  MG th is  fa c t  is not devoid of  any 
serious impl ica t ion .  There is f a i r l y  strong evidence tha t  such 
causatives are derived from t h e i r  i n t r a n s i t i v e  counterparts which can 
there fore  be considered more basic ( in  th is  respect) .  In recent  
years a great number of  new causatives have emerged (espec ia l ly  in 
the speech of  the younger generation) which correspond to already  
ex is t ing  i n t r a n s i t i v e s .  So, p a r a l le l  to co l loquia l  expressions in
current use fo r  many years,  e .g .  ' t o n  peQane '  (s/he 'd ied '  him, i . e .  
s/he made him d i e ) ,  new expressions are now used, e .g .  ' n a  t o  
k a t a l  i ksutne t o  Qema'  ( l e t  us 'conclude'  the issue,  i . e .  l e t  us bring 
the issue to an end and reach a conclusion).  This expression was
heard with some surprise two years ago in a s tu d e n ts -s ta f f  meeting at 
Athens Un ivers i ty  but was immediately in te rpreted  in the way i t  was 
meant to be and has by now become quite 's tandard ized ' .  In short ,  
there is reason to be l ieve tha t  in the case of  'double purpose' MG Vs
there is a process involved in the der iva t ion  o f  the causatives and
th a t  th is  process i s ,  moreover, qu ite  productive.  So, in th is  
p a r t i c u la r  case i t  makes sense to posit  the i n t r a n s i t i v e  as the basic 
form and mark in the lexicon those in t r a n s i t iv e s  which undergo the 
process o f  being used also as causatives. More evidence in th is
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d i rec t io n  w i l l  be discussed a f t e r  the presentat ion of  t e s t  resul ts  in 
the f in a l  chapter.
The second group o f  MG causatives of  motion, singled out again on 
morphological ra th e r  than semantic c r i t e r i a ,  involves verbs which 
have a morphological ly re la ted  (although not id e n t ic a l )  in t r a n s i t i v e  
counterpart .  Such verbs are:
I I .  ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up) corresponding to ' a n e v e n o '  (go up, ascend),  
' k a t e v a z o '  ( take down) corresponding to ' k a t e v e n o '  (go down, 
descend), ' b a z o ' (put in)  corresponding to ’ b e n o ’ (enter )  and 
' v y a z o '  ( take out)  corresponding to ' v y e n o '  (go out ) .
Once again the correspondences are qu ite  easy to estab l ish ;  (5a) can 
be said to imply ( 5 b ) :
(5a) anevasa  t a  v i v l i a  s t o  r a f i  (V=anevazo)
I  took-up the books on the shel f  
I  put the books up on the shel f
(5b) t a  v i v l i a  a n e v i k a n  s t o  r a f i  (V=aneveno)
the books went-up on the shelf
the books went up on to the shel f .
Besides the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  o f  the event with a non-causative  
( ' a n e v e n o ' ) ,  the new posit ion can also l e x i c a l i z e  with a predication  
which is  as s ta t iv e  as is compatible with the notion of  motion, i . e . :
(5c) t a  v i v l i a  i n e  anevasmena s t o  r a f i  ( V=anevazome)
the books are taken-up to/on the sh e l f
the books are put up on the she l f .
I t  would seem at f i r s t  sight tha t  since these verbs are closely  
re la ted  in meaning, the l e x ic a l i z a t i o n  of  the change-of- locat ion is 
in t h e i r  case less a r b i t r a r y  than fo r  other verbs. Not ice,  however, 
tha t  two more verbs with very s im i la r  morphological and semantic
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chara c te r is t ic s  can be added to th is  group, fo r  which no in t r a n s i t iv e  
counterpart  exis ts  (with the same propert ies as those o f  the verbs 
presented under I I ) ,  such as ' v a z o ' (put)  and f b i z o '  ( s t ic k  ( i n ) ) .  
The resu l t in g  posit ion  o f  the object can l e x i c a l i z e  in the case o f  
' v a z o '  w i th in  a sta te  predication which makes no reference whatsoever 
to the preceding/causing event.  This is effected through monovalent 
predicators which have no causative counterpart  and are 
morphologically completely unrelated to ' v a z o ' , namely ' i m e ’ (be) and 
' v r i s k o m e '  (be found),  e .g .  (6a) can only ' r e s u l t '  in (6b):
(6a) e v a l a  t a  v i v l i a  s t o  t r a p e z i  (V=vazo)
I put the books on the tab le
(6b) t a  v i v l i a  i n e / v r i s k o n d e  s t o  t r a p e z i  ( \ = i m e / v r i  skome)
the books are (found) on the tab le
In those cases where ' v a z o '  (put)  is fol lowed by a PP involving  
' ins id e  something' the verb can 'borrow' from ' b a z o '  (put in) a 
monovalent predicator  re fe r r in g  to the event of  the ob jec t 's  change- 
o f - lo c a t io n ,  e .g .  (7a) implies (7b):
(7a) e v a l a  t o  v i v l i o  s t o  s i r t a r i  ( \ i =vazo )
I put the book in the drawer
(7b) t o  v i v l i o  b i k e  s t o  s i r t a r i  (V=beno)
the book went- in the drawer
This can be in terpreted  as implying that  the reason why ' v a z o '  (put) 
does not have a l e x ic a l i z e d  monovalent predicator as ' a n e v a z o '  (take 
up) and the other verbs of  group I I  have, is prec ise ly  the semantic 
f a c t  th a t ,  as a cover term of those verbs, i t  does not specify how 
the motion is e ffec ted  with r e la t io n  to the re su l t in g  posit ion of  the 
moving object .  This p o s s i b i l i t y  cannot be ruled out.  I t  is of  no 
great importance, however, because ' b i z o ' ( s t i c k  ( i n ) )  which is at  
l eas t  as spec i f ic  as ’ b a z o '  (put in) does not have an in t r a n s i t iv e  
counterpart  s im i la r  to those o f  group I I  verbs e i t h e r .  The
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conclusion that l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  of  the change-o f - locat ion /pos i t ion  is 
again a r b i t r a r y  seems inescapable.  In any case, the causative  
character of  both ' v a z o '  and ' b i z o '  ( lacking a corresponding 
monovalent predicator)  cannot be disputed,  and ne i ther  can t h e i r  
close morphological and semantic re la t io n s h ip  with the causative  
verbs of  group I I .  Yet no uniform explanation can be found fo r  the 
presence (or absence) in th is  subf ie ld  o f  a monovalent predicator  
l e x i c a l i z i n g  the change-of- locat ion.  Besides, there seems to be no 
ground fo r  establ ishing the i n t r a n s i t i v e  ra th e r  than the t r a n s i t i v e  
as more basic in the case of  these verbs; so we can only assume that  
the question o f  der iv ing one from the other cannot be raised.
A t h i r d  category of  MG causatives o f  motion can be id e n t i f i e d  on 
morphological grounds. I t  comprises verbs which may be said to have 
a corresponding monovalent predicator which is mediopassive in form, 
i . e .  ending in ' - o m e ' .  I t  is easy to f ind  examples o f  th is  category 
but very d i f f i c u l t  to decide which verbs are genuine members and 
which are not,  the reason being that fo r  a large number of  ' - o m e '  
verbs o f  motion, at le a s t ,  i t  is not in the le a s t  c le a r  whether they 
are passive or not.  The whole issue is of  great importance for  
ca u s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty .  Therefore ' - o m e '  verbs are given special  
a t ten t ion  in a subsequent section.  For the moment, a few verbs w i l l  
be presented as examples of  what I consider group I I I  here in order 
to see how they compare to verbs in other groups, always in re la t io n  
to the questions of  l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  and der iva t io n .
I I I .  ' s i k o n o '  ( r a is e )  corresponding to ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e ) ,  
' a p o m a k r i n o '  (remove, move awayyp) corresponding' to 
' a pomak r i nome '  (move awayiNTR)> ' t i n a z o '  (shake upyp) 
corresponding to ' t i n a z o m e '  ( 'shake up' j^yp,  be shaken up),  
' v i 07zo ' (drowny^, sink,  immerse in water)  corresponding to 
' v i Q i z o m e '  (drown^y^, s in k ) ,  ' g r e m i z o '  (pu l l  down) 
corresponding to ' g r e m i z o m e '  ( f a l l  down (a p r e c ip ic e ) ) ,  ' x o n o ' 
( s t i c k ( i n ) ) ,  corresponding to 'x o no me ' (be stuck/engulfed i n ) ,  
' k a O i z o '  (make s.o .  s i t )  corresponding to ' k a Qo me i '  ( s i t ,  be 
seated),  e tc .
- 133 -
The semantic r e la t io n  of  verbs in th is  group to those of  other groups 
is ra ther  evident.  Notice,  fo r  instance,  the r e la t io n  of  ' s i k o n o '  
( ra is e )  to ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up), ' x o n o '  ( s t i c k  ( i n ) )  to ' b i z o '  
( s t i c k ( i n ) ) ,  ' v i B i z o '  (s ink,  drown) to ' v u l j a z o '  (s ink,  drown),  
' k a d i z o '  (make s .o .  s i t )  to 'y o n a t i z o 2 t (make s .o .  kneel) and 
' a p o m a k r i n o 1 (move away) to ' p a r a m e r i z o '  ( p u l l ,  put as ide).  They 
d i f f e r  from one another in the sorts of  causers and causees they 
accept and the exact involvement of  the causer. Not ice,  however, 
th a t  such d i f fe rences  appear both w i th in  each group and across 
groups, so once again the type of  l e x ic a l  i z a t io n  o f  the change-of-  
locat ion does not appear to have any semantic s ig n i f icance .  Besides, 
whether they have a more or less indisputably in t r a n s i t i v e  ' - o m e '  
counterpart  (e .g .  ' s i k o n o '  ( r a i s e ) )  or are only re la ted  to a passive 
' - o m e '  verb (which does not normally count as ' l e x i c a l i z e d  e f f e c t ' ) ,  
they always en ta i l  tha t  t h e i r  d i re c t  object changes locat ion owing to 
external  in tervent ion  and therefore  pass the te s t  fo r  causatives.  
F in a l ly ,  although ' - o m e '  in t r a n s i t iv e s  can be etymolog ical ly  analysed 
as ' r e f l e x i v e s ' ,  there is no evidence fo r  postula t ing the causative  
forms as more basic,  Synchronical ly,  the process of  
' r e f l e x i v i z a t i o n '  is product ively  e ffec ted  through completely 
d i f f e r e n t  means ( i . e .  addi t ion of  the p re f ix  ' a f t o - ' )  and does not 
concern the verbs in question.
IV.  The fourth group o f  verbs is understood here as involving  
causatives which e i t h e r  have a counterpart completely unrelated to 
them in form, or no counterpart  at a l l .  This is a ra th e r  d i f f e r e n t  
case from those discussed so f a r .  In the absence of morphological 
re la t io n s  i t  is not equal ly  easy to t e l l  what the new sta te  of  
a f f a i r s  ( the changed lo c a t io n /p o s i t io n )  a c tu a l ly  involves.  I t  is 
there fore  worth inves t iga t ing :  (a) whether s p e c i f ic  correspondences 
can be establ ished fo r  some verbs and (b) whether absence o f  such a 
correspondence a f fe c ts  the causative character of  the verbs in 
question.
Certain correspondences are f a i r l y  easy to e s tab l is h ,  A case in 
point is the p a i r  ' f e r n o '  (br ing)  - ' e r x o m e '  (come). The s im i l a r i t y  
of th is  p a i r  to t p i \ i e n c 2 t ( take s . t h .  s.wh.) - ' p i y e n o j '  (go) is too 
obvious to require  e labora t ion .  Other cases such as th a t  o f  ' s t e l n o '
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(send) and ' p e t a o / r i x n o '  (throw) are more problematic and should be 
considered in some d e t a i l .
In c er ta in  examples ' s t e l n o '  (send) may be said to e n ta i l  ' f t a n o '  
( a r r i v e ) ,  while in others th is  correspondence is not v a l id :
(8a) * e s t i l e  t i  b a l a  s t a  S i x t j a ,  a l a  i  b a l a  5en e f t a s e  e k i
s/he sent the ba l l  to the goal -post ,  but the ba l l  did 
not a r r iv e /g e t  there
(8b) e s t i l e  ena yrama s t i  y e r m a n i a ,  a l a  t o  y rama  5en e f t a s e
( e k i )
s/he sent a l e t t e r  to Germany, but the l e t t e r  did not 
g e t / a r r i v e  ( t h e re ) .
Apparently what ' s t e l n o '  necessari ly implies is tha t  the object is
caused to s t a r t  t r a v e l l i n g  ( i . e .  leave the place i t  used to hold)
hence the unacceptabi l i ty  of  (8c):
(8c) * e s t i l a  ena yrama s t i  y e r m a n i a  a l a  i n e  akomi  s t o  s i r t a r i  mu
I sent a l e t t e r  to Germany but i t  is s t i l l  in my drawer
What i t  does not imply is tha t  the goal intended by the causer is
reached, hence the a c c e p ta b i l i ty  of  (8b).  The unacceptabi l i ty  of  
(8a) can be explained i f  one considers th a t  the journey involved is 
so short th a t  the observer would be expected to take in the whole of  
i t  ra the r  than ju s t  the beginning. In th is  respect ' s t e l n o '  (send) 
is  not unl ike  verbs such as ' p e t a o 2 l (throw) or ' e k t o k s e v o '  (hur l )  
which have a s im i la r  r e s t r i c t i o n .  The object is caused to travel  
(through the a i r  in these l a t t e r  cases) but i t s  resu l t in g  posit ion  
w i l l  only l e x i c a l i z e  under cer ta in  condit ions.  The nature of  these 
conditions has to be examined in order to see whether i t  can be 
re la ted  to the issue of  r e la t i v e  sal ience/prominence o f  the causative  
element. S im i la r ly  to ' s t e l n o '  (send),  f p e t a o 2 f (throw) and ' r i x n o '  
(throw) may be seen as p a r t i a l l y  e n ta i l in g  ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l ) ,  on the 
basis of  examples such as (9a):
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(9a) * p e t a k s e / e r i k s e  t o  k u t i  s t o  p a t oma ,  a l a  t o  k u t i  ben  epese  
s t o  pat oma
s/he threw the box to the f lo o r ,  but the box did not f a l l  
on the f lo o r .
I t  might seem at f i r s t  sight tha t  the crucia l  d i f fe rence  between 
' throw' and ' f a l l '  is tha t  the l a t t e r  necessar i ly involves downward 
motion unl ike the former,  hence the correspondence is re s t r ic te d  to 
those cases where th is  condition is also met by ' th ro w ' .  Notice,  
however, th a t  although th is  is true  to some extent ,  a spec i f ica t ion  
of  the goal (reached and maintained by the moving object )  is perhaps 
equally  important with respect to the facts  o f  MG ' p e t a o / r i x n o ' and 
' p e f t o '  at  l e a s t .  So (9b) is also unacceptable fo r  the same reason 
tha t  (9a) i s ,  although the motion described is not downward:
(9b) * e r i k s e  t o  a f t o k i n i t o  s t o  b e n d r o ,  a l a  t o  a f t o k i n i t o  ben
epese  s t o  b end r o
s/he ' threw' the car on the t re e ,  but the car did not 
f a l l  on the t ree
s/he crashed the car into the t r e e ,  but the car did not 
h i t  the t r e e .
I f  the d i re c t io n  of  the moving object is upward, e .g . :
(9c) e r i k s e  t i  b a l a  p s i l a / s t i  s t e y i
s/he threw the ba l l  h igh/ to  the roof
the conditions o f  'goal s p e c i f ic a t io n '  and 'downward d i r e c t io n '
coincide in the sense th a t  g ra v i ty  w i l l  also determine the new and 
f in a l  posi t ion o f  the moving object .  Therefore in (9c) ' p s i l a '
(high) w i l l  not allow a l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  with ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )  while ' s t i
s t e y i '  ( to the roof )  w i l l .
The facts  o f  English ' throw' are not d is s im i la r  to those jus t
presented fo r  ' p e t a o £ ’ and ' r i x n o ' ,  so i t  is worth looking c lose ly  at 
an analysis o f  ' throw' which draws a l in e  between (10a) and (10b) in
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terms of  the r e l a t i v e  prominence of the feature  of  motion (Ikegami 
1969:89):
(10a) He threw the ba l l  s k i l l f u l l y
(10b) He threw the ba l l  over the fence.
The former sentence is analysed as "make a c er ta in  movement of  the 
arm + in order to cause something to go through the a ir"  and the 
l a t t e r  as "cause something to go through the a i r "  + "by making a 
cer ta in  movement o f  the arm". Ikegami ' s  view is tha t  the d i f fe rence  
between uses such as that  of  (10a) and the one in (10b) l i e s  in the 
r e l a t i v e  prominence o f  "the feature  o f  motion" in connection with  
th is  verb.  Hence he categorizes such verbs as being "s i tuated on the 
f r inge  of  the category of  verbs of motion" ( p . 90) .  I t  seems to me 
tha t  the d i f fe rence  between the two examples of fered by Ikegami might 
become c learer  i f  a t h i rd  common use of ' throw' is juxtaposed to 
them; in p a r t i c u la r ,  one which speci f ies  the goal of  the motion even 
more precisely  than (10b) and can imply th a t  the new posit ion  (goal 
reached) is preserved. Consider therefore the example:
(11) He threw the bal l  to the t ree .
This ,  I suggest, may be more d i r e c t l y  understood as implying (among 
other things) 'he caused the ba l l  to f a l l  on/at  the t r e e '  and allows 
fo r  the p o s s i b i l i t y  tha t  the object  stayed at  i t s  new locat ion .  Now 
(10b) may be also understood as implying 'he caused the bal l  to f a l l  
at a place which was at the other side o f  the fe nce ' .  Sentence (10a) 
is  s t i l l  one step fu r t h e r  than (10b) in that the goal o f  the object 's  
journey is completely unspecif ied.  This seems to be the crucial  
d i f fe rence  with the remaining examples. To what extent is i t  
therefore  true to say th a t  fo r  ' throw' "the non-causative  
in te rp re ta t io n  is the more usual one" as Ikegami does? (1969:105).  
On the basis of  the examples discussed i t  seems to  be the case that  
two impl icat ions remain constant: (a) the object is caused to travel  
through the a i r  (b) i t  receives impetus by the causer. The condition  
of  motion is always prominent (contrary to Ikegami's claims) and the
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condit ion of  c a u s a t iv i ty  is always present. I f  the goal is not 
speci f ied or not reached the resu l t ing  location o f  the object is not 
reg is te red  and the change-of- locat ion does not l e x i c a l i z e  through a 
sp ec i f ic  i n t r a n s i t i v e .  This does not render the causative element 
less prominent. On such i n t u i t i v e  grounds the exact opposite could 
also be claimed, namely tha t  the contr ibution of the causer is more 
c ru c ia l ;  in a way, a l l  we know about the event in question is that  
some object is caused to t rave l  by some external  source o f  motion. 
I t  seems, however, th a t  the r e la t i v e  prominence of the causer/causing  
event cannot be discussed on the basis o f  such considerat ions.  
Factors such as p e r c e i v a b i l i t y  of the causer, degree of  involvement 
of the causer ( in  the process/event caused), accompaniment, e t c . ,  
seem to be much more re levant  than presence or absence o f  l e x ic a l i z e d  
e f f e c t .  As already pointed out, such fa c to rs ,  which bear on the 
nature o f  the causer ra the r  than the e f f e c t ,  are best discussed in 
connection with a g e n t iv i ty  and w i l l  be taken up l a t e r .  For the 
moment, a l l  th a t  can be said on the basis of  the cases discussed so 
f a r  is th a t  there is no evidence:
th a t  the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  of  the change-o f - locat ion /pos i t ion  of  the
object  plays a ro le  in id e n t i fy in g  causatives o f  motion;
tha t  e i t h e r  the causative or the non-causative verb is more basic
except in the case o f  phonological ly iden t ica l  p a i rs .
On the other hand, r e l a t i v e  prominence of the causative element 
requires recourse to the notion of  a g e n t iv i ty .  This is therefore  
posited as a point  o f  in te rsec t ion  of  the notions of  c a u s a t iv i ty  and 
a g e n t iv i ty .
3 .2 .1  Non-causative t r a n s i t i v e s
In the s p ec i f ic  area under invest igat ion  there  are two categories of  
t r a n s i t i v e s  which are not causatives. Both categories describe a 
s i tu a t io n  where an e n t i t y  x  moves in r e la t io n  to some other e n t i t y  y
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which is e i t h e r  not moving {usual ly expressed through a NP of  
locat ion)  or moving but not necessari ly at  the in s t ig a t io n  o f  x .
The f i r s t  one comprises cases such as:
I .  (a) ' p l i s i a z o  t i n  p o l i '  (approach the c i t y )
(b) ' b i a s x i z o  t i n  p l a t i a '  (cross the square)
(c) ' b j a v e n o  t o n  p o t a mo '  (cross the r i v e r )
(d) ' p e r n a o  t o  b r o mo '  (cross the road)
(e) ' p r o s p e r n a o  t o  m a y a z i '  (pass (by) the shop)
( f )  ' s k a r f a l o n o  t o  v uno '  (cl imb the mountain)
(g) ' s t r i v o  t i  y o n i a ' ( turn (at /round) the corner)
(h) ' p i b a o  t o  f r a x t i '  (jump (over) the fence)
( i )  ' aneveno  t i  s k a l a '  (go up the ladder)
( j )  ' k a t e v e n o  t o  p o t a m i '  (go down the r i v e r )
(k) ' p e r p a t a o  mj a  a p o s t a s i / 2 0  x i l j o m e t r a '  (walk a distance/20km)  
(1) ' t r e x o  m j a  a p o s t a s i / 2 0  x i l j o m e t r a '  (run a distance/20km)
(m) ' k o l i b a o  mj a  a p o s t a s i / 2 0  x i l j o m e t r a '  (swim a distance/20km)
(n) ' t a k s i b e v o  t o n  kosmo'  ( t rave l  (around) the wor ld) .
These can be regarded as i n t r a n s i t i v e  verbs which under certa in  
circumstances - such as the ones exemplif ied above - become 
t r a n s i t i v e s  with an NP of locat ion as t h e i r  d i re c t  ob ject .  They 
cannot imply th a t  th is  object is caused to move; only the subject is 
moving. Notice,  however, that  ' p l i s i a z o 2 ' (approachjp) can be a 
causative in cases l i k e  /p l i s i a z o  t i n  k a r e k l a  s t o  t r a p e z i '  ( I  
'approach' the cha i r  to the ta b le ,  i . e . '  I move the chair  near the 
t a b l e ) .  Rather predictably  there are no passive constructions  
equivalent to examples (a) to (n) since the object NPs are not
lYlOX
affected by the action of  the subject.  This doesAmean, however, tha t  
there are no mediopassive forms corresponding to the verbs in 
question.  I t  is important to not ice,  though, tha t  under certa in  
circumstances, fo r  some o f  these verbs, passive constructions are 
possible,  although the verbs are s t i l l  non-causatives o f  motion, 
e .g . :
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( e ' )  /  vo 1 vo p r o s p e r a s t i k e  apo ena f i a t  ( V = p r o s p e r n j e m e )
the Volvo was overtaken by a F ia t .
Notice also tha t  although (12a) does not have a corresponding (12b):
(12a) o j a n i s  e t r e k s e  e k s i  m i l j a  (V=trexo)
John ran six  miles
(12b) * t r e x t i k a n  e k s i  m i l j a  apo t o n  j a n i  ( V=trexome)
six miles were run by John
the mediopassive form of the same verb ( i . e .  ' t r e x o m e ' )  is possible 
in cases l i k e  the one exemplif ied in (13):
(13) t r e x e t e  a f t i  i  a p o s t a s i ?
i s - i t - r u n  th is  distance?
is i t  possible to run th is  distance?
On the basis of  such data i t  becomes obvious tha t  the re la t ions  
between constructions such as (13 ) ,  t r a n s i t i v e  causative  
constructions,  and t r a n s i t i v e  non-causative ones have to be examined 
more c a r e fu l l y ,  and tha t  p a s s iv i z a b i l i t y  can be used as a tool  in 
th is  inves t iga t ion .  Factors such as 'degree of  affectedness of  the 
object o f  a t r a n s i t i v e  construction'  play an important ro le  in 
whether a cer ta in  t r a n s i t i v e  verb can have a corresponding passive in 
MG. Presence or absence of  c aus a t iv i ty  cannot solve such problems by 
i t s e l f  and although in most cases i t  is easy to  determine (w i th in  the 
f i e l d  under inves t iga t ion )  whether a verb is causative or not,  
marginal cases also ex is t  as w i l l  become obvious in what fol lows.
The second category of  non-causative t r a n s i t iv e s  o f  motion comprises 
verbs such as:
I I .  ' k i n i y a o '  (hunt ) ,  ' a k o l u Q o '  ( f o l lo w ) ,  ' k a t a b i o k o ' (chase),
' s i n o b e v o ' (accompany), ' o b i y o '  ( l e ad ) .
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In a sentence 1 ike (14):
(14) t o  p e b i  s i n o b e f s e  t u s  p r o s k o p u s  s t i n  k o r i f i  ( V = s i n o b e v o )
t u  l o f u
the ch i ld  accompanied the boy scouts to the top 
of  the h i l l
i t  cannot be claimed that  the subject is the causer of  the d i re c t  
object 's  change-of- locat ion.  There is no ind icat ion  that the event 
would not have taken place without the subject 's  in te rvent ion .  A 
case l i k e  (15) seems, however, more problematic:
(15) 7 a s t i n o m i a  k a t a b i o k e  t o n  k l e f t i  apo x o r j o  ( V = k a t a b i o k o )
se x o r j o
the pol ice  chased the t h i e f  from v i l l a g e  
to v i l l a g e
Probably the most immediate in te rp re ta t io n  of  th is  sentence would be 
tha t  the t h i e f ' s  continuous change-of- locat ion ( ' f rom one v i l l a g e  to  
the n e x t ' )  is due to the chasing of the po l ice :  i f  the po l ice  were 
not a f t e r  him, the t h i e f  might not have moved at a l l .  Notice,  
however, tha t  the change-of- locat ion described by the PP in question 
does not necessar i ly  r e f e r  to the t h i e f ' s  movements but ra ther  to 
those of  the po l ice .  Hence (15) is by no means an unnatural sentence 
(although i t  does not involve the most prototypical  understanding of  
the verb in question):
(16) 7 a s t i n o m i a  k a t a b i o k e  t o n  k l e f t i  pu  ( \ = k a t a b i o k o )
k r i v o t a n  se mj a  s p i l j a
the pol ice  were chasing the t h i e f  who 
was hiding in a cave.
Notice, fu r t h e r ,  th a t  the object of chasing need not even be aware of  
the fac t  th a t  s/he is being chased. I t  can be therefore  said tha t  
the verb is mainly descr ip t ive  o f  the subject 's  motion and espec ia l ly  
of  h is /her  in ten t ions .  In th is  sense i t  is not considered here a
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causative of  motion, although the p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  i t  may function as 
one is not ruled out.
The lea s t  c lea r  case in category I I  is a c tu a l ly  ' o b i y o ' ( l e ad ) .  
Consider sentence (17a):
(17a) t o  p e b i  me o b i y i s e  s t o  s p i t i  t u  j a n i  ( V = o b i y o )
the ch i ld  led me to John's house.
This sentence necessari ly  e n ta i ls :
(17b) p i y a / e f tasa  s t o  s p i t i  t u  j a n i  ( \ J = p i y eno )
I went t o /a r r iv e d  at John's house.
I t  seems once again th a t  the verb describes mainly the subject 's  
action,  although the ob jec t 's  motion may well be a t t r ib u te d  to th is  
action.  Consider f o r  instance (18):
(18) o x o r i k o s  o b i y i s e  t o  a l o y o  s t o  x o r a f i  ( V = o b i y o )
the peasant led the horse to the f i e l d .
Sentence (18) seems qui te  s im i la r  to (19) containing an indisputably
causative verb:
(19) o x o r i k o s  p i y e  t o  a l o y o  s t o  x o r a f i  ( \ l = p i y e n o )
the peasant took the horse to the f i e l d .
The main d i f fe rence  between the two l a s t  sentences is tha t  the former 
spec i f ies  qu ite  e x p l i c i t l y  tha t  the animal was using i t s  self-moving  
mechanism to change location  in the d i rec t ion  indicated by the person 
leading i t ,  while the l a t t e r  may also be understood as implying that  
the horse was carr ied  to the f i e l d  on something else which was moving 
(e .g .  a v e h ic le ) .  Hence although ' o b i y o '  ( lead) is  not immediately
understood as 'causing somebody's motion' ,  th is  p o s s i b i l i t y  cannot be 
ruled out e i t h e r .  The main considerations that  go into  such a
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decision verge on who is  responsible fo r  the motion, i . e .  who has the 
i n i t i a t i v e  fo r  the ob je c t 's  motion. Such propert ies  I regard as 
mainly l inked with the issue o f  a g e n t iv i ty .  I there fore  consider  
tha t  a proper understanding of  an in between case l i k e  ' o b i y o '  and of  
d i re c t  versus in d i re c t  causatives requires a b e t te r  understanding of  
ag en t iv i ty .
3 .3  A gent iv i ty  as a c lu s te r  o f  propert ies
Surveys of  work on ag en t iv i ty  (e .g .  Cruse 1973, Morley 1983) have 
tended to concentrate on di f ferences between the various accounts, 
thereby implying tha t  what they have in common is unproblematic.  
However, fo r  the purposes of  the present analysis ,  at le a s t ,  cer ta in  
of the genera l ly  accepted views need to be reviewed.
Fi l lmore ( 1968b:24) defines the agentive case as th a t  o f  the 
" t y p ic a l l y  animate perceived in s t ig a t o r  o f  the action id e n t i f i e d  by 
the verb".  Gruber (1976:165) i d e n t i f i e s  agentive verbs as those 
"necessitat ing an Animate w i l l f u l  subject".  Ross (1972) and Dowty 
(1972b) have action verbs involving two-place predicates where the 
f i r s t  argument is an agent characterized by in tent ion  (Ross) and by 
in tent ion  and v o l i t i o n  (Dowty). The same point is in essence taken 
up by Jackendoff (1976) where the agent f i l l s  up the f i r s t  argument 
posit ion  of  a v o l i t io n a l  predicate  CAUSE. The agreement on th is  
issue o f  proponents of  widely d i f f e r e n t  theor ies  is ra th e r  s t r ik in g .  
The tes ts  t y p i c a l l y  used to id e n t i fy  agents or agentive verbs 
involve,  equal ly  commonly, manner adverbials speci fying 'purpose' 
such as ' c a r e f u l l y ' ,  ' d e l i b e r a t e l y ' ,  ' e a g e r ly ' ,  ' a t t e n t i v e l y '  which 
are re ferred  to here as 'purposive Advs'. Besides these,  the DO-SO 
te s t  is used fo r  English,  which need not be discussed as i t  is 
convincingly proven by Langacker (1975) to be ra th e r  controvers ia l .
The consequence o f  such a narrow 'yes or no' understanding o f  the 
notions of  'agent '  and 'agentive verb' seems to be lumping together  
verbs which can be shown to d i f f e r  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  with respect to th is  
property.  Since we are only concerned with motion verbs here,  Gruber
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(1976) and M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's (1976) examples w i l l  be given 
special  a t te n t io n .
Gruber's examples o f  cases where the theme can be i d e n t i f i e d  as agent 
involve:
(20) John went in to  the room
(21) John r o l le d  down the h i l l
(22) John f loa ted  across the lake .
These are juxtaposed to (23 ) ,  meant as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  the 
im p o ss ib i l i ty  o f  having an agent in the case of  inanimate e n t i t i e s  
(as subjects):
(23) The log f loa ted  across the lake.
This is fol lowed by the observation tha t  there  are "very few verbs 
which are Motional or Durational and which cannot be in te rpreted  as 
being Agentive when the subject is Animate" (1976:158).  There is 
nothing wrong with these observations except tha t  they are not very 
revea l ing .  A c loser  look at  the very examples provided ( (20 )  to  
(22 ) )  shows th a t  t h e i r  subjects do not bear exactly  the same re la t io n  
to t h e i r  respective predicates concerning the property in question,  
even i f  i t  is r e s t r i c te d  to in tentional  i t y  as the only decisive  
f a c to r .  Purposive constructions are both uncommon and unnatural in 
combination with (21) and ra ther  un l ike ly  in combination with (22) ,  
while (20) is (by i t s e l f )  more l i k e l y  than not to receive an 
' i n t e n t i o n a l '  in t e r p r e t a t io n .  A l te r n a t i v e ly ,  while (21b) and (22b) 
seem a l l  r ig h t  and the l a t t e r  one is reminiscent o f  (2 3 ) ,  (20b) is 
ra th e r  strange:
(21b) John ro l l e d  down the h i l l  unconscious
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(22b) John f loa ted  across the lake unconscious
(20b) John went into the room unconscious.
Thus the c r i t e r i a  of  'animacy' and ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  cannot be 
s u f f i c i e n t .  Gruber does, however, i d e n t i f y  what we might c a l l  here 
centra l -core  or p ro to ty p ic a l ly  agentive verbs as those whose subjects 
are o b l i g a t o r i l y  ra th e r  than opt iona l ly  agents, e .g .  ' run '  and 
' f l e e ' .  The remaining English motion verbs presumably o p t iona l ly  
take agents as subjects,  though; therefore no fu r th e r  d is t inc t ions  
are deemed necessary.
A rough but more de ta i led  c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  verbs in terms of
a g e n t iv i ty  is attempted by M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976).  Some
verbs are said to involve th is  notion in the sense that  the question 
can ar ise as to whether the act was in tentional  or acc identa l;  e.g.  
' k i l l '  in a sentence l i k e  He k i l l e d  a man may be understood as 
in t e n t io n a l ,  and in tha t  case i t  is agentive; or un in tent iona l ,  in 
which case i t  is non-agentive.  Another category of  verbs is
exemplif ied by ' d i e '  and there the question o f  a g e n t iv i ty  does not 
ar ise  at  a l l  ( they could be understood as non-agentive par  
exce l lence) .  In addi t ion to these two, one more category is  
recognized,  where in t e n t i o n a l i t y  is incorporated into the meaning of  
the verbs in question.  In such cases the question o f  a g en t iv i ty
again does not a r ise ,  w i th in  th is  system, since i t  is a necessary 
condi t ion,  e .g .  'chase' in They have been chasing him since dawn. 
These verbs could be therefore  cal led  agentive par excel lence.  This 
is  in essence a 'necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condi t ions'  approach, which 
i f  appl ied to a sp ec i f ic  area o f  the vocabulary o f  a language, such 
as the one under invest iga t ion  here, y ie lds  ra the r  poor resu l ts .  A 
few verbs such as ' k i n i s a o '  (hunt) and ' k a t a f t i o k o '  (chase) can be 
shown to necessari ly  incorporate the feature of  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  and 
there fore  q u a l i f y  as t r u l y  agentive.  The res t  would simply have to  
be unmarked fo r  th is  fe a ture .  Consideration of  a single  example w i l l  
su f f ic e  at th is  po int:
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(24) o jam's t aks i bev i  j a  t i  j a r o  [V=taksibevo)  
John is t r a v e l l i n g  to Yaros.
I t  can be safe ly  argued that  the sentence is not ambiguous as to an 
in tent iona l  and an unintentional  in te rp re ta t io n  of ' t aks ibevo '  , but 
simply vague. So, ’ taks ibevo '  w i l l  be unmarked, or neutral with 
respect to a g e n t iv i ty .  The same would apply to ' y l i s t r a o '  ( s l i p ) ,  
though common sense would d ic ta te  a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  between these two 
at lea s t :  ' t aks ibevo ' is usual ly understood as describing an
in tent iona l  act (although i t  admittedly does not incorporate an 
' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  fea ture  by necessi ty ) .  The facts  o f  ' y l i s t r a o '  are 
very d i f f e r e n t ,  however. The cases where i t  is not an accident to  
s l ip  are very ra re .  Nevertheless, w i th in  a system which works with 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions,  ' y l i s t r a o '  cannot be marked as 
e s s e n t ia l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from ' t aks ibevo ' in terms of  a g e n t iv i ty ;  fo r  
the former verb can also appear with a purposive construction:
(25) o kloun y l i s t r i s e  ke epese j a  na kani  ta pebja na yelasun 
the clown sl ipped and f e l l  to make the chi ldren laugh.
Since (25) is grammatical ' y l i s t r a o '  would have to appear in the same
category with ' p i yeno ' (go),  ' fevyo '  ( leave) and ' t aks ibevo '
( t r a v e l ) ,  despite the fa c t  tha t  (25) re f l e c ts  one of  the leas t  
ch a ra c te r is t ic  uses of  the verb.
The problem with a l l  such accounts seems to be tha t  they r e s t r i c t  
ag en t iv i ty  and agentive verbs to the paradigm cases, i . e .  those which 
involve a prototypical  understanding of the notion of  agent only.  
They consequently expect verbs to be e i t h e r  agentive or non-agentive  
on the basis of  whether the subject they each accept is animate and 
in ten t iona l  or not. The re levant features o f  th is  t r a d i t i o n a l  notion
of  agent are more or less already of fered in Lyons (1977).  The agent
is understood as involv ing an animate e n t i t y  which in t e n t io n a l l y  and 
responsibly uses i t s  own force or energy to bring about an event or 
i n i t i a t e  a process resu l t ing  in a change in the physical condition or 
locat ion of  some other e n t i t y .  These propert ies  indisputably  
character ize  what we may c a l l  a prototypical  agent. There is no
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in d ica t ion ,  however, as to what happens in 'non-paradigm' cases, 
where the re levant features are said to be separable from each other.  
We therefore  need a more de ta i led  analysis o f  what th is  prototypical  
notion of  agent involves and at the same time a sp ec i f ic a t io n  of the 
points at which deviat ions  from the prototype can occur. This should 
lead to a b e t te r  understanding of  verbs in d i f f e r e n t  semantic domains 
with respect to the property in question.  Such an understanding 
implies ra is ing  the question of  a g e n t iv i ty  fo r  each verb but not 
expecting a yes-no answer.
Types of e n t i t i e s  which can be regarded as closest to the 
prototypical  agent are n a tu ra l ly  those perceived as having inte rnal  
energy, whose motion is not perceived as re su l t in g  from some other,  
external  cause and is there fore  in ferred  to ar ise  from w ith in .  
Natural e n t i t i e s  (e .g .  the sun or clouds) and natural  phenomena (e .g .  
ra in ,  earthquakes, f i r e )  are probably the c learest  cases, followed by 
cer ta in  kinds o f  machines (e .g .  vehicles or computers).^ Objects 
unable to act (move, funct ion) on t h e i r  own (e .g .  books, stones) and 
there fore  c h a r a c t e r is t i c a l l y  objects not perceived as self-moving are 
at the bottom of  the scale.  The p r i o r i t y  of  'perceived '  versus 
' l o g i c a l '  cause cannot be too strongly  emphasized and examples from 
the domain o f  motion verbs are abundant in th is  respect.  Consider 
a l l  the motions a t t r ib u te d  to the unmoving sun: e .g .  ' a n e v e n i '  (goes 
up),  ' v y e n i '  (comes ou t ) ,  ' y i r i z i '  ( tu rn s ) ,  ' f e w / '  ( leaves) ,  ' p e f t i '  
( f a l l s ) .  Consider also the case of  vehicles which seem to be 
regarded as extensions of  human motion and are there fore  compatible 
with actions otherwise a t t r ib u te d  to humans and animals ( including  
' t r e x o '  (run) in MG). In short a l l  these are e n t i t i e s  with motion 
perceived as se l f -genera ted;  the most typ ica l  such e n t i t i e s  are 
humans, espec ia l ly  as they are also capable o f  in tent iona l  act ion and 
can be regarded as prototypical  agents. Animals are obviously the 
next step,  since they also act in t e n t io n a l l y  despite the f a c t  tha t  
sometimes t h e i r  act ions are a t t r ib u te d  to i n s t i n c t .  L inguist ic  
evidence fo r  th is  is the fa c t  tha t  they can appear as subjects of  
c le a r ly  in tent iona l  verbs such as ' k i n i y a o '  (hunt ) .
Control over one's motions is a c h a ra c te r is t ic  c lose ly  l inked to  
in tent ion  (see Givon 1979) and animals are also understood as having
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control  over t h e i r  motions. A f te r  a l l ,  even human motions o f  certa in  
types such as ' t i n a z o m '  (jump up) or ' t r e m o '  ( tremble) are ra ther  
automatic and not e as i ly  character izable  as involving e i t h e r  control  
or in te n t .  In general ,  every instance of  contro l led  causation is 
assumed to involve in te n t .  C lear ly  the r e la t io n  is not b i l a t e r a l ;  
intending to do something does not necessari ly  imply being also in a 
posit ion to do i t .  In th is  context i t  is therefore  assumed that both 
' i n t e n t '  and ' c o n t r o l '  are only l inked to animate (mainly human) 
e n t i t i e s .  I f  an action is characterized by ' c o n t r o l ' ,  i . e .  as the 
re su l t  o f  an agent 's possessing control  over the s i tu a t io n  being 
brought about, i t  is  assumed tha t  i t  is also in tentional  (on the part  
of  the agent) .  I t  may, however, be the case that although the agent 
intends to bring an event about, s/he may not have f u l l  (or even any) 
control  over i t .  In the area under invest iga t ion  th is  possibi l  i t y  
w i l l  be discussed in connection with the d is t in c t io n  between d i re c t  
and in d i re c t  causatives.
I t  is therefore  suggested that  fo r  each verb i t  can be investigated  
what sorts of  agents i t  allows as subjects and the extent  to which 
they are proto typica l  agents. Assigning agent-status to e n t i t i e s  
lacking the prototypical  charac te r is t ics  o f  agents may be considered 
a process o f  metaphoric extension (Givon 1984:106).  Since the 
present inves t iga t ion  on the whole excludes the consideration of 
metaphoric uses of  MGMVs, i t  is important to sta te  where the l i m i t  is 
drawn; fo r ,  c le a r ly ,  cases such as:
(26) 7 s k e p s i  t u  p e t a k s e  m a k r i a  (V = p e t a o )
his thought f lew f a r
although very in te res t in g  and explainable w i th in  the framework of  
Prototype theory along the same l ines  necessary fo r  other types of  
non-prototypical  uses, are not taken into account here.  The sample 
is r e s t r ic te d  qui te  a r b i t r a r i l y  to perceivable physical motion and 
concrete in s t ig a to rs  of  th is  motion.
To re ca p i tu la te  what has already been said on the notion o f  agent,  
the proto typ ical  agent is understood as being human, c le a r ly
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perceived as the d i r e c t  causer of  an event,  intending to bring th is  
event about and having absolute control  over i t s  completion.  Within 
the framework of  Prototype theory,  a g e n t iv i ty  is understood as a 
c luste r  of  these propert ies  ra ther  than one d iscre te  fe a tu re .  Each 
property is also understood as sca lar .  Each subsequent point  on the 
scale marks a devia t ion from the prototype.  The hierarchy with in  
each property does not seem to require fu r th e r  explanation.  The 
d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  of  the scales c onst i tu t ing  a g en t iv i ty  is considered 
universa l ,  but d i f f e r e n t  languages are expected to draw the d iv id ing  
l i n e  at s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  points .  The spec i f ic  proposal presented 
below of how th is  c lu s te r  o f  scaled propert ies can be understood is 
offered in Givon (1984:107) :
"a. Humanity: human > animate > inanimate > abstract
b. Causation: d i r e c t  cause > in d i re c t  cause > non-cause
c. V o l i t io n :  strong in ten t  > weak in tent  > non-voluntary
d. Control: c le a r  control  > weak control  > no control
e. Sal iency: very obv ious/sa l ient > less obv ious/sa l ient > 
unobvious/nonsal ient"
Givon considers th a t  ontogenetica l ly  (or at  leas t  o n to lo g ic a l ly )  we 
are deal ing with one core property:  obviousness/sal ience o f  cause. 
His explanation is worth quoting in f u l l :
" . . .  a human is c loser  to the ego, thus more f a m i l i a r  and 
obvious. D i rec t  causes tend to be perceptual ly  more obvious,  
occupying a c le a r  b o u n d a r y  p o s i t i o n  w i th in  the chain (as also 
does the e f f e c t ,  which is c a teg o r ic a l ly  coded as p a t i e n t ) .  
Intermediate points in the chain are less s a l ie n t .  Strong in tent  
creates a higher p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e s s , i . e .  v is i b l e  e f f e c t .  
D i t to  fo r  strong co n tro l . "  (1984:107)
I t  is f a i r l y  c le a r  th a t  th is  notion o f  agent is  r e s t r i c te d  in a 
d i f f e r e n t  d i rec t io n  namely in subsuming a g en t iv i ty  under c au s a t iv i ty .  
For the moment, t r a n s i t i v i t y  and d i re c t  vs in d i r e c t  causatives w i l l  
be discussed in th is  l i g h t  and then an extension of  th is  notion w i l l  
be attempted to cover in t r a n s i t i v e s  and MG mediopassives also.
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3.4  T r a n s i t i v i t y  and a g en t iv i ty
On the basis of  th is  approach two proto typ ical  conditions are 
postulated on which t r a n s i t i v i t y  depends, i . e .  the t r a n s i t i v e  
prototype involves:
(a) the presence o f  a v o l i t i o n a l ,  v is i b l e ,  c o n t ro l l in g  cause 
( i . e .  a prototypical  agent) as subject;
(b) the presence o f  a c le a r l y  v is ib le  r e s u l t - r e g i s t e r in g  e f f e c t  
or a patient-of-change as object .
Consequently p r o to ty p ic a l ly  t r a n s i t i v e  events w i th in  the f i e l d  of  
MGMVs w i l l  be o f  the type:
(27) o makis sikose ena v i v l i o  (V=sikono)
Makis l i f t e d  a book
(28) 7 marieta evale to m o l i v i  sto t rapez i  (V=vazo)
M ar ie t ta  put the penci l on the table
(29) ta pebja petaksan ta x a r t j a  mu sto patoma (V=petao)
the chi ldren threw my papers on the f l o o r .
By contrast  with these sentences, sentence (30) with a non-vo l i t iona l  
subject and a non-typical  object (on the basis of  condit ion (b) 
above) w i l l  be characterized as reg is te r in g  an unprototypical  
t r a n s i t i v e  event,  although i t  exh ib i ts  a l l  the syntactic  
chara c te r is t ic s  o f  t r a n s i t i v i t y :
(30) o makis ibe ena v i v l i o  (V=v7epo)
Makis saw a book.
Following the pract ice  establ ished in the preceding chapter,  the 
c h ara c te r is t ic s  of  whole proposit ions are taken into  consideration in
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order to reach a decision on the features of  individual  verbs
appearing in them which are assumed to be the main c a r r ie rs  of  these 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  By juxtaposing examples (27) and (30) whose subject  
and object NPs are ident ica l  i t  becomes transparent that while ' t o
v i v l i o '  ( the book) in (30) is not in the least  a ffec ted  by the
subject 's  act ion - and is therefore  a very unprototypical  pa t ien t  - 
in (27) the ob jec t 's  posit ion  is d i f f e r e n t  and may be regarded as a 
proto typica l  instance of  a pa t ie n t .
The facts  o f  t r a n s i t i v i t y  I have sketched so f a r  are in accordance
with GivoVs (1984) model. I t  should be obvious from what has 
preceded th a t ,  in his understanding, p ro to typ ic a l ly  t r a n s i t i v e  events 
are col lapsed with p ro to ty p ic a l ly  agentive events. Thus a sentence
l i k e  (30) would be in te rpreted as 1ess - than-pro to typ ica l ly  t r a n s i t i v e  
not only because i t s  object NP is a non-prototypical  p a t ien t ,  but
also because i t s  subject is a non-prototypical  agent since i t  is non- 
v o l i t i o n a l .  This can be contrasted with (27) where the opposite
conditions hold. There can probably be l i t t l e  objection to th is  i f  
one considers the overwhelming importance o f  the human action model, 
i . e .  tha t  a typ ica l  event is l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  expressed in Indo- 
European languages, at le a s t ,  predominantly by reference to an 
' a c t o r /a g e n t ' ,  the action performed and the 'p a t i e n t / o b j e c t /  
r e c ip ie n t '  o f  th is  act ion (see also Werner and Kaplan 1963, M i l l e r  
and Johnson-Laird 1976).  What is perhaps more problematic is the
re la t io n  between p ro to typ ic a l ly  agentive and p ro to typ ic a l ly  
t r a n s i t i v e  sentences on the one hand and p ro to ty p ic a l ly  causative  
ones on the other.  This is not discussed in Givon, but on the basis 
of what has already been said one may assume that a l l  three coincide.  
Consider, however, the fol lowing sentences:
(27) o m a k i s  s i k o s e  ena v i v l i o  
Makis picked up a book
{ V = s i k o n o )
(30) o m a k i s  i 5e ena v i v l i o  
Makis saw a book
(V=v7epo)
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(31) o m a k i s  k i t a k s e  ena v i v l i o  
Makis looked at a book
{ V ^ k i t a z o )
Considering t r a n s i t i v i t y ,  c a u s a t iv i t y  and a g en t iv i ty  separate ly ,  (27) 
can be thought o f  as p r o to typ ic a l ly  t r a n s i t i v e ,  causative and 
agentive; (30) is less p r o to ty p ic a l ly  t r a n s i t i v e  than the other two, 
also less agentive than e i t h e r  and non-causative; (31) is more 
t r a n s i t i v e  and more agentive than (30) since i t  has a v o l i t io n a l  
subject and less t r a n s i t i v e  than (27) .  However, prec ise ly  because
(31) contains a v o l i t io n a l  subject i t  is not equal ly  non-agentive 
with (30 ) ,  although they are equal ly non-causative.  In short,  
distance from the prototype does not seem to me to  be at  p a ra l le l  
points along the three dimensions in question. In th is  sense i t  can 
be thought tha t  t r a n s i t i v i t y  consti tutes a conf la t ion  of  the separate  
dimensions o f  a g en t iv i ty  and c a u s a t iv i ty .
In view of what has preceded, i t  can be argued, however, th a t  the 
degree of  c a u s a t iv i ty  of  t r a n s i t i v e  verbs depends mainly on the 
degree o f  deviat ion from the prototype of  the p a t ie n t .  Obviousness 
of change in the object can be shown to play a more important ro le  
than ag en t iv i ty  of  the subject ( f o r  those cases at  le a s t  where the 
two are not completely interdependent) .  Notice, fo r  instance, the 
case of  MGMVs accepting a NP o f  locat ion (see 3 . 2 . 1 ,  category I ) .  I 
have suggested th a t  a possible measure/cri ter ion f o r  c aus a t iv i ty  
might be p a s s i v i z a b i l i t y .  One might expect tha t  the less af fected  
the ' p a t i e n t ' ,  the less possible i t  would be fo r  i t  to appear as the 
subject of  a passive construct ion.  Some of  the V-NP|_qc examples in 
3 . 2 . 1 ,  I can be contrasted with V-Prep-NP^c constructions (with the 
same verb) and seen as viewing the object as more important to the 
event than t h e i r  V-Prep-NPLoc counterparts in which the NPlqc is 
viewed simply as a point  of  reference fo r  the subject 's  location  or 
movement ( c f .  Givon 1984:99).  In view o f  these observations 
reconsider now the fol lowing examples:
(32a) o j a m ' s  p i b i k s e  t o  f r a x t i  { V= p i §a o )
John jumped the fence
vs
*(see examples (32) to (39)).
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(32b) o j a m ’s p i b i ks e  pano apo to f r a x t i  
John jumped over the fence
(33a) taksibepse (o lo )  ton kosmo (V=taksibevo)
s/he t r a v e l le d  ( a l l )  the world
vs
(33b) taksibepse se olo ton kosmo
s/he t r a v e l l e d  t o / i n  a l l  the world 
s/he t r a v e l le d  a l l  around the world
There is c le a r l y  more than one way of  handling such cases. They may 
be understood as p a r a l l e l  to a recent development in MG syntax 
whereby in very co l loquia l  speech the preposi t ion marking the 
locat ion of  an object or the goal o f  the motion is completely 
omitted; e .g . :
(34a) p i yen i  Qesalonik i  [ \ l=piyeno)
instead of
(34b) p i yen i  s t i  Qesaloniki
s/he goes to Salonica.
S im i la r ly :
(35a) ine p a r i s i  (V=ime)
instead of
(35b) ine s to p a r i s i
s/he is in Paris .
This may be explained in terms o f  the verb 's  having enough semantic 
information - 'move towards goal '  in the case o f  ' p i yeno ' (go) and 
'p os i t ion  in space' in the case o f  ' i m e ' (be) - to make the
- 153 -
preposi t ion redundant. Notice,  in th is  respect,  that  in e i t h e r  case, 
i . e .  d i rec t io n a l  or s ta t io n ary ,  the preposit ion is the same ( i . e .  
' s e ' )  and that  e l im ina t ion  of  ' s t o ' / ' s t i '  (which is in e f f e c t  Prep. + 
A r t i c l e )  applies only a f t e r  the two most general (highest taxonomic 
l e v e l )  verbs of  the re levant  categories,  i . e .  ' p i yeno '  and ' /me'  
respect ive ly .
An a l t e r n a t i v e  view to redundancy in the case of  ' p i bao ' and 
' t aks ibevo ' in (32a) and (33a) ,  is the one compatible with Prototype 
theory,  namely construing a locat ive  as a p a t ien t  ob ject ,  i . e .  
construing events as involving d i re c t  objects;  but since these 
objects are not e s s e n t ia l l y  a ffected by the subject 's  act ion ,  the 
resu l t ing  events are very f a r  from the t r a n s i t i v e  prototype.  I t
seems plausib le  to assume th a t  precisely  because the object does not 
become a proto typ ica l  enough pa t ien t  in such cases, i t  cannot be 
fu r t h e r  promoted to subject posit ion  in a passive construct ion,  hence 
(32a) does not have a corresponding:
(32c) * o f r a x t i s  p i b i x t i k e  (apo to j a n i )
the fence was jumped (by John).
Neither does ( 3 3 a ) :
(33c) (o los)  o kostnos t a k s i b e f t i k e
the (whole) world was t r a v e l le d .
This change o f  perspective may explain why:
(36a) o j a n i s  prosperase to mayazi
John passed by the shop
does not have a corresponding:
(36b) * t o  mayazi  p rosperas t i ke  (apo to j a n i )  ( \=prospernjeme)






(37a) to f i a t  prosperase t i  volvo {\=prospernjeme)
the F ia t  overtook the Volvo
(37b) 7 volvo prosperas t i ke  apo to f i a t  [V^prospernjeme)
the Volvo was overtaken by the F ia t .
I t  can be said th a t  the car in subject posit ion in (37b) is  in th is
case understood as ' a f fe c te d '  by having been overtaken by another car
(as, fo r  instance, in a car race) .
A c lea re r  case is perhaps presented by (38) vs (39):
(38a) o j a n i s  b i esx i se  to basos
John crossed/traversed the wood
(V=5 7asx i zo )
(38b) to basos b i a s x i s t i k e  (apo to j a n i )





ena potami b i a s x i z i  to basos 
a r i v e r  traverses the wood
to basos b i asx i ze te  apo ena potami  
the wood is  traversed by a r i v e r
(V=5 7’ asx i zo )
(V=b7asxizome)
The examples in (39) re g is te r  something permanent and important in 
connection with the wood; i t  is in a way cut in two by the r i v e r .  I t  
is therefore  p lausib le  to consider tha t  in th is  l a t t e r  case i t  is 
closer to the prototypical  pa t ien t  as i t  is more a ffected  by the 
subject.  Consequently (39a) is closer to the t r a n s i t i v e  prototype 
than (38a) and th is  could be the reason why i t  has a corresponding 
p a s s i v e .  ^ The crucia l  thing to notice here is tha t  i t  is not the 
propert ies of  the subject, but ra ther  the condition of  the object  
which is decis ive  here; while the subject in (38a) is both animate 
and v o l i t i o n a l ,  the subject in (39a) is ne i ther .
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For s im i la r  reasons (40a) has a p a ra l le l  in (40b) and (41a) in (41b):
(40a) o exBros p e r i k i k l o s e  t i n  p o l i
the enemy surrounded the c i t y
(40b) 7 p o l i  pe r i k i k l o Q i k e  apo ton exQro
the c i t y  was surrounded by the enemy
(41a) ena s inefo  kapnu p e r i k i k l o s e  to s p i t i
a cloud of smoke surrounded the house
(41b) to s p i t i  pe r i k i k l o Q i k e  apo ena s inefo
kapnu
the house was surrounded by a cloud 
of  smoke.
A possible explanation of  the facts  of  ' § i a s x i z o ' and ' p e r i k i k l o n o '  
is tha t  John in (38b) is a s ingle  e n t i t y ,  occupying a point  in space 
at any given time, and therefore  unable to s tre tch a l l  the way across 
a wood (thereby d iv id ing  i t  in to  two parts )  at a given moment in 
t ime. On the other hand, since a r i v e r  extends considerably fu r th e r  
on a horizontal  plane than 'John' ,  i t  can e a s i ly  d iv ide  a wood into  
two (as in ( 3 9 ) ) .  Likewise,  'enemy' in (40) designates a whole 
co l lec t io n  of  ind iv idua ls ,  who can there fore  e as i ly  form themselves 
into a c i r c l e ,  i . e .  the e n t i t y  has extent.  The essent ia l  facts  about 
'wood' in (39 ) ,  ' c i t y '  in (40) and 'house' in (41) (by comparison 
with 'wood' in (38a) )  is the re la t ionsh ip  in which they stand to 
something with extent ,  a r i v e r  and the enemy/the smoke respec t ive ly .
In any case, the q u a l i t i e s  of  the subject are not decis ive  in the 
d i f fe rence  between (38b) and (40b).  The object seems to be more 
ser ious ly  a ffected in (40a,  41a) and therefore  c loser  to the
t r a n s i t i v e  prototype than (38a) .  For the same reason i t  is also 
closer  to the causative prototype.  Most important ly ,  animacy and 
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  of  the subject are not crucia l  in any of  the cases 
j u s t  discussed. Apparently the degree of  c a u s a t iv i ty  rests mainly
(V=per i k i k l ono )
(V=per ikik lonome)
{V=per i k i k lono)
(V=per ikiklonome)
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with the degree of  ' p a t i e n t i v i t y '  of  the affected ob ject .  
' p r o s p e r n a o '  (over take),  ' p e r i k i k l o n o '  ( e n c i rc le ,  surround),  
' b i a s x i z o '  ( t raverse )  + NP|_qc> although they are not causatives of  
motion, are nearer the causative prototype ( in  the sense of change of  
condition of  the object )  than other [NPj_oc] verbs which cannot 
passiv ize .  This d i f fe rence  depends wholly on how much of a patient  
the object is and there fore  on q u a l i t ie s  of  the subject other than 
animacy and i n t e n t i o n a l i t y .
A number of  points raised in e a r l i e r  sections (3 .1 ,  3 .2 ,  3 .3 )  w i l l  be 
taken up in what fol lows and examined in the l i g h t  of  th is  
'p rototype '  understanding of t r a n s i t i v i t y  and a g e n t iv i ty .  I t  is 
considered tha t  w i th in  th is  framework more l i g h t  can be cast on the 
re levant  issues, i . e .  t r a n s i t iv e s  which are not causatives o f  motion, 
the r e la t io n  between phonological ly  identica l  causative/non-causative  
pa irs ,  d i re c t  vs in d i re c t  c a u s a t iv i t y ,  ag en t iv i ty .
3 .5  D i rec t  vs in d i r e c t  causatives
The d is t in c t io n  between d i r e c t  and in d i rec t  causatives has been 
already mentioned. I t  w i l l  be argued here tha t  i t  consti tutes  
perhaps the best way to investigate  the re la t io n s h ip  between 
ca u s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty .  Consider f i r s t  the verb ' x o r e v o '  (dance) 
which can be used in a v a r ie ty  of  ways and occupy d i f f e r e n t  points on 
a scale of  t r a n s i t i v i t y  and c au s a t iv i ty .  I t  w i l l  be looked at in 
some d e ta i l  as i t  const i tu tes  a good example of  the in su f f ic ien c y  of  
formal, syntactic  ch a ra c te r is t ic s  and re s t r ic te d  notions of  
a g en t iv i ty .
(42) 7 m a r i e t a  x o r e v i  t o  x o r o  t i s  k i l j a s  { \ = x o r e v o )
Mar ie t ta  dances (the) b e l ly  dance
(43a) o f i l i p o s  x o r e v i  t i  m a r i e t a
Ph i l ip  dances Mar ie t ta  
Philip 'dances with Marietta.
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(43b) o f i l i p o s  x o r e v i  me t i  m a r i e t a  
P h i l ip  dances with Mar ie t ta
(44) 7 dada x o r e v i  t o  moro s t a  y o na t a  t i s
( the)  nanny dances the baby on her knees
The d i f ferences between the various points on the scales in question 
can be captured by reference to  the notions already discussed. As
the verb is b a s ic a l ly  an in t r a n s i t i v e  of motion, none o f  the NPs here
construed as d i r e c t  objects are prototypical  pa t ien ts .  In (42) the 
object NP, f a r  from being a pa t ie n t ,  is in e f f e c t  s im i la r  in function  
to a manner (adverb ia l )  sp e c i f ic a t io n .  In (43a) i t  could be thought 
of as derived from a PP whose NP is in tha t  case construed as a
d i r e c t  ob ject ;  the object is af fected  more than in (43b) which
describes the same event, in a way, in th a t  the i n i t i a t i v e  of
performing the event is a t t r ib u te d  to the subject;  in tent ion  is 
probably shared but viewed as mainly stemming from the subject; weak 
control  only can be a t t r ib u te d  to the subject as the o b je c t -p a t ien t  
must necessari ly  also use i t s  self-moving mechanism ( in  the
appropriate manner). In th is  sense the causer is non-sa l ien t .  The
main point here is tha t  the event is described as an instance of
in d i re c t  causation.  In (43b) the object appears w i th in  the PP and is  
c le a r ly  viewed as less a ffected than in (43a) ;  a l l  the factors  
responsible fo r  the execution of  the act /event ( i . e .  in ten t ion ,  
contro l ,  cause, r e s p o n s ib i l i t y ,  i n i t i a t i v e )  are viewed as shared by 
subject and ob ject .  The question of  causation does not a r ise .  
F in a l l y ,  in (44) the object is a prototypical  p a t ien t ;  i t  need not be 
using i t s  self-moving mechanism in the le a s t ,  and although in tention  
may be common to subject and object ,  i t  is  c le a r ly  a t t r ib u te d  to the 
former,  who is also the d i r e c t  causer o f  the event and has c le a r  and 
obvious control  over i t .  This is an instance of  a very sa l ien t  
causer, a proto typica l  agent: she is both perceived and wholly
responsible fo r  the event.  By contrast with (43a) ,  th is  is a case of  
d i r e c t  causation.
This p a r t i c u la r  verb also c l a r i f i e s  the status o f  the causatives 
belonging to category I  ( in  3 . 2 ) .  I t  seems quite  reasonable to
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regard cases of  what I c a l l  'phono!ogical ly  i d e n t i c a l '  causative/non­
causative pairs as a type o f  extension of  meaning. The r e s u l t  of  a
process of  e l im ina t ing  preposit ions is a d i re c t  object in place of  a
PP (construing a lo c a t iv e  as a p a t i e n t ) .  Assuming th a t  causatives of  
motion of  the type in question are derived from the corresponding 
i n t r a n s i t i v e s ,  one can th ink  of  them as the re s u l t  of  a process 
p a ra l le l  to the one ju s t  mentioned in connection with PPs: 
'construing an i n t r a n s i t i v e  as a t r a n s i t i v e ' .  The close l i n k  between 
the various uses of  ' xorevo'  j u s t  discussed can be seen as an 
extensive example of such a process. The process s ta r ts  with a 
genuine in t r a n s i t i v e  as in ' o f i l i p o s  xorev i  sto ba le to  t i s  operas'  
( P h i l ip  dances at the b a l l e t  of  the Opera). There fo l low cases such 
as the examples provided (42) - (44) where the la s t  one, at  le a s t ,  
involves a d i r e c t  causative of  motion. There is ,  o f  course, no 
question of  regarding these various instances o f  ' xorevo'  as 
'homophones'. S im i la r ly  fo r  ' /c 7 7 a 0 ^' ( r o l l ) ,  ' s t r / v o ^ '  ( t u rn ) ,  
' v u l j a z o 2 ' (sink) and the remaining verbs of  category I of  MG 
causatives o f  motion.
In discussing the facts  of  d i r e c t  vs in d i re c t  causatives i t  seems 
useful to compare them with e x p l i c i t  causatives,  expressed in MG 
through verbs such as ' kano'  (make), ' anagazo'  ( fo rce)  and the l i k e ,  
and l i n k  the issue with the a g en t iv i ty  scales.
Consider the d i f ferences between e x p l i c i t  causatives (henceforth EC), 
and lex ica l  ones (henceforth LC), comprising d i r e c t  and ind i rec t  
causatives (henceforth DC and IC respec t ive ly ) :
EC (45a) 7 v rox i  mas ekane na yi r i sume piso {V=y i r i zo)
the ra in  made us come/go back
LC (45b) ??7  v rox i  mas y i r i s e  p i so  
the ra in  turned us back
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EC (46a) 7 p r o e l a s i  t u  exQru  ekane  t o  s t r a t o  na ( V = i p o x o r o )
i p o x o r i s i
the advance of the enemy made the army 
r e t r e a t
LC (46b) * 7  p r o e l a s i  t u  exQru i p o x o r i s e  t o  s t r a t o
the advance of the enemy ' re t r e a t e d '  the army
EC (47a) * e k a n a  t a  v i v l i a  na anevun  s t o  r a f i  ( \ l =aneveno )
I made the books go-up on the shel f
LC (47b) anevasa  t a  v i v l i a  s t o  r a f i  ( V= anevazo )
I took-up/put-up the books on the shel f
EC (48a) o j a n i s  mas ekane na anevume pano x o r i s  na (V=aneveno)
t o  0 e 7 7*
John made us go-up upstairs  without  
wishing to
LC (48b) ?o j a n i s  mas anevase pano me t i s  f o n e s  t u  ( V= anevazo )
x o r i s  na t o  Qe l i
John took-up us upsta irs  with his screams without wishing to
John made us go upsta irs  with his screams without wishing to
The main points to notice here can be summed up as fol lows:
(a)  E x p l i c i t  causatives may have causers th a t  are f a r  from
prototypical  agents, e .g .  (45a) and (46a) which are also
explainable as instances o f  ' reason'  ra the r  than 'cause' ,  
although the d i f fe re nce  is hard to analyse in these terms. Even 
when the causer is human, as in (48a) ,  s/he may lack a l l  the  
remaining c hara c te r is t ic s  o f  a prototypical  agent. In tention  may 
be absent and control  very weak. Responsib i l i ty  is a subject ive  
c h a ra c te r is t ic  in tha t  i t  may be a t t r ib u te d  by the speaker-causee 
' u n i l a t e r a l l y '  to the person s/he understands as the causer.
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E x p l i c i t  causatives are t y p i c a l l y  used when the causee is not a 
prototypical  p a t ien t  (e .g .  (47a) is completely blocked),  since 
they require  th a t  s/he must also take act ion ,  i . e .  be a c t iv e ly  
involved in the event and therefore  at l e a s t  share the  
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  i t s  completion.
(b) The d is t in c t io n  between DCs and ICs is not as c lea r -c u t  as may be 
thought,  except i f  one concentrates on proto typ ical  instances.  
P ro to typ ic a l ly  DCs should e xh ib i t  the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  
prototypical  t r a n s i t i v e s ,  e .g .  (47b) which is a c le a r  case of  
'm anipulat ive '  causation: the causer has a l l  the propert ies of  
the proto typ ical  agent and the causee is a proto typica l  p a t ien t .
(c) ICs are much more n a tu ra l ly  paraphrasable with a corresponding EC 
expression than DCs are,  e .g .  (4 8 a ) - (48b) vs (4 7 a ) - (4 7 b ) .  The 
reason is obvious: p a ra l le l  to ECs t h e i r  proto typ ical  instances 
involve the causee's act ive  p a r t ic ip a t io n  in the event; the 
causer is a t t r ib u te d  re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the act ion; s/he must 
also e x h ib i t  a t  leas t  'weak in te n t '  (e .g .  (48b))  but exercise  
only weak contro l .  The causer is ,  however, p ro to ty p ic a l ly  human; 
hence the unacceptab i l i ty  of (45b) and (46b).
Indiv idual  MG causatives of  motion w i l l  d i f f e r  as to the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  they al low and may be seen as ranging from cases very 
close to DC to cases o f  metaphoric use.^
In view of  what is stated under (b) above, verbs which can be 
p r o to ty p ic a l ly  used as DCs w i l l  have a high degree of  a g e n t iv i ty .  In 
the f i e l d  under in v es t ig a t io n ,  th is  involves verbs such as:
' p l i s i a z c > 2 > (approach),  ' s f r / v o ^ '  ( t u r n ) ,  f y i r i z o 2 ' ( t u r n ) ,  
' p e r i f e r o ' ( take around), ' b i z o '  ( s t i c k ) ,  'petao^'  (throw) and others 
(see L is t  IV ) .
Examples:
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(49a) 7 n i n i  p l i s i a s e  t i n  karek la sto t rapez i  ( \ = p l i s i a z o )
Nini  approached the chair  to the tab le
(49b) *7 n i n i  p l i s i a s e  ton j a n i  sto t rapez i
Nini  approached John to the table
(49c) ??<? aeras p l i s i a s e  ta f i l a  s t i n  por ta
the wind approached the leaves to  the door
The subject-causer should have c lear  contro l ,  be a d i r e c t  and 
absolutely s a l ie n t  causer besides being animate and v o l i t io n a l  and 
usually  human, hence the unacceptab i l i ty  of  (49c) .  By impl icat ion  
the pa t ien t  has to be also a prototypical  one, in the sense of  having 
none of these propert ies;  hence the unacceptab i l i ty  of  (49b).  
Together with ' m e t a k o m i z o 2 f ( t ransport  f u r n i tu r e ,  e t c . ,  while moving 
house), ' y l i s t r a o 2 f ( s l i p )  and ' k i k l o f o r o '  ( c i r c u l a t e ) ,  ' p l i s i a z o '  
(approach) features at the top of  the a g en t iv i ty  scale fo r  MG 
causatives of  motion, as can be at tested in L is t  IV.  Al l  these verbs 
are shown to accept only animate causers (and sometimes only human), 
scoring very high fo r  each o f  the propert ies j o i n t l y  comprising 
a g en t iv i ty .  The only property not a l lo t t e d  a special  column in L is t  
IV is 'obviousness/sal ience of cause' .  I t  is considered that  
sal ience is in fac t  a character isat ion  of  the 'sum t o t a l '  o f  the 
remaining proper t ies .
A number of  other verbs such as ' ipsono ' ( r a i s e ) ,  ' xami lono ' ( lower) ,
' paramer izo'  (push as ide) ,  ' metafero ' ( t ra n s p o r t ) ,  ' b i z o '  ( s t i c k ) ,  
'petao^'  ( throw),  ' t i n a z o '  (shake u p / o f f ) ,  ' r i x n o '  (throw) are shown
to deviate s l i g h t l y  from the prototype of  a g e n t iv i ty  by allowing  
e n t i t i e s  other than human and animate as subjects,  e .g . ;
(50) o aeras xami lose t i s  ombreles (V=xami lono) •
the wind lowered the umbrellas
(51) 7 x jonos t i vaba tus er i kse kato (V=r ixno)
the snowball threw them down.
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We are s t i l l ,  however, in the area of  high a g e n t iv i ty  since in the 
case o f  animate subjects these verbs are marked for  implying simple 
in te n t ion ,  c lea r  control  and d i re c t  c a u s a t i o n .  ^ The few possible 
exceptions are marked in L is t  IV with an x ra ther  than a + fo r  the 
re levant property,  as an indication that such uses are marginal^,  
e . g . :
(52) ?o a s t i n o m o s  p a r a m e r i s e  t u s  f i t i t e s  me ( \ l = p a r a m e r i z o )
t i s  f o n e s  t u
the policeman pushed the students aside with  
his screams.
Thus ' p a r a m e r i z o '  (push aside) w i l l  be r e lu c ta n t ly  marked (x) fo r  
'weak' besides ' c l e a r '  contro l ,  to take care also o f  uses such as 
exemplif ied in (52) .
Verbs marked as accepting subjects exercising e i t h e r  strong or weak 
control  as well as allowing the p o s s ib i l i t y  of  IC are ' f e r n o '  
(b r in g ) ,  'p/veno^'  ( take t o ) ,  ' a p o m a k r i n o '  ( take away), ' s i k o n o ' 
( ra is e ,  l i f t ) ,  ' v a z o '  (p u t ) ,  ' v y a z o ' ( take ou t ) ,  ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up),  
e t c . , e . g . :
(53a) p/ye t a  r u x a  s t o  k a Q a r i s t i r i o  { \ l = p i y e n o )
s/he took the clothes to the laundry
is p r o to ty p ic a l ly  agentive,  whi le:
(53b) p i  ye t i  07 a t u  s t o  0 e a t r o ,  opos  t o n  i x e  ( \ l = p i y e n o )
p a r a k a l e s i
he took his aunt to the the a t re ,  as she had 
asked him to
is less so, because although the agent is high on the 'animacy' scale 
and has simple in te n t io n ,  he has 'weak contro l '  o f  the s i tu a t io n :  the 
r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  the act is shared with the causee and the 
i n i t i a t i v e  is a t t r ib u te d  to the l a t t e r .  Thus there is good reason to
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presume th a t  the causee is a c t iv e ly  p a r t ic ip a t in g  in the event (a t  
leas t  using her self-moving mechanism). Notice also some instances 
of  ' f e r n o '  (b r in g ) :
(54a) ta t rena fernun t ravmat ies {V^ferno)
the t ra in s  bring wounded (persons)
(54b) 7 Balasa efere skupib ja s t i n  p a r a l i a
the sea brought l i t t e r  to the beach
with subjects low on the 'animacy' scale; and
(54c) efera to f i l o  mu sto p a r t i
I  brought my f r ie nd  to the party
which is s im i la r  to (53b) in tha t  the object is again animate, 
v o l i t i o n a l ,  using h is /h e r  self-moving mechanism, e t c . ,  in short quite  
an unprototypical  p a t ien t .  These less agentive verbs pose an 
in te re s t in g  problem. Should they be understood as involv ing in d i re c t  
causation in uses such as those exemplified in (53b) and (54c) above, 
or not?
The d iv id ing  l i n e  between d i re c t  and in d i rec t  causation has general ly  
been assumed to be presence vs absence o f  'manipulat ion'  (c f .  
Shibatani  1976a,b,  where d i re c t  causation is ca l led  'manipulat ive  
causation ')  and the borders are assumed to be c le a r .  I t  seems, 
however, th a t  there is gradation wi th in  both the manipulat ive and the 
non-manipulat ive kind and in fa c t  a l i n e  leading from e x p l i c i t  
causatives to p ro to t y p ic a l ly  d i r e c t  ones. Crucial  features in th is  
connection seem to be: ' c o n t r o l ' ,  'accompaniment' and ' i n i t i a t i v e ' ,  
a l l  leading to a s p ec i f ic a t io n  of  the degree of  r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  of  
causer and causee, and degree of  sal ience o f  cause.
In the absence of  a supporting context, i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to prove the 
v a l i d i t y  o f  these observations.  An attempt w i l l  be made, however, at  
a careful  analysis o f  re levant sentences in the hope of showing that
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what are here posited as 'c ru c ia l  fea tures '  are indeed r i g h t l y  so 
character ized and espec ia l ly  th a t  none of them, taken in d iv id u a l ly ,  
is s u f f i c i e n t .  Consider the fol lowing examples:
(55a) mas ekane na pame sto p a r t i  me t i n  a p i l i  (V=piyenoi )
o t i  a l j o s  ben 0a mas ksanami l i s i  
s/he made us go to the party threatening  
th a t  otherwise s/he would not t a l k  to us again.
This is an instance of  an EC involving in t r a n s i t i v e  ' p i y e n o j '  (go).  
The causer does not p a r t ic ip a te  physica l ly  in the execution of  the 
actual caused event. S/he does not accompany the causees. There is 
good reason to be l ieve ,  though, tha t  s/he has 'strong i n t e n t ' .  The 
remaining examples involve t ra n s i t iv e -c a u s a t iv e  uses of  ' p i y e n o 2 f 
( take t o ) .
(55b) mas p i ye sto p a r t i  me t i n  a p i l i  o t i  (V^p/yeno^)
a l j os  ben 0a mas ksanami l i s i
s/he took us to the party  threatening that
otherwise s/he would not t a l k  to us again
In (55b) the causer is a t t r ib u te d  strong in ten t ;  s/he has the 
i n i t i a t i v e  in the change-of- locat ion event and also accompanies the
causees who can be only a t t r ib u te d  weak in te n t  and no i n i t i a t i v e .
(55c) p iye t i  mi tera tu sto j a t r o  opos ton i xe (V=piyeno2 )
paraka les i
he took his mother to the doctor as she had 
asked him to do
The main d i f fe rence  here seems to be tha t  although the causer 
accompanies the causee, both (strong) in te n t  and i n i t i a t i v e  are 
a t t r ib u te d  to the l a t t e r .
(55d) p iye t i  yata sto j a t r o  (V-piyeno2 )
s/he took the cat to the doctor
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Here, o f  course, the causer possesses a l l  the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  a 
proto typica l  agent and the causee is more or less a prototypica l  
p a t ie n t .  In essence (55d) is p a ra l le l  to (53a) ' p i y e  t a  r u x a  s t o
k a Q a r i s t i r i o '  (s/he took the clothes to the laundry) .
Examples (55a-d) are meant as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  the gradedness of  
the phenomenon o f  c a u s a t iv i t y ,  which can be d i r e c t l y  l inked to the 
facts of  a g e n t iv i ty  (as already pointed out at the beginning of  th is  
chapter) .  A d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  dichotomy does not seem very 
i l lu m in a t in g .  The t r a d i t i o n a l l y  used feature  of  'accompaniment', 
although useful fo r  d i f f e r e n t  purposes, is not very important in th is  
p a r t i c u la r  context and can be replaced by the property of  ' c o n t r o l ' .  
Notice, fo r  instance,  th a t  (55a) is an instance of  very weak control  
and low sal ience on the par t  of  the causer, tha t  (b) and (c) seem to 
d i f f e r  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  in terms of  control ( the former one involving of  
weaker control  than the l a t t e r ) ,  while (d) is characterized by strong 
contro l .  The suggestion here is that ' c o n t ro l '  seems to take care of  
'accompaniment' in a more reveal ing way, as i t  can l i n k  d i r e c t l y  with 
sal ience o f  cause. I t  is  appl icable under the fo l lowing conditions:  
the act can only be performed by the actor being physica l ly  present 
and acting un t i l  i t s  completion; at the same t ime, no active  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  is required on the part of  the moving object ( p a t i e n t ) .  
These conditions are c h a r a c te r is t ic  of  s i tuat ions  considered here to 
be p r o to ty p ic a l ly  under the c le a r  control of  the causer. I f ,  or to 
the extent th a t ,  they are s a t is f i e d ,  the verb is considered more 
agentive (than otherwise) in th is  respect. Thus, fo r  instance,
' i p s o n o '  ( ra ise )  w i l l  get a higher score than ' s i k o n o ' ( r a i s e ) ,  
' a n e v a z o '  (p u t / take  up),  ' f e r n o '  (b r in g ) ,  e t c . ,  a l l  other things  
being equal ,  since cases p a ra l le l  to (55a) ,  (55b) and (55c) are
impossible in the case o f  ' i p s o n o ' ( r a i s e ) ;  but not in the case of  
the l a t t e r  verbs. This means that  i t  can only function as a c lear  
case of  a d i r e c t  causative.  The salience o f  a causer as a
proto typica l  agent cannot be disputed in cases such as that
exemplif ied by a l l  instances of  ' i p s o n o ' ( r a i s e ) .
Si tuations usual ly expressed with an EC ( e x p l i c i t  causative) ,  where 
the causer may be simply issuing an order,  making a suggestion,  
asking the causee to perform an act ,  giving d i rec t io n s ,  and the l i k e ,
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are in certain cases of MGMVs also expressible through a LC (lexical  
causat ive).
Examples of such causative verbs are: ' s i kono1 ( ra is e ) ,  ' kaQizo'  
(make s.o.  s i t ) ,  ' vazo'  (put ) ,  ' vyazo'  (take out),  ' ksaplono ' (make 
s.o, l i e  down), ' anevazo'  (take up/make s.o. go up), ' katevazo ' (take 
down/make s.o. go down), ' pernao2 ' ( p a s s e s ) ’ ' s t r i v o 2 ' ( t u r n ^ s ) ,  
etc. Character istic examples of the d i f fe ren t  possibi1i t i e s  are:
(56) 7 b a s k a l a  s i k o s e  t o n  j a n i  s t o n  p i n a k a  (M = s i k o n o )
the teacher 'stood up' John to the blackboard
the teacher made John stand up in f ro n t  of the blackboard
(57) 7 b a s k a l a  e v y a l e  t o n  j a n i  ekso  (V=wazo)
the teacher ' took out'  John
the teacher made John go out/asked John to go out
(58) 7 n a z i  e s t i s a n  t u s  k r a t u m e n u s  s t o n  t i x o  ( V = s t i n o )
the Nazis stood the prisoners at the wall
(59) e v a l e  t a  p e b j a  mesa j a  na mi n  k r i o s u n  (V=vazo)
s/he put the chi ldren inside so th a t  they would
not catch cold
s/he made them go inside so that they would not catch cold
(60) p e r a s e  t u s  k s enus  s t o  s a l o n i  ( V = p e r n a o )
s/he passed the guests to the lounge
s/he showed the guests into the lounge
(61) z i t i s a n  apo t o n  o b i y o  na t u s  k a t e v a s i  ( V - k a t e v a z o )
s t i n  p r o t e l e f t e a  s t a s i
they asked from the d r iv e r  to take them down 
at one stop before the la s t  
they asked the d r iv e r  to put them o f f  
at one stop before the l a s t .
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In L is t  IV such verbs are marked fo r  allowing both strong and weak 
control  and d i r e c t  as well as in d i re c t  cause, ju s t  l i k e  those of  the 
previous category,  i . e .  ( take t o ) ,  ' f e r n o ' (b r in g ) .  They
have to be singled out, however, as allowing a fu r th e r  deviat ion from
the prototype of  d i r e c t  c au s a t iv i ty ,  in th a t  the causer need not be 
obviously exerc ising control  over the event, fo r  the reasons of fered  
in the discussion o f  the examples ( 55a-d) .  I t  would perhaps be 
desirable  to have more points on the 'c o n t r o l '  scale to mark th is  
devia t ion ,  since ' c o n t r o l ' ,  in my understanding o f  the term, involves
more than one condit ion (as pointed out in the discussion of
gradation and c o n t r o l ) .
The most in te res t in g  case in th is  connection is perhaps presented by 
those MGMVs which are even c loser  to the EC prototype,  having the 
special  c h a ra c te r is t ic  tha t  they are most n a tu ra l ly  replaceable by 
equivalent EC constructions (unl ike  the immediately preceding group).  
S ig n i f i c a n t l y ,  these are ra ther  c lear  cases of  extension of  meaning, 
e .g . :
(62a) mas t r e x i  s ta mayazja (V=trexo2 )
s/he makes us run to the shops
(62b) mas t r e x i  j a  f o t o t i p i e s
s/he makes us run fo r  photocopies
(63) mas sern i  ston ipobromo [V=serno)
s/he drags us to the horse-races
(64) me es t i se  mis i  ora ekso apo to sinema (V=st ino )
s/he 'stood'  me fo r  h a l f  an hour outside the cinema
s/he kept me wai t ing outside the cinema fo r  ha l f -an -hour .
Notice tha t  (62a) and (62b) may be e i t h e r  + / “ accompaniment, while  
(63) implies accompaniment, and (64) implies the complete absence of  
the causer from the locat ion o f  the caused event; (64) is most
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commonly used fo r  an appointment made (p r io r  to the caused event) and 
not kept by the subject.
Sal ience of  cause is very low in these examples because control  is 
very weak. I f  the causer is simply issuing an order,  s/he is less  
s a l ie n t  than a d i r e c t  causer, e .g .  (6 2 ) - (6 4 )  as opposed to 'c a r ry in g '
someone/something; i f  s/he is not even present during the execution
of  the act ,  s/he is even less s a l i e n t ,  e .g .  (62a-b),  (64) as opposed 
to (6 3 ) .  The verbs are not understood l i t e r a l l y ;  although they imply 
' change-o f - locat ion '  ( ' serno ' (drag),  ' t r e x o ' ( r u n ) ) ,  or 'change-of-  
pos i t io n '  o f  the causee { ' s t i n o '  (make s . th .  stand, p la c e ) ) ,  probably 
only the feature  of  'speed' is reta ined in ' t r e x o '  ( run ) ,  and ' serno '  
(drag) re ta ins  l i t t l e  more than 'unwil l ingness to perform the act '  or 
'a c t ing  as i f  dragging one's fe e t  a long' .  As fo r  ' s t i n o '  (make s.o .  
stand),  i t  probably keeps the feature of  'having an upright  
p o s i t io n ' ,  although even tha t  is not absolute ly  necessary; the 
predominant c h a r a c te r is t ic  in such uses is 'being at  a f ixed  point  
u n w i l l in g ly  or fo r  a longer period than one intended t o ' .  I t  is also 
in te res t in g  to notice tha t  although the causer is low on the scales
o f  control  and cause, and perhaps neutra l /unspec i f ied  for  degree of
in te n t ,  s/he is very high on the animacy scale (usual ly  human), e .g . :
(65) *7 vrox i  mas es i re  s p i t i  mas ( \ i=serno)
the ra in  dragged us home
(66) *o binatos i l j o s  mas es t i se  s t i n  p a r a l i a  (V=st/no)
the strong sun 'stood'  us on the beach
(67) * t o  a f t o k i n i t o  mas t r e x i  s inex ia  s to serv i s  (V=trexo^)
the car makes us run continuously to the 's e rv ic e .
This shows the importance o f  understanding a g e n t iv i ty  as a c lu s te r  of  
proper t ies ;  devia t ion from the prototype of  a g en t iv i ty  is expected to  
take place in any one (or more than one) o f  i t s  individual  
propert ies .  I t  also gives an idea of  how extension of  meaning may be 
understood to work, i . e .  as devia t ion from the prototype.
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I t  has been already stated here tha t  only physical motion is taken 
into  considerat ion and no f ig u r a t i v e  uses of  MGMVs. Yet cases l i k e :
(68) o B o r i v o s  a p o ma k r i n e  t u s  p e r a s t i k u s  ( \ l = a p o m a k r i n o ) 
the noise drove away the passers-by
which are taken into account since they involve physical change-of-  
locat ion of  the object and a concrete causer-subject can well be 
thought of  as a step in the process of  meaning extension.  Consider
(69) as a paraphrase of  (68):
(69) 7 p e r a s t i k i  a p o m a k r i n B i k a n  apo t o  B o r i v o /  ( V- a po t nak r i nome )
eks  e t i a s  t u  B o r i v u
passers-by pul led/went away because of the noise.
I t  seems plausib le  tha t  the NPs expressing cause or reason with in a 
PP { [ a p o  t o  0or7'vo]PP, [ e k s  e t i a s  t u  B o r i v u ] ? ? )  in (69) are construed 
as agents and become subjects in sentences l i k e  (68) where the causee 
is  consequently 'demoted' from the subject posit ion  i t  holds in (69) 
to d i re c t  object pos it ion  in (68 ) ,  Givon's model does not ra ise  th is  
point,  but I consider i t  quite in tegratab le  in any form of  Prototype 
theory.  I t  is qu i te  conceivable that every step on a scale marking 
deviat ion from the prototype of  a t r a n s i t i v e ,  causative,  agentive 
construction should be understood as a step towards extension of  
meaning and may bring about a rearrangement of  the ro les / funct ions  of  
the d i f f e r e n t  arguments o f  a predicate ,  focusing some and defocusing 
others.  The re su l t in g  constructions w i l l  in e f f e c t  present the 
'same' event viewed from a d i f f e r e n t  angle.
3 .6  Agent iv i ty  measurements fo r  in t ra n s i t iv e s
In what has preceded, some arguments were presented against a 
complete conf la t ion  of  ca u s a t iv i ty  and a g en t iv i ty  and in favour of  
considering only t r a n s i t i v e s  as candidates fo r  membership in the 
category o f  causatives,  at leas t  fo r  methodological reasons. I t  has 
also been suggested that  the degree of  ag en t iv i ty  o f  causatives of
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motion could be 'measured' on the basis of  Givon's (1984) a g en t iv i ty  
scales. L is t  IV shows how the verbs so examined compare with each 
other with respect to th is  p a r t i c u la r  dimension. The only property  
(among the c lu ste r  o f  propert ies  j o i n t l y  const i tu t ing  a g en t iv i ty )  
which is not a t t r ib u te d  a separate column is sal ience.  I t  is 
considered tha t  espec ia l ly  in the absence o f  any spec i f ic  contextual  
information,  the r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  the 'causer'  is in fac t  
re f lec te d  in the overal l  p ic tu re  of  how agentive the verb is on the 
basis of  a consideration of  the remaining propert ies .
A fu r th e r  deviat ion from Givon's analysis is im p l i c i t  in what has 
already been said concerning a g e n t iv i ty ,  namely tha t  in t r a n s i t iv e s  of  
motion also e xh ib i t  d i f f e r e n t  degrees of  a g en t iv i ty .  I t  is 
considered there fore  that one-argument predications can be also 
categorized as more or less agentive on the basis of  propert ies such 
as animacy, in tent ion  and contro l .  The re s p o n s ib i l i t y  of  the actor  
is now measured in r e la t io n  to h is /her  own a c t i v i t y ,  which is not 
transferred  to any other e n t i t y .  The property of  causation is 
inapplicable  in th is  case, espec ia l ly  as i t  is presented in Givon's 
scales,  i . e .  in terms of  d i re c t  and in d i re c t  cause, so there is no 
column corresponding to i t  in L is t  V which includes non-causatives of  
motion. T ransi t ives  describing the motion o f  t h e i r  logical  subject  
are considered along with in t r a n s i t iv e s  of  motion. The d is t in c t io n  
drawn is in fa c t  between causatives of  motion (which can only be 
t ra n s i t i v e s )  and non-causatives (which can be e i t h e r  t r a n s i t i v e ,  e.g.
' k i n i y a o ' (run a f t e r ,  hunt) and ' ka tab ioko '  (chase),  or i n t r a n s i t i v e ,
e .g .  ' t r e x o j ' ( run) and ' aneveno' (ascend)) .  The assumption im p l ic i t  
here is tha t  causatives are to be compared fo r  the purposes of  
ag en t iv i ty  measurements with other causatives only; and, 
consequently, non-causatives with other non-causatives.  Consider, 
f i r s t ,  sample sentences with ' ka tab ioko '  (chase):
(70a) 7 ast inomia ka tab i ok i  ton b rape t i  (V=katabioko)
the pol ice  are chasing the fu g i t i v e
(70b) to p e r i p o l i k o  ka tab iok i  ton brapet i
the patrol  car is chasing the fu g i t i v e
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(70c) ??7  s f e r e s  k a t a b i o k u n  t o n  b r a p e t i
the b u l le ts  are chasing the fu g i t iv e
(70d) * 7  p e t r e s  k a t a b i o k u n  t o n  b r a p e t i
the stones are chasing the fu g i t i v e .
Clear ly  the verb scores high on the 'animacy' scale;  the same applies  
to the ' i n t e n t '  and 'c o n t r o l '  scales. I t  hardly needs to be 
demonstrated with examples th a t  to chase somebody one must have a 
strong in tent ion  to do so and c lear  control o f  the s i tu a t io n ;  i t  is  
most un l ik e ly  tha t  the event is in accordance with the wishes of  the 
chased person or that the l a t t e r  has any act ive  involvement in the 
accomplishment o f  the action .
I t  can be shown that  ' t r e x o '  (run) is a step lower in a g en t iv i ty  than 
verbs l i k e  ' k a t a b i o k o '  (chase) and ' k i n i y a o '  (hunt, run a f t e r ) ;  on 
the 'animacy' scale,  besides animates, vehic les ,  and natural  forces,  
i t  also accepts cer ta in  kinds of  non-self-moving subjects such as 
l iqu id s  and mass objects moving under the e f fe c t  of g ra v i ty  or  
impetus, e .g . :
(71) t o  n e r o  t r e x i  mesa s t o n  kuva  ( V=trexo)
the water is running into the bucket.
There are less grounds fo r  postula t ing 'strong i n te n t '  f o r  ' t r e x o '  
(run) than fo r  ' k a t a b i o k o '  (chase) and ' k i n i y a o '  (hunt, run a f t e r ) .  
I t  i s ,  however, conceivable th a t  a c t i v i t i e s  requir ing  a r e l a t i v e l y  
greater  amount o f  energy to accomplish than others should be marked 
fo r  marginal ly exh ib i t ing  'strong i n te n t '  besides 'simple in te n t '  
(hence ' t r e x o '  receives x  in the relevant box). The basis fo r  
marking th is  way verbs such as ' t r e x o j '  ( run) ,  ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb)  
and ' k o l i b a o '  (swim) is the fa c t  tha t  they y ie ld  quite  unnatural  
sentences i f  combined with expressions such as ' x o r i s  l o y o '  ( f o r  no 
reason),  ' x o r i s  na k s e r i  j a t i '  (without knowing why), e tc .  I t  is 
f e l t  tha t  there is a d i f fe rence  at  th is  point from ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) ,  
fo r  instance, which is qu ite  compatible with such expressions and is 
therefore  only marked fo r  'simple i n t e n t ' .  Notice also that
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7perpatao ' is higher than ' t r e x o 7 on the animacy scale as i t  requires  
animate subjects only,  but ' vab i zo '  (step) and ' porevome'  (go on 
f o o t ) ,  although very s im i la r  to ' perpatao7 in most respects,  are even 
higher on the animacy scale as they require only human subjects.  Al l  
these verbs are genera l ly  agentive but not fo r  the same reasons; 
hence they appear at d i f f e r e n t  leve ls  of  a g e n t iv i ty .  Notice, fo r  
instance, tha t  ' ormao7 (burst  in/on) has to be marked fo r  'strong  
i n te n t '  ra ther  than 'simple i n te n t '  but is lower on the animacy scale 
since vehic les and natural  forces (besides animates) can also appear 
as i t s  subjects.  Most of  these verbs in the more or less  
p r o to typ ic a l ly  agentive group are marked fo r  ' c l e a r  c o n t r o l ' .  I t  is 
f e l t ,  however, th a t  ' y on a t i zo '  (k n e e l ) ,  'kaBome'  ( s i t )  and ' ksaplono'  
( l i e  down) should also be marked fo r  marginal ly  allowing 'weak 
contro l '  since they can appear in sentences such as:
(72) yonat i se apo to ksafn i ko x t i p ima  (V=yonat i zo)
s/he kneeled under/because o f  the sudden blow
or
(73) z a l i s t i k e  ksafn i ka ke ksaplose sto patoma (V=ksaplono)
s/he suddenly f e l t  d izzy and lay on the f lo o r
where ' epese sta yonata ' (s/he f e l l  on h is /her  knees) and ' epese sto  
patoma ' (s/he f e l l  ( f l a t )  on the f lo o r )  are implied,  respect ive ly .  
I t  also seems reasonable to mark ' pe r i p l an jeme '  (roam around) fo r  
'n o n - in ten t '  as wel l  as 'simple in t e n t '  to take care o f  uses such as:
(74a) per i p ]an iB i kan  apo laBos p l i r o f o r i e s  {V^per iplanjeme)
they roamed around because o f  wrong d irec t ions
(74b) pe r i  p i an iB i kan s t i n  p o l i  j a  na peras i  i  ora
they roamed around ( in )  the town to pass the t ime6 .
So the reason why ' per ip lan jeme '  s t i l l  f igures w i th in  the agentive  
group is i t s  high score fo r  animacy. Other verbs comparable in 
a g e n t iv i ty  to the ones discussed are: ' b us u l i zo '  (crawl (as of  a 
baby)) ,  ' xorevo ' (dance),  ' xorop ibao '  (hop), ' ser j an i zo ,  su l a t sa ro '  
(walk around/about) .
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The c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  verbs into groups is meant only as a r e f le c t io n  
of  what t h e i r  ' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  image' i s .  There are c le a r l y  no 
borders between these 'g roups ' .  So ' t r e x o '  (run) and ' p i b a o '  (jump) 
require  the act ive  physical  involvement of  the. moving subject,  yet  
are lower than the other verbs ju s t  discussed in terms o f  animacy. 
Although they may be f e l t  as p r o to ty p ic a l ly  agentive,  they are shown 
to be less so. These two verbs are in a way the l i n k  with the next 
group, consist ing of  verbs genera l ly  understood as unspecified for  
in ten t ion  and there fore  'vague' as to a g e n t iv i ty .  I am re fe r r in g  to 
MGMVs such as:
' t a k s i b e v o '  ( t r a v e l ) ,  ' e p i s t r e f o j '  ( r e tu rn ) ,  ' p l i s i a z o i '  (approach),  
' b i a s x i z o '  ( t r a v e r s e ) ,  ' a n e v e n o ' (ascend), ' p i y e n o j '  (go),  ' e r x o m e '  
(come), ' f e v y o '  ( l e a v e ) ,  ' b e n o '  ( e n te r ) ,  ' y i r i z o j '  ( turn)
and others which allow fo r  s i tuat ions  where the moving e n t i t y  may be 
lower on the 'animacy' scale than 'human' and may execute the 
described motion while  being carr ied ,  fo r  instance,  i . e .  not 
necessari ly  using i t s  self-moving mechanism. To take care of  th is  
l a t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  these verbs are marked fo r  both 's trong '  and 'weak 
c o n t r o l ' .  I t  is  in te res t in g  to notice,  however, the dif fe rences  
which they e x h ib i t .
A small number among them: ' e p i s t r e f o j '  ( r e tu r n ) ,  ' y i r i z o 3  p i s o '
(come back),  ' p l i s i a z o '  (approach),  ' t a k s i b e v o '  ( t r a v e l ) ,  ' b i a s x i z o '  
( t raverse )  are compatible with qua l i fy ing  phrases of  the kind ' x o r i s  
na t o  k a t a l a v i '  (without knowing/real iz ing i t )  and can thus be 
singled out as marginal ly  allowing 'n o n - in ten t '  and 'no c o n t r o l ' .  
Unlike ' t a k s i b e v o '  ( t r a v e l ) ,  fo r  instance, ' p i y e n o j '  (go) and ' f e v y o '  
( leave) y ie ld  very odd sentences in such environments. What is 
perhaps more in te re s t in g ,  i f  the moving e n t i t y  is understood as being 
unconscious, or in any way completely lacking control  or intent ion  
with respect to the motion described,  ' e r x o m e '  (come) sentences such 
as (75) are f in e ,  but ' p i y e n o '  or ' f e v y o '  ones, such as (76) and (77) 
are not:
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(75) s t i s  5 i r Q a n  i  t r a v m a t i e s  s t o  nos o k om io  {V=erxome)
at 5 o 'c lock  the wounded came to the hospital
(76) l l s t i s  5 e f i y a n  i  t r a v m a t i e s  apo t o  nos o k om io  (V=fevyo)
at 5 o 'c lock  the wounded l e f t  the hospital
(77) l l s t i s  5 p i y a n  i  t r a v m a t i e s  s t o  n osokom io  { V ^ p i y e n o )
at 5 o 'c lock  the wounded went to the hosp i ta l .
In case ' i  t r a v m a t i e s ' ( the wounded) are completely lacking control  
or in tent ion ,  sentences with ' t u s  p i r a n '  ( they took them away) and 
' t u s  p i v a n '  ( they took them ( t o ) )  w i l l  replace (76) and (77)  
respect ive ly .  The equivalent causative construction ' t u s  e f e r a n '  
(they brought them) need not be subst i tuted fo r  (75 ) .  For th is  
reason i t  seems plausib le  to mark ' e r x o m e '  (come) as also accepting 
'no contro l '  and 'n o n - in t e n t '  (besides ' c le a r  c o n tro l '  and 'simple  
i n t e n t ' ) ,
Notice the d i f fe rence  between 'p /y eno j '  (go) and ' fevyo '  ( leave ) :
(78) o l i  7 k r a t u m e n i  e f /yan apo t i s  f H a k e s  a v e r o f ;  (V=feyyo)
t u s  p i r a n  s t i s  6
a l l  the prisoners l e f t  the prison 'A v e r o f f ' ;  
they took them (away) at 6
(79) o l i  7 k r a t u m e n i  p i y a n  s t i s  f i l a k e s  a v e r o f ;  ( V = p i y e n o )
t u s  e f e r a n / p i y a n  s t i s  6
a l l  the prisoners went to the prison 'A v e r o f f ' ;  
they brought them/took them there at 6.
I t  seems that ' p i y e n o ' requires at  lea s t  'weak con tro l '  while ' f e v y o '  
has to be marked fo r  marginal ly also accepting subjects without any 
control  over the event.
A possible explanation fo r  these facts could be th a t  'p/yeno'  (go) 
focuses on the whole journey ra ther  than i t s  beginning or i ts
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end(1 ike 'come' and ' l e a v e ' ) .  I f  the speaker focuses on only the end 
point,  ' c o n t r o l '  is  perhaps less re levant than when s/he focuses on 
the whole of  i t .
P redic tably ,  a completely d i f f e r e n t  overal l  picture  is given by verbs 
such as ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  down) or ' t r e m o '  ( tremble)  which f igure  
quite  low on a genera l ized ag en t iv i ty  scale,  fo r  a number of  reasons. 
For instance ' k a t r a k i l a o 1 ( r o l l  down) scores very low on 'animacy' as 
i t  is b as ica l ly  r e s t r i c t e d  to non-self-moving objects ( i . e .  e n t i t i e s  
without a self-moving mechanism or not using i t  to perform the motion 
in quest ion).  I t  is also a t  the bottom of both the ' i n t e n t '  and the
'c o n t r o l '  scales, as i t  is completely incompatible with any notion of
in te n t io n ,  e .g . :
(80) * k a t r a k i l i s e  j a  na p j a s i  t i  b a l a  [ V = k a t r a k i l a o )
s/he r o l le d  down to catch the bal l
as well as with any notion of  the subject 's  having control  over the
event.  The d i f fe rences  w i th in  th is  group are very s l i g h t .  Three 
verbs: ' y l i s t r a o j '  ( s l i p ,  s l i d e ) ,  ' v i B i z o m e 1 (s ink)  and ' p e f t o '
( f a l l )  can be margina l ly marked for  'weak/simple i n t e n t '  and 'weak 
contro l '  (besides 'n o n - in te n t '  and 'no c o n t r o l ' ,  which character ize  
the proto typ ical  uses o f  these verbs),  e .g . :
(81) I v i B i s t i k e  s t o  5 r o s e r o  n e r o  { V = v iB iz o m e )
s/he sank into  the cool water
is acceptable f o r  a number of  native speakers.
3 .7  Modern Greek mediopassives and passives as in t r a n s i t iv e s
In the l a s t  category discussed in the previous section a number of  
verbs ending in '-ome' (hence '-ome' verbs) are included: ' v i B i z o m e '  
( s in k ) ,  ' g r e m i z o m e ' ( f a l l  down/to pieces),  ' s o r j a z o m e '  ( f a l l  f l a t  on 
the ground). MG ' - o w e '  verbs are mediopassive in form and, with the
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obvious exception of  'deponent verbs' such as ' e r x o m e '  (come) or 
' a p o m a k r in o m e ’ (move away), are t r a d i t i o n a l l y  juxtaposed to act ive  
form ' - o '  verbs as implying th a t  t h e i r  subject is a ffec ted  ra ther  
than a f fe c t in g  some other e n t i t y .
I f  th is  view were accepted at i t s  face-va lue,  '-ome' verbs should not 
have been considered fo r  a g en t iv i ty  measurements at  a l l ;  they could 
be simply singled out as d i s t i n c t l y  non-agentive.  I t  has seemed, 
however, on c loser  inspection,  tha t  the facts o f  these verbs 
concerning a g e n t iv i ty  are not as simple as th a t ,  nor is t h e i r  
behaviour uniform in th is  respect.  I t  is suggested here th a t  these 
facts  should be analysed and explained along s im i la r  l ines  to those 
applied to other one-argument predicates,  i . e .  'o rd ina ry '  
i n t r a n s i t i v e s .  In order to show the necessity of  considering ' -ome'  
verbs together  wi th in t r a n s i t i v e s  fo r  ag en t iv i ty  measurements, i t  
seems important to look b r i e f l y  at the re la t io n s  between passives and 
other re la ted  constructions.  Such re la t io n s  do not seem to be a 
stra ight forward matter even in languages which have been much more 
thoroughly analysed than MG, e .g .  English.  I t  seems best to s ta r t  
the discussion with a b r i e f  considerat ion of  English passives in 
re la t io n  to c a u s a t iv i t y ,  t r a n s i t i v i t y  and a g e n t iv i ty .
A sentence such as ' the kn ife  was broken' is of fered by M i l l e r  and 
Johnson-Laird (1976:518-9)  as an example of  a diminished passive; the 
missing actor is understood, 'broken'  is an ad jec t ive  and the 
omission is s yntac t ic .  I t  seems plausib le  to argue th a t  th is  absence 
of an external  causer o f  the event is the l i n k  between passives and 
in t r a n s i t i v e s .  Passive sentences have been recognized as 
i n t r a n s i t i v e  ones in the l i t e r a t u r e  fo r  independent reasons (e .g .  
Perlmutter 1983).  But the schema I envisage concerning causative-  
t r a n s i t i v e s ,  in t r a n s i t i v e s  and passives involves d i f f e r e n t  steps 
along a scale o f  'diminished importance of  an external  causer' and is 
closer  to the approach adopted by Shibatani (1985) who character izes  
pass iv iza t ion  as a process of  ' agent-defocusing'  ( p .830).  The actual  
scale I have in mind may be exemplif ied as fol lows:
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(a) (82) 'John broke the glass '  (T ra ns i t ive -cau sa t ive )
Causer: present and specif ied
(b) (83) 'Someone broke the glass'
Causer: present but unspecified
(Transit ive-causative)
(c) (84) 'The glass was broken'  
Causer: only implied
(diminished Passive)
(d) (85) 'The glass broke'
Causer: completely absent
( I n t r a n s i t i v e )
This understanding of passives l inks  also with the fa c t  that they do 
not genera l ly  express agents o ver t ly ,  i . e .  agentless or diminished 
passives are f a r  more numerous than those with overt  agents even in
those languages which do al low overt  expression of an agent. The
impl icat ions are p a r t i c u l a r l y  important fo r  present purposes, since 
cases of  passive sentences accepting an [apo NP] preposit iona l  phrase 
equivalent to by-phrases fo r  English are quite  rare  in col loquia l  MG 
and a l l  the '-o/ne' verbs under invest iga t ion  are complete in terms of  
valency with only one NP. The point I am making concerning the 
mediopassive form is tha t  with MGMVs, at  l e a s t ,  even in the case of
genuine passives,  the agent is not so much s y n t a c t ic a l ly  omitted as
semantical ly downgraded and pragmat ica l ly  brought out o f  focus in the 
sense of Shibatani  (1985:837) .  I f  MG passives are so in te rpre ted ,  
the r e la t io n  between genuine passives and p o te n t ia ls  can be also 
brought out. MG potent ia ls  are expressed with mediopassive verb- 
forms, e .g . :
( 8 6 ) ben b j a v a z e t e  a f t o  t o  v i v l i o  (V =b java zom e)
i t - i s - n o t - r e a d  th is  book
th is  book is unreadable
(87) ben t r o y e t e  a f t o  t o  f a i  {V = t ro y o m e )
i t - i s - n o t - e a t e n  th is  food
th is  food is inedible^.
- 178 -
Far from re g is te r in g  something about an external  agent, sentences 
(8 6 ) and (87) seem to me to focus on some property o f  t h e i r  
respect ive  subject NPs. What is perhaps more i l lu m in a t in g ,
'spontaneous events'  are expressed in MG both through in t r a n s i t iv e s ,  
e .g . :
( 8 8 ) a f t o  t o  vazo  s p a z i  e f k o l a  {M=spazo)
th is  vase breaks ea s i ly
- which seems to me l i k e  a c le a r  statement about a property  
a t t r ib u te d  to the subject NP - and, in the absence of  such an
i n t r a n s i t i v e ,  through a mediopassive-form verb, e .g . :
(89) a f t o  t o  i l i k o  k a t a s t r e f e t e  e f k o l a  (y ~ k a t a s t r e f o m e )
th is  materia l  is destroyed e a s i ly .
There would seem to be no real  d i f fe rence  between (89) and potent ia ls  
as exemplif ied in ( 8 6 ) and (87) .
A number of  examples with MGMVs of mediopassive form w i l l  hopeful ly  
const i tu te  corroborating evidence fo r  the claim that  passives are
s im i la r  to in t r a n s i t i v e s  in the sense th a t  the involvement of an
external agent is not invoked:
(90) p e t r e s  t i n a z o n d e  s t o n  a e ra  apo t i n  k o r i f i  ( V = t i n a z o m e )
t u  i f e s t i u
stones are-thrown-up into the a i r  from the top 
of  the volcano
(91) b i x t i k e  ena agaQi  s t o  p o b i  mu ( \ l = b i z o m e )
i t -w as-s tuck  a thorn into  my foot
a thorn got into my foot
(92)  7 s taQm i  t u  n e r u  i p s o Q i k e  ( M=ipsonome )
the level  o f  the water was-raised/rose
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(93) o p i r a v l o s  s i k o Q i k e
the rocket was-raised (rose)
(V= s ik o n om e)
(94) s i k o Q i k e  s k o n i  ( V= s ik o n om e )
dust rose
(95) t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  me t a  x r o n j a  {V^g rem iz ome)
the house was-pulled/brought-down with time
(95) t o  a f t o k i n i t o  x o d i k e  s t i  l a s p i  m e x r i  t a  t z a m j a  ( V=xonome)
the car was engulfed/stuck/went into the mud 
up to the windows
(97) t a  n e r a  t i s  l i m n i s  t a r a x t i k a n  ( V ^ t a ra z o m e )
the waters of  the lake were-disturbed
(98) t o  p e § i  i n e  anevasmeno s t o  Sendro  { \ l ~anevazome)
the ch i ld  is mounted/gone up on the t ree
the ch i ld  is on the t ree  (as a re s u l t  o f  having gone up 
the t r e e ) .
(99) 7 m a r i e t a  i n e  s k a r f a l o m e n i  s t o  f r a x t i  ( V = s k a r f a l o n o m e )
Marie t ta  is 'cl imbed'  on the fence
Mar ie t ta  has climbed on the fence (and is 
now on the fence as a r e s u l t ) .
I t  seems completely c o u n te r in tu i t iv e  to consider any of  the above 
cases analysable as: f x  moves as the re s u l t  of  the a c t i v i t y  of  an 
external  causer' .  Despite the fac t  tha t  most o f  the subject NPs in 
these examples are inanimate and some of them are also non-se l f -  
moving, no external  agent is viewed as responsible fo r  the motion 
e i t h e r .  They are not r e la ta b le  to 'corresponding'  act ive  sentences, 
e . g . :
( 9 0 ' )  k a p j o s  t i n a z i  p e t  r e s  apo t i n  k o r i f i  t u  i f e s t i u
someone is throwing up stones from the top of  the volcano
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(9 1 ' )  k a p j o s  e b i k s e  ena agaQi  s t o  p o b i  m
someone stuck a thorn into my foot .
In (95) and (96) the (e x te rn a l )  cause of  the motion is in e f fe c t
g ra v i ty .  But the language chooses to express what is a c tu a l ly  
observable. Gravity  is not a s a l ie n t  enough cause of  motion. So no 
agent is regis te red in the le a s t ;  no agent is even implied in these 
cases. Notice tha t  in (92) an act ive  form in t r a n s i t i v e  can replace  
the verb, i . e .  ' ane ven o '  (go up).  S im i la r ly  in (91) ' b i k e 1 (went in)  
can replace the mediopassive ' b i x t i k e ' ,  Sentences (92) to (94) are 
s im i la r  to cases l i k e :
(100) o i l j o s  v y i k e  p i  so apo t o  vuno  (V=vyeno)
the sun came out from behind the mountain
where ' v y e n o '  (go/come out) can be also replaced by a number of  other  
in t r a n s i t i v e s ,  e .g .  ' p e r a s e '  (passed) and ' a n e v i k e ' (went up). As 
has been already pointed out ' g re m iz o m e ' (be pul led down) can be 
replaced by ' e p e s e '  ( f e l l  down) in (95) and ' x o Q i k e '  (was engulfed)  
by ' v i Q i s t i k e '  (sank) in (96 ) .
Examples (90) to (97) are instances of  such dramatic 'agent-de-  
focusing' that they move to category (d) (example (85 ) )  of  the scale 
sketched at the beginning of  3.7 where absolute absence of the 
external  causer is implied.  Examples (98) and (99) represent extreme 
cases of  th is  s i tu a t io n ;  (98) cannot be re la ted  to ' a n e v a s t i k e '  (was 
taken up); i t  simply implies ' t o  p e b i  a n e v i k e  s t o  b e n d r o '  ( the chi ld
went up onto the t re e )  and views the re su l t in g  s i tu a t io n  as more 
permanent than a simple event,  i . e .  as having some o f  the propert ies  
of a s ta te  (see Chapter 2 ) .  As fo r  (99 ) ,  the mediopassive form of  
' s k a r f a l o n o '  (c l imb) ,  namely ' s k a r f a l o n o t n e '  (be climbed), does not 
occur in any form other than the P a r t ic ip le  ' s k a r f a l o m e n o s '  except 
marginal ly in p o te n t ia ls ,  e .g .  ' b e n  s k a r f a l o n e t e  a f t o s  o v r a x o s '  
( th is  rock is 'u n c i im a b le ' ) .
The in e v i ta b le  conclusion must be that  the borders between 
in t ra n s i t iv e s  and passives are at  lea s t  fuzzy.  This implies tha t
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some proto typ ical  or 'core '  instances of  passives can be detected.  
What has been cal led  here a 'genuine passive'  re fe rs  to cases 
f u l f i l l i n g  the fol lowing c r i t e r i a :  (a) mediopassive form of  the verb;
(b) moving NP a ffec ted ,  i . e .  theme = pa t ien t ;  (c) e x p l i c i t l y  present 
second argument: a NP with in  an [ apo NPjPP expressing the e n t i t y  
responsible fo r  the motion of  the theme-patient;  (d) the NP of the 
[apo  NPJPP possessing the ch arac te r is t ic s  of  the proto typ ical  agent. 
One could then fu r th e r  assume tha t  the verbs occurring in genuinely  
passive constructions are,  almost by d e f i n i t i o n ,  at the bottom of the 
ag en t iv i ty  scale.  Hence id e n t i fy in g  the leas t  agentive MGMVs could 
amount to  discovering which verbs can occur in genuinely passive 
sentences. Yet even th a t  would be an u n re a l is t ic  task; the marked 
tendency of MG to replace passive constructions with equivalent  
active ones resu l ts  in the number o f  actual 'genuine passives' being 
extremely small w i th in  any sp ec i f ic  semantic f i e l d  (e .g .  MVs). Most 
act ive  verbs have a corresponding passive form which is automatical ly  
formed by analogy to common-use passives (e .g .  ' m e t a f e r o m e '  (be
t ran sp o r te d ) ) ,  but i t  is v i r t u a l l y  impossible to f ind natural  
environments fo r  them, i . e .  acceptable sentences containing these 
verb forms. What is even more in t r ig u in g ,  [a po  NPJPPs can also 
express 's ource ' ,  e .g .  ' a p o m s k r i n B i k e  apo t u s  a s t i n o m u s ' (he moved 
away from the policemen) w i l l  not be in te rpreted  as a passive at  a l l ,  
although the verb is mediopassive in form ( ' a p o m a k r in om e '  (move 
away)) and ' i  a s t i n o s n i '  (the policemen) has a l l  the chara c te r is t ics  
of  a prototypical  agent.
We are there fore  l e f t  with one-argument predications where the 
mediopassive ending simply predisposes fo r  a non-agentive 
understanding o f  the verb8 . I t  can be shown, however, th a t  '-o/ne' 
(mediopassive form) verbs e xh ib i t  d i f f e r e n t  degrees of  ag e n t iv i ty  and 
tha t  even genuinely passive verbs can be more agentive than some 
act ive  form i n t r a n s i t iv e s .
A closer look at  sp ec i f ic  ' -om e ’ verbs is intended to  support these 
points.  Consider f i r s t  ' g re m iz o m e '  (be pul led down, f a l l  down) and 
' v i B i z o m e 1 (be sunk, s in k ) ,  which have already been used as examples.
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(101a) t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  apo t i n  a s t i n o m i a  (V^g rem izom e)
the house was pul led down by the pol ice
( 1 0 1 b) t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  apo t u s  s i s m u s
the house was brought down by the earthquake
( 1 0 1 c) t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  apo mono t u  e p i b i  i t a n  e r i p o m e n o  
the house f e l l  by i t s e l f  because i t  was decrepi t
(102a) t o  p l i o  v i B i s t i k e  apo t o n  k a p e t a n j o  (V = v iB i z o m e )
the boat was sunk by the captain
(102b) t o  p l i o  v i B i s t i k e  apo t i n  t r i k i m i a
the boat sank by/because of  the tempest
(102c) t o  p l i o  v i B i s t i k e  apo m ja  v l a v i  s t i  m i x a n i  t u
the boat sank because of some damage in i t s  engine
The c loser  the cause to the proto typica l  agent the more l i k e l y  i t  is 
tha t  we are deal ing with a genuine passive.  Hence the (a)  sentences 
are the only ones where, as already pointed out,  ' g r e m i z o m e '  and 
' v i B i z o m e '  cannot be replaced by ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )  and ' v u l j a z o ' (sink)  
re spect ive ly .  In the absence of  any [ apo NP] s p ec i f ica t io n  there is 
no way of  knowing whether the verbs in question are passive or  
i n t r a n s i t i v e .  The degree of  a g e n t iv i ty  of  both verbs is qui te  low, 
s im i la r  to th a t  o f  the semantical ly re la ted  a ct ive  form in t r a n s i t iv e s  
j u s t  mentioned and fo r  p rec ise ly  the same reasons; the motions 
described are very s im i la r  and the e n t i t i e s  undergoing them are of  
the same type.  What is p a r t i c u l a r l y  in te re s t in g  here is tha t  
' v i B i z o m e ' may margina l ly  occur in an in ten t iona l  environment, unl ike  
’ v u l j a z o ' , and is there fore  s l i g h t l y  higher than the l a t t e r  on the 
scale.
The c leares t  case of  a genuinely passive verb, which is higher on the 
a g en t iv i ty  scale than a number of  act ive form in t r a n s i t i v e s ,  is  
' o b i y u m e '  (be l e d ) .  I consider both (103) and (104) equal ly
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prototypical  instances of  th is  verb and equal ly genuinely passive 
sentences.
(103) 7 e x m a l o t i  o b i y i Q i k a n  apo t u s  f r u r u s  se  [ V - o b i y u m e )
s t r a t o p e b o  s i g e n d r o s e o s  a l i s o b e m e n i  ke
pano se f o r t i y a
the hostages were led by the guards to  
a concentration camp, in chains and 
on l o r r i e s
[subject :  human, non-voluntary,  no c o ntro l /ve ry  weak contro l ,  non­
cause]
(104) o i p u r y o s  e k s o t e r i k o n  t i s  l i v i i s  {V=ob iyume)
o b i y i B i k e  apo t o n  i b j o  t o n  p r o B i p u r y o
s t i n  eBusa s i n e b r i a s e o n  opos i x e  z i t i s i
the min is ter  of  fore ign a f f a i r s  of  Libya
was led by the Prime M in is te r  himself
to the conference room ju s t  as he had asked (to be)
[subject :  human, simple in te n t ,  weak contro l ,  in d i re c t  cause]
The point,  of  course, is tha t  ' o b i y u m e ' is qu i te  compatible with the 
notion of  the subject 's  intending the event to take place,  having at  
l e a s t  some control  over i t  and some re s p o n s ib i l i t y  fo r  i t ,  as wel l as 
having the i n i t i a t i v e  fo r  the accomplishment o f  the action described.  
I t  is qu ite  evident tha t  i t  should therefore  appear somewhere in the 
middle o f  the a g en t iv i ty  scale,  espec ia l ly  as i t  necessar i ly requires  
animate (and usual ly  human) subjects. Needless to say, in t r a n s i t iv e s  
such as ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  down), ' v u l j a z o ' (sink) and the l i k e  are 
much lower on a general ized a g en t iv i ty  scale.
A completely d i f f e r e n t  p ic ture  is given by ' a p o m a k r i n o m '  (move away) 
which should be considered a c le a r  case of  a 'deponent verb ' ,  a 
charac te r iza t ion  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  given to verbs which were thought to  
be passive in form but act ive  in meaning. I t  must be pointed out
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here, th a t  the reluctance to adopt the term whole-heartedly does not 
imply tha t  th is  is an e n t i r e l y  wrong way o f  think ing of them. The 
problem is ,  r a th e r ,  tha t  p rec ise ly  because degree of  a g en t iv i ty  and 
therefore  'how act ive  a verb i s '  is not a given but a matter fo r  
in v es t ig a t io n ,  i t  is not in the leas t  c lear  from a semantic point  of  
view at  which point we leave deponent verbs and move into  the area of 
t rue passives.
The verb ' a po m a k r in o m e '  is  compatible with both simple in te n t  and 
non-intent ;  also with c lea r  and weak contro l ,  fo r  the same reasons as 
act ive  form in t r a n s i t i v e s  l i k e  ' e p i s t r e f o i '  ( re turn )  or ' p l i s i a z o j '  
(approach). Thus (105) and (106) are equal ly proto typ ical  uses of  
' a p o m a k r in o m e ' :
(105) a p o m a k r i n B i k e  y r i y o r a  apo t i  f o t j a  ( V= apom ak r inom e ) 
s/he moved away quickly  from the f i r e
(106) x o r i s  na t o  k s e r i  a p o m a k r i n o t a n  s i n e x o s  
apo t o  meros  pu  i B e l e  na p a i
without knowing i t ,  he was continuously moving away 
from the place he wanted to go
I t  is also c le a r  tha t  one can 'move away' not only u n w i l l in g ly  but 
also as a passive passenger on a conveyance. For these reasons 
' a p o m a k r i n o m e ' ends up ra ther  high on the a g e n t iv i ty  scale o f  
i n t r a n s i t i v e s ,  scoring s im i l a r l y  to ' e rx o m e ' (come).
A number o f  examples have already been given o f  ' - om e'  verbs 
(sentences (90) to (9 7 ) )  which function as i n t r a n s i t i v e s  in the sense 
th a t  no external  causer can possibly be invoked, although the 
subjects in the s p ec i f ic  examples are inanimate and often non-se l f -  
moving. I t  was claimed there th a t  no corresponding act ive  sentences 
e x is t  (al though there do e x is t  completely unrelated act ive  sentences 
with the corresponding act ive  verb forms).  This implies that in
these cases we cannot t a l k  of  diminished/truncated passive 
constructions.
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The verbs in question are: ' i p s o n o m e '  (be r isen ,  r i s e ) ,  ’ s i k o n o m e '  
(be r i s e n / l i f t e d ,  r i s e ) ,  ' x o n o m e '  (become immersed/stuck/engulfed  
i n ) ,  ' b i z o m e '  (become stuck i n ) ,  ' t i n a z o m e '  (be thrown up, jump up),  
' p e t a y o m e '  (be thrown up, leap up, jump). A typica l  example of  how 
th is  l a s t  verb is understood here is :
(107) p e t a y o n d e  f l o y e s  apo t a  p a r a B i r a  {V=pe tayo me )
are-being-thrown flames out o f  the windows
flames jump out of  the windows.
Needless to say, the passive and i n t r a n s i t i v e  English verbs proposed 
as t rans la t ions  are not meant as an ind ication  that  the verbs are 
ambiguous in MG, The point here is tha t  they can be shown to
funct ion s im i la r ly  to act ive  form i n t r a n s i t iv e s  l i k e  ' x a m i l o n o j '
( lower j^j jp) ,  fo r  instance,  and receive s im i la r  a g en t iv i ty  scores to 
them. A re levant example with ' x a m i l o n o '  is (108):
(108) t a  f i l a  t u  f i t u  x a m i l o s a n  apo t i n  z e s t i
the leaves of  the plant dropped/ ' lowered'  from the heat.
I t  is in te res t ing  to notice th a t  although the cause (or  perhaps the 
reason) is e x p l i c i t l y  given in (108) and there does ex is t  a 
corresponding causative ' x a m i l o n o '  ( lower jp)  e .g .  ' x a m i l o s e  t a  m a t j a  
t u '  (he lowered his eyes),  no corresponding act ive -causat ive
construction ex is ts  fo r  (108) ,  i . e . :
(109) * 7  z e s t i  x a m i l o s e  t a  f i l a  t u  f i t u
the heat lowered the leaves of  the plant
is ungrammatical. Apparently ' th e  heat '  in (108) is not deemed a 
s a l ie n t  enough cause to acquire the status o f  an agent.
The la s t  examples o f  mediopassive verbs involve ' anevazome '  (be taken 
up) and ' k a t e v a z o m e '  (be taken down). The complete paradigm is as 
fo l lows:
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(a) t r a n s i t i v e  (causat ive ) :  '  a n e v a z o '  ( take up), ' k a t e v a z o '  ( take
down)
(b) i n t r a n s i t i v e  act ive  form: ' a n e v e n o '  (go up),  ' k a t e v e n o ' (go down)
(c) ( i n t r a n s i t i v e )  mediopassive form: ' ane vazome ' , ' k a t e v a z o m e ' .
Although (c) verb-forms do not normally appear with an [ apo NP]PP 
where the NP has the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  a proto typ ical  agent, they  
can nevertheless be considered true  passives: a l l  instances of
in t r a n s i t i v e  motion of  th is  kind not carr ied out by a prototypical  
p at ien t  are understandably expressed with the (b) forms.9 So, cases 
of in d i re c t  causation are expressed with the act ive  form 
i n t r a n s i t i v e ,  e .g . :
(110) anev ika m e  pan o  apo t i s  f o n e s  t u  ( \ l= a ne ven o )
we went u p (s ta i rs )  ' f rom' (because of)  his screams
or the act ive  form t r a n s i t iv e -c a u s a t iv e ,  i . e . :
(111) mas anevase  pano  me t i s  f o n e s  t u  (V ^an eva zo )
he made us go upsta irs / took us upstairs with his screams
but not with the ' -ome'  form. What is perhaps more in te res t in g ,  
though, is tha t  even proto typ ical  patients  (objects not possessing a 
self-moving mechanism, in th is  case) may well  appear with the (b) 
ra ther  than the (c) forms, e .g . :
(112) 7 v a l i t s e s  a n e v i k a n  k j o l a s  s t o  a e r o p l a n o  [V ^a ne v e no )
the suitcases have gone up already onto the plane.
As already argued at  the beginning of th is  section,  the choice 
between a (diminished) passive and an act ive  form i n t r a n s i t i v e  is 
b a s ic a l ly  a matter of  degree o f  'agent -defocus ing ' . The degree of  
ag en t iv i ty  of  a p a r t i c u la r  predicate ,  even i f  i t  is an instance of  a
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genuine passive w i l l  have to be decided independently of  the type of  
implied (but absent) agent. I t  w i l l  rest  with a s pec i f ica t ion  of the  
types of  objects undergoing the motion described and the extent to 
which they may be shown ( in  s p ec i f ic  sentences) to exercise control  
over the event,  have in tent ion  to carry i t  out or undergo i t ,  in 
short with a s p ec i f ic a t io n  of  what have been establ ished as scaled 
propert ies composing a g e n t iv i ty .
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Notes on Chapter 3
1. There is ,  of  course, a d i f fe rence  between some natural  forces at 
l e a s t ,  and other kinds of  'q u a s i -a g e n ts ' , in tha t  the former can 
be understood as 'events '  while the l a t t e r  can be in te rpreted  as 
r e f l e c t in g  extensions of human motion. So, fo r  instance:
( l a )  t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  apo t o  s i sm o  { V= grem izom e )
the house fe l l /w a s  pul led down from/because 
of the earthquake
with a mediopassive verb ' g r e m i z o m e f ( f a l l ,  be pul led down) has a 
p a ra l le l  in ( l b ) :
( lb )  t o  s p i t i  epese  apo t o  s i s m o  ( V = p e f t o )
the house f e l l  from/because of  the earthquake
with an i n t r a n s i t i v e  verb ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l ) .  This p o s s i b i l i t y  does 
not a r ise  in the case of  ( 2 a) where the agent is human, 
v o l i t i o n a l ,  e t c . ,  and can, there fore ,  only appear in an [apo
NP]PP re la ted  to a passive understanding of ' g re m iz o m e '  (be
pulled down):
(2a) t o  s p i t i  g r e m i s t i k e  apo t i n  a s t i n o m i a  [V ^g rem iz om e)
the house was pul led down by the pol ice
( 2 b) * t o  s p i t i  epese apo t i n  a s t i n o m i a  ( V = p e f t o )
the house f e l l  by the pol ice .
I t  is th ere fore  suggested that  ' s i s m o s ' (earthquake), fo r
instance,  is in such cases understood as an event and can
function as 'reason'  or stand fo r  cause by i t s e l f ,  i . e .  without a 
supporting environment, e .g .  ' e ks  e t i a s  t u  s i s m u ' (because of the 
earthquake).
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2. I t  must be shown tha t  aspect is not by i t s e l f  the decis ive fa c to r  
here (as i t  might be thought on the basis of  these two examples). 
For:
( l a )  mia a s t r a p i  b i e s x i s e  t o n  u ra n o  ( V=57 a s x i z o )
(a f lash  of)  l ig h tn in g  crossed the sky
does not have a corresponding
( lb )  *0 u r a n o s  5?a s x i s t i k e  apo m ia  a s t s r a p i  ( \ = ' 6 i a s x i z o m e )
the sky was crossed by (a f lash of)  l igh tn ing
but a much more emphatic descr ip t ion of a s im i la r  s i tua t ion
(2) o l o k l i r o s  0 u r a n o s ,  S i a s x i s t i k e  apo ( \ l = b i a s x i z o m e )
a s t r a p e s
the whole sky was crossed by 
( f lashes o f )  l igh tn ing
is acceptable,  presumably because i t  is in th is  l a t t e r  case f e l t  
tha t  the sky is (perceptual ly )  more seriously  a ffected and 
therefore  c loser  to the p a t ie n t 's  prototype. This explanation is 
compatible with the d is t in c t io n s  made wi th in  'events'  ( in  the 
previous chapter) between more and less typ ica l  instances of  
'punctual occurrences' . I t  can be thought that in (2) the event 
has more duration ( i s  less of  a punctual occurrence) than in ( lb )  
and that  there is ,  as a consequence, a la s t in g  e f f e c t  on the sky. 
I f  something is a ffec ted ,  i t  undergoes a change o f  s ta te  and the 
new s ta te  obviously has to l a s t  long enough to be registered as 
such. Apparently while  in the case of ( lb )  th is  p o s s i b i l i t y  does 
not a r is e ,  in ( 2 ) ,  on the other hand, i t  does.
3. I t  is n a tu ra l ly  assumed that  manipulat ive causation is ruled out 
as a p o s s i b i l i t y  fo r  IC by d e f i n i t i o n .  I t  is f u r t h e r  assumed 
tha t  l ex ic a l  causatives w i l l  be re a d i ly  in terpreted  as d i r e c t /  
manipulat ive i f  juxtaposed to e x p l i c i t  ones; e.g.  '5e/? t o n  e s t i s a
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eyo o r Q i o , t o n  ekana a p l o s  na s t a Q i '  ( I  did not 's tand'  him up, I 
simply made him stand) or ' 5 en b o r o  na t o n  v a l o  mesa , b o r o  omos 
na t o n  kano na b i '  ( I  cannot put him in ,  but I can make him come 
i n ) .  There also exis ts  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a proto typica l  agent 
subject combining with a prototypical  pa t ien t  ob ject through an 
e x p l i c i t  causative:  e .g .  ' /  x r i s u l a  ekane t i n  p o r t a  na a n i k s i ' 
(Chryssoula made the door open) vs ' i  x r i s u l a  a n i k s e  t i n  p o r t a '  
(Chryssoula opened the door) .  The former example is a non- 
prototypical  descr ip t ion  o f  the event and the impl icat ion is 
probably th a t  the door would not open (res is ted  opening),  so tha t  
exceptional  force or a special  technique was needed to get i t  
open.
4. I am using 'simple in te n t io n '  as the second point on the
' v o l i t i o n '  scale fo r  a l l  these actions/events fo r  which only 
context could provide evidence fo r  p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong in tent ion .  
This I consider necessary in order to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between such
cases and those of  verbs necessari ly  implying strong (or
'emphatic' as I c a l l  i t )  in te n t ,  such as ' k a t a b i o k o '  (chase).
5. I consider th a t  the theore t ica l  assumptions made by the
proponents o f  Prototype theory are compatible with the p a r t ic u la r  
appl ica t ion  o f  a g e n t iv i ty  c r i t e r i a  in Lists  IV and V. I t  must be 
pointed out,  however, tha t  there is no ind ica t ion  in the
l i t e r a t u r e  o f  whether or how such c r i t e r i a  could be applied in 
order to compare lex ic a l  uni ts  (verbs in th is  case) without the 
help o f  a supporting context .  Pluses and minuses do present an 
id e a l i z a t io n ,  in the sense th a t  a l l  l i n g u i s t i c  data are presented 
in an idea l ized  form when they appear in the form o f  Tables and 
Indices.  Al l  th a t  can be said is  tha t  the re levant  data have 
been a t  lea s t  checked against the in tu i t io n s  o f  a number of  
native  speakers. An x is used to indicate  marginal or re s t r ic te d  
use, disagreement between subjects and ra ther  unprototypical  
uses.
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6 . I t  could be thought th a t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  discussed in connection
with ' p e r i p l a n j e m e '  (wander) exis ts  also fo r  other agentive 
verbs. Notice,  however, that  ( l a )  is very odd;
( l a )  ? p e r p a t u s a n  apo laQos o b i y i e s  (V = p e r p a t a o )
they walked because of wrong instruct ions
while in ( l b ) :
( lb )  p e r p a t i s a n  m e x r i  t o  staQmo apo laQos o b i y i e s
they walked up to the s ta t ion due to wrong instruct ions
the crucia l  PP ' a p o  laQos o b i y i e s '  does not r e f e r  to the a c t i v i t y  
of walking but ra ther  to the goal ' t o  s taQmo ' .
7. Notice tha t  the verbs ' b j a v a z o m e '  (be read) and ' t r o y o m e ' (be
eaten) correspond to act ive  form ones ' b j a v a z o '  (read) and ' t r o o '  
( e a t ) ,  respect ive ly  and that  in the Present tense they can be 
only used as p o te n t ia ls .  Examples of such constructions
(p o te n t ia ls )  are also offered in 3 .2 .1 .
8 . A p a r t i c u l a r l y  i l lu m in a t in g  recent categor iza t ion  of  the whole 
system of  MG verbs on the basis of  t h e i r  syntactico-semantic  
fea tures ,  which attempts a break-away from the t r a d i t i o n a l  act ive  
vs passive voice dichotomy is presented in Theophanopoulou-Kontou 
(1984).  Within th is  system, in t r a n s i t iv e s  th a t  we would 
character ize  as low in ag en t iv i ty  (on the basis of  prototype  
theory c r i t e r i a ) ,  e .g .  ' p e Q e n o '  ( d i e ) ,  are understood as 
' u n id i r e c t io n a l l y  p a t i e n t - o r i e n t e d ' .  Verbs which can occur in 
genuinely passive constructions,  e .g .  ' s k o t o n o m e '  (be/get  
k i l l e d ) ,  with a corresponding genuinely act ive  counterpart  ( i . e .  
' s k o t o n o '  ( k i l l ) )  are categorized as ' m u l t i d i r e c t i o n a l ^  patien t  
and agent or ien ted '  - the former label  attached to the passive 
instance and the l a t t e r  to the act ive  one. This approach can be 
in te rpre ted  as also bringing together non-agentive in t r a n s i t iv e s  
with (non-agentive)  passives.
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9. By 'p ro to typ ica l  p a t ie n t '  here I mean objects not possessing a 
self-moving mechanism or not using i t  while the motion in 
question is tak ing place.  Therefore animate subjects are
compatible with the '-o/ne' form, provided they are being car r ied ,  
fo r  instance.
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4.  PRINCIPLES OF CATEGORIZATION AND 
MINOR PROPERTIES OF MOTION VERBS
4.1 Pr inc ip les  of  categor iza t ion  of  motion verbs
In Chapters 2 and 3 a proposal was made as to how MGMVs can be 
c la s s i f i e d  with respect to what are considered here 'major  
c la s s i f i c a t o r y  f e a t u r e s ' ,  i . e .  propert ies r e la t in g  to the S-P-E 
d is t in c t io n ,  c a u s a t iv i t y  and a g e n t iv i ty .  The content of  such 
propert ies w i l l  not be considered any f u r t h e r .  Their  status is ,  
however, worth discussing as i t  appears in d i f f e r e n t  analyses of  MVs 
to be qu ite  debatable.
Two main points w i l l  be made in th is  section.  The f i r s t  one involves  
the d is t in c t io n  between 'major '  and 'minor' propert ies  fo r  MGMVs. I t  
is suggested here, tha t  the former e x h ib i t  d i f f e r e n t  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  
from any o f  the l a t t e r  kind of  propert ies which have been proposed 
fo r  the analysis o f  s im i la r  semantic f i e l d s ,  e .g .  English and German 
motion verbs (and n a tu r a l ly  those which w i l l  be proposed as v a l id  fo r  
MGMVs).
The second point involves the controversia l  issue o f  how such 
semantic f i e l d s  are organized.  Taxonomies fo r  verbs and MGMVs in 
p a r t i c u la r  are f i r s t  discussed in d e t a i l .  A separate discussion of  
'minor' p ropert ies  proposed f o r  MGMVs fol lows in the next section.  
The overal l  organizat ion of  the f i e l d  under inves t iga t ion  and the 
'n on -arb i t ra r in es s  of  categor ies '  are examined in the l a s t  two 
sections.  I t  is also suggested tha t  'h ierarchy of  p roper t ies '  is 
d i f f e r e n t  from ' r e l a t i v e  sal ience '  and that  tes ts  e l i c i t i n g  
information from native  speakers are needed to invest iga te  both 
r e l a t i v e  sal ience and the psychological  v a l i d i t y  o f  the proposed 
types o f  o rganizat ion .  (How th is  is to be e ffected  is the concern of  
the next c h a p t e r . )
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What are posited here as major propert ies  fo r  MGMVs have been shown 
to e x h ib i t  the fo l lowing c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  They are:
(a)  C la s s i f i c a to ry ,  i . e .  appl icable  to large  areas o f  the vocabulary
and capable of  categor is ing many d i f f e r e n t  verbal  
domains. The S-P-E d is t in c t io n ,  c a u s a t iv i ty  and 
a g e n t iv i ty  are ev ident ly  re le van t  fo r  a 
c la s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  almost the whole o f  the verbal  
vocabulary of  MG or English.
(b) Relat ive /graded,  i . e .  possessed by verbs to a higher or lower
degree. The fa c t  tha t  a g e n t iv i ty  and 
t r a n s i t i v i t y  are graded propert ies  is  recognized 
in Hopper and Thompson (1980, 1982) and Givo'n 
(1984).  S-P-E is also shown1 here as involving a 
continuum.
(c) Involving/subsuming other fea tures ,  e .g .  durat ion,  ingression,
in te n t io n .  The relevance of ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  
f o r  an assessment o f  a g e n t iv i ty  and of  
'd u ra t io n '  f o r  the S-P-E d is t in c t io n  has been 
demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 2 respect ive ly .
(d) Characterising predicat ions mainly (and verbs through
predications) and there fore  l inked to  
grammatical categor ies,  l i k e  t r a n s i t i v i t y ,  
aspect,  e tc .
'M inor '  propert ies  re levant  to the sp ec i f ic  domain under 
inves t iga t ion  do not e x h ib i t  e i t h e r  the f i r s t  or the four th of  these 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  The i r  r e la t io n  to (b) and (c)  w i l l  be shown to vary 
and depend on the nature o f  each s p ec i f ic  property .  This issue w i l l  
be discussed in section 4 .2 .
The d is t in c t io n  proposed here between major and minor propert ies  has 
a close p a r a l le l  in Putnam's (1975) d is t in c t io n  between syntact ic  and
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semantic markers, on the one hand, and stereotypical  propert ies on 
the other.  Putnam's semantic markers are "category indicators  of 
high c e n t r a l i t y "  and const i tu te  "part of  a widely used and important 
system of c la s s i f i c a t io n "  ( p . 267).  An example of  the sort of  
semantic markers Putnam uses fo r  natural  kind terms is o ffered  in 1.3 
where the normal form descr ipt ion fo r  'water '  is presented. Natural  
kind terms c le a r ly  involve a completely d i f f e r e n t  type o f  l i n g u i s t i c  
competence than motion verbs, so the p a ra l le l  cannot be too close.  
Besides, the l i n k  between major c la s s i f i c a t o r y  propert ies fo r  MVs and 
grammatical categories such as t r a n s i t i v i t y  and aspect makes i t  
plausib le  to th ink  o f  them as syntactico-semantic.  So no d is t in c t io n  
p a ra l le l  to Putnam's syntactic  and semantic markers is envisaged. 
They are also shown to be graded (unl ike  semantic markers fo r  natural  
kinds) and to subsume other features which share c h arac te r is t ics  with 
those propert ies  which are considered here as minor propert ies .
A serious problem w ith in  the l im i t s  of  the present study is the 
status o f  what may be considered ' i n  between' propert ies and in 
p a r t i c u la r  those character iz ing  whole semantic domains. A case in 
point is 'motion ' ,  which is necessari ly implied by a l l  the verbs 
included in the semantic f i e l d  under in v es t iga t ion ,  and may be 
thought of  as a higher leve l  property in r e la t io n  to sp ec i f ic  and (by 
impl ica t ion)  minor features o f  motion. Adhering to the d is t in c t io n s  
set out here between major and minor propert ies ,  'motion'  appears as 
a genuinely ' i n  between' case. I t  may be thought of  as 
cl a s s i f i c a to ry  (although i t  is not of  the same status as S-P-E, 
a g en t iv i ty  and c a u s a t iv i ty )  since i t  characterizes a r e l a t i v e l y  large  
semantic f i e l d .  Notice tha t  Pulman (1983:108) considers the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  including 'move' in the set o f  ' p r i m i t i v e '  verbs such 
as 'cause ' ,  'make',  'become', ' a c t '  and 's a y ' .  Some of these verbs 
correspond to what are posited here as major propert ies (namely 
'cause'  and ' a c t ' ) .  Gradedness is not, however, a c h a ra c te r is t ic  of 
'motion ' ,  in the sense that  a l l  the verbs investigated here are 
understood as possessing th is  feature  and are not dist inguished as 
more or less m o t io n a l . * In th is  respect, a t  le a s t ,  the d i f fe rence  
between 'motion' and S-P-E or caus a t iv i ty  and a g en t iv i ty  is quite  
dramatic.^ The question is therefore raised whether a hierarchy of
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features can be establ ished wi th in  the f i e l d  under inves t iga t ion .  
This question requires carefu l  considerat ion.
A p a r t i a l  taxonomy of  MVs with corresponding h ie ra rch ica l  features is 
attempted by Nida (1975:95-7)  and is worth considering in d e t a i l .  
Nida's example can be diagrammatical ly presented as fo l lows:
move
2 . e .g .  come, go, a r r iv e ,
enter ,  e x i t ,  advance, 
r e t r e a t ,  . . .
e .g .  t r a v e l ,  tour ,  journey,  
wander, rove, . . .
[manner]
3. walk,  run, crawl,  r id e ,  hop, skip,  . . .
This example is used by Nida to i l l u s t r a t e  the point th a t  there  are a 
number o f  re s t r i c t io n s  on semantic subordination: th a t  one cannot 
journey by hopping or skipping,  although walking is a p o s s i b i l i t y ;  
and that  although wandering is usa l ly  done by walking,  one can also 
wander by t r a i n  (a t  le a s t  according to Nida).
To f u l l y  appreciate the problem with th is  type of  approach, one must 
also consider a fu r th e r  comment Nida makes ( i b i d . )  concerning the 
status o f  ' t r a v e l ' .  He argues th a t  since ' t r a v e l '  does not specify  
' d i r e c t i o n ' ,  one could assume that  i t  is more inc lus ive  than the 
terms 'come' and 'g o ' ;  yet  there are many contexts in which these 
l a t t e r  terms are used in a more general sense than ' t r a v e l ' :  "a term 
such as 'go'  may be used in such widely d i f f e r e n t  contexts as 'go to 
the dining room' or 'go to Europe' while ' t r a v e l '  would f i t  only the 
l a t t e r  o f  these contexts" ( i b i d . ) .
- 197 -
I t  is not in the le a s t  obvious why 'manner' specifying MVs should be 
c la s s i f i e d  as t h i r d  leve l  categor ies,  i . e .  lower than verbs which are 
'genera l '  in tha t  they do not specify  'manner'.  On the other hand, 
verbs speci fying ' d i r e c t i o n ' ,  even i f  they are superordinate as 
individual  items to other MVs ( including some verbs speci fying  
'manner' ) ,  are not to be understood as h ie ra r c h ic a l ly  higher as a set  
to the whole set o f  'manner' specifying MVs. In other words, i t
cannot be a p r i o r i  establ ished whether 'd i r e c t io n '  is more inc lusive  
(generic)  than 'manner' .
I f  'absence of ce r ta in  fe a tu re s /s p e c i f ic a t io n s '  were to be equated 
with ' r e l a t i v e l y  higher l e v e l '  in MV-taxonomies, then we would expect 
verbs lacking both a 'manner' and a ' d i r e c t io n '  s p e c i f ic a t io n  to be 
the most inc lus ive  ones and a l l  other MVs to  act as t h e i r  genuine
hyponyms. In pract ice  th is  would mean that the most inc lus ive  MVs in
th is  set would be 'wander' and ' r o v e ' . ^  In e f f e c t ,  i t  is  obvious 
th a t  the opposite holds. The i n t u i t i o n  that ' t r a v e l '  and ' t o u r '  are 
not r e a l l y  less s p e c i f ic  than 'walk '  and ' run '  (as Nida's general 
schema would have them) is corroborated by the fa c t  th a t  the former 
are prec ise ly  the ones o f fe r in g  fewer p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  combination 
with 'manner' speci fy ing MVs: They were touring crawling/hopping/  
skipping are p a r t i c u l a r l y  odd sentences, i f  not unacceptable.
Although the terms appearing in Nida 's schema are shown not to be
taxonomically organized,  other terms wi th in  the f i e l d  o f  MVs do 
exh ib i t  hyponymic r e la t io n s .  In what fo l lows,  i t  w i l l  be 
demonstrated th a t  the whole f i e l d  is ne i ther  a per fect taxonomy, nor 
a per fec t  paradigm, but has c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  both types of 
organizat ion.  Spec i f ic  subsets which c onst i tu te  taxonomies seem to 
have propert ies  qu i te  d i f f e r e n t  from those o f  w e l l -e s tab l is he d  noun 
taxonomies. I t  is  suggested, th a t  these propert ies are not sp ec i f ic  
to the f i e l d  of  MVs, but are probably c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  verb 
taxonomies in general .  In the fo l lowing section they are considered 
in some d e t a i l .
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4 .1 .1  Taxonomies fo r  verbs
The main points th a t  need to be raised in d is t ingu ish ing  noun
taxonomies (o f  the kind best known from e th n o s c ie n t i f ic  studies)  from 
verb taxonomies, involve: number o f  taxa,  number o f  leve ls  of
inclusiveness,  c ro s s -c la s s i f i c a t io n ,  covert categor ies,  r e la t i v e  
abstraction o f  leve ls  and the ' type o f '  or 'kind o f '  re la t io n s h ip  
considered as c h a r a c te r is t ic  of  taxonomical ly subordinate terms, 
sometimes ind is t ingu ishab le  from c lass- inc lus ion  (Lehrer 1974:20,23)  
but sometimes contrasted to simple hyponymy (Rhodes 1983:2 ,18 ) .
In i t s  most general understanding, a taxonomy involves simply a set 
of  words re la te d  through superordination th a t  can be represented as a 
t ree  diagram, so tha t  any number o f  words can appear at  the same
l e v e l .  Since, however, d i f f e r e n t  wr i te rs  and d i f f e r e n t  d is c ip l in es  
have tended to use 'taxonomy' to imply d i f f e r e n t  constructs,  i t  seems 
necessary to s t a r t  th is  presentat ion with 'p e r fe c t ' /g en u in e  fo lk  
taxonomies o f  the kind of fered in B e r l in ,  Breedlove and Raven 
(henceforth BBR) (1968,  1973), Pulman (1983) and Rhodes (1983).  Such 
s t r i c t  taxonomies involve:
1. Five leve ls  o f  inclusiveness at most
2. Only one possible hierarchy o f  taxons
3. No c ro s s -c la s s i f i c a t io n
The terms 'category'  and ' taxon'  are used here interchangeably and so 
are 'word' ,  ' t a x o n - l a b e l ' ,  ' t e r m ' .  The labels  used f o r  the d i f f e r e n t  
l eve ls  o f  inclusiveness d i f f e r  from one taxonomist to  the other,  so
in the example which fol lows immediately (and which is p a r t i a l l y
reproduced from Pulman 1983:84),  the terminology o f  BBR (1973),  
Rhodes (1983) and Rosch (1977b) is juxtaposed fo r  easy reference.  
For the discussion,  Rhodes' terms w i l l  be used, as being less 
burdened with ethnobiological  implicat ions than BBR's.
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Level BBR Rhodes Rosch
(0)
( 1)
PLANT unique inc lus ive
beginner
TREE FLOWER VEGETABLE l i f e  form kind superordinate
(2) OAK WILLOW PINE
(3) DWARF WEEPING WHITE
generic
spec i f ic
(4) STRAIGHT- CURLY-LEAVED v a r ie ta l
( F i c t i o n a l )
generic basic level
spec i f ic  subordinate
v a r ie ta l
BBR (1973) and Rhodes (1983) contend that  the most inc lus ive  level  is 
often covert ,  and th a t  th is  may also be the case with a number of  
taxa at  other l e v e ls .  They also observe th a t  some generic taxa do 
not belong to any kind and argue tha t  generic taxa have a c ogn i t ive ly  
p r iv i leged  status (compare Rosch's ; basic l e v e l '  ca tegor ies ) .  In 
connection with the number of  leve ls  of  inclusiveness i t  w i l l  be 
shown th a t  in most cases only two leve ls  (generic and s p ec i f ic )  can 
be f a i r l y  e a s i ly  estab l ished. C ro s s -c las s i f ica t ion  is not only 
frequent ,  but seems to be a c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  verb domains. The 
depth of  verb taxonomies and the l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  of  categories are 
i n te r r e la te d  issues,  and furthermore they l i n k  to d i f fe rences  between 
leve ls  in terms o f  r e l a t i v e  abst raction.  Nida (1975:89) observes 
tha t  f i v e  and six  lev e ls  are not at a l l  rare in the case o f  e n t i t i e s  
(nominals) but th a t  " fo r  events three and four  leve ls  are not too 
common unless we also use 'high leve l  meanings', e .g .  event,  act ion ,  
movement". I t  is ra th e r  obvious tha t  even the commonest kind of  
events are more complex than such perceptual ly  and/or fu n c t io n a l ly  
d i s t i n c t  ind iv idua ls  as ' t r e e s ' ,  'dogs' and ' c h a i r s ' ,  commonly 
appearing in noun-taxonomies. I t  is equal ly  obvious tha t  'high  
l e v e l '  units  o f  the type Nida mentions are also more complex than 
noun-categories which correspond to t h e m ' ( i n  terms o f  leve ls  of
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inclusiveness) such as 'an imal '  or ' p l a n t ' .  The question is not 
whether one is allowed to use 'high leve l  meanings' but whether they 
could possibly l e x i c a l i z e  in the way plants and a r t i f a c t s  do.
As already demonstrated, such high level  propert ies are graded and 
sometimes l inked to sp ec i f ic  predications and spec i f ic  verb forms. 
In the domain of  MGMVs, fo r  instance, ' s ta te s '  can be only re la ted  to 
Perfect b' p a r t i c ip le s  (as suggested in Chapter 2 ) .  This means that  
one would have to estab l ish  d i f f e r e n t  taxonomies fo r  d i f f e r e n t  verb 
forms, which is both i n t u i t i v e l y  wrong and methodological ly  
undesirable.  Even i f  one concentrates on a p a r t i c u la r  verb form 
(e .g .  Pres. I f . )  and an agreement is reached to the e f f e c t  tha t  
' t r e m o '  ( t remble) ,  fo r  instance, is a 'process'  (as already  
suggested), how does one l e x i c a l i z e  'process' to serve th is  purpose? 
For 'events '  the usual subst i tu te  is DO. But DO, HAPPEN, CAUSE and 
the l i k e ,  require  a p r io r  agreement as to t h e i r  exact content before 
they can be used in any actual verb taxonomy. They are technical  
terms o f  a completely d i f f e r e n t  nature from 'g ener ic '  and ' s p e c i f i c '  
level  categories such as 'wa lk '  and ' s t r i d e ' ,  i . e .  ' n a t u r a l ' ,  non­
technical  le x ic a l  items. I t  is arguable that the inclusion of  
technical  terms such as ' r e p t i l e '  or 'mammal' in noun taxonomies also 
resu l ts  in 'h yb r id '  taxonomies, i . e .  taxonomies which are ne i ther  
purely technical  nor purely ' f o l k ' .  Notice,  that  DO and HAPPEN are 
even more abstract and more technical  than the above mentioned nouns. 
They are no more examples of  l e x ic a l i z a t i o n  than covert categories  
are.  They are bundles o f  fea tu res /co n d i t io n s /p ro p er t ies .  Their  
hierarch ica l  or non-h ierarch ical  re la t ions  to  other features can be 
discussed on the basis of  Lounsbury's (1964:1085-7) p r inc ip les  which 
w i l l  be d ea l t  with in a subsequent section.  The point  i s ,  however, 
th a t  they cannot acquire the status of  actual  le x ic a l  items, i . e .  
lab e l led  taxons w i th in  a taxonomy.
I t  is there fore  argued, tha t  i t  is un l ike ly  to have terms on more 
than two or three leve ls  of  inclusiveness in verb domains, without  
including technical  terms and/or covert categories.  Covert 
categories also ra ise  a number of  problems. The standard 
taxonomists' j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  set t ing  up covert categories is tha t  a 
series o f  's o r t in g  tasks '  performed by d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  subjects
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on the same set of  terms - each group ge t t ing  d i f f e r e n t  instruct ions  
on the number of  c luste rs  they should form - can y ie l d  h ie rarch ica l  
structures,  some leve ls  of  which are unlabel led .  These unlabel led
taxons c onst i tu te  covert  categor ies.  I f  such a pract ice  is fol lowed,  
the psychological r e a l i t y  of  covert  categories cannot be questioned.  
What can be questioned is t h e i r  exact status.  What we do know about 
them is th a t  the corresponding groupings of  objects are not 
l e x ic a l i z e d .  I t  seems th ere fore  p lausib le  to assume, th a t  covert  
categories are combinations of  proper t ies ,  s im i la r  to technical  terms 
and sharing t h e i r  problems. For the moment, some covert categories,  
the content o f  which can be spel led out, are included in L is t  V I ,  
which presents as many taxonomic re la t ions  as I have been able to 
detect  in the area of  MGMVs. In the discussion of  p a r t i c u la r
taxonomically organized sets,  i t  w i l l  become obvious th a t  covert  
categories are not a l l o t t e d  a s p e c i f ic  posit ion  in the hierarchy.
Verb taxonomies are unanimously recognized as involving  fewer taxa  
than noun taxonomies and th is  makes i t  already more d i f f i c u l t  to see 
i f  a p a r t i c u la r  f i e l d  is taxonomically organized or not (e .g .  Rhodes 
1983:10).  They also involve fewer leve ls  which renders i t  impossible 
to check c er ta in  propert ies suggested as c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  taxonomies 
(e .g .  maximum of  f i v e  l e v e l s ) .  As can be t e s t i f i e d  in L is t  V I ,
c ro s s -c la s s i f i c a t io n  is abundant. This is excluded by BBR (1973) fo r  
instance but allowed by more recent studies,  e .g .  Hunn (1982),  while  
Lehrer (1974) also allows fo r  overlap.
Taxonomic re la t io n s  which can be f a i r l y  sa fe ly  i d e n t i f i e d ,  involve  
'gener ic '  and ' s p e c i f i c '  leve l  categor ies.  The o r ig in a l  idea on how 
the inc lus ive  term is  to be i d e n t i f i e d  is  based, in the present
analysis ,  on Dixon's (1971) 'n uc lear '  verbs and the we l l -es tab l ished  
procedure o f  simple s u b s t i tu t io n .  Dixon (1971:436) argues tha t  the 
l e x ic a l  verbs o f  a language f a l l  into two mutual ly exclusive  sets:  
nuclear and non-nuclear ones. The former type are analysable through 
a small set o f  ra the r  general and wel1-motivated semantic features  
(some of which are l i k e l y  to under l ie  categories in the grammar of  
the language) while the semantic content o f  the l a t t e r  type is 
definable  through the semantic descr ip t ion o f  a nuclear verb (or a 
previously defined non-nuclear one) and the syntactic  apparatus of
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the language. One o f  the c leares t  examples Dixon o f fe rs  involves the  
verbs ' lo o k '  and ' s t a r e ' :  the former, which is nuclear,  cannot be 
defined through some other verb, while the l a t t e r ,  which is non­
nuclear,  can be defined as ' look  hard ' .  One does not have to agree 
with the componential descr ip t ion Dixon assumes as the only one 
appropriate fo r  nuclear verbs in order to accept his main points.  
This d iv is ion  is a natural  one, in the spec i f ic  sense tha t  i t  is not 
a r b i t r a r y  (corroborated by the evidence he brings in from Dyalyrjuy 
and Guwal verbs).  I f  a language has a minimum number of  verbs i t  
need not contain any non-nuclear ones, as i t  can replace them with a 
' d e f i n i t i o n ' .  For the same reason i t  could not do wi thout nuclear  
verbs (as they are not ' s u b s t i t u t a b l e ' ) .
Since i t  has seemed important to include as many hyponyms as possible 
and given the special  s o c io l in g u is t ic  problems of  MG, already  
mentioned in the In troduction,  terms o f  d i f f e r e n t  o r ig in  and use as 
well as verbs belonging to d i s t i n c t  reg is te rs  are included.  
'Katharevousa' terms of  re s t r i c te d  use are marked with a subscript  
SI while d ia le c ta l  and ' l i t e r a r y '  ones are marked with S3. The 
remaining terms are unmarked. They would c onst i tu te  an S2 category 
which is understood as the main body o f  what is commonly re fe rred  to 
as 'Koine Nea El 1 i n i k i ' ,  i . e .  common/standard Modern Greek.4 These 
unmarked terms belong to d i f f e r e n t  re g is te rs .  So, fo r  instance,  
among the verbs roughly equivalent to ' l e a v e '  or 's e t  o f f ' ,  both 
' f e v y o '  and ' a n a x o r o '  are unmarked in L is t  VI (Category 5 ) .  Besides 
covering the same conceptual area these verbs belong to 'Koine Nea 
Ell  i n i k i ' ,  so choice between them depends on fac tors  re la ted  to  
d i f f e r e n t  reg is te rs  or d i f f e r e n t  ' frames'  ( in  the sense o f  Brown and 
Yule 1983:238-241,  or Verschueren 1981:338).  In very simple terms an 
important person (e .g .  a p o l i t i c i a n )  can be said to ' a n a x o r i '  (set  
o f f )  to London, but the same verb cannot be used in a sentence 
roughly equivalent to 'my brother l e f t  fo r  school at  8 : 3 0 ' .  In such 
a case ' f e v y o '  (set  o f f )  would be used instead.  Although an accurate 
appl ica t ion  o f  these notions l i e s  outside the scope o f  the present 
study, i t  is necessary to r e f e r  to them, as the whole issue is  
close ly  re la ted  to the discussion of  basic leve l  categor ies.
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In connection with the presentat ion o f  the material  in L is t  VI three  
more points must be made. There are separate categories (e .g .  6 ,7)  
fo r  corresponding t r a n s i t i v e  and i n t r a n s i t iv e  verbs. In those cases 
where no cover term ex is ts  and the content of  the inc lus ive  covert  
category cannot e a s i ly  be described,  sets o f  verbs appear which are 
understood as belonging to the same natural  class (henceforth NC). 
C ro ss -c la ss i f ic a t io n  const i tu tes  a d i s t i n c t  c h a r a c te r is t i c  of  the 
taxonomies presented here (as already pointed out) and terms which 
appear in more than one category/taxonomy are marked with CC followed 
by the address of  the category(ies)  in which they also appear (e .g .  
' a n a r i x o m e '  CC25 (c l im b ) ) .  There are many areas where class-  
inclusion is only p a r t i a l  and some of these w i l l  be discussed 
separately  fo r  each one of the taxonomies which w i l l  be analysed in 
some d e ta i l  in the fo l lowing section.  A more acute problem which 
arises and requires special  a t ten t ion  involves the determination of  
the level  of  inclusiveness of  the items under inves t iga t ion .
4 .1 .2  Levels o f  inclusiveness and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked categories
As already mentioned in 4 .1 .1 ,  taxonomists r e f e r  to  f i v e  leve ls  of  
inclusiveness,  each one of  which is  a t t r ib u te d  special  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  In th is  section a t ten t ion  is drawn to the generic  
and spec i f ic  leve ls  and t h e i r  re la t io n  to Rosch's basic and 
subordinate level  categor ies.
In BBR (1973:216) i t  is e x p l i c i t l y  stated that generic leve l  
categories are "the most commonly re fe rred  to  groupings o f  organisms 
in the natural environment, are the most s a l i e n t  psychological ly  and 
are l i k e l y  to be among the f i r s t  taxa learned by the c h i ld " .  I t  is 
f a i r l y  obvious th a t  the generic level  corresponds to  Rosch's basic 
leve l  of  abstraction which is the level  at  which "categories carry  
the most information,  possess the highest cue v a l i d i t y ,  and are,  
thus,  the most d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  from one another" (Rosch et  a l . 
1976:383).
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The cogn i t ive ly  p r iv i le g ed  status of  generic level  categories seems 
to acquire some substance through the experiments o f  Rosch and her 
colleagues in the case o f  the kinds o f  nouns they have investigated .  
In one such experiment, b io log ica l  taxonomies were tested using as a 
hypothesis the resu l ts  o f  anthropological  studies (B e r l in  1971, in 
p a r t i c u l a r ) .  Categories l i k e  'maple' ,  ' b i r c h ' ,  'oak'  were expected 
to belong to the basic level  and ' t r e e '  ( the  inc lus ive  category) to  
'k in d '  (see 4 . 1 . 1 ) ,  i . e .  Rosch's superordinate l e v e l ,  while  'whi te  
oak' and 'red oak', hypothesized as ' s p e c i f i c '  by Ber l in  should 
correspond to Rosch's subordinate l e v e l .
The te s t  resu l ts  showed that  the hypothesized correspondence was 
wrong. The basic level  of  abstraction id e n t i f i e d  by Rosch on the 
basis of  the number o f  common a t t r ib u te s  provided fo r  each term by 
subjects (see 1 .3 . 2 .3 )  turned out to  be one leve l  higher than 
B e r l in 's  hypothesized generic l e v e l ,  i . e .  ' t r e e ' ,  proved to be basic 
level  ra ther  than 'oak'  or 'b i r c h '  (Rosch 1977b:214-6 ) . The same 
applied to b io log ica l  taxonomies f o r  ' f i s h '  and 'b i r d '  also 
hypothesized as superordinate and proving to  be basic l e v e l .  These 
resu l ts  seem to be in accordance with common sense and in t u i t i o n  and 
i t  is in te res t ing  to notice tha t  hypotheses based on the i n t u i t i o n  of  
the experimenters fo r  non-biological  taxonomies yie lded the expected 
re su l ts .
Unfortunately Rosch's method of  id e n t i fy in g  basic leve l  categories  
presupposes the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  obtaining l i s t in g s  o f  a t t r ib u te s  fo r  
each term from subjects.  As already indicated in 1 .3 . 2 . 4  th is  task  
cannot be implemented fo r  verbal notions, the l a t t e r  being f a r  more 
abstract and complex than the sorts of  nouns used in Rosch's 
experiments. I t  is  therefore  necessary to  turn to other re la ted  
notions in order to id e n t i f y  the level  of inc lus iveness/abstraction  
of  s pec i f ic  verbs as well as focus a t te n t io n  on the special  
c hara c te r is t ic s  a t t r ib u te d  to generic leve l  categor ies.  The notions 
of  'c o g n i t iv e ly  p r iv i le g ed  s ta tu s ' ,  'psychological  sa l ience '  and the 
l i k e ,  although i n t u i t i v e l y  correct are too vague to  be used as a 
working hypothesis.  Rosch's basic leve l  categories may be also 
understood as being more frequent and f a m i l i a r  than superordinate or 
subordinate ones (Pulman 1983:125).
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F a m i l i a r i t y  and commonness or frequency of  contact ra ise  of  course 
the question: " f a m i l i a r  to whom?" Interpersonal v a r ia t io n  in how 
basic a term is ,  is obviously to be expected in any semantic f i e l d .  
I t  is qu ite  conceivable tha t  Gricean pr inc ip les  are at  work governing 
the choice o f  taxonomic level  from which a term is drawn, at leas t  
fo r  those models fo r  which f a m i l i a r i t y  and s im i la r  notions are 
decis ive  in the choice o f  leve l  of  inclusiveness.  Evidently there  
are also language and cu l ture  spec i f ic  conventions, against which 
such p r inc ip les  operate.  Now an analysis of  the in te rp lay  of  factors  
such as assumptions on knowledge of speaker and l i s t e n e r ,  context,  
s i t u a t io n ,  e tc .  l i e s  outside the scope o f  the present study.  
Nevertheless, the impl icat ions  of  such considerations fo r  determining 
the level  of  inclusiveness of  verbs have to be pointed out.
Consider as an example a subset of  category 5 in L is t  VI involving  
verbs a l l  o f  which can be used f o r  a ship s a i l in g  o f f :
' a p o p l e o ' ,  ' a n a x o r o ' ,  ' f e v y o ' ,  ' s a l p a r o ' .
As already mentioned, ' a n a x o r o '  and ' f e v y o '  are not re s t r ic te d  to 
s a i l in g  ( o f f )  and belong to d i f f e r e n t  re g is te rs .  S im i la r ly  ' a p o p l e o '  
is formal and may be considered techn ica l .  Notice th a t  radio and 
t e le v is io n  broadcasts may use ' a p o p l e o '  but are more l i k e l y  to use 
' a n a x o r o '  instead.  The only term which is s o c i o l in g u is t i c a l ly  marked 
here (S3) is ' s a l p a r o ' ,  considered somehow d i a l e c t a l ,  very 'popular '  
and there fore  perhaps not part  o f  'Koine Nea E l l i n i k i '  (although i t  
is  not uncommon in novels or t rans la t ions  o f  f i l m - s c r i p t s ) .
On i n t u i t i v e  grounds, a t  l e a s t ,  there can be l i t t l e  doubt tha t  fo r  
sp ec ia l is ts  or n o n-spec ia l is ts ,  educated or non-educated native  
speakers the most 'c o g n i t iv e ly  p r i v i l e g e d ' ,  'psychological ly  
s a l i e n t ' ,  f requent and f a m i l i a r  verb in the set is a c t u a l ly  ' f e v y o ' ,  
which is also the one f i r s t  learned by the average c h i ld .  What are 
the consequences of  these observations in terms of  leve ls  of  
inclusion? Following Dixon (1971) ,  since ' a n a x o r o '  and ' f e v y o '  cover 
the same conceptual ground and the remaining verbs can be 'def ined'  
by re fe r r in g  to them, they should appear on the same l e v e l .
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Following Verschueren (1981),  d i f ferences in re g is te r  are accountable 
fo r  in terms of  frames and there fore  each one of  these verbs is basic 
level  fo r  a d i f f e r e n t  subset o f  the populat ion: ' a p o p l e o '  fo r  navy 
o f f i c e r s ,  ' s a l p a r o ' f o r  s a i lo rs ,  ' a n a x o r o ' fo r  educated Greeks with 
a strong tendency towards pomposity or te le v is io n  broadcasting 
personnel at  work, ' f e v y o '  fo r  people who have never t r a v e l le d  by 
ship and more importantly fo r  anybody who has no reason to make any 
of the d iscr iminat ions implied by and conveyed through the other  
verbs.  In th is  sense i t  could be argued that  ' f e v y o '  alone is 
' l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked'.
Words used in normal everyday speech, which do not require  special  
contextual  features  to be used appropr iate ly ,  and carry no 
impl icat ions  or a f f e c t i v e  overtones are termed ' l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  
unmarked' in Cruse (1977).  The neutral  q u a l i t y  of  such words is 
explained by Cruse on the basis o f  well-known Gricean pr inc ip les  and 
R. Brown's notion o f  a leve l  o f  'maximum u t i l i t y '  ( i b i d . :155) .  Cruse 
considers the r e la t i o n  between taxonomically l inked words such as 
'an im al -dog-span ie l ' and observes th a t  i t  is  more often important 
th a t  a spaniel belongs to the class of  dogs than th a t  i t  belongs to 
the class o f  spanie ls.  In th is  sense 'dog' represents the 'neutral  
level  o f  s p e c i f i c i t y '  ( i b i d . )  and th is  neutral q u a l i t y  or l i n g u i s t i c  
unmarkedness is said to be inherent in c er ta in  items. Such items 
belong probably to Rosch's basic level  of  abstrac tion .
In a given context a verb such as ' a p o p l e o '  or ' s a l p a r o ' (both 
equivalent to ' s a i l  away') w i l l  be the normal way to describe the 
same event and can there fore  be understood as a basic leve l  term in 
th a t  p a r t i c u la r  context .  This does not mean, however, th a t  ' a p o p l e o '  
and ' s a l p a r o '  are not subordinate to ' f e v y o ' .  A taxonomy can be 
establ ished independently of  which verbs are most normal, f a m i l i a r  or 
frequent in p a r t i c u l a r  contexts. The obvious requirement is ,  that  
the term posited as higher level  than s p ec i f ic  or subordinate,  should 
have the well known c h a ra c te r is t ic s  (from t r a d i t i o n a l  s tructura l ism)  
of covering a wider conceptual area than those terms posited as lower  
leve l  ones, in which a l l  the l a t t e r  are included. I f  the 
hypothesized subordinates are used c o r rec t ly  ( i . e .  a p propr ia te ly ) ,  
t h e i r  inclusion re la t io n s  can be assumed to be part  o f  native
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speakers' competence. Provided the term posited as inc lus ive  carr ies  
the addit ional  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  of  being l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked, 
frequent,  f a m i l i a r  and indisputably  primary,  i t  can be considered as 
an instance o f  Dixon's (1971) 'nuc lear '  verbs,  Rosch's basic leve l  
categor ies,  or the generic leve l  taxa of  t r a d i t io n a l  taxonomists.  
These (a d d i t io n a l )  propert ies  may also character ize  verbs appearing 
as subordinate in the taxonomy*, the d i f fe rence  is ,  of  course, tha t  
these l a t t e r  verbs are not inc lus ive .
The most important issue in the l i g h t  o f  Prototype theory remains of  
course the observation tha t  subordinate categories are not 
equidis tant from the inc lus ive  one. Some of  them are judged as more 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  the inc lus ive  category name than others.  We cannot 
know, a p r i o r i ,  in the case of  verbs, what renders subordinate 
categories more or less prototypical  of  the category name: Rosch's 
method, which is again based on counting a t t r ib u te s  provided by 
subjects,  is inapp l icab le .  Therefore,  commenting on the content of  
the various taxonomies, proposed here fo r  MGMVs, factors  possibly  
contr ibuting to  ( r e l a t i v e )  p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  w i l l  be pointed out and in 
p a r t ic u la r :  (a)  l i n g u i s t i c  markedness and (b) r e l a t i v e  class
inc lus ion.  For un l ike  b io log ica l  categor ies,  verb taxonomies may 
involve p a r t i a l  inc lus ion.  Besides these,  r e la t i v e  sal ience ra ther  
than number of  common features seems to be of  great importance, an 
issue which w i l l  be discussed in the fo l lowing section,  deal ing with  
'minor p roper t ies '  and espec ia l ly  a f t e r  a presentat ion o f  re levant  
t e s t  resu l ts  ( in  the next chapter) .
In order to keep th is  pre l iminary  discussion to what is only 
necessary fo r  the presentat ion of  the taxonomies, a number o f  points  
simply mentioned so f a r  w i l l  be taken up again and discussed in more 
d e ta i l  in the analysis o f  the s pec i f ic  materia l  examined here.  L is t  
VI contains both the taxonomic sets and the natural  classes proposed 
fo r  MGMVs, but only those taxonomies which seem to exemplify the most 
acute problems a r is ing  here are discussed in d e ta i l  in what fol lows.
- 208 -
4 .1 .3  Taxonomic sets proposed fo r  Modern Greek motion verbs
As already mentioned, 'move' could be a candidate f o r  an intermediate  
level  in a general taxonomy o f  MVs. I t  must be pointed out here tha t  
the corresponding le x ic a l ! z e d  taxon in MG, namely ' k u n j e m e ' 
(movej^jp) ,  can hardly be understood as a d i re c t  in c lus ive  term of  
change-of- locat ion verbs,  as i t  is normally used to imply change-of-  
p o s i t io n /p a r t i a l  motion. Therefore i n t r a n s i t i v e  ' k u n j e m e ' and 
t r a n s i t i v e  ' k u n a o '  appear in d i f f e r e n t  taxonomies ( 1  and 2 ) involving  
verbs which imply motion but no chage-o f - location.
The only possible l e x ic a l i z e d  superordinate f o r  a number of  change- 
o f - lo c a t io n  MGMVs is ' p i y e n o '  (go) which is not, however, equivalent  
to the English superordinate TRAVEL ( f o r  the status of  which there  
also e x is t  problems as i t  d i f f e r s  from the common English verb 
' t r a v e l ' ) .  The f i r s t  problem with ' p i y e n o '  (go) - set  3 in L is t  VI - 
is th a t  most of  the terms th a t  could be posited as i t s  hyponyms, 
could be also hyponyms o f  ' e r x o m e '  (come). In other words, though i t  
looks as the most general verb in the set under considerat ion,  i t  
does not have tha t  s ta tus,  because i t  contains a d e i c t i c  component 
which is not present in the vast major i ty  o f  the remaining verbs, A 
fu r th e r  problem emerges i f  one applies the standard subst i tu t ion  
te s ts :  'p i y e n o j ' (go) requires a goal s p e c i f i c a t io n ,  which is not
necessary for  most o f  i t s  possible hyponyms. I f  both 'p i y e n o j ' (go) 
and ' e r x o m e ' (come) are put at  an inc lus ive  l e v e l ,  two possible sets 
o f  hyponyms could appear as candidates fo r  the hypothesized taxonomy. 
The f i r s t  one is included in L is t  VI:
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p i y e n o j  /  erxome  
go /  come
m e ta v e n o $ }  
go from NP|_qc
t 0  NPL0C
t a k s i S e v o  /  p e t j e r n e 2 




d 5 e v o $ j  porevome  
go towards go a long 
pL0C distance on 
(covering a foot
long distance)
p r o x o r o
advance
o p i s Q o x o r o
r e t r e a t
p r o s e r x o m e ^ j
come/go
k o p j a z o $3
come/go
Fig. 1
Of these hyponyms only ' m e t a v e n o '  corresponds to ' p i y e n o '  and not to  
7e r x o m e while ' p r o s e r x o m e '  and 7k o p j a z o ' are properly included in 
' e r x o m e '  only.  The remaining verbs could be hyponyms o f  e i th e r  
supposed superordinate,  a s i tu a t io n  not l i k e l y  to appear in noun 
domains.
In terms of  co l lo c a t io n a l  pa t terns ,  notice t h a t  ' p o r e v o m e ' , 7o5 evo7, 
' p r o x o r o '  and ' o p i s Q o x o r o '  do not necessitate a goal s p ec i f ic a t io n ;  
i f  one does appear, i t  is  introduced with a d i rec t io n a l  preposit ion  
equivalent to  ' towards ' ,  namely ' p r o s ' .  The same s i tu a t io n  is 
evident i f  a d i f f e r e n t  set o f  verbs is posited under th is  ' tw in '  
inc lus ive  category,  namely 'manner' specifying verbs,  such as: 
' p e r p a t a o '  (wa lk ) ,  ' s e r n o m e '  (c ra w l ) ,  ' k i l a o j '  ( r o l l ) ,  ' p e t a o j '  
( f l y ) ,  ' y l i s t r a o '  ( s l i p ,  s l i d e ) .  Some of the terms o f  both sets 
appear as inc lus ive  to other categories (e .g .  'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) ,  or 
' p r o x o r o '  (advance)) ,  and what is  more important,  a number of  them 
appear to possess the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  suggested here as re levant  to 
basic level  categor ies.  This means that ' p i y e n o j '  could be a
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candidate fo r  the f i r s t  leve l  o f  inclusiveness ( l i f e - f o r m ,  i . e .  k ind /  
superordinate) ,  i t s  immediate hyponyms ( o f  both sets)  could be 
'g ener ic '  level  and t h e i r  own hyponyms would be ' s p e c i f i c '  l e v e l .
Notice,  however, the complications ar is ing for  a massive taxonomic 
organizat ion of  th is  type. I t  could be claimed that  'manner' 
specifying verbs might also be considered as hyponyms o f  'genera l '  
verbs , such as those appearing in F i g . l  and many others such as: 
' a n e v e n o '  (ascend),  ' a k o l u Q o '  ( f o l lo w ) ,  ' b e n o '  ( e n t e r ) ,  in short any 
motion verb which is not marked fo r  'manner'.  I f  such a solut ion is 
adopted, ' p i y e n o '  (go) would be level  1 ( k in d ) ,  a l l  verbs which do 
not specify 'manner' would be leve l  2 (ge ner ic /ba s ic ) ,  'manner' verbs 
would be leve l  3 (subord ina te /spec i f ic )  and t h e i r  hyponyms would be 
level  4 ( v a r i e t a l ) .  The u n d e s i ra b i l i t y  of  such a solut ion is already  
noted in connection to Nida's proposal which is s im i la r ,  in a way, to  
th is  schema - see 4 .1 .  Such a schema would wrongly predict  tha t  
sentences such as: ' ? ? t a k s i b e v e  se rn om enos '  (he t r a v e l l e d  crawling)
are acceptable (which they c e r t a in ly  are n o t ) .  I t  would also imply 
th a t  'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) is lower level  than highly s p e c i f ic  terms such 
as ' t r i y i r i z o '  (roam around). What is worse, ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) might 
even have to appear at  a lower level  ( i . e .  4 = v a r i e t a l ) ,  since 
' p r o x o r o '  (advance), fo r  instance,  has i ts  own set o f  hyponyms (see 
35 in L is t  V I ) ,  which would have to appear on level  3 (gener ic /basic  
l e v e l ) .  Such predict ions are i n t u i t i v e l y  f e l t  to be wrong and both 
col locat iona l  and other subst i tu t ion  considerations would have to be 
abandoned in more cases than not.
In short ,  although the status of  ' p i y e n o j '  (go) is c e r t a in ly  
d i f f e r e n t  from tha t  o f  most other change-of- locat ion verbs, i t  is 
more p lausib le  to consider both ' p i y e n o '  and ' e r x o m e '  appearing 
immediately under a covert  category involving 'c h a n g e -o f - lo c a t io n ' ,  
and F i g . l  sub-taxonomy as including a l l  t h e i r  (more/ less c le a r  cases 
of)  hyponyms. I f  simple subst i tu t ion  is the crucial  c r i t e r i o n ,  then 
' e r x o m e '  (come) has to appear on the same leve l  with ' p i y e n o j ' .  I t  
i s ,  however, f e l t  tha t  in th is  d e ic t i c  pa i r ,  ' p i y e n o j '  is somehow the 
less,  marked member. The v a l i d i t y  of  such judgments can only be 
checked through re levant  te s ts ,  some o f  which w i l l  be discussed in 
the next chapter.
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The taxonomic set headed by ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) and ' v a b i z o '  (walk)
needs to be examined in some de ta i l  as i t  contains a l o t  o f  hyponyms
to these inc lus ive  terms and provides examples of  most o f  the
problems discussed from the theore t ica l  point  o f  view in the
preceding sections.
p e r p a t a o  /  v a b i z o
[walk here and there ]  [wal k /unsteadi ly ]  [walk together wi th]  
saunter, s t r o l l
s u l a t s a r o
v o 1 t a r o
s e r j a n
t r i k l i z o  f s t r a v o p a t a o \  s i n o b i p o r o  s impor evome  
stagger / /  stumble, \ \  (+ long distance)
t r i p  over
p a r a p a t a o  (stumble, walk unstead ily)
[walk a long distance]  
p e z o p o r o  I  o b i p o r o  porevome
[walk slowly]
T
v r a b i p o r o  a r y o p a t o ^  a r y o p o r o  
( + ' long distance)
s i y a n o p e r p a t o $3 
walk s lowly /without  noise
b u s u l i z o  /  a r k u b i z o $3 t s a l a v u t o
crawl (as o f  a baby) wade
/ / i
v i m t i z o  k i k l o b r o m o $2 b r a s k e l i z o  p i s o p a t o 5 3  a k r o p a t o $  3
pace walk in c i r c le s  s t r id e  walk backwards t ip to e
Fig.  2
To s t a r t  w i th ,  since both ' p e r p a t a o '  and ' v a b i z o '  cover the same 
conceptual area,  they are t e n t a t i v e l y  put on the same leve l
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(hypothesized gener ic /bas ic  l e v e l ) .  For some speakers, a t  le a s t ,
' p e r p a t a o '  and ' v a b i z o '  are thought of  as belonging to  d i f f e r e n t  
reg is te rs  and in th a t  case ' p e r p a t a o '  is the unmarked member of  the 
p a i r .  I f  such considerat ions are allowed to play a ro le  in the 
organizat ion of  the taxonomy, ' v a b i z o '  could appear as a hyponym of  
' p e r p a t a o ' .  The cost is not very great .  I t  is qu ite  possible tha t  
' v a b i z o '  is the most c h a r a c te r is t ic  kind of  ' p e r p a t a o ' , i . e .  i t s  most 
proto typ ical  instance.  Therefore,  i t  may be considered equal ly  basic 
level  with ' p e r p a t a o '  and move one leve l  up . 5
Considering now the status of  the proposed covert categories in 
F i g . 2, notice f i r s t  th a t :  ' s i n o b i p o r o '  (walk a long distance together  
with)  and i t s  near-synonym ' s i m p o r e v o m e '  may be also c la s s i f i e d  under 
the next covert  category,  namely [walk a long d is tance] ,  or appear as 
hyponyms of  the verbs o f  th is  l a t t e r  category which are 
morphological ly re la te d  to them. Notice also tha t  i f  covert  
categories are part  o f  the hierarchy,  the bla t a n t l y  wrong predict ion  
is made tha t  verbs such as ' t r i k l i z o '  (stagger) or ' p o r e v o m e '  (walk a 
long distance) are on a lower level  of  inclusiveness than ' p i s o p a t o '  
(walk backwards) or ' k i k l o b r o m o '  (walk in c i r c l e s ) ,  simply because 
' t r i k l i z o '  (stagger)  does not happen to belong together with any 
other term(s) of  the taxonomy.
Covert categories are useful fo r  grouping together items which are on 
the same taxonomic leve l  and which have an obvious common 
c h a r a c te r is t ic ,  i . e .  words which form a natural  class but e x h ib i t  no 
taxonomic re la t io n s .  Within such natural  classes c er ta in  items may 
be l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked with respect to the remaining members of  
the same class.  In F i g . 2 very few such cases can be i d e n t i f i e d :  
' t r i k l i z o '  (s tagger ) ,  ' p a r a p a t a o '  (stumble) and ' p o r e v o m e '  (walk a 
long d is tance ) .  The same, however, appl ies to items which are not 
under a covert category.
Notice th a t ,  ' v i m a t i z o '  (pace),  ' b r a s k e l i z o '  ( s t r id e )  and ' b u s u l i z o '  
(crawl (as of  a baby)) are also l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked compared to  
other hyponyms o f  ' p e r p a t a o ' , such as ' p e z o p o r o ' ,  ' o b i p o r o ' ,  
' v r a b i p o r o '  which are high r e g is t e r ,  and the items marked SI or S3
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which are not part  of  most speakers' act ive  vocabulary.  Al l  the
suggested hyponyms of 'p e r p a t a o '  are,  however, on the same taxonomic 
l e v e l .  The extent  to which t h e i r  being more marked l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  
af fec ts  t h e i r  distance from the inc lus ive  category can be discussed 
only a f t e r  p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  te s t  resul ts  are obtained.
Notice,  f i n a l l y ,  th a t  many items of th is  set  p a r t i c ip a t e  in other  
taxonomies as w e l l .  The points of  c ro s s -c la s s i f i c a t io n  are marked in 
L is t  V I .  To mention a few, notice tha t  ' p o r e v o m e '  (walk a long 
distance) is also part  o f  the previous taxonomy ( F i g . l ) ;  ' b u s u l i z o ' 
and ' a r k u b i z o '  both implying 'crawl (as of  a baby)' can also appear 
together with ' s e r n o m e '  (crawl)  in set 25; ' p i s o p a t o '  (walk 
backwards) appears also in a taxonomy involving backward motion in 
general ,  i . e .  under ' o p i s Q o x o r o '  (move backwards); the set of  verbs
implying 'walk here and there '  appear together with ' t r i y i r i z o '  (go
here and there ,  roam around) in set 18, etc .
Another large taxonomy, which includes a l o t  o f  hyponyms to the  
hypothesized inc lus ive  term and allows a number of  intermediate  
covert categories,  is headed by ' f e v y o '  and ' a n a x o r o '  both of  which 
are equivalent to ' leave  or set o f f ' .  I t  is suggested that  only 
' f e v y o '  ( leave) in th is  taxonomy represents the level  of  s p e c i f i c i t y  
which is " leas t  motivated contextual ly" in the sense of  Cruse 
(1977:156) ,  and th a t  ' a n a x o r o '  (depart)  is  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked 
although i t  covers a s im i la r  conceptual area with i t  (as pointed out 
in the preceding sec t ion) .  Therefore only ' f e v y o '  ( leave) is 
understood here as a basic leve l  category.
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f e v y o  /  a n a x o r o  
leave /  depart





m e t a n a s t e v o  \ l k s e n i t e v o m e <  apom ne
apoSimo i m s e v o 5 3






[ le a v e /g e t  o f f  the 
ground/land]
a p o y io n o w e  a p o p le o  
take o f f  \  sai l  o f f  
(the ground)
p a r a m e n  zoa 
\ \  \ v
move aside/over s a l p a r o  , 
sa i l  o f f
i f j o t r a v j e m e  
move away
[leave as undesirable]  
c lear  o f f ,  buzz o f f
/csekub 7 7 a 0 5 3
s t r i v o S3 s p a z o S3 . . .
[ leave secret ly/a lthough not allowed]
S i a f e v y o  \ k s e f e v y o  \  b r a p e t e v o  
get away ^scape, s l i p \  escape
away
a p o x o r o  a p o s i r o m e  ape rxome3 j  
withdraw r e t i r e  leave
Fig. 3
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I t  is fu r t h e r  suggested tha t  some of the subordinate categories in 
t h is  taxonomy are also l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked compared to other 
items which cover a s im i la r ,  i f  not id e n t ic a l ,  conceptual area with  
them. This means th a t  'm e t a n a s t e v o '  (emigrate) is a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  
unmarked term compared to the remaining verbs implying 'change 
country o f  res idence ' ,  because the l a t t e r  carry  a f f e c t i v e  overtones,  
are less f a m i l i a r ,  belong to marked reg is te rs  etc .  This cannot be 
in te rpre ted  as implying th a t  i t  should be on the same taxonomic leve l  
with ' f e v y o '  ( l e a v e ) .  I t  may be, however, an example o f  a taxon 
moving up and l a b e l l in g  an otherwise unlabel led higher taxon ( i . e .  a 
covert category).  This p o s s i b i l i t y  is offered in Hunn (1982) without  
an accompanying s p ec i f ica t io n  o f  the circumstances under which a 
taxon can general ize  in th is  way. Within the framework adopted here,  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  a subordinate category's becoming basic leve l  is 
re s t r i c t e d  to categories appearing as most proto typica l  of  the
inc lus ive  category name, and covert categories are shown ( fo r  
independent reasons) to const i tu te  no taxonomic l e v e l .  In th is  
taxonomy, both ' a p o x o r o '  (withdraw) and ' a p o s i r o m e '  ( r e t i r e ) ,  
although r e l a t i v e l y  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked (high re g is te r )  seem to me 
more proto typica l  o f  the inc lus ive  category ( ' f e v y o ' )  than 
' m e t a n a s t e v o '  (emigrate) or ' S r a p e t e v o '  (escape),  f o r  reasons to be 
discussed in the fo l lowing chapter. As they are not l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  
unmarked, however, the chances th a t  e i t h e r  of  them general izes and 
appears on the same level  with ' f e v y o '  are few; but ' m e t a n a s t e v o '  
and ' S r a p e t e v o '  cannot be allowed to become basic leve l  e i t h e r ,  in 
th is  p a r t i c u la r  taxonomy, as they are most un l ike ly  to be considered 
very proto typica l  instances o f  ' f e v y o ' .
At th is  stage some o f  the factors which may play a ro le  in the
formation of  prototypes in the area o f  MGMVs are simply pointed out 
and i n t u i t i v e  judgments are made which may not correspond to tes t
re su l ts .  The important thing to notice is  that since counting
a t t r ib u te s  is not f e a s ib le ,  we are l e f t  with the vague notions of  
perceptual  and social  sal ience (Rosch and Mervis 1975:599).  An 
attempt is made at  making these notions more e x p l i c i t  and th is  can 
only be done in connection with very spec i f ic  (and consequently very 
r e s t r i c t e d )  data here.  The greatest,  disadvantage is  the fol lowing:  
except fo r  very few cases, i t  is v i r t u a l l y  impossible to f ind
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categories with a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  genuine hyponyms (properly  
included subordinates) and equal ly impossible to f ind  enough hyponyms 
unmarked fo r  r e g is t e r ,  so tha t  these two factors could be constant 
and one would there fore  have to consider only r e la t i v e  sal ience of  
a t t r ib u te s  or dimensions. A case in point is the fo l lowing taxonomy.
' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )
[ f a l l  down, [ f a l l  on s . o . / s . t h .  [ f a l l  in to  mass/ l iquid]
i . e  due to g r a v i ty ]  with force]
k a t o l i s Q e n o 3 2l
s l ide  down
k a t a p i p t o $ i
f a l l  down*
s o r j a z o m e
collapse
g remizome  
f a l l  from 
a p re c ip ic e /  
f a l l  in ruins
x a t r a k i l a o  p r o s p e f t i  n x n o m e  v u t a o j  k a t a b i o m e
r o l l  down get on j
k u t r u v a l a o  
r o l l  down
k a t a r e o
collapse
x im a o
v io le n t l y
throw
one's knees \ 6 nese l f  upon
e n s k i p t o $ i
charge
ormao e f o r m o $ j
dash, f a l l  v io le n t l y  on
dive dive
t u b a r o  
f a l l  upside 
down, overturn
e p i p i p t o $ j  x i n o m e  
dash, f a l l  v io le n t l y  on
a na t r e p om e




Three natural  classes can be i d e n t i f i e d  here, two of  them 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  in terms of  the cause of  motion and a th i rd  one 
involving downward motion into l i q u id .  As already suggested in 
Chapter 3, ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )  is  p r im ar i ly  (p ro t o ty p ic a l ly )  understood as 
implying downward motion due to g ra v i ty  (hence i t  is low on the 
ag e n t iv i ty  sca le ) .  The f i r s t  covert category contains therefore  
hyponyms which are as a set most c h a ra c te r is t ic  of  'p e f t o ' ( f a l l ) ,  
i . e .  instances o f  ' f a l l  down'. The second one involves verbs 
implying ' f a l l  on someone/something on purpose' and therefore  
correspond to a f a i r l y  unprototypical  understanding o f  'p e f t o ' ,  while  
the la s t  set contains only two items, which can be replaced by 
' p e f t o '  only when the motion is into l iq u id  and in p a r t i c u la r  into  
the sea, namely ' v u t a o j '  (d ive)  and i t s  near-synonym ' k a t a b i o m e ' . 
These two items form a natural  class with  others not implying 
' f a l l i n g '  but 's in k in g '  and appear with them under 19 in L is t  V I .  
This taxonomy is th ere fore  the c learest  case of  r e la t i v e  
p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  of  whole sets o f  items with respect to the inc lus ive  
basic leve l  one. I t  seems f a i r  to say tha t  although a l l  the 
suggested hyponyms are properly included in the higher one, those 
implying f a l l i n g  down a cc iden ta l ly  and without r o l l i n g / t u r n in g  are 
the closest to i t  ( a l l  other things being equal ) .  These are 
' g r e m i z o m e '  ( f a l l  from a p re c ip ic e / in  ru in s ) ,  ' s o r j a z o m e '  (co l laps e ) ,  
' k a t a r e o '  (c o l lap s e ) ,  ' k a t a p i p t o '  ( f a l l  down) and ' k a t o l  i s B e n o '  
( s l i d e ) ;  the l a s t  three verbs are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked. These are 
fol lowed by items involving r o l l in g / t u r n in g  (the remaining items in 
the same covert  category) and f i n a l l y  by those requ ir ing  a special  
environment (w a ter ) .  This may give an idea o f  r e l a t i v e  distance from 
the inc lusive category in terms of  a t t r ib u te s  and r e l a t i v e  sal ience  
of a t t r ib u t e s ,  the importance of  which can be only discussed on the 
basis o f  te s t  resu l ts  in the fol lowing chapter.
The remaining sets are poor examples o f  taxonomic organizat ion,  in 
the sense that  very few items are properly included in the suggested 
higher level  one. Three more examples w i l l  be considered, s ta r t ing  
with ' v i Q i z o m e '  (sinkjNTR)-
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v iQ i z o m e
sink
v u l j a
sink
k a t a p o n d i z o m e  > 
sink to tfTe bottom
e m v a p t i z o m e 3 j
submerge
f u d a r o  
sink to the bottom
k a t a b i o m e  
dive ,  submerge





As can be a ttested  in L is t  V presenting the d i f fe rences  in ag en t iv i ty  
of  various non-causative MGMVs, ' v i Q i z o m e '  (s ink)  involves  
es s e n t ia l l y  accidental  motion (due to g ra v i ty )  and only marginal ly  
does i t  also al low f o r  intended submersion into  water.  Therefore  
' k a t a b i o m e '  (d ive)  and ' v u t a o j '  (d ive)  are f a i r l y  marginal in th is  
taxonomy as they necessar i ly  involve in te n t io n .  Notice th a t  ne i ther  
can be replaced by ' v i Q i z o m e '  unl ike  the s i tu a t io n  in the previous 
taxonomy where ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )  can replace them both, presumably 
because ' p e f t o '  is  less marked for  absence o f  in tent ion  and control  
than ' v i Q i z o m e ' , a fa c t  which does not show in L is t  V.
A fu r th e r  problem in F i g . 5 is that ' v u l j a z o '  (s ink)  is  a near-synonym 
of  the inc lus ive  category name and c e r t a in ly  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked. 
The only reason why ' v i Q i z o m e '  appears as the basic leve l  term in 
F i g . 5 is th a t  ' v u l j a z o '  does not involve i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  or control  
even marginal ly  (see L is t  V) .  I f  we concentrate on the proto typ ical  
understanding of  ' v i Q i z o m e ' , both verbs should appear as inc lus ive  of  
the re s t .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  ' v u l j a z o '  w i l l  p red ic tab ly  be considered 
the most c h a r a c te r is t i c  type o f  ' v i Q i z o m e '  and as such, i t  can again 
move one level  up. This taxonomy is th ere fore  l e f t  with only three  
properly included hyponyms of  the hypothesized basic leve l  term, a l l  
of  which are marked fo r  high or low r e g is te r .  One item ' n a v a y o '  
( founder, be shipwrecked) may be considered as not proper ly  included 
in ' v i Q i z o m e ' ,  since unl ike  the l a t t e r  verb i t  does not necessari ly
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imply 's ink ing '  - in the case o f  people on board a ship - but ra ther  
'be shipwrecked' .
T ran s i t ive  verb taxonomies include even fewer taxa than i n t r a n s i t iv e  
ones as can be a ttes ted  in L is t  V I .  The best example of  a t r a n s i t i v e  
verb taxonomy is o ffered by 'p/yeno^'  ( take to )  which appears as a 
twin inc lus ive  category along with ' f e r n o 1 (br ing) fo r  the reasons 
already mentioned in connection with 'p i y e n o j 1 (go) and ' e r x o m e 1 
(come).
m e ta k o m iz o2
move
( f u r n i t u r e )
f e r n o  /  p i y e n o 2 
bring /  take to
m e t a f e r o . 
/
t r a n s fe r ,
transpor
m e ta v ^ v a z o  
transmit ,  
t ra n s fe r
a x S o f o r o ^ j
carry
baggage
k u v a l a o
carry
p e r i f e r o  p r o s k o m i z o  p e t a o ^
carry br ing / take  give a
around (a document l i f t
to an o f f i c i a l )
m e t a t o p i z o  
displace
Fig. 6
Three terms are marked fo r  high r e g is te r  and r e s t r i c te d  use: 
' a x Q o f o r o ' (carry  baggage), 'p r o s k o m i z o 1 (br ing ,  take to)  and
' m e t a v i v a z o 1 ( t r a n s f e r ) .  On the other hand, ' k u v a l a o 1 (carry )  and 
' p e r i f e r o ' (carry  around),  which are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked, are not 
properly included in the hypothesized higher twin category,  because 
unlike  the cover terms, they need not imply th a t  a dest inat ion  is to 
be reached. A t h i r d  fa c to r  is therefore  brought in to  play (besides 
l i n g u i s t i c  markedness and r e la t i v e  sal ience o f  a t t r i b u t e s ) ,  namely 
proper (or not) class inclusion.
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The la s t  taxonomy o f  L is t  VI which w i l l  be discussed here is headed 
by ' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) and i t s  near-synonym ' a n e r x o m e ' .  The l a t t e r  
verb is r e s t r ic te d  to high re g is te r  and is  in th is  respect more 
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked than the former one.
s k a r f a l o n o  
cl imb
aneveno /  anerxome  
ascend /  go upward
a n i f o r i z o  a n a b i o m e ^ j  ( a n ) i p s o n o m e
r ise
a n a n x o m e $ j  
cl imb go uphi l l  emerge,
(usual ly  out of  
water)
( s i k o n o m e )  
r i s e ,  stand up
i p e n p s o n o m e $ j  
r ise  over s .th
s i konom e  
r i s e ,  stand up
( a n ) e y i r o m e $ i  
r i s e ,  ar ise
anas ikonom e anaka&ome
s i t  up, ra ise  
/ l i f t  oneself  s l i g h t l y
s i t  up
( a n ) i p s o n o m e
r i s e
ap oy io nom e  p e t a y o m e / p e t j e m e 2 i p e r i p s o n o m e ^ j  
take o f f  jump up r i s e  over s . t h .
Maui
Only three items are genuine hyponyms o f  ' a n e v e n o ' , namely 
' a n a r i x o m e '  ( c l im b ) ,  ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imbe) and ' a n i f o r i z o '  (go up a 
slope) .  The remaining terms, are instances o f  p a r t ia l  overlap ra ther  
than proper class inc lus ion.  Notice tha t  ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e )  and 
'  ( a n ) i p s o n o m e '  ( r i s e ) ,  fo r  instance, can only be replaced by
- 221 -
' a n e v e n o '  (go up) under s p e c i f ic  circumstances, e .g .  i f  the moving
object is 'smoke' or 'd u s t ' .  I t  seems there fore  preferable  to
consider ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e )  as independent o f  the ' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) 
taxonomy and posi t  i t  as a basic level  category i t s e l f ;  i t  has a l l  
the c h a ra c te r is t ic s  we associate here with l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked 
verbs and includes hyponyms.
Genuine hyponyms of ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e )  are a c tu a l ly  those
corresponding to one of  i t s  uses, namely ' r i s i n g  from a s i t t i n g  or 
ly ing p o s i t io n ' ,  and not i t s  'change-o f - locat io n '  use. Par t ia l  
overlap ra ther  than class inclusion is responsible fo r
s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  in th is  set .  This seems to be very common in most 
other castes t e n t a t i v e l y  presented as taxonomies in L is t  V I .
To give an overa l l  p ic ture  of  the remaining contents o f  L is t  V I ,  i t  
is  important to notice th a t  they f a l l  under three main categories.  
One of them involves hyponyms which are properly included but of  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e s t r i c t e d  use. In most cases e i t h e r  t h e i r  number is 
very small ,  or they are so uncommon, tha t  no d e f i n i t e  judgments can 
be made on them and t h e i r  exact r e la t io n  to the hypothesized 
superordinate.  In th is  category f a l l  taxonomies 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 24, 32, 33, 35, 36, 37 and 38.
Another category includes cases of  p a r t i a l  overlap ra th e r  than 
genuine inc lus ion .  Such cases are; 9 ( involv ing only one genuine 
hyponym), 10 and 23.
A t h i r d  category involves sets o f  verbs which are headed by a covert  
category,  no l e x ic a l i z e d  taxon. These sets are ca l led  here 'natura l  
c lasses ' .  Such cases are 7, 12, 13, 18, 25-31 and 34. For some of  
these sets a l e x ic a l i z e d  higher level  category is also provided 
p a r a l le l  to th'e s p e c i f ic a t io n  o f  the content of  the covert  category 
(e .g .  12INTR ' s p e v S o '  [move r a p i d l y ] ) .  I t  i s ,  however, assumed that  
such categories cannot be considered basic leve l  terms because they 
are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked.
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On the basis of  these data,  i t  should be c lea r  by now why i t  is 
claimed tha t  there are only few cases with a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  
genuine and unmarked hyponyms of  inc lusive categories in the area of  
MGMVs. Pulman (1983:110) makes a s im i la r  observation f o r  English 
verbs in genera l ,  s ta t ing  th a t  i t  is '’d i f f i c u l t  to f ind  enough basic
leve l  verbs with a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  hyponyms" in order to te s t
whether the prototype e f f e c t  obtains also fo r  verbs.
In th is  section I  have concentrated on estab l ish ing  p a r t i a l  (two
leve ls  deep) taxonomies in the area of  MGMVs. The main points 
concern the status of  terms posited as generic and subordinate leve l  
and t h e i r  re la t io n s  to one another.  I t  is suggested th a t  the 
re levant  too ls  f o r  accomplishing th is  task are the notion o f  r e la t i v e  
l i n g u i s t i c  unmarkedness and the degree of  class inclusion.
The the ore t ica l  discussion in 4 .1 .2  and the descr ipt ion accompanying 
i t  in 4 . 1 . 3 ,  provide a basis fo r  tes t ing  the hypothesis tha t  the 
prototype e f f e c t  holds fo r  verbs (besides nouns) and suggest what
factors  may be responsible in th is  area of  inves t iga t ion  for  the 
formation o f  prototypes.  Rosch and her colleagues claim that  the 
main fa c to r  in the case of  nouns is family  resemblance (e .g .  Rosch 
and Mervis 1975:599).  Arguments have been of fered here ( 1 .3 .2  and 
4 .1 )  in support of  Pulman's (1983:122) pos it ion  th a t  the prototype 
e f fe c t  cannot be a t t r ib u te d  to family  resemblance in the case of  
verbs. I t  should be obvious from the preceding discussion,  th a t  even 
in the case o f  what seem to be the most promising taxonomies in th is  
f i e l d ,  we are in obscure t e r r i t o r y ;  (a) we are focusing on 
di fferences between low leve l  categories (Rosch's subordinate l e v e l ,  
BBR's s p e c i f ic  l e v e l )  and (b) accurate l i s t i n g s  o f  a t t r ib u te s  are 
impossible to  compile.  As already pointed out,  though, factors  other  
than family  resemblance may be substi tuted f o r  i t :  f a m i l i a r i t y  and 
r e l a t i v e  l i n g u i s t i c  unmarkedness have already been discussed. The 
most promising fa c to r  seems to be the r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  
a t t r ib u t e s .  The overa l l  issue o f  which minor propert ies  operate 
with in  the f i e l d  under invest iga t ion  and how they r e la t e  to one 
another need to be considered in d e t a i l .
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4.2 Minor propert ies  o f  Modern Greek motion verbs
The fac t  tha t  English MVs have been categorized in many d i f f e r e n t  and 
equally p lausib le  ways wi th in  the framework of  various 'c h e c k l is t '  
theories is i t s e l f  an ind ica t ion  tha t  the semantic f i e l d  in question 
is undoubtedly structured but th a t  there are many angles from which 
i t s  s t ructur ing  can be approached. With th is  observation in mind, 
the task of  id e n t i fy in g  common components among MVs in MG (and 
probably in any Indo-European language) and bringing out t h e i r  
structura l  r e la t io n s  is a r e l a t i v e l y  s tra ight forward matter.  ' The 
p i t f a l l  to avoid is s ta r t in g  the analysis and basing the descr ipt ion  
on contrasts and oppositions between neighbouring words, which is the 
standard s t r u c t u r a l i s t  p rac t ice .
A general c la s s i f i c a t io n  of  MGMVs is presented in Lists V I I  and V I I I  
which does involve some s t r u c t u r a l i s t  re la t io n s ,  the exact status of  
which can be only discussed a f t e r  an analysis o f  the re levant  
propert ies involved.  This c la s s i f i c a t io n  is  only one of  a number of  
possible categor iza t ions .  A l te rna t ive s  are discussed at many 
d i f f e r e n t  points in the course o f  the present inves t iga t ion .
The main categories i d e n t i f i e d  are the fo l lowing: 'causatives '  of  
motion are considered a separate class from 'non-causat ives '  of  
motion. Both classes include 'change-o f - locat io n '  (CL) and 'change- 
o f - p o s i t io n '  (CP) verbs, as well as 'change of  o r i e n ta t io n '  (or  
ro ta ry  motion) ones. 'Genera l '  motion is dist inguished from motion 
executed in a p a r t i c u la r  'manner'.  'D i r e c t i o n a l '  motion is a 
c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  most CL verbs. ' V e r t i c a l '  motion is juxtaposed to 
motion with ' indeterminate '  d i r e c t io n .  Verbs describing path/  
'passage' and verbs involving 'dependent motion' appear in groups of  
t h e i r  own. A separate category includes verbs marked fo r  'absence of  
d e st in a t ion '  /  'random w a lk ' .  Propert ies involving the 'medium' /  
'environment' in which the motion is executed, ' impetus' and ' type of  
object '  moving w i l l  be discussed separately .  S im i la r  'minor 
proper t ies '  are exh ib ited in both 'causatives '  and 'non-causatives'  
of  motion.
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The discussion which fol lows concentrates on non-causative CL verbs,  
which are by f a r  the most numerous. S i m i l a r i t i e s  and d i f ferences  
between t r a d i t io n a l  approaches and Prototype theory are pointed out 
in the course of  th is  analysis o f  MGMVs, such as gradation and 
central  vs marginal instances.  The term 'minor p roper t ies '  implies 
here 's p e c i f i c  to the semantic f i e l d  under in v e s t ig a t io n ' .  Their  
re la t ionsh ips  to one another,  r e la t i v e  hierarchy and d i f ferences in 
status cannot be discussed before a p r io r  analysis o f  the semantic 
content and re la t io n s  between a number of  verbs understood here as 
involving the propert ies  in question.  The terms ' f e a t u r e s ' ,  
'components', ' p r o p e r t i e s ' ,  ' a t t r i b u t e s '  are used interchangeably.
Since most of  the discussion w i l l  revolve around CL verbs, i t  seems 
in order to r e f e r  to CP verbs f i r s t  which w i l l  not be given extensive  
treatment.  As can be attested in L is t  V I I ,  three groups are 
i d e n t i f i e d  w i th in  th is  area.  One of  them includes verbs describing  
'change o f  posture'  or 'change of  p o in t - o f -s u p p o r t ' , e .g .  '/ra0 o/ne^' 
( s i t ) ,  'yerno^' ( l e a n ) ,  ' y o n a t i z o j '  ( k nee l ) .  Most of  these verbs 
r e f e r  to human body motion. A number of  them are also used as 
s ta t ives  describing the resu l t in g  pos i t ion /posture ,  e .g .  ' k a d o m e j '  
( s i t / b e  seated),  ' k s a p l o n o j '  ( l i e  down), e tc .
Whether one of  these uses is more primary than the other cannot be 
decided on ' l i n g u i s t i c '  grounds. M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:549-  
50) suggest tha t  since there may be no gross movement in common 
between standing from a s i t t i n g  posture and standing from a crouching 
one, the action component is r e l a t i v e l y  unspecified and the resu l t ing  
posture is the main global concept. On such grounds i t  could be 
claimed that the primary use is the s ta t ive  one. Bodily movement 
'change of  po in t -o f -suppor t '  verbs appear in L is t  V I I  together with 
verbs sharing th is  property with them though these l a t t e r  ones are 
not necessar i ly human body 'change of posture'  verbs, such as 
' k r e m j e m e ' (be hung), and ' \ e r n o ' ( l e an ) .  Notice th a t  i f  we are 
looking fo r  the most constant ra ther  than the most c h a ra c te r is t ic  
property of  these verbs, i . e .  a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condition  
ra the r  than a proto typica l  condition of  app l ica t ion ,  the term 'change 
of  po in t -o f -suppor t '  is more appropriate than 'change of  posture ' .  
Imagine a person's body having already acquired a s i t t i n g  posture but
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having no seat y e t .  This s i tu a t io n  cannot be cal led  ' s i t t i n g ' ,  since 
the support is s t i l l  provided by the ground and one's fe e t  as fo r  a 
standing pos i t ion .  I t  does not require a lengthy explanation to  
demonstrate tha t  the necessary condition involves the point of  
support. Whether th is  condit ion ,  which covers a l l  possible cases, 
has any psychological  v a l i d i t y  or not is a d i f f e r e n t  matter.  This 
issue is d i r e c t l y  l inked to the d i f fe rence  between 'most general '  and 
proto typica l  understanding of  these verbs and w i l l  be taken up again 
in the next chapter.
A second group of CP verbs involves also ' p a r t i a l '  motion which does 
not, however, r e s u l t  in a d i f f e r e n t  posture of  the moving object .  
Such verbs are ' k i l j e m e '  (wal low),  ' k u n j e m e '  (move, s t i r ) ,  ' s a l e v o '  
( s t i r ,  move s l i g h t l y ) ,  and the l i k e ,  e .g . :
( 1 ) t o  y u r u n a k i  k i l j e t e  s t i  l a s p i  
the p i g l e t  wallows in the mud.
Some of these verbs cannot appear in 'punctual occurrences' and are 
ra the r  odd in event predications in general ,  others are much less 
'processual ' .  Compare, fo r  instance, ' k i l j e m e '  (wallow) to 
' t r a d a z o m e '  ( j e r k ,  shake).
( 2 ) * t o  y u r u n a k i  k i l i s t i k e  s t i  l a s p i  j a  mja  s t i y m i  
the p ig le t  wallowed in the mud for  a moment
(3)  t o  s p i t i  t r a d a x t i k e  j a  m ja  s t i y m i  o l o k l i r o
the house shook f o r  a minute 'whole'
the whole house shook fo r  a minute
The d i f fe rence  between the second and the t h i r d  group is obvious: the 
l a t t e r  one, involv ing 'reg u la r / rep ea te d '  p a r t i a l  motion, includes 
f a i r l y  'processual '  verbs, e .g .  ' t r e m o '  ( t remble ) ,  ' t a l a n d e v o m e '  
( o s c i l l a t e ) ,  'p a l o m e '  ( v i b r a t e ) .  In Chapter 2 i t  is shown tha t  
' t r e m o '  ( tremble)  predications cannot be construed as typ ica l  events.
Expectedly there are points of  overlap between these two l a s t  groups.
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Consider fo r  instance ' a n a p i b a o '  (jump up/jump up and down) which can 
involve e i t h e r  a momentary movement or a ser ies of  ' jumps ' .  In the 
l a t t e r  case ' a n a p i S a o '  is more l i k e l y  to be understood as a CL ra ther  
than a CP verb, e . g . :
(4a) mol  i s  akuse  t o n  p i r o v o l i s m o  a n a p i b i s e  s t i n  k a r e k l a  t u
when he heard the shot he jumped up on his cha i r
(4b) o p r o p o n i t i s  e v a l e  t u s  m a d i t e s  na a n a p ib u n
the coach made the pupils jump up and down.
In short ,  the borders between CL and CP verbs are also fuzzy .  In 
L is t  V I I  which presents a c la s s i f i c a t io n  based on my personal 
in tu i t io n s  in cases of  doubt as to the typ ica l  understanding of  an 
item, ' a n a p i S a o '  appears under CP (and as unspecif ied concerning 
r e g u l a r i t y / r e p e t i t i o n  of  motion). In the fo l lowing chapter,  
discussing p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  judgments o f  subjects,  a more object ive  
image of  th is  verb can be o f fered .
4 .2 .1  'Change-o f - location '  and ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '
'Change-o f - location '  (CL) or ' t r a n s l a t io n '  o f  an object  is considered 
in M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:533) as co n st i tu t in g  the "nucleus 
of  the semantic domain" of  MVs. The f u l l  construction they propose 
can be s im p l i f i e d ,  fo r  our present purposes, and presented as (FROM 
(TO (TRAVEL))) (x , iv ,v ) .  TRAVEL is used as the most general re levant  
predicate ,  i . e .  as expressing CL in the simplest way possible (see 
also M i l l e r  1972).  Preposit ional  phrases appear as predicate  
modif iers ,  so w and v  represent the i n i t i a l  and f in a l  locations  
respect ive ly  of  the moving object ( x ) .  The main categories  
i d e n t i f i e d  w i th in  th is  sub-area of  MGMVs appear in L is t  V I I I  in 
diagrammatic form.
Th e o re t ic a l ly  any change of  locat ion  can be understood as a deviat ion  
from the axes set on a plane or in space (Ikegami 1969:112) .  In the 
most general terms possible ,  one would expect language to express
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motion along a v e r t ic a l  axis ( i . e .  in r e la t io n  to g r a v i t y ) ,  along a 
horizontal  axis (e .g .  forward - backward), around an axis (ro tary  
motion). Notice,  however, th a t  unl ike v e r t ic a l  d i r e c t io n ,  ' forward '  
and 'backward' in fa c t  express d i rec t io n  r e la t i v e  to notions such as 
an ob je c t 's  natural  f ro n t  or habitual  d i rec t io n  of  motion. S im i la r ly  
'h e re '  and ' t h e r e '  involve d i rec t io n  r e l a t i v e  to speaker and 
addressee's locat ion ,  i . e .  motion re la ted  to d e ic t i c  elements of  the 
language also apparent in the use of  d e ic t i c  verbs such as ' p i y e n o j '  
(go) and ' e r x o m e '  (come). I f  the point  of  o r ig in  and the point of  
dest ination are marked fo r  being on d i f f e r e n t  le v e ls ,  verbs are used 
which are marked fo r  v e r t i c a l i t y ,  e .g .  ' a n e v e n o ' (ascend) or 
' v u l j a z o '  ( s in k ) .  There are no verbs, however, which are 
correspondingly r e s t r i c te d  to horizontal  d i r e c t io n .  I f  a 
c la s s i f i c a t io n  of  MVs is made on the basis of  t h e i r  most general 
understanding, a d is t in c t io n  can be drawn between verbs marked for  
v e r t i c a l i t y  and verbs which are indeterminate in terms of d i rec t iona l  
o r ien ta t ion  ( i . e .  unmarked fo r  v e r t i c a l i t y )  ra the r  than between 
v e r t ic a l  and horizontal  d i rec t io n  specifying verbs. Notice,  fo r  
instance, th a t  'p r o x o r o ' (advance), ' b e n o '  ( e n te r ) ,  ' i p o x o r o ' 
(withdraw) are not re s t r ic te d  to a horizontal  axis in the same way 
th a t  ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb) is r e s t r ic te d  to a v e r t ic a l  one (unl ike  
English 'c l im b '  of  course),  e .g . :
(5) ; i p o x o r i s e  s t i n  k o r i f i  t u  vunu
s/he re t rea ted  to the top of  the mountain
may be pragmat ical ly  odd but is not unacceptable, and
( 6 ) p r o x o r u s e  o l o  ke p j o  vaQ ja  s t o  p i y a b i
s/he advanced more and more deeply into the well
is a p e r fe c t ly  acceptable sentence. For th is  reason verbs marked fo r  
presence of  v e r t i c a l i t y  are c la s s i f ie d  separate ly in L is t  V I I I  and no 
corresponding 'h o r i z o n t a l i t y '  box is envisaged. I f  prototypical  
conditions of  app l ica t ion  are taken into account, though, i t  is 
possible to id e n t i f y  typ ica l  uses of  ' i p o x o r o ' (withdraw) which may 
be l inked with e i t h e r  a horizontal  or a 'downward' d i rec t io n  but not
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with an 'upward' one. Such discrepancies between a general and a 
proto typ ical  understanding in terms of  d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  are most 
evident in the case of  some 'manner' speci fying MVs and w i l l  be taken 
up and discussed in d e ta i l  at a l a t e r  point  in th is  chapter.
D irect ional  spec i f ic a t ions  other than v e r t ic a l  ones do not appear 
separate ly in L is t  V I I I .  Their  importance is not a t  issue.  Most 
analyses of  English CL verbs provide or presuppose an extensive  
treatment of  d i rec t io n a l  adverbials and lo c a t iv e  preposit ions which 
are t r a d i t i o n a l l y  understood as semantic components o f  the verbs in 
question (e .g .  Gruber 1965, 1976, Ikegami 1969, M i l l e r  1972, M i l l e r  
and Johnson-Laird 1 9 7 6 ) .  ^ The absence of s im i la r  studies for  the 
corresponding MG d i r e c t i o n a l / lo c a t i v e  Advs renders impossible the 
task of  analysing such semantic components of  CL MG Vs in depth and 
bringing out t h e i r  proto typica l  c h a ra c te r is t ic s .  The ir  combinational  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  as well  as t h e i r  r e la t i v e  sal ience in comparison with  
other kinds of  semantic material  (e .g .  'manner',  ' c a u s a t i v i t y ' ) w i l l  
be discussed in 4 . 2 . 4 ,  4.4 and espec ia l ly  in Chapter 5. At th is  
point,  examples o f  MG CL verbs w i l l  be provided which can be safe ly  
matched with d i r e c t i o n a l / lo c a t i v e  Advs as analysed in Ikegami 
(1969:112-31).  Further examples can be found in L is t  VI;  the 
addresses of  the re levant  groups o f  verbs appear under each one of  
the Advs presented in what fol lows immediately:
D irect iona l  Adverbials Examples o f  MGMVs
upward /  up 
6 ,7 ,8
' a n e v e n o '  ( a s c e n d )  
' a p o y io n o m e ' ( take o f f )  
' s k a r f a l o n o ' (climb)
downward /  down 
9 ,1 0 ,11 ,19 ,33
' k a t e v e n o ' (descend) 
' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  down) 
' v u l j a z o ' (s ink)
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Directional Adverbials Examples of MGMVs
forward /  onward ' p r o x o r o '  (advance, proceed)
35 ' p r oo Q um e '  (advance)
' p r o e l a v n o '  (push forward)
backward /  back ' o p i s Q o x o r o ' (move backward)
29,30,36  ' o p i s Q o f t r o m o '  ( r e t r e a t )
' e p i s t r e f o '  ( re turn )
inward /  in ' b e n o '  (ente r )
19,21,33  ' i s v a l o '  ( invade)
' v u t a o '  (dive)
outward /  out ' v y e n o '  (move out of)
22,37 ' p r o v a l o '  (appear out of)
' e k s e r x o m e '  (come out of)
towards /  to ' p l i s i a z o '  (approach)
' p r o s e r x o m e ' (come to)  
' e p i s k e p t o m e '  ( v i s i t )  
' f Q a n o ' ( a r r i v e ,  reach)
away from /  from ' a p e r x o m e '  (go away)
1a p o x o r o '  (withdraw)  
k s e k i n a o '  ( s t a r t  o f f )
Besides these d i rec t io n a l  adverbia ls ,  a number of  the aforementioned 
analyses of  English MVs, include also ' th rough ' ,  'by '  and 'across'  
which r e f e r  to intermediate  locations o f  the journey,  'around' which 
re fe rs  to 'change o f  o r i e n t a t i o n ' ,  ' w i t h ' ,  ' a f t e r '  and 'b e fo re '  which 
r e f e r  to motion of  an object r e l a t i v e  to the lo c a t io n (s )  of  some 
other object .  These w i l l  be considered and exemplif ied separate ly;  
they are understood here as being of a d i f f e r e n t  status than the ones 
already mentioned. The re levant sections in L is t  V I I I  are label led
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'P a th ' ,  'Dependent Motion ' ,  'Random Walk' and 'Change of  
O r i e n t a t i o n ' .
4 .2 .2  'Path '  and 'dependent motion'
The term 'pa th '  is used here in a r e s t r i c t e d  sense un l ike  i t s  use in 
M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976) or Fi l lmore (1978) where 'path of  
motion' includes everything which is here understood as d i rec t iona l  
change-o f- locat ion .  I t  is  juxtaposed to 'source'  and 'g o a l '  in the 
sense tha t  i t  concentrates on intermediate locat ions o f  the journey.
Verbs belonging to th is  category appear under 24 of  L is t  V I .  Since 
the verbs in question describe in essence motion r e l a t i v e  to some 
sp ec i f ic  location usual ly  taking up the pos it ion  o f  t h e i r  d i r e c t  
object ,  they can be re la te d  to a separate class of  CL non-causative  
t r a n s i t i v e s  which do not describe 'path '  (or 'passage')  but are 
s im i la r  to them in describing motion r e la t i v e  to some locat ion  
occupying the posi t ion of  t h e i r  d i re c t  ob ject .  These are:  
'p e r i k i k l o n o ' ( e n c i r c l e ) ,  ' t r i y i n ' z o 2 '  (surround),  ' p a r a k a m p t o '  
(dev ia te ,  pass around),  e t c . ,  e .g . :
(7)  o s t r a t o s  p e r i k i k l o s e  t i n  p o l i
the army encircled/surrounded the town.
Such verbs c onst i tu te  probably a l i n k  between central  cases of  'pa th '  
(e .g .  ' p e r n a o '  (pass),  ' b i a s x i z o '  ( t r a v e r s e ) )  and marginal cases of  
the 'change of  o r i e n t a t io n '  group (to be discussed at  a l a t e r  p o in t ) .
In L is t  V I I I  verbs describing motion r e l a t i v e  to some other moving 
e n t i t y  ra the r  than a f ixed  locat ion appear under 'dependent motion' .  
These are also understood as l inked to the group discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, in the sense th a t  ' r e l a t i o n a l '  c h arac te r is t ics  
are again central  to t h e i r  meaning. The English counterparts of  
these verbs are commonly analysed as incorporating 'd i re c t io n a l  
adverbial  components' o f  various forms, e .g .  ' b e f o r e ' ,  ' a f t e r ' ,  
' t o g e t h e r ' / ' w i t h ' .
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A l l o t t i n g  MG verbs to such classes is as simple a task as i t  is fo r  
the equivalent English verbs and examples are provided here for  the 
sake o f  completeness ra ther  than anything else.  So verbs l i k e :
' a k o l u d o ' ( f o l lo w ) ,  ' k i n i y a o '  (run a f t e r ,  hunt) ,  ' k a t a b i o k o '  (chase) 
are t r a d i t i o n a l l y  understood as involving ' a f t e r ' .  Verbs l i k e  
' o b i y o '  ( l e a d ) ,  ' p r o i y u m e '  (go in f ront of)  ' p r o p o r e v o m e '  (walk in 
front  o f ) ,  'p r o t r e x o '  (run in f ront  of )  may be said to involve
'b e f o r e ' .  A l l  these verbs are t r a n s i t i v e  non-causatives.  Some of  
them are marked fo r  'manner' as well as ' r e la t ive /dependent  motion' ,  
e .g .  'p r o p o r e v o m e '  (walk (a long distance) in f ron t  o f ) ,  'p r o t r e x o ' 
(run in f ro n t  o f ) ,  'p r o v a b i z o ' (walk in f ro n t  o f ) .
As already noted in Chapter 3, ne i ther  ' k i n i y a o '  (run a f t e r ,  hunt) 
nor ' k a t a b i o k o '  (chase) require  that t h e i r  d i r e c t  ob ject be moving, 
in contrast  to ' a k o l u B o '  ( f o l lo w ) .  There is no doubt, however, tha t  
t h e i r  proto typica l  uses involve such a condi t ion.  Not ice,  simply, 
tha t  a c la s s i f i c a t i o n  based on the 'most general '  meaning of verbs 
would have no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  fo r  a l l o t t i n g  them to th is  p a r t i c u la r
group. The s i tu a t io n  is d i f f e r e n t  in the case of  ' o b i y o '  ( lead) the 
proto typ ical  instances of  which do not involve a condi t ion that the 
subject should be ' i n  f ro n t  of/ahead o f '  the object ,  e .g . :
(8) t o n  o b i y i s a n  s t o  a s t i n o m i k o  tmima  
they led him to the pol ice  s ta t ion .
In terms of  the prototypical  image conveyed by (8) there is l i t t l e  
doubt th a t  the v ic t im  and his guards are side by side.  The relevance  
of th is  observation l i e s  simply in the fac t  tha t  n e i the r  the verbs of  
the ' a f t e r '  group nor ' o b i y o '  ( lead) of  the ' i n  f ro n t  o f '  group 
concentrate on physical motion as such. They involve conditions of  
appl ica t ion  which focus on other charac te r is t ic s  such as 'purpose' ,  
' i n t e n t i o n '  and the l i k e .  Therefore,  ' incorpora t io n '  of  d i rec t io n a l  
adverbials does not seem to be the central  issue in connection with
qu i te  a number o f  these verbs and espec ia l ly  the commonest ones. The
group of  verbs t r a d i t i o n a l l y  analysed as involving ' to ge ther '  or 
'w i th '  c onst i tu te  perhaps a c lea rer  example o f  the inappropriateness  
of  the notion of  ' incorporat ion  of  d i rec t io n a l  Advs'.  I t  is
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questionable whether 'w i th '  and ' to g e th er '  can be c la s s i f i e d  as
d i rec t io n a l  adverb ia ls /preposi t ions  (such as 'u p ' ,  ' o u t ' ,  ' b e fo r e ' ,  
' a c ro s s ' ) .  Typical examples of  th is  group are: ' s i n o b e v o '
(accompany), ' s i m p o r e v o m e '  (walk (a long distance) together with )  and 
i t s  near-synonym '  s i n o b i p o r o '  and ' s i n t a k s i b e v o '  ( t ra v e l  together  
w i t h ) ,
Some verbs are also marked fo r  'manner',  e .g .  ' s i m p o r e v o m e ' (walk
together w i t h ) .  The commonest verb of  the group, namely ' s i n o b e v o '
(accompany), has no addi t ional  spec i f ic a t io n s ,  e i t h e r  in terms of  
type o f  motion, type o f  moving ob ject ,  medium/environment in which 
motion takes place or d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  ( in  terms of axes). Moreover, 
i t  is appl icable  to any kind o f  a c t i v i t y / a c t i o n ,  e .g . :
(9) o m i x a l i s  t r a y u b a i  ke  i  a n i t a  t o n  s i n o b e v i  me t i n  k i B a r a  
Michael sings and Annita accompanies him with the g u i ta r .
I t  can be argued, o f  course, tha t  i t s  proto typ ical  instances do 
involve physical CL (o f  some duration)  which is carr ied  out so that  
the 'p r in c ip a l  t r a v e l l e r '  ( tak ing up the posit ion of  the d i rec t  
object )  would not be l e f t  alone.  The most general understanding of  
t h is  verb is not however l inked to (physical)  CL.
The property of  'accompaniment' can be understood in a more general 
way and used to d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between a l l  'dependent motion' verbs 
and those t y p i c a l l y  involving ' impetus' or 'p ro p e l le n t  motion' such 
as ' e k t o k s e v o m e '  (be launched),  ' p e t a y o m e '  (spring up) and i t s  near­
synonym ' t i n a z o m e ' , ' e k t o k s e v o m e '  (be launched).  Gruber (1965, 1976),  
fo r  instance, c l a s s i f i e s  a l l  verbs involving 'b e f o r e ' ,  ' a f t e r '  and 
'w i th '  together as incorporat ing 'accompaniment', a label  which seems 
more su i tab le  to the very l a s t  sub-group mentioned here,  i . e .  MG 
' s i n - '  compounds. The relevance o f  such a broad d i s t i n c t io n ,  in 
terms of presence or absence of  'accompaniment', is more apparent in 
the case of  causatives of  motion, where a large category o f  verbs can 
be characterized as lacking th is  property.  Such a category would 
involve not only verbs marked fo r  ' impetus' (e .g .  the causative  
counterparts o f  the above mentioned set)  but also others such as:
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' s t e l n o '  (send),  or ' a p o y i o n o '  (cause a plane to take o f f ) .  
'Accompaniment' could then serve in id e n t i fy in g  contrast pa i rs ,  e .g .  
' p i y e n o 2 '  ( take to)  vs ' s t e l n o '  (send).  In the area o f  causatives of  
motion, presence o f  'accompaniment' is probably c h a r a c te r is t i c  of  
most CL verbs, e .g .  groups 15, 17, 28, 29, 31,  34, 37 of  L is t  V I .  I t  
is  a necessary property o f  the d e ic t i c  pa i r  'p/yeno^'  ( take to)  and 
' f e r n o '  (br ing) and some o f  t h e i r  hyponyms, e .g .  ' p r o s k o m i z o '  (b r in g /  
take (a document to  a c i v i l  serv ice  o f f i c i a l ) ) ,  ' k u v a l a o '  (carry  
s . t h .  (heavy)) ,  ' p e r i f e r o '  (carry  around), e tc .  I t  is  probably 
construable as one of  the proto typ ical  conditions o f  appl ica t ion  of  
causatives l i k e  ' v a z o '  (p u t ) ,  ' v y a z o '  ( take out) and a number of  
t h e i r  hyponyms, e .g .  ' x o n o '  ( s t i c k  i n t o ) .  Groups 13TR and 20 in L is t  
VI are character ized by i t s  absence.
The re levant d is t in c t io n s  between causatives,  in th is  respect,  are 
considered in d e ta i l  in Chapter 3, where i t  is argued tha t  the notion
of 'c o n t r o l '  (which is understood here as subsuming the notion of
'accompaniment') is a b e t te r  tool  in bringing out such d i f fe rences ,  
in connection with c a u s a t iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty .  At th is  point  i t  is 
only worth notic ing tha t  'accompaniment' as a 'minor' property seems 
to have a d i f f e r e n t  status in the causative group than in the non­
causative one, as i t  is applicable  to a fa r  greater  number o f  verbs.
I t s  sal ience r e la t i v e  to other 'minor' propert ies can be discussed 
again in connection with some te s t  resu l ts  in the fo l lowing chapter.
4 .2 .3  'Change of o r i e n t a t i o n '
The term 'change of o r i e n ta t io n '  is appl icable  to two types o f  verbs.  
The f i r s t  type are usual ly  re fe rre d  to as ' r o t a r y  motion' verbs.  The 
commonest members o f  the group, i . e .  ' s t r i v o j '  and ' y i r i z o j '  (both 
implying ' t u r n ' )  are not necessari ly  l inked with (complete) ro ta t ion  
as such, but ra ther  with change of  d i r e c t io n ,  e .g . :
(10) s t i  y o n i a  t u  bromu e s t r i p s e  b e k s i a
at the corner of  the s t re e t  s/he turned r i g h t .
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The next commonest one ' s t r i f o y i r i z o '  ( t w is t  and tu rn )  appears
t y p i c a l l y  in an environment o f  the type:
(11) ben b o r u s e  na k i m i Q i  ke  s t r i f o y i r i z e  s t o  k r e v a t i
s/he could not sleep and twisted-and-turned in bed.
None of  these c h a r a c te r is t ic  uses is central  to the notion of
ro ta t ion  around an ex is t in g  or notional axis although ' s t r i f o y i r i z o ' 
( tw is t  and turn) in (11) is c loser  to ( i r r e g u la r  and incomplete) 
ro ta t ion  than ' s t r i v o j '  ( tu rn )  in (10 ) .  This is perhaps b e t te r
presented in less common verbs o f  the group, e .g .  ' p e r i s t r e f  ome'
(revolve,  tw ine ) ,  '  p e r i b i n u m e '  (w h i r l ,  s w i r l ,  eddy), ' s t r o v i l i z o m e '  
( w h i r l ) ,  ' e l i s o m e '  (snake, wind),  ' p e r i  e l i s o m e '  ( c o i l ) ,  ' k u l u r j a z o m e '  
(curl up, wheel),  e tc .
Most of  the verbs o f  ro ta ry  motion do not d is t inguish c le a r ly  between 
change-of- locat ion and change-of-posit ion.  Consider, fo r  instance,
' a n a p o b o y i r i z o '  and i t s  near-synonym ' t u b a r o '  (over tu rn ) .  So they 
d i f f e r  from the classes already discussed in more than one respect.
Another group of  MGMVs which can be also understood as involving  
'change of o r i e n t a t i o n ' ,  but no ro ta ry  motion, includes verbs which 
are indisputably CL verbs,  and c h a r a c t e r is t i c a l l y  'processual '  
(durat ion is a d e f i n i t e  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of  the whole group). Change 
of d i rec t ion  is in t h e i r  case 'random' unl ike  the category ju s t
discussed, and i r r e g u l a r ,  on the whole. The nearest notion in 
physics seems to be 'random walk'  which implies tha t  the past h is tory  
(d i re c t io n )  of  the motion is not re levant to i t s  continuation,  i . e .  
each next step depends only on the location previously  held and 
cannot be predicted on the basis of  what has preceded i t .  The term 
'random walk' is used in L is t  V I I I  to d is t inguish these verbs from 
those involv ing ro ta ry  motion which appear under 'change of  
o r i e n t a t i o n ' .  Their  most s a l ie n t  c h a ra c te r is t ic  seems to be 'absence
of  f in a l  d e s t in a t io n '  or 'aimless change of  lo c a t io n ' .  The group has
an unusually great number of  items, the commonest ones being:
' t r i y i r i z o '  (roam around),  ' p e r i p l a n j e m e '  (wander) and ' p e r i f e r o m e '  
(rove,  roam around) which do not specify 'manner',  ' type  o f  object '
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moving, ' instrument/means'  of  motion. A subset involves hyponyms of  
' p e r p a t a o ' (wa lk ) ,  e .g .  ' s u l a t s a r o '  ( s t r o l l )  and i t s  near-synonyms 
' p e r i b j a v a z o ' , ' s e r j a n i z o ' , ' v o l t a r o ' ,  e tc .  One verb ' a r m e n i z o '
( s a i l  about) requires  a s p ec i f ica t io n  of  ' the  sea' as a 'medium/ 
environment' .
The main in te r e s t  of  th is  group l i e s  in that i t  is extremely 
d i f f i c u l t  to i n t e r p r e t  i t s  members in terms o f  necessary and 
s u f f i c i e n t  condit ions,  contrast ive  features and formal components, 
although the semantic s i m i l a r i t y  of  i t s  members is obvious. Even the 
term 'aimless c h ang e-o f - loca t ion ' ,  which is suggested here as 
r e f l e c t in g  t h e i r  most s a l ie n t  property,  is ra the r  unfor tunate.  I t  is 
closer to the facts  to suggest that d i f f e r e n t  grades of  'absence of  
purpose' or ' r e l a t i v e  seriousness of purpose' can be id e n t i f i e d  
with in  th is  group.
Verbs l i k e  ' p e r i i y u m e ' ( tour )  and 'p e r i o b e v o ' ( tour ,  t r a v e l ) ,  l i k e  
' t a k s i b e v o ' ( t r a v e l )  i t s e l f  would be at  the top of  a 'seriousness of 
purpose' scale,  in comparison to the remaining verbs of  the group. 
The verb ' p e r i p l a n j e m e '  (wander) could be immediately a f t e r  them, in 
th is  respect, as i t  does not specify whether wandering is in tent iona l  
or accidental  (due to losing one's way ra ther  than wandering around 
fo r  amusement).
The verbs mentioned in the f i r s t  part  of  the discussion o f  th is  group 
(e .g .  ' p e r i f e r o m e '  (roam around)) are a step lower on the scale and 
there are d i f fe rences  between them too,  a l l  l inked to the 
subjec t ive ly  assessed property of  'seriousness o f  purpose' .  Notice,  
fo r  instance, th a t  while ' kano v o l t a '  (have a walk) has a f a i r l y  
pos i t ive  connotation,  ' v o l t a r o '  ( s t r o l l ) ,  though also etymolog ical ly  
re la ted  to i t ,  has a ra the r  negative connotation and ' k o v o  v o l t e s '  
(walk around) is  even worse. A great  number of  verbs and verbal  
expressions which belong to the domain under considerat ion have a 
d i s t i n c t l y  negative connotation and could be therefore  understood as 
ly ing  at the bottom of  the suggested scale where 'complete absence of  
seriousness o f  purpose' is matched with social  disapproval .  Such
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verbs are: ' y i r o f e r n o ' , ' y i r n o v o l a o ' , ' a l o n i z o ' ,  ' v o s k o ' ,
' s u r t u k e v o ' , ' a l i t e v o ' t ' k o p r o s k i l i z o ' , e tc .
I t  can be e a s i ly  argued, of  course, tha t  such considerations are of  a 
purely s o c io l in g u is t ic  nature and that  no semantic theory needs to  
account fo r  them. The point made here, however, is th a t  presence, 
absence and r e l a t i v e  seriousness of purpose are the most s a l ie n t  
propert ies of  th is  group. They are responsible fo r  the semantic 
s i m i l a r i t y  of  the items in question,  they const i tu te  the very 
propert ies which d i f f e r e n t i a t e  them e s s e n t ia l l y  from other groups of  
MGMVs and they cannot be adequately replaced by concomitant features  
such as change of d i rec t io n  and duration of  the motion. I t  is  
f u r t h e r  suggested th a t  wi th in  the framework o f  prototype theory such 
propert ies can be e a s i ly  accommodated in the form of  descr ip t ive  
conditions of  appl ica t ion  ( ra th e r  than 'yes-no'  c r i t e r i a !  fe a tu re s ) .  
Such conditions have the addit ional  advantage o f  not requir ing  
homogeneity, i . e .  they can be of  d i f f e r e n t  types and can combine 
perceptual ly  with c u l t u r a l l y  important information.
4 .2 .4  'Manner',  'medium', and ' in s t ru m e n ta l i ty '
In what has preceded, reference is often made to verbs belonging to 
various categor ies,  such as ' v e r t i c a l  d i r e c t io n '  or 'dependent
motion ' ,  while at  the same time specifying 'manner' of  motion, e .g .  
' s k a r f a l o n o ' (c l imb) ,  or '  s i m p o r e v o m e '  (walk (a long distance)
together w i th ) .  The d is t in c t io n  between 'general  motion' verbs and 
'manner speci fy ing '  verbs is not, however, a widely accepted one. In 
f a c t ,  analyses o f  English MVs use 'manner' as a label  fo r  much f in e r  
d is t in c t io n s  than the ones implied here, e .g .  F i l lm o re 's  (1978) 
'manner' issued fo r  d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  between ' s t r i d e '  and ' s c u r ry ' ,  
while M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's (1976) example o f  'manner' is  
' t r a v e l  r a p i d l y ' .  In the present analysis ,  'manner' is used in a
f a i r l y  broad sense and is meant to cover three d i f f e r e n t  areas: a 
central  one involv ing various types of  ( t y p i c a l l y )  human motion on 
ground, e .g .  ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  ' p e r p a t a o ' (wa lk ) ,  a much wider area 
involving d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  moving in water or a i r ,  e .g .  ' k o l i b a o ' 
(swim), ' p e t a o j '  ( f l y ) ,  and a most r e s t r i c t e d  one involving
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d is t in c t io n s  at  a low level  o f  inclusiveness as exemplif ied by
hyponyms of  verbs belonging to the central  area,  e .g .  ' v i m a t i z o '  
(pace), ' b r a s k e l i z o ' ( s t r i d e ) .
The re la t io n s  between 'manner' ,  'medium' and ' in s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  are 
presented diagrammatical ly in F i g . 8 ( o v e r le a f ) ,  where the innermost 
c i r c l e  includes 'gene ra l '  MVs and the next la rg e r  one, verbs 
speci fy ing manner in a broad sense ( invo lv ing  ins trum enta l i ty  and 
medium). The verbs appearing outside th is  la rg e r  c i r c l e  belong to
the most s p e c i f ic  understanding of  'manner' .  Both l a t t e r  categories  
are also c la s s i f i e d  on the basis of  the medium/environment wi th in  
which the motion takes place.
The reason fo r  considering such widely d i f f e r e n t  kinds of  motion as 
belonging together and as separate from 'general  motion' verbs is
th a t  they behave in a s im i la r  manner when combined with verbs o f  the
l a t t e r  group. Notice,  fo r  instance,  tha t  a l l  the verbs specifying  
'manner',  which are given above as examples, can appear in the 
fol lowing environment in the form of  Present P a r t ic ip le s :
(12) p i y e / e f B a s e  ( k a p u )  _________
s/he went t o / a r r i v e  at (some place) ________
The f in a l  posi t ion in the above environment can be occupied by: 
' t r e x o n d a s ' ( running) ,  'p e r p a t o n d a s '  (w alk ing),  ' b u s u l i z o n d a s '  
(crawling (as o f  a baby)) ,  ' k o l i b o n d a s ' (swimming), ' p e t o n d a s '  
( f l y i n g ) ,  e tc .  The reverse ( in  terms o f  grammatical forms) is 
impossible:
(13) * k o l i b i s e  m e x r i  t o  v r a x o  p i y e n o n d a s
s/he swam up to the rock going.
I t  has to be explained at  th is  point  th a t  'manner' is understood here 
as re la te d  both to 'medium' and ' i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ' .  The term 'medium' 
is often used to ind ica te  the environment in which motion takes 
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the means/cause o f  motion, i . e .  human body, conveyance and perhaps 
g ra v i ty .  I t  must be noticed tha t  MG does not normally lex ica l  ize
ins trum enta l i ty  through cover terms such as English ' r i d e '  implying
moving by car,  fo r  instance,  or ' f l y 7 implying moving by plane.  Even 
' p l e o '  ( s a i l )  and i t s  hyponyms, e .g .  ' a p o p l e o '  ( s a i l  o f f /aw ay) ,  are 
mainly used to describe the motion of  the ship and r a r e ly  tha t  of  the 
people on board. In short ,  ins trum enta l i ty  is commonly expressed 
through PPs o f  the form: 'me t o  a e r o p l a n o / p l i o / a f t o k i n i t o '  (by plane/  
s h ip /c a r ) .  The same type of  PP is used in jux tap os i t ion  to the ones 
j u s t  mentioned to specify  ' f e e t '  as instrument, i . e .  'me t a  p o b j a '  
( ( l i t . )  with the f e e t ,  on f o o t ) .  S t r i c t l y  speaking, th is  la s t  
expression does not d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between running and walking but i t  
is in fac t  the l a t t e r  kind of  motion which is b a s ic a l ly  implied,  
since 'walk '  is the unmarked member o f  the p a i r ,  i . e .  the commonest 
way of  changing location  (on land and) on foot .
The interdependence of 'medium' with ' i n s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  and 'manner' 
is also f a i r l y  c le a r ,  although 'medium' cannot be completely subsumed 
under 'manner' in the way tha t  ' in s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  can. Notice,  fo r  a 
s t a r t ,  th a t  the ma jor i ty  of  'body involvement' CL non-causatives 
imply ' l a n d '  as a medium (e .g .  ' s e r n o m e '  (c reep) ,  ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  
down), ' s k a r f a l o n o ' ( c l im b ) ) .  Some o f  them imply ' loss  o f  contact
with ground' and may be considered as involving both land and a i r  as 
'medium', e .g .  'p i b a o '  ( jump).
A number of  verbs e x is t  fo r  which 'water '  as 'medium' needs to be 
spec i f ied .  Verbs implying motion i n / in t o  water are,  fo r  instance,  
' v i B i z o m e '  ( s in k ) ,  ' v u l j a z o j '  ( s in k ) ,  ' v u t a o j ' ( d iv e ) .  Verbs 
implying motion on/ in  water are: ' k o l i b a o '  (swim), ' p l e o '  ( s a i l ) ,  
' a r m e n i z o ' ( s a i l  about) ,  e tc .  There are also examples of  verbs 
implying motion out o f  water: ' a n a f i i o m e '  (emerge (out o f  water) ,
break water ) .  Two of these verbs require  special  mention: ' v u t a o i '  
(d ive)  and ' k o l i b a o '  (swim). Besides motion in water,  among other
things,  ' v u t a o j '  (d ive)  implies ' loss o f  contact with ground' and can 
be there fore  understood as an in between case, a cross of two 
mediums: land and water; i t  is also t y p i c a l l y  (although not
necessar i ly)  l inked to human body motion. The l a t t e r  verb,  i . e .
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' k o l i b a o '  (swim) is probably the only central  case o f  'manner' and
'body involvement' ,  though i t  also characterizes the motion of  f i s h .
The remaining verbs could, in p r in c ip le ,  be used fo r  d i f f e r e n t  types 
of objects moving, and the 'manner' o f  motion can, in t h e i r  case, be 
understood as the re s u l t  of  the combination o f  'water '  (as medium) 
and 'kind of  object '  moving, but nothing more sp ec i f ic  than th a t .  I t  
is there fore  arguable,  th a t  with the exception of  ' k o l i b a o '  (swim)
and perhaps ' v u t a o j '  (d ive)  and i t s  near-synonym 'kataS/oroe', the
remaining verbs do not r e a l l y  specify 'manner' of motion but other  
propert ies  such as 'medium', ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ' ,  'purpose' ,  ' type of  
object moving' .
S im i la r  considerations are appl icable in the case of  verbs which 
require  ' a i r '  as medium. The counterpart  o f  ' k o l i b a o '  (swim) is 
' p e t a o j '  ( f l y )  in th is  area, which implies 'body involvement' and 
spec i f ic  'manner' of  motion fo r  birds but is otherwise s im i la r  to 
' p l e o '  ( s a i l )  in th a t  i t  is  also used fo r  other kinds of  objects 
moving in the a i r ,  t y p i c a l l y  planes, marginal ly  objects in them. 
Verbs l i k e  ' a p o y i o n o m e '  ( take o f f )  and ' p r o s y i o n o m e '  ( land) involve  
two mediums, land and a i r  ( s im i l a r l y  to ' v u t a o j '  ( d i v e ) ) .  The same 
applies to a l l  the verbs implying ' impetus'  or 'p ro p e l le n t  motion' ,  
e .g .  ' e k t o k s e v o m e '  (be launched),  ' t i n a z o m e '  (spring up),  e tc .  This 
l a s t  group is a fu r t h e r  example of  problems of  general
c la s s i f i c a t io n s ,  or ra th e r  t h e i r  subjective  character .  Verbs
implying ' impetus' can be c la s s i f i e d  under 'manner' ,  'change of  
medium' ( i f  such a category needs to be invented) ,  'absence of
accompaniment' or 'g e n e r a l - d i r e c t io n a l ' motion. Not ice,  fu r th er ,  
th a t  ' loss  of  contact with ground' is also applicable  to ' p i S a o '
( jump), ' x o r o p i b a o '  (hop) and the l i k e .
The point o f  view of  the c la s s i f i c a t io n  is necessar i ly  a matter of  
choice,  unless a p r io r  analysis of  sp ec i f ic  items to  be c la s s i f ie d  
reveals which propert ies  are more s a l ie n t  than others,  e .g .  
whether, fo r  instance,  the property of  'manner' (clambering motion) 
is more s a l ie n t  in ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (climb) than the property o f  'upward' 
d i re c t io n  or vice versa. At th is  point ,  d i f f e r e n t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of
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c la s s i f i c a t io n  are presented with a view to accommodating propert ies  
which are here understood as l inked to 'manner' of  motion. 'Medium', 
' in s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  and ' impetus' are regarded as being most close ly  
re la ted  to 'manner' in the sense th a t  t h e i r  in te rac t io n  resul ts  in 
various types of  locomotion. Reference to ' type o f  ob jec t '  moving 
has also been made in th is  connection. I t  is conceivable tha t  a 
general c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  should be based on ' type o f  ob ject '  moving, 
since a l o t  of  'manner' d is t in c t io n s  depend on i t .  The most 
prominent examples involve verbs describing the motion o f  l i q u id s /  
masses, e .g .  ' s t a z o '  ( d r i p ) ,  ' x i n o m e ' ( f low in to ,  be s p i l l e d ) .  
Notice,  also,  th a t  d i f fe rences  in 'speed' exempl if ied through 
subordinate leve l  items such as ' a r y o s a l e v o '  ( s t i r  s l o w l y / s l i g h t l y ) ,  
' a n o k i l a o '  ( f low s lowly ) ,  ' t a x i p l o o 1 ( s a i l  r a p id ly ) ,  e tc .  should 
also be subsumed under 'manner' in the understanding o f  'manner' 
posited at  the beginning of  th is  section as the most r e s t r ic te d  one. 
Other examples of  high s p e c i f i c i t y  involve ' length  of  distance  
covered' as exhib i ted  by hyponyms of  'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) such as 
' p o r e v o m e '  (walk a long distance) and combinations of  'speed and 
length '  present in verbs l i k e  ' v r a S i p o r o ' (walk a long distance  
s lo w ly ) .
Following M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird's (1976:550) terminology,  we could 
consider verbs such as 'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) ,  ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  ' s e r n o m e '  
(crawl,  creep),  ' s k a r f a l o n o ' (cl imb) and ' k o l i b a o ' (swim) as 
re fe r r in g  to "main global  locomotory motions". The equivalent  
English verbs have received extensive treatment in many d i f f e r e n t  
ways and the exerc ise  is not worth repeating fo r  MG verbs.  Specif ic  
points o f  various approaches are,  however, worth discussing in order  
to show the d i f fe rences  between them and Prototype theory.
A possible approach to th is  p a r t i c u la r  set o f  verbs is presented by 
Leech (1969:189) who establ ishes a "mul t iple  taxonomic system" of the 
form:
1 LOCO 2 LOCO
'walk '  ' run 'run
3 LOCO etc .  
' c r a w l '
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The f i r s t  two examples correspond to 'go on f o o t ' ,  the t h i r d  one to  
'go on a l l  fo u r s ' .  The terms 1 LOCO, 2 LOCO, e t c . ,  stand fo r
d i f f e r e n t  ways o f  changing location  without involvement of  any
external  instrument. Such an approach concentrates on the s tructura l  
re la t io n s  o f  the items in question and seems to be consistent with 
the p r in c ip le  of  the 'maximally general ,  minimal s p e c i f ic a t io n s '  (see 
Chapter 1 ) .  I t  is f a i r l y  easy to show tha t  anything more spec i f ic  
than such incomplete d e f in i t io n s  r isks v io la t in g  th is  p r in c ip le .  I t  
can be also argued that  even lengthy and comprehensive accounts of  
the verbs in question re s u l t  in incomplete and unsat isfactory
d e f in i t io n s  i f  they are governed by the ideals of  neat formulae and
maximal g e n era l i za t io n .  Consider f i r s t ,  as a case in point ,  M i l l e r  
and Johnson-Laird's (1976:547-53) account o f  'w a lk ' .  The motion 
lab e l led  by 'walk '  is analysed in a complex of  lower level  bodily  
movements, such as l i f t i n g  a foot  from the ground and moving the 
other one in f ro n t  of i t  while simultaneously moving the body forward 
and changing i t s  centre o f  g ra v i ty ,  e tc .  To d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between 
' run '  and 'w a lk ' ,  M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird ( i b i d . )  introduce a 
component ATG which stands fo r  'always touching ground' , re fe rs  to 
' f e e t '  and is part  o f  the sp ec i f ica t io n  of  the l a t t e r  verb but not of  
the former one. ATG is meant as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  "how manner of  
t r a v e l l i n g  can be incorporated" and is assumed to denote "the 
appropriate pattern  o f  muscular coordination stored in act ion memory" 
( p . 552).  Hence the formula fo r  walk amounts simply to:
(WITH (ATG (ACT))) (x, S, FEET) & CAUSE (S, (on (TRAVEL)) (x,  LAND))
To make the d e f i n i t i o n  maximally general ,  a proposal is added to the 
e f fe c t  tha t  'on land'  can be removed. The actual j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
provided is th a t  we have no t rouble  understanding "walking on a i r "  or 
walking on water ( i b i d . ) .  Consequently there is no spec i f ica t ion  
of d i rec t io n a l  o r ie n ta t io n  and no impl icat ions as to dest ina t ion ,  
cont inu i ty  and r e g u l a r i t y  of  motion. The possible r e la t io n  o f  manner 
specify ing verbs with d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  w i l l  be discussed in some 
d e t a i l ,  fol lowing a b r i e f  considerat ion of  other c h ara c te r is t ic s  of  
some of these verbs.  At th is  point ,  s u f f ice  i t  to notice that  
d e f in i t io n s  such as the one ju s t  presented, besides being incomplete,  
also mix general with proto typica l  information.  I t  is not obvious
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why ' f e e t ' ,  fo r  instance,  should be included and 'on land' need not; 
one can p e r fe c t ly  understand 'walking on one's hands' and such a 
s i tu a t io n  is perhaps less un l ike ly  than 'walking on w a te r ' .
The i n e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  concentrat ing on the typ ica l  instances of  the  
occurrence o f  such verbs is also apparent in analyses which are 
completely unrelated to Prototype theory and are in essence contrast -  
based in keeping with the s t r u c t u r a l i s t  t r a d i t i o n .  Consider, as a 
f u r t h e r  example, Nida (1975:73-82) who s ta r ts  with the pre l iminary  
r e s t r i c t i o n  th a t  his analysis should be appl icable to the movement of  
persons. Nida is in search of diagnostic features o f  the meaning of  
a small set o f  semantical ly re la ted  verbs such as ' r u n ' ,  'w a lk ' ,  
'hop ' ,  ' s k i p ' ,  ' jump',  'dance' and ' c r a w l ' .  The resu l t ing  
presentat ion of  the contrasts exh ib ited by these verbs is in the form 
of  an extremely d e ta i le d  matrix involving the nature of  the contact  
of  limbs with the ground and features such as number of limbs used, 
order of  contact,  whether one or another limb is always in contact or 
no limb is in contact at a l l  at times.
The extreme d e ta i l  o f  the descr ipt ion is i t s e l f  i n d ic a t iv e  of  the 
f a c t  th a t  s p ec i f ic  instances ra ther  than a maximally general p ic ture  
of the motions in question are being analysed plus the addit ional  
requirement tha t  contrasts be brought about at  every single point  and 
at the cost o f  including information which is i r r e le v a n t  fo r  the 
understanding and correct  use o f  the items in question.  Once again 
mixing general with s p ec i f ic  information seems in e v i ta b le .  Notice,  
fo r  instance,  th a t  the spec i f ica t ion  of  ' ru n '  involves: '2 limbs
used' ,  ' a l t e r n a t i v e  order of  contact with ground' and 'no limb in 
contact at  t imes'  which is the only point  on the matrix  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  ' ru n '  from 'w a lk ' .  The r e s t r i c t i o n  to persons, 
however, necessitates  a spec i f ica t ion  o f  '2 l imbs'  ra ther  than a more 
general one involv ing 'any limbs which are normally in contact with  
ground' .
S t r u c t u r a l i s t  analyses y ie ld  be t te r  resu l ts  when they compare verbs 
which contrast more dram at ica l ly ,  e .g .  ' run '  and 'walk '  compared to 
' r o l l '  and 'c r e e p ' .  The main contrasts in terms of perceptual
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propert ies  can be d i r e c t l y  borrowed from such analyses for  the 
descr ipt ion o f  s im i la r  MGMVs and construed as conditions of  
app l ica t ion .  Examples w i l l  be of fered however to show that not a l l  
propert ies have a contrast ive  value fo r  a whole set o f  verbs and tha t  
some of  the non-contrastive ones are qu ite  re levant  fo r  the 
understanding o f  the items in question.
Change-of - location,  c on t inu i ty  of  the motion and contact with ground 
are common c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  ' t r e x o '  ( ru n ) ,  'p e r p a t a o '  (walk) ,
'  k i l a o j '  ( r o l l )  and ' s e r n o m e '  (c reep) .  The points of  contrast  
involve 'continuous contact '  fo r  the two l a s t  verbs ra the r  than 
' i n t e r m i t t e n t  contact '  which characterizes the f i r s t  pa i r  and 'whole 
body/main part  o f  the body in contact '  ra ther  than 'e x t rem i t ie s  of  
limbs ( f e e t ) ' .  A property such as 'continuous series  of  points in 
contact with ground' juxtaposed to 'any p a r t /p o r t io n  of  the body in 
contact '  can also be evoked in a s t r u c t u r a l i s t  analysis to 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between ' k i l a o j '  ( r o l l )  and ' s e r n o m e '  (c reep).
Notice,  however, th a t  a l o t  more information is necessary which need 
not be contrast ive  even w i th in  th is  small subset. The verb ' k i l a o j '  
( r o l l )  is scarcely appl icable  to human body motion, as i t  requires a 
round object moving and implies 'smooth' motion, a t  le a s t  in i t s  
prototypical  uses. I t  is t y p i c a l l y  used fo r  the motion o f  a b a l l ,  
fo r  instance, and in case the object is not p e r fe c t ly  round and 
smooth (e .g .  a barrel  ra ther  than a b a l l )  the verb also invokes the 
pic ture  o f  a re c l in in g  surface or obvious external  in s t ig a t io n  of  the 
motion. A fu r t h e r  property,  which characterizes th is  motion and 
under which the condition of  'smoothness' can be subsumed, is 
' r e g u l a r i t y ' ,  which seems re levant to a number o f  verbs of  th is  
domain. Points o f  contrast between ' k i l a o j '  ( r o l l )  and ' k a t r a k i l a o '  
( r o l l  down) include ' r e g u l a r i t y '  and 'smoothness' which are absent in 
the l a t t e r  verb. Besides these propert ies ,  ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  down) 
also involves 'downward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  to human body, and 
t y p i c a l l y  ' loss of  equ i l ib r ium ' and ' g r a v i t y '  as the cause o f  motion. 
'Continuous contact with ground' is ,  as already mentioned, a shared 
property o f  these two verbs with ' s e r n o m e ' (c reep) .  'Body 
involvement' as a sole means of  change-of- location can be considered 
as a point  of  contrast  between ' s e r n o m e '  and the aforementioned
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verbs.  Other proper t ies ,  present at  le a s t  in i t s  prototypical  
instances,  such as ' r e l a t i v e l y  slow motion' and CL which is not 
ty p ica l  fo r  humans, need not, however, be mentioned in connection 
with every other verb of  the set.  Further propert ies  w i l l  be 
discussed in connection with the te s t  resu l ts  in the fol lowing  
chapter.
In Chapter 2 on the S-P-E d i s t in c t io n ,  a basic d i f fe rence  was noticed 
between the verbs ju s t  discussed and 'p i b a o '  ( jump).  In simple terms 
th is  can be stated as a condition tha t  'p i b a o ' involves 'momentary' 
loss of  contact with ground. A fu r th e r  point  o f  contrast could be 
th a t  ' p i b a o '  (jump) is l inked with 'upward' d i r e c t io n ,  a property i t  
shares with 'x o r o p i b a o ' (hop). The motion described by ' p i b a o '  can 
be a 'punctual occurrence' or an a c t i v i t y  (ser ies  of  repeated jumps), 
while ' x o r o p i b a o ' (hop) is necessar i ly character ized by ' c o n t i n u i t y ' .  
An important prototypical  condition fo r  the app l ica t ion  of  both 
' p i b a o '  (jump) and ' x o r o p i b a o '  (hop) is th a t  they are not normally 
used fo r  covering a distance in order to reach some dest inat ion  on a 
non-vert ica l  ax is .  This condit ion seems to be a more prominent point  
of contrast with the other verbs already discussed, but is completely 
absent in the l i t e r a t u r e  as f a r  as I know. Including 'order  of 
contact '  in the s p ec i f ic a t io n  of  these verbs in order to contrast  
them (as Nida 1975 does) would be misleading: no p a r t i c u la r  order of  
contact seems to be c h a ra c te r is t ic  even of the proto typ ical  uses of  
' x o r o p i b a o '  (hop). The boundaries between ' p i b a o '  and ' x o r o p i b a o '  
are ev idently  fuzzy .  Concentrating on t h e i r  respective  prototypical  
conditions of  app l ica t ion  can bring out the essent ial  points of  
contrast which seem to be re la ted  to 'seriousness o f  purpose',  
' s in g le  vs repeated motion' and ' r e g u l a r i t y  o f  repeated jumps/hops'.  
I t  seems plausib le  to assume tha t  prototypical  condit ions fo r  the 
appl ica t ion  of  ' p i b a o '  (jump) involve moving over an obstacle in 
order to continue on one's course, t ry ing  to reach something high, or 
physical exercise ( re la te d  to regular  and repeated such motions).  
Compared to the proto typica l  instances o f  'x o r o p i b a o '  (hop) which 
involve 'motion fo r  recreational  purposes', those o f  ' p i b a o '  (jump) 
are 'marked' fo r  'seriousness o f  purpose'.  The points o f  overlap  
( i . e  the ' focus'  o f  fuzziness) become evident;  when c o n t in u i ty /
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r e p e t i t io n  and r e g u la r i t y  are present but (seriousness of)  purpose is  
in doubt, choice between the two verbs in question w i l l  be random.
Another 'manner' specify ing verb which can be only malt reated wi th in  
the framework of  contrast-based theor ies is ' x o r e v o '  (dance).  
Regular i ty  o f  motion, nature of  contact with ground, points of  
contact etc .  seem completely i r r e le v a n t  in th is  case. Nida (1975:75)  
provides a value fo r  a l l  the dimensions re levant  fo r  'walk '  or ' run '  
in analysing 'dance' ,  while M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:551)  
consider i t  an instance o f  a 's p e c ia l ized  mode' of  " t r a v e l l in g  by 
foot on land",  in the same subset with 'hop' and ' s k i p ' .  I t  is hard 
to see the relevance of such considerations fo r  the average speaker's  
competence with respect to th is  extremely id io sy n c ra t ic  verb.  
Although i t  implies 'continuous motion' ,  i t  is not used fo r  covering 
distance or reaching a dest ination but is c le a r l y  marked fo r  
'purpose' ( loosely  speci f ied  here as ' r e c r e a t i o n a l ' ) .  Stat ing th a t  
the motion involved is ' rhythmic'  does not amount to much e i th e r ;  
typ ica l  (and often marginal)  instances of  i t s  appl ica t ion  in terms of  
perceptual propert ies  can be only described in connection with  
spec i f ic  cu l tu res ,  a s i tu a t io n  not l i k e l y  to ar ise  in any other kind 
of  movement discussed so f a r .  R es tr ic t ion  to humans is  also part  of  
i t s  s p ec i f ic a t io n ;  the dancing o f  tra ined bears and courtship dances 
of birds can be safe ly  exclu ded even from general (as opposed to 
pro to typ ica l )  d e f in i t io n s ,  as extensions of meaning.
Two more 'bod i ly  movement' verbs w i l l  be discussed very b r i e f l y ,  
which necessi tate  a s p ec i f ica t io n  of  'medium' and are mentioned 
e a r l i e r  in th is  section in tha t  connection, namely ' k o l i b a o '  (swim) 
and 'p e t a o j ' ( f l y ) .  Notice th a t  a sp ec i f ic a t io n  of  limbs used, fo r  
instance,  is completely i r r e le v a n t  fo r  e i t h e r  o f  them. Nida 
(1975:79) includes ' fore l imbs used as a means of propulsion '  fo r  
' f l y ' ,  fo r  the sole purpose ( i t  seems to me) of  contrast ing i t  with  
other bodily movement verbs at every single  po int .  Evident ly  'wings'  
and not ' fo re l im bs '  ( in  general)  needs to go into  i t s  s p ec i f ic a t io n .  
Notice, also,  th a t  ' k o l i b a o '  (swim) is not mainly used fo r  reaching a 
dest ination  and tha t  i t s  d i re c t io n  is t y p i c a l l y  horizonta l  e spec ia l ly  
i f  appl ied to humans.
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General d e f in i t io n s  and contrast-based matrices cannot reveal  these 
proper t ies ,  which seem, however, central  to the understanding of  the 
verbs in question.  In fa c t ,  the re la t io n s  between ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  
and 'manner' are r a r e ly  ( i f  at  a l l )  taken in to  account, except fo r  
very obvious cases l i k e  tha t  of  'c l im b'  or ' jump'.  I t  seems, 
however, tha t  d i f f e r e n t  'manner' specifying motion verbs e x h ib i t  
d i f f e r e n t  degrees of  com p at ib i l i ty  with v e r t ic a l  and horizontal
d i r e c t io n .
I t  seems plausib le  to assume th a t  ' k o l i b a o ' (swim) applied to human 
motion is the most c h a ra c te r is t ic  case of  horizontal  d i rec t io n  since 
the motion i t  describes is t y p i c a l l y  executed on the surface of  the  
sea, i . e .  on near ly  zero gradient .  Swimming towards the bottom of  
the sea or from the bottom to the surface is less ty p ica l  and in most 
such cases verbs marked fo r  v e r t i c a l i t y  w i l l  be used instead,  i . e .
' k a t a b i o m e ' (d ive)  and ' a n a b i o m e ' (emerge (out of  w a t e r ) ) .  Motion in 
a l l  d i f f e r e n t  d i rec t io n s  w i th in  water as in scuba d iv ing ,  fo r  
instance,  arguably involves marginal instances o f  the verb's  
app l ic a t ion .
Motion in the a i r ,  i . e .  in ( three  dimensional) space expressed by 
' p e t a o j ' ( f l y )  is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  indeterminate as to d i rec t io n a l  
o r ie n ta t io n .  In pra c t ic a l  terms th is  means tha t  only completely
v e r t ic a l  d i rec t io n  may be specif ied with an expression marked fo r
v e r t i c a l i t y ,  i . e .  ' k a n o  v u t j a '  (d iv e ) .  In terms o f  proto typ ical
conditions of  appl ica t ion  ' p e t a o j '  can be said to be compatible with  
a v a r ie ty  of  d i f f e r e n t  d i rec t io n s ,  i . e .  not speci f ied fo r  ' t y p i c a l l y  
horizonta l  d i r e c t io n '  unl ike  ' k o l i b a o ' (swim).
Compared to these two verbs, 'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) is an in between case, 
i . e .  much less f l e x i b l e  than ' p e t a o j '  ( f l y )  but more so than 
' k o l i b a o ' (swim). I f  walking is  excecuted on qu ite  a precipi tous  
grade, a verb marked f o r  v e r t i c a l i t y  is l i k e l y  to be used instead,
i . e .  ' a n i f o r i z o ' (go u p h i l l ) .  Compared to 'p e r p a t a o ' (walk ) ,  
' s e r n o m e ' (creep,  crawl)  is more r e s t r ic te d  to horizontal  d i rec t io n  
fo r  obvious physiological  reasons, i . e .  owing to the physical
a b i l i t i e s  o f  the human body. A very precipi tous  grade w i l l
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necessitate use of  ' s k a r f a l o n o ' (cl imb) instead.  More accurately  
put,  i t  w i l l  push in the d i rec t io n  of  ' s k a r f a l o n o ' .
In a language such as MG which does not have separate lexemes for  
' creep'  and ' c r a w l ' ,  the boundaries between ' s e r n o m e '  (creep,  crawl)  
and ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb) are expectedly fuzzy and choice between the 
two verbs is bound to depend on how slopy the surface is ,  in marginal 
cases of  the use of  e i t h e r  of  them. The s i tu a t io n  is c le a r ly  
d i f f e r e n t  in the case o f  moving objects with physical a b i l i t i e s  other  
than those of  humans, e .g .  snakes, where ' s e r n o m e '  (creep) w i l l  
predictab ly  cover a wider area than ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (c l im b ) .  The l a t t e r  
verb w i l l  be only used in such cases, i f  the d i re c t io n  is completely 
v e r t ic a l  (e .g .  a snake going up a t r e e ) .
Gradation is also apparent in the case o f  verbs p ro to ty p ic a l ly  
understood as involv ing 'downward' d i rec t io n .  In a maximally general 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  ' y l i s t r a o '  ( s l i p ,  s l id e )  can be only unspecif ied as to 
v e r t i c a l i t y ,  but in i t s  proto typica l  uses, i t  c e r t a in ly  requires a 
condition of  'downward d i r e c t i o n ' .  Compared to 'y 7 i s t r a o j '  ( s l i p ,  
s l i d e ) ,  ' k i l a o j '  ( r o l l )  seems to be less marked fo r  'downward 
d i r e c t i o n ' .  In terms o f  p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  conditions,  th is  means that  
' y l i s t r a o '  is  a central  case of  'p r o t o ty p ic a l ly  downward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  
while ' k i l a o '  is less so. C lear ly ,  i f  the surface is completely 
v e r t i c a l ,  ne i ther  verb w i l l  be appl icable any more. The choice w i l l  
be re s t r ic te d  to ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l ) ,  ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  down) or some 
other 'downward' motion verb implying e i t h e r  ' i n t e r m i t t e n t  contact '  
with surface or ' loss  of  contact '  with supporting surface. Thus, i f  
one imagines a l i n e  leading from a completely horizonta l  to a 
competely v e r t ic a l  d i re c t io n ,  points along th is  l in e  can be occupied 
by various 'manner' specifying verbs in the fo l lowing sequence:
' k o l i b a o '  ' s e r n o m e '  ' p e r p a t a o '  ' p e t a o j '  ' k i l a o '  ' y l i s t r a o '  
HORIZONTAL     VERTICAL
A possible schematic representat ion of  the re la t io n s  of  
' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  and 'manner of  motion' exhib ited in some verbs 
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C lear ly ,  the above b r i e f  presentat ion only touches on the problem of  
combinabil i ty  between h o r i z o n ta l -v e r t ic a l  d i re c t io n  and 'manner' of  
motion. I t  is hoped, however, tha t  such an approach can be used and 
expanded so as to cover most 'manner' speci fying MVs as well as most 
'genera l '  motion ones.
4.3  Hierarchy o f  propert ies:  taxonomies and paradigms
I t  can be e a s i ly  shown tha t  almost any hierarchy which could be 
proposed as holding between 'major proper t ies '  would be a r b i t r a r y .  
I t  has also been argued here tha t  categor iza t ion  of  the same material  
depends heav i ly  on the angle from which the analyst wishes to look at  
i t  and the sor t  of  features s/he decides to use. This also implies  
th a t  h ie ra rch ica l  s t ruc tur ing  between 'minor p roper t ies '  is also 
a r b r i t r a r y ,  at  le a s t  to some extent .  The extent to which these 
claims are t rue  can be discussed at  th is  po int ,  since most of  the 
re levant propert ies  have been presented, analysed and exempl if ied .  
The purpose o f  th is  discussion is twofold.  I t  should f i r s t  show th a t
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in s t r u c t u r a l i s t  terms the f i e l d  under invest iga t ion  is probably what 
Lounsbury (1964:1086-7)  would consider 'n e i th e r  a genuine taxonomy 
nor a genuine paradigm' but closer to the l a t t e r  ra th e r  than the
former, unless no d is t in c t io n  is drawn between 'dimensions' and 
' f e a t u r e s ' .  I t  should secondly lead to the conclusion that  
discovering the ' r e l a t i v e  sal ience '  of  propert ies  is  a more
worthwhile task than discovering t h e i r  r e la t i v e  hierarchy,  since the 
former but not the l a t t e r  can come out of  spec i f ic  tests  e l i c i t i n g  
information from native speakers and g iv ing,  th e re fo re ,  a less 
a r b i t r a r y  p ic tu re .  A re la te d  issue,  which is also more in te res t in g  
than hierarchy of  proper t ies ,  is the 'n o n -a rb i t ra r in e s s '  of t h e i r  
combinations, which w i l l  be taken up in the fo l lowing section.
In 4.1 i t  is argued th a t  'major '  propert ies are often l inked with 
d i f f e r e n t  predications and d i f f e r e n t  forms of  the same verb,  so that  
both ' s t a t i v e '  and ' n o n - s t a t i v e ' , fo r  instance, may be appl icable  to 
' a n e v e n o '  (ascend). This w i l l  depend, among other th ings ,  on whether 
i t  appears in the P er f .b '  form as '/me a ne v as men os ' , or  in the 
P r e s . I f ,  form as ' a n e v e n o ' .  Even i f  we ignore such problems (along 
with the phenomenon of  gradation) and account only f o r  a p a r t ic u la r  
' p r i n c i p a l '  form o f  a verb,  i . e .  the P r e s . I f .  one, a s t r i c t  hierarchy  
seems impossible,  e spec ia l ly  i f  we also do away with the major-minor
features d is t in c t io n  adopted in the present study. Notice a number
o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  fo r  such features in the area under in ves t ig a t io n .





Instead o f  the above p lausib le  schema, one could also have:
POSITIONAL (vs NON POSITIONAL: e.g .  be vs th ink/have)
DYNAMIC (Move)
CAUSATIVE (Cause) NON-CAUSATIVE (Non-cause)
CAUSE CAUSE TRANSITIVE INTRANSITIVE
CHANGE- CHANGE-
OF-LOCATION OF-POSITION
A l t e r n a t i v e ly ,  CAUSATIVE could branch into AGENTIVE and NON-AGENTIVE 
and instead o f  CAUSE CHANGE-OF-POSITION above, one could have NON­
CAUSE CHANGE-OF-LOCATION (s t ick ing  to genuine s t r u c t u r a l i s t  
contrasts ) .  A possible branching of  th is  new category could be:
NON-CAUSE
CHANGE-OF-LOCATION
CAUSE NOT CAUSE CAUSE
CHANGE-OF-POSTURE CHANGE-OF-POSTURE CHANGE-OF-ORIENTATION















general manner impetus random walk
INTRANSITIVE
MOTIONAL NON-MOTIONAL
CHANGE OF CHANGE OF CHANGE OF POSITIONAL NON-POSITIONAL
LOCATION POSITION ORIENTATION
I t  is f a i r l y  uncontroversial  tha t  at  lea s t  some entailment  
re la t ionsh ips  can be detected as ex is t ing  between the propert ies  
under considerat ion.  Both CL and CP, fo r  instance,  do imply 
' m o t i o n a l ) '  and th is  order seems i r r e v e r s ib le .  Therefore some 
taxonomic s tructur ing  at  intermediate leve ls  can be envisaged.
In 4.1 i t  is also argued th a t  'genera l '  means simply 'not specifying  
manner' and does not suggest a h ierarchica l  connection between the 
two, so such a p o s s i b i l i t y  is ruled out.  This involves,  however, a 
broad understanding o f  'manner' as presented in 4 . 2 . 4 .  D i f f e r e n t  
understandings would obviously lead to d i f f e r e n t  c la s s i f i c a t io n s .  
Notice,  f u r t h e r ,  th a t  in 4 .2 .1  'g enera l '  CL is l inked to 
' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ' .  Where d i rec t io n a l  features stand in connection
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with 'g enera l '  and 'manner' s pec i f ica t ions  is ,  however, an open 
question.  I t  is a c tu a l ly  suggested in 4 .2 .4  tha t  ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  is 
also l inked with 'manner' .  Whether th is  is accepted or not,  the 
r e l a t i o n / r e l a t i v e  h ie ra rch ica l  order of  CL, CP and ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  
allows fo r  a number of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  not discussed y e t .  Although 
only CL is  usual ly analysed as involving d i rec t io n a l  proper t ies ,  i t  
can be shown tha t  CP can also subsume such components. Consider,  
f i r s t ,  some r e la t io n s  between CL and ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  which have been 
already hinted at  in previous sections:
CHANGE OF LOCATION
DIRECTIONAL <-------------------------------------> DIRECTIONAL
v e r t ic a l  (h o r iz o n ta l )  indeterminate \ \
o r ig in  and path dependent 
dest ination
As already pointed out in 4 . 2 . 2 ,  'accompaniment' could appear under 
'dependent' motion, or be understood in Gruber's (1965, 1976) sense, 
in which case i t  is a property o f  much higher leve l  involving goal,  
d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ,  e tc .  ' D i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  can also appear under CP. 
Verbs such as '/csap/ono^' ( l i e  down), ' s k i v o '  (bend),  ' s o r j a z o m e '  
(c o l lap se ) ,  involve 'downward d i r e c t io n '  in every possible use. 
Besides, 'kaQome^' ( s i t  down) is p r o to ty p ic a l ly  understood as 
involving 'downward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  i . e .  s i t t i n g  from a standing posit ion  
and less t y p i c a l l y  as involving 'upward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  i . e .  s i t t i n g  up 
from a ly ing  pos i t io n .  A d i f f e r e n t  verb ' anakaQome'  ( s i t  up) can be 
used in the l a t t e r  case, which obviously involves 'upward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  
as does also 'anap/bao'  (jump up).  A l l  these verbs are c la s s i f ie d  
under CP in L is t  V I I  and in p a r t i c u l a r ,  some o f  them are under 'CP 
re su l t in g  in d i f f e r e n t  posture'  while others appear under 'CP non­
resu l t ing  in d i f f e r e n t  pos ture ' .  Therefore ' d i r e c t i o n a l '  could be 
above CL and CP.
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In the previous section i t  is argued that  'change o f  o r ie n ta t io n '  
involving ' r o t a t i o n '  could be e i t h e r  on the same leve l  with CL and CP 
or under both as i t  involves verbs unspecified fo r  CL or CP. I t  is 
also suggested that  ' in s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  may be subsumed under 'manner'.  
Especia l ly  i f  no d is t in c t io n  is drawn between 'dimensions' and 
' f e a t u r e s ' ,  a number of  d i f f e r e n t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  e x is t ,  with respect  
to ' in s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  and 'medium'. They can be schematical ly  









FEET FEET & HANDS
These schemata are abbreviat ions of  'complete' versions in which most 
features under ' instrument'  would appear under each separate 'medium' 
sp ec i f ica t io n  and vice versa.  What is more important, ' ins trument '  
l in k s  up with 'ca use ' ,  so that  a confusion between higher and lower 
level  propert ies is again possible ( ignoring the p r inc ip les  suggested 
here as re levant  fo r  the d i s t i n c t io n ) .  Nevertheless, taxonomic 
re la t io n s  can be again detected,  with the proviso th a t  'dimensions'  
and ' f e a tu re s '  are not kept separate.  Notice,  fo r  instance,  that the 
hie ra rch ica l  order o f  whatever appears under BODY in the above schema 
cannot be reversed. Notice,  fu r th e r ,  tha t  features involv ing 'number 
of limbs used' or d i f f e r e n t  types o f  'contact with ground',  e .g .  
'continuous' ,  ' i n t e r m i t t e n t ' ,  e n ta i l  obviously 'contact with ground',  
but ' loss of  contact '  would then have to appear on a higher level  
than,  say, 'continuous contact '  and in p a r t i c u la r  on the same level  
with 'contact with ground' .
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Propert ies such as 'd is tance covering'  are also necessar i ly  lower 
than CL, and ' + / -  f a s t  motion' is lower than 'manner' in any 
understanding of  the l a t t e r .  In 4 .1 .3  a number o f  propert ies are 
mentioned which are re levant to  spec i f ic  verb taxonomies, such as 
those proposed fo r  hyponyms of  ' f e v \ o '  ( l e av e ) ,  e .g .  'negative  
connotat ion' ,  'going away from a group of  people ' ,  'changing country 
of residence' ,  e tc .  There can be l i t t l e  doubt that these propert ies  
are h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  lower than CL, 'dis tance cover ing ' ,  and 
' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ' ,  fo r  instance.  I t  is  not there fore  t rue  that  
features cannot be used to support the a t tes ted  h ierarch ica l  
structure  between hyponymically/ taxonomically re la te d  items (Rhodes 
1983).  Nida's taxonomy (discussed in 4 .1 )  is  not convincing because 
i t  involves terms which are probably on the same h ie ra rch ica l  l e v e l .  
I f  'p roper '  taxonomies are establ ished (and i t  is suggested in 4 .1 .3  
tha t  they can be only establ ished at a f a i r l y  low level  in th is  
f i e l d ) ,  features d is t inguish ing  lower from higher leve l  taxa ( in  the 
same taxonomy) do support the hierarchica l  s tructure ,  almost by 
d e f i n i t i o n .  The problem seems to be whether the attested di f ferences  
between a basic leve l  category and i t s  hyponyms can be construed in 
the form o f  ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  features,  i . e .  undescript ive ( i f  not 
p r im i t iv e )  one/two-word terms or not.  I t  is  suggested here that  
except fo r  few cases the answer is negative.
I t  is f u r t h e r  suggested th a t  the propert ies in question have a 
spec i f ic  h ie ra rch ica l  status only wi th in  spec i f ic  taxonomies. This 
means that there is no a p r io r i  reason why 'negative  connotat ion'  
should be lower than ' t r a n s i t i v i t y '  or 'non-causat ive ' ,  fo r  instance,  
except fo r  the major-minor propert ies d is t in c t io n  proposed here. 
Within taxonomy 5 ( L i s t  V I ) ,  'negative connotation'  is  used fo r  verbs 
such as ' k s e k u b i z o m e ' , ' s t r i v o ' and the l i k e ,  a l l  equiva lent to
' c le a r  o f f ' .  In th a t  p a r t i c u la r  taxonomy, i t  can be said to be even 
lower leve l  than some property:  'o ther  people in vo lv ed ' ,  also present 
in other hyponyms of  ' fevyo '  ( leave) such as ' a p o x o r o '  (withdraw) and 
' a p o s i r o m e '  ( r e t i r e ) .  Within taxonomy 11 (L is t  V I ) ,  i t  could be used 
to character ize  verbs such as ' k a t r a k i l a o '  and ' k u t r u v a l a o '  ( r o l l  
down) and i t  is f a i r l y  c le a r  th a t ,  in tha t  case, i t  has nothing to do 
with 'o ther  people invo lved ' .  Such considerations do not,  however, 
bear on how s a l ie n t  the property of  'negative connotat ion'  may be
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psycholog ica l ly . In the next chapter discussing te s t  re s u l ts ,  i t s  
r e l a t i v e  sal ience can be p a r t ly  assessed in connection with other  
propert ies ,  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  considered re levant f o r  MVs such as 
' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  and 'contact with ground'.  For the moment, a l l  that  
can be said is th a t  i t s  exact h ie rarch ica l  pos i t ion  cannot be 
independently determined.
In t r a d i t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  terms i t  must be noticed that  
paradigmatic s t ructur ing  is also exh ib i ted in the f i e l d  under 
in v es t ig a t io n .  Paradigms are exemplif ied by the pa i rs :
' b e n o '  (go in)  - ' v y e n o '  (go ou t ) ,
' v a z o '  (put in)  - ' v y a z o '  ( take out ) ,
' i s a y o ' ( import)  - ' e k s a y o ' (export)
' i s e r x o m e '  (en te r )  - ' e k s e r x o m e '  ( e x i t )
where only IN-OUT are contrasted.  S imi la r  paradigmatic r e la t io n s  are 
exhib i ted in the fo l lowing pairs:
' a n e v e n o '  (go up) - ' k a t e v e n o ' (go down)
' a n e v a z o '  ( take up) - ' k a t e v a z o ' ( take down)
' a n i f o r i z o ' (go u p h i l l )  - ' k a t i f o r i z o '  (go downhil l )
' i p s o n o ' ( r a is e )  - ' x a m i l o n o '  ( lower)
' a n e r x o m e '  (ascend) - ' k a t e r x o m e '  (descend)
D e ic t ic  pa irs  e x h ib i t  also paradigmatic re la t io n s :
' p i y e n o j '  (go) - ' e r x o m e '  (come)
/ p i y e n o 2 / ( take to )  - ' fer/?o' (bring)
I t  seems, however, th a t  ' f e v y o '  ( leave) can be also contrasted to
' e r x o m e ' (come) and ' s t e l n o ' (send) to ' f e r n o '  (b r in g ) ,  although more
than a 's in g le  fe a ture  contrast '  is involved.
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The psychological v a l i d i t y  of  some of  these patterns and propert ies  
w i l l  be discussed in the fol lowing chapter.
4.4 Motion verbs and the non-arb i trar iness of  categories
Mervis and Rosch (1981:91-2)  present evidence to show tha t  a t t r ib u te s  
(p roper t ies )  are not combined a r b i t r a r i l y  to form i tem s .7 i f  the
opposite were t rue  a l l  combinations of  a t t r i b u t e  values would be 
equally  l i k e l y  to occur. Mervis and Rosch's ( i b i d . )  i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  
th is  issue involves the propert ies normally used in c la ss i fy in g  
animals, i . e .  "coat" ( f u r ,  fe a thers ) ,  "oral opening" (mouth, beak) 
and "primary mode of locomotion" ( f l y in g ,  on fo o t ) .  I f  animals were 
created according to a model contending th a t  the d iv is io n  of  real  
world objects in to  categories is o r i g i n a l l y  a r b i t r a r y ,  one would 
expect e ight d i f f e r e n t  types/combinations,  e .g . :
animals with f u r  and mouths moving p r im ar i ly  on foot
animals with f u r  and mouths moving p r im ar i ly  by f l y in g
animals with fu r  and beaks moving p r im a r i ly  on foot
etc.
I t  is  f a i r l y  evident tha t  the perceived world of  objects is not 
a c tu a l ly  structured in th is  manner. Only two of  the eight  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  possible combinations of  a t t r ib u t e  values "comprise the 
great m a jor i ty  o f  ex is te n t  species in the world th a t  are possible 
based on th is  to t a l  set" ( i b i d . ) ,  i . e .  mammals ( f u r ,  mouth, f e e t ) ,  
and birds ( fea th ers ,  beak, f l y i n g ) .  I t  would, in f a c t ,  be more 
accurate to say th a t  creatures with feathers and mouths moving
pr im ar i ly  on foot are not l i k e l y  ( i f  at a l l )  to occur and that  
creatures with feathers  and beaks moving p r im a r i ly  on foo t ,  although 
they do occur (e .g .  chicken),  are quite expectedly judged by subjects 
as marginal instances o f  the re levant superordinate category,  i . e .  
' b i r d ' .
In the area o f  MVs the 'n o n -a rb i t ra r in e s s '  o f  categories is equal ly  
( i f  not more) obvious, although i t  is perhaps of  a d i f f e r e n t  nature.  
Propert ies such as ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y ' , 'animacy' ,  'presence of
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supporting s u r fa c e ' ,  ' l i q u i d  moving o b je c t ' ,  e tc .  w i l l  combine or not 
in an even less a r b i t r a r y  and q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  way from 
a t t r ib u te s  observed in d iscre te  objects.  Combinations in th is  f i e l d  
depend, to a large extent ,  on the laws of  physics,  besides the 
natural c h ara c te r is t ic s  of  moving objects,  e .g .  the natural  
p ote n t ia ls  o f  human beings as moving organisms. The issue is both 
broad and complex, so that  tack l ing  i t  in any d e ta i l  would lead 
beyond the scope o f  the present inves t iga t ion .  I t  seems, however, 
worthwhile point ing out a number of  se l f -exp lanatory  cases in support 
of Rosch's p r in c ip le  from an area of  the vocabulary which is 
completely d i f f e r e n t  from the ones Rosch and her col leagues have 
dea l t  with so f a r .  The p r in c ip le  seems to me to give a new prospect 
to le x ic a l  semantic analysis ,  which has so fa r  handled re la t ions  
between co-ex is t ing  propert ies  in the form o f  enta i lments.
Consider as an example ' impetus' as a c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f  a number of  
causatives of  motion such as ' petac>2 '  ( throw) ,  ' e k s f e n b o n i z o '  ( h u r l ) .  
Presence of ' impetus' can be said to imply 'absence of  accompaniment' 
or ' loss of  c o n ta c t ' .  This r e la t io n  can be handled through 
entailment or semantic l e x ic a l  redundancy rules (although th is  
pract ice  is not applied in the treatments of  MVs th a t  I know o f ) .  
The combination of  ' impetus' with ' loss o f  contact '  may in other  
words be considered a necessary / inev itable  one. The same applies to  
the r e la t io n  o f  ' impetus' with some property we could c a l l  'speed ' /  
' energy ' .  I t s  combination with ' t r a v e l  through a i r '  i s ,  however, a 
less necessary one, since objects can be 'h ur led '  while in water, 
from the surface o f  water into i t ,  e tc .  Within the framework of  
prototype theory ' t r a v e l  through a i r '  should feature  as part  of  the 
combinatorial  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  ' impetus' .  Within the framework of  
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  conditions approaches ' t r a v e l  through a i r '  
appears usual ly  as a separate property,  unrelated to ' impetus ' .
The property of  'continuous'  motion is c le a r l y  combinable with  
' r e g u la r / re p ea te d '  or the notion of  'random walk' as exemplif ied in 
' p e r i  p i  an j e r ne '  (wander) and the l i k e .
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'L iq u id ' / 'm a s s '  as type of  moving object co-occurs normally with  
'downward' ra the r  than 'upward' d i re c t io n ,  unless ' impetus' is 
involved.  The l a t t e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  does e x is t  but is somehow marked/ 
marginal.  The point here is tha t  verbs r e s t r ic te d  to describing the 
motion of  l iqu id s  only,  e .g .  ' s t a z o '  ( d r ip ) ,  'x i n o m e ' (be s p i l le d )  
are more l i k e l y  than not to also involve 'downward' motion. An 
apparent exception to th is  is provided by the verb ' a t i a v l i z o ' (gush 
out) which, however, may be also thought to involve ' im petus ' /  
'energy' and can there fore  hardly be cal led  an exception.  This verb 
is  an example of  the co-occurrence of  'upward' and 'outward' which 
although f a r  from necessary, i t  is c e r t a in ly  much commoner than that  
of 'outward' and 'downward', espec ia l ly  in the case o f  'water '  as the 
medium of  motion ( f o r  obvious reasons).  C ha ra c te r is t ic  examples of  
these combinations are ' a n a f i i o m e ' t which involves 'out o f  water and 
upward' and ' k a t a b i o m e ' which involves ' i n t o  water and downward'. I t  
is  also in te re s t in g  to notice th a t  although there e x is t  verbs which 
combine 'up'  and 'out o f ' ,  e .g .  ' k s e p e t a y o m e ' (jump out o f ,  appear 
suddenly out o f ) ,  the combination o f  'up'  and ' i n t o '  does not 
m a te r ia l i z e  in any MGMV.
Quite ev ident ly  motion into water w i l l  also be 'downward', a 
combination exemplif ied in verbs such as ' v i Q i z o m e ' / ' v u l j a z o '  (s in k ) ,
' k a t a S i o m e ' / ' v u t a o ' (d iv e ) ,  and the l i k e .  A g e nera l iza t ion  ( i f  not 
an explanation) o f  these simple observations is the obvious 
combination of  g ra v i ty  as the cause of motion with 'downward 
d i r e c t i o n ' .  I f  the moving object lacks a self-moving (henceforth SM) 
mechanism, i t s  motion is more l i k e l y  than not to have 'downward' 
ra ther  than 'upward' d i re c t io n ,  unless there is an external  cause 
involved such as ' impetus ' ,  'accompaniment', e tc .  In short ,  '-SM'  
combined with absence of  an obvious external  cause is na tu ra l ly  
combinable with 'downward' d i re c t io n .
The natural  a b i l i t i e s  of  the human body being f a i r l y  l im i ted  to 
s pec i f ic  kinds of  change of locat ion ,  a number o f  th e o r e t i c a l l y  
possible combinations are ruled out. Three examples w i l l  be 
provided. Notice th a t  a sp ec i f ic a t io n  o f  ' f e e t '  as ' ins trument '  
(means o f  propulsion) combines with ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  and 'ground as 
supporting s u r fa c e ' .  Absence o f  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  does not combine
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ea s i ly  with 'upward d i r e c t i o n ' ,  but is f a i r l y  common in connection 
with 'downward d i r e c t i o n ' , e .g .  ' y l i s t r a o ' ( s l i p ) ,  ' k a t r a k i l a o '  ( r o l l  
down), ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l  (down)), ' g r e m i z o m e '  (co l lap s e ) .  'Dependent 
motion' is l inked with ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  as typ ica l  o f  animate moving 
objects,  e spec ia l ly  in the case of  motion ' a f t e r '  a person, e .g .
' k a t a d i o k o ' (chase), ' k i n i y a o ' (hunt, run a f t e r ) ,  ' a k o l u Q o ' ( f o l lo w ) .
In general ,  'manner' of  motion is  l inked to ' a g e n t i v i t y ' . Notice the
case o f  'p e r p a t a o ' f r e x o ' ,  ' s k a r f a l o n o \  'p /Sao ' ,  and a l l  t h e i r  
hyponyms, where the sp ec i f ic  'manner' o f  motion involved is a 
concomitant fa c to r  o f  ' a g e n t i v i t y ' .
A s p ec i f ica t io n  of  ' f e e t  and arms' as ' instrument'  is r a r e ly  ( i f  at  
a l l )  combinable with completely 'downward' d i re c t io n .  In section
4 .2 .4  i t  is argued th a t  the gradient o f  the in c l in e  o f  the surface on 
which the motion is executed l im i t s  the number of  possible
combinations with d i f f e r e n t  types of  human body motion. Some of  the 
observations made there  can be r e - in te rp re te d  in terms o f  the 'non­
a rb i t ra r in e s s  o f  c a te g o r ie s ' .  At th is  stage,  where none of these 
observations are elaborated on, choice between d i f f e r e n t  
in te rp re ta t io n s  or representat ions would be premature.
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Notes on Chapter 4
1. I f  one compares d i f f e r e n t  forms of  the same verb,  e .g .  ' im e  
anevasmen i  ' ( I  am ascended/mounted on) and ' a n e v e n o ' ( I  am going 
up/ascend),  one could say th a t  the former is ' l e ss  motional '  than 
the l a t t e r  (as aready argued in Chapter 2 ) .  P a r t ic ip le s  l i k e  
' ime a n e v a s m e n o s - i ' receive the most s ta t iv e  in te r p r e t a t io n  that  
can be possibly a t t r ib u te d  to a MV. Besides, i t  is possible to 
consider th a t  CL verbs such as 'p i y e n o ' (go) are 'more motional '  
than CP ones involv ing 'p a r t i a l  motion' such as ' s a l e v o '  (move 
s l i g h t l y ,  s t i r ) .
2. In the f i e l d  under investiga tion  'c s u s a t i v i t y '  may be thought of  
as a ' c r i t e r i a ! '  ( ra th e r  than a graded) property;  i t  is mainly  
understood here as equivalent to 'motion due to external  
f a c t o r s ' .  In Chapter 3 i t  is ,  however, shown t h a t  the issue is 
in general ( i . e .  i r resp ect ive  o f  the s pec i f ic  semantic f i e l d )  a 
controversial  one. I t  is arguable th a t  ' h i t ' ,  f o r  instance,  is 
probably ' le ss  causative'  than ' k i l l ' ,  since in the former case 
i t  is not obvious what the change of  condition o f  the object is .  
Within the f i e l d  of  MVs i t  is shown also th a t  there  is at  lea s t  a 
dif fe rence  in degree o f  causation between ' d i r e c t '  and ' i n d i r e c t '  
causatives and th a t  gradation may be detected both w i th in  the 
manipulat ive and the non-manipulat ive kind o f  causation.  In 
short ,  there  is good reason to bel ieve tha t  ' c a u s a t i v i t y '  i t s e l f  
should be regarded as graded.
3. I am not saying th a t  Nida is suggesting any such absurdity.  I am 
simply t ry in g  to show what the resu l ts  would be i f  we were to  
push things to t h e i r  log ica l  conclusions.
4. The lexicon of  MG bears witness to a 'd ig lo s s ic '  s o c io l in g u is t ic  
past (see Ferguson 1959, Kazazis 1982).  Present day Greek as 
used by most speakers involves a large number o f  'katharevousa'  
elements which cannot be ignored.  Kazazis (1982:111) observes
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th a t  many forms which were o r i g i n a l l y  'katharevousa'  are "part o f  
the vernacular of  some, and sometimes most, speakers o f  Greek", 
and th a t  the combinations o f  o r i g i n a l l y  ' katharevousa' elements 
present in the speech of educated Greeks d i f f e r  from one i d i o le c t  
to another. What consti tutes standard ' d i m o t i k i ' ,  in other  
words the standard language spoken in large  c i t i e s  (or 'Koine Nea 
E l l i n i k i ' )  is s t i l l  a matter of  great debate.  Therefore,  the
judgments expressed here are in part sub ject ive ,  although my
in t u i t io n s  were constantly checked against those o f  other native  
speakers and a l o t  o f  use was made of  the materia l  drawn from the  
newspapers, magazines and books mentioned in 1 .4 .  I consider  
tha t  there would be l i t t l e  disagreement as to the status of  items
marked SI and S3. The former are d i s t i n c t l y  ' l e a r n e d ' ,  of
'katharevousa'  o r ig in ,  and t h e i r  use is r e s t r i c t e d  to the speech 
of educated speakers. The l a t t e r  are l inked to 'popular '  o r ig in ,  
l i t e r a r y  use or r e s t r ic te d  to ' ru ra l  speech'.
5. This observation can be associated with Verschueren's (1981:336’ 
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Verschueren observes tha t  the
"inhabi tants  of  some pigeon-in fested European c i t i e s  may be 
expected to have PIGEON as a basic leve l  term fo r  pigeons 
and BIRD fo r  a l l  other bi rds".
Verschueren intends th is  as an example of  the fa c t  that there is 
no simple correspondance between cognit ive  structure  and 
bio log ica l  hierarchy.  There is ,  however, an a l t e r n a t i v e  way of  
in te rp re t in g  i t .  For c i t y  dwellers in genera l ,  'pigeon'  is 
l i k e l y  to be the most c h a ra c te r is t ic  bi rd they know, i . e .  the  
most proto typ ica l  member of  the category ' b i r d ' .  I t  may 
there fore  acquire 'basic  l e v e l '  status,  i . e .  genera l ize  through 
moving one leve l  up.
6. The notion o f  incorporation of  abst rac t,  formal components is 
a l ien  to the th e o re t ic a l  framework adopted in the present study.  
Nevertheless, the semantic information associated with  
d i r e c t i o n a l / lo c a t i v e  Advs can be ' t r a n s la t e d '  in to  descr ip t ive  
and ' in fo rm a l '  appropriateness conditions in a f a i r l y  
stra ight forward manner.
7. This is the most conscise presentat ion o f  material  and 
conclusions also included in other works of  Rosch, e .g .  Rosch 
(1976) repr in ted  in Johnson-Laird (1977).
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5. ELICITING INFORMATION FROM NATIVE SPEAKERS
5.1 Semantic s i m i l a r i t y  sor t ing tasks and c lu s te r  analysis
As already demonstrated, the semantic information per ta in ing  to the 
verbs under considerat ion is both complex and of  d i f f e r e n t  types.  No 
analysis or c la s s i f i c a t i o n  can encompass i t  a l l ,  no matter how 
de ta i led  i t  may be. I t  is also suggested t h a t  the overal l  
organizat ion of  the domain is complex and th a t  s p ec i f ic  patterns can 
be shown to depend on the items chosen. By im pl ica t ion ,  any tests  
which might be set up to e l i c i t  information on s tructur ing  and 
propert ies  from native  speakers w i l l  be of  l im i t e d  use. The 
necessity,  however, o f  obtaining such information has been stressed 
at many points throughout the preceding discussion.  Besides, there  
is a l o t  of  evidence from a number o f  studies,  t h a t  part  of  the 
information in the subjective  lexicon can be revealed through 
semantic s i m i l a r i t y  sor t ing tasks and p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  t e s t s . * Both 
types of  tes ts  are there fore  used and t h e i r  resu l ts  w i l l  be reported  
and discussed in what fo l lows.
In semantic s i m i l a r i t y  sort ing tasks (henceforth SST) subjects are 
asked to group together items which they consider to be more close ly  
re la ted  in meaning than they are with other items o f  the set of fered  
to them. They are th ere fore  required to understand the meanings of  
these items in whatever way ava i lab le  to them and to weight and 
combine such c r i t e r i a ,  i . e .  to decide on t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  importance, 
in whatever way they deem f i t .  The general idea is that such 
information cannot be extracted d i r e c t l y  and tha t  inferences can be 
made on the basis o f  a careful  considerat ion o f  the resu l t ing  
clusters  of  i tems. One of the methods o f  processing the data 
obtained from indiv idual  subjects'  groupings has been extensively  
used by M i l l e r  (1969,  1971, 1972),  Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971),  
Long (1975) and others.  I t  involves tabula t ing  co-occurrences of  
items in the form of  a matrix  and then applying c lu s te r  analysis to 
th is  data matr ix ,  in order to transform i t  into c lu s te rs .  This
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method of  obtaining a h ie ra rch ica l  c lu ster ing  scheme (henceforth HCS) 
is  the one applied here.
A number of  points have to be made at the outset concerning the goal 
and the appropriateness o f  the method used. M i l l e r ' s  o r ig ina l  idea 
was that c luste rs  obtained by the procedure ju s t  mentioned would 
somehow correspond to the taxonomic structures proposed by various 
th eo r is ts  fo r  the same or s im i la r  types of  items and tha t  they would 
also r e f l e c t  the semantic features/dimensions involved.  This 
suggests th a t  i f  a s p ec i f ic  set o f  items involves features which are 
not h ie ra r c h ic a l ly  ordered (taxonomical ly organized) c lu s te r  analysis  
(henceforth CA) would be inappropr ia te .  A fu r th e r  assumption is 
considered to underly th is  method, namely tha t  items which have been 
judged as s im i la r  (and there fore  grouped together)  have been grouped 
on the same basis,  i . e .  th a t  the same semantic property was somehow 
f e l t  as being responsible fo r  the groupings of  a l l  the subjects who 
put the same items together .  The question is th ere fore  raised as to 
whether such a procedure is  appl icable to sets of  items which are not 
necessari ly  considered to involve independent and h ie ra r c h ic a l ly  
ordered propert ies  and e spec ia l ly  to sets of  items which may be 
judged as s im i la r  on a number of  d i f f e r e n t  semantic c r i t e r i a .
There are two possible answers to these problems, a th e o re t ica l  one 
concerning the 'n a tu re '  of  c lu s te r  analysis as a s t a t i s t i c a l  
technique and an empirical  one based on the possible in te rp re ta t io n s  
of the resu l ts  o f  s p e c i f ic  sets submitted to th is  method o f  
processing.
I t  has to be noted th a t  CA is genera l ly  not involved wi th hypothesis 
tes t ing  (Anderberg 1973:11).  I t  can be used as a discovery procedure 
and can help avoid forc ing or imposing a p a r t i c u la r  s tructure  on the  
data.  This suggests, th a t  i f  fo r  instance,  the p re va i l in g  fac to r  
responsible f o r  groupings is not a property hypothesized as 
h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  higher than others,  more than two main c luste rs  w i l l  
appear on the f i n a l  HCS and the hypothesis in question w i l l  be e i t h e r  
p a r t l y  or wholly discarded. This does not, however, imply that we 
end up with un in terpre tab le  and useless c lu s te rs .  I t  simply makes
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more d i f f i c u l t  the task of  in te rp re t in g  the re s u l ts ,  or ra the r ,  
looking fo r  an a l t e r n a t i v e  explanation to h ie ra rch ica l  ordering of  
propert ies .
To be more s p e c i f ic ,  consider the example of  kinship terms, which do 
not involve a s t r i c t  hierarchy of  proper t ies .  Since some subjects 
may put 'daughter '  and 'son' together on the basis of  some 
'generat ion '  property ,  others on the basis o f  ' l i n e a l i t y '  
(consanguini ty) ,  and s t i l l  others on the basis of  both propert ies ,  
the f in a l  c lu s te r  cannot be characterized by only one o f  these 
propert ies ,  but w i l l  have to r e f l e c t  both. Moreover, a four th  group 
of subjects may put 'daughter '  and 'son'  in separate c lusters  on the 
basis o f  the ' female '  vs 'male'  d is t in c t io n .  The f in a l  HCS w i l l  show 
at leas t  whether the 'sex '  property is more s a l i e n t  than the 
combination o f  'consanguin ity '  and 'generat ion '  or v ice  versa (which 
w i l l  depend d i r e c t l y  on how close ly  re la ted  'son'  and 'daughter '  
appear to be, i . e .  on t h e i r  number of  co-occurrences).  I cannot see 
why such a f inding is less important than ' r e l a t i v e  h ie rarchy '  and I 
do not th ink  tha t  i t  involves a greater  id e a l i z a t io n  than the 
'h ie rarchy  t e s t in g '  i n te rp re t a t io n s .
A number of  studies report  the resu l ts  o f  c luster -analysed SSTs 
carr ied out on sets of  items which do not necessar i ly  involve e i t h e r  
hie ra rch ica l  ordering or independence of features (e .g .  Fillenbaum 
and Rapoport 1971 - verbs of  ' ju d g in g ' ,  Long 1975 - motion verbs).  
These resu l ts  are both 'p la u s ib le '  and '1 i n g u i s t i c a l l y  re le v a n t '  in 
the sense of  M i l l e r  (1959 :181-2 ) .  What is more important,  they are 
also corroborated by other  methods which do not involve h ie ra rch ica l  
ordering,  such as mult i -dimensional  scaling (Fi l lenbaum and Rapoport, 
i b i d . ) .
A f in a l  note is in order at  th is  point on what we expect the c lu s te r -  
analysed SST to do in th is  p a r t i c u l a r  in ves t ig a t io n .  The overal l  
organizat ion of  the domain of  MGMVs is c le a r l y  d i f f e r e n t l y  structured  
from tha t  of  any s p e c i f ic  subset which can be given to subjects to 
sort  out.  I t  is not there fore  possible to expect any t e s t  based on a 
subset to reveal  the overal l  s t ruc tur ing  (or prove the v a l i d i t y  of  an
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already establ ished one).  I t  seems, however, possible to check the 
relevance of  some propert ies  arr ived at  through t r a d i t io n a l  
l i n g u i s t i c  analyses already discussed in previous chapters.  I t  can 
be shown, also,  th a t  subjects can sometimes express the c r i t e r i a  on 
the basis of  which they have put items together.  I t  is in te re s t in g  
to notice ,  tha t  such c r i t e r i a  r a re ly  correspond to a single ,  
independent property.  The b e l i e f  expressed at many points in the 
course o f  the preceding analysis that cer ta in  propert ies ,  or 
combinations of  propert ies  are more s a l ie n t  than others can at leas t  
be p a r t ly  checked by considering both the resu l ts  of  the f in a l  HCS 
and indiv idua l  pa ir ings o f  items (appearing in the form of  the number 
of co-occurrences in the data m atr ix ) .
5 .1 .1  Semantic s i m i l a r i t y  tes ts  involving English motion verbs
M i l l e r  (1972) and Long (1975) present resu l ts  o f  SSTs involving  
English MVs. Their  resu l ts  are therefore  worth looking at more 
c a r e fu l l y  than those of  other te s ts .  The general p ic ture  seems to be 
tha t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong hypotheses were tested and th a t  these 
hypotheses cannot be refuted on the basis o f  the resul ts  obtained.  
The pract ice  fol lowed in both works of  overgeneral iz ing the v a l i d i t y  
of f indings based on a p a r t i c u l a r l y  small amount of  data seems 
unwarranted, espe c ia l ly  as i t  is also open to a l t e r n a t i v e  
in te rp re ta t io n s .  However, two issues raised in M i l l e r  (1972) are of  
special in te r e s t  f o r  our present purposes, namely r e l a t i v e  sal ience  
and the incorporation of  d i re c t io n a l  components.
One of  M i l l e r ' s  SSTs involves 18 'd i r e c t io n a l '  English MVs which are 
given to 52 subjects to sort  in to  groups w i th in  sentence frames of  
the form "He Verb  (X ) " . These sentence frames d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between 
causative and non-causative uses of  the verbs in question.  M i l l e r  
is in te rested  in demonstrating the psychological r e a l i t y  of  the  
formal d i rec t io n a l  components he considers to be incorporated in the 
verbs, e .g .  'a round' ,  ' t o ' ,  ' o u t ' ,  'down'. He also examines the 
hierarch ica l  re la t io n s  between d i rec t io n a l  propert ies and c au s a t iv i t y  
and concludes th a t  the causative /non-causat ive  d is t in c t io n  
( ' O b j e c t i v e ' / ' R e f l e x i v e '  in his terminology) is strongest in the ' t o '
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c lu s te r ,  but tha t  the d i rec t io n a l  component is in general more 
s a l ie n t  and h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  higher than the causative/non-causat ive  
one.
A close look at  the actual  co-occurrences o f  verbs M i l l e r  gets shows 
th a t  such conclusions are not wholly sustained.  Consider f i r s t  the 
data from the 'downward' motion group of items, which involves both 
causative and non-causative verbs and is probably the c leares t  case 
with in  th is  t e s t .  Each p a i r  o f  verbs is fol lowed by the number of  
co-occurrences i t  has in the matr ix ,  i . e .  the number of  subjects who 
put the two verbs together:
(a) lowerCAUS - dropCAUS -> 30 
descendNON-CAUS " sinkN0N-CAUS _> 31 
f a l 1 N0N-CAUS “ sinkNON-CAUS _> 41
( b )  d r o p CAUs -  f a l l N O N - C A U S  ^  19  
l o w e r CAUS -  s i n k N 0N-CAUS - >  18  
l o w e r CAUs -  f a ^ N O N - C A U S  _> 15  
d r °PCAUS -  s i n k N0N-CAUS > 16
(c) d e s c e n d N 0 N _ c A U S  " l o w e r C A U S  “> 2 8  
descendN0N_CAUS - f a l l N 0 N - C A U $  " >  2 8
The data in (a)  and (b) suggest th a t  when both items wi th in  the  
'downward' group are CAUS or NON-CAUS they get the highest ra tes;  i f  
they do not share the property they get much lower scores. In fa c t ,  
considerably fewer than 50% of  the to ta l  number of  subjects put the 
items in question together.  The data in ( c ) ,  however, seem to 
suggest th a t  the causative /non-causat ive  d i s t in c t io n  does not play  
any ro le .
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I t  must be pointed out tha t  M i l l e r ' s  te s t  does not involve any 
'upward' motion verbs. Therefore the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c lus te r ing  the 
above subset ('downward' motion) with any other verb of  the set  
offered to subjects is ra ther  low. In the absence o f  any 'upward'  
d i rec t io n  verbs and on the basis of  such l im i ted  and inconclusive  
evidence, M i l l e r ' s  claim th a t  d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  is more s a l ie n t  than the 
causative/non-causative d is t in c t io n  is not wel l founded.
The data from the remaining d i rec t io n a l  verbs of  the set are not any 
b e t te r .  The 'around' group consists of  what seems to me to be an 
inc lus ive  term, i . e .  ' t u r n '  and i t s  hyponyms. Clustering these items 
together may be in te rpre ted  as reveal ing the psychological  v a l i d i t y  
of  the ' type o f '  l e x ic a l  re la t io n s h ip ,  i . e .  hyponymic inc lus ion.
Within the group of verbs character ized by M i l l e r  as incorporating  
' o u t ' ,  ' e j e c t '  and 'withdraw' have only 17 co-occurrences (again 
considerably fewer than 50% of the subjects put them together ) ,  
although they are both causatives ( in  M i l l e r ' s  t e s t ) .  On the other
hand, ' e x i t '  and ' l e a v e ' ,  both non-causatives but belonging to
d i f f e r e n t  'd i r e c t i o n a l '  groups, namely 'o u t '  and 'away' respect ive ly  
(according to M i l l e r ' s  c la s s i f i c a t i o n )  score 42, i . e .  higher than the 
best case w i th in  the 'downward' group.
Consider, fu r th e r ,  the set of  verbs M i l l e r  c l a s s i f i e s  under 
' t o g e t h e r ' :
a s s e m b le r s  - c o l l e c t r s  -> 38
assembleCAUS - gatherCAUS -> 40
gatherCAUS - c o l l e c t CAUS -> 50
M i l l e r  takes these high ra t ings as proof of  the existence (a c tu a l ly  
the importance) of  the ' d i r e c t i o n a l '  (as he c a l ls  i t )  preposit ion  
' t o g e t h e r ' .  But to s t a r t  w i th ,  these verbs are near-synonyms, so 
t h e i r  being clustered together is not much of  a proof fo r  anything as 
concrete as a 'd i r e c t io n a l  preposi t ion '  (although t h e i r  common 
property is  c e r t a in ly  l inked to  some condit ion of  'p u t t ing  things
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together '  and we do not r e a l l y  need a te s t  to prove i t ) .  What is 
probably more in te re s t in g ,  though, is  th a t  although they are a l l  
three supplemented with an "X"  ( in  the sentence frames),  the l a s t  
pa i r  gets a much higher score. One possible explanation could be 
th a t  'assemble' may be associated with a d i f f e r e n t  ( l i n g u i s t i c )  frame
than the other two (e .g .  assemble pieces to construct a u n i t ,  while
'ga ther '  and ' c o l l e c t '  may not be so understood).  Be that  as i t  may, 
M i l l e r ' s  second attempt at establ ishing the ' incorpora t io n '  of  
spec i f ic  components/features and a feature  hierarchy on the basis of  
such resu l ts  seems ra the r  unsat is fac tory .
Once again the highest scores correspond to a combination of  two 
common propert ies :  presence o f  c au s a t iv i ty  and 'p u t t in g  things
t o g e th e r ' ,  where th is  l a t t e r  property is c e r t a in ly  not of  the same 
status as 'downward' or 'around' ,  i . e .  purely ' d i r e c t i o n a l ' .
M i l l e r  also considers the ' to g e th er '  group in connection with  
'approach' and ' v i s i t ' ,  the former o f  which he c la s s i f i e s  under 
' toward'  and the l a t t e r  one under ' t o ' .  Notice now the score of  th is  
l a s t  pa i r :  approach X - v i s i t  X -> 26 and M i l l e r ' s  comment:
"The r e f l e x iv e - o b je c t i v e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  is strongest fo r  the t o  
c luste rs :  a p p r o a c h e s  and v i s i t s  were clustered together with
a s s e m b l e s , c o l l e c t s  and g a t h e r s  by only one or two judges. Since
the d i rec t io n a l  preposit ions are r e a l l y  t o w a r d  and t o  fo r  
a p p ro a c h e s  and v i s i t s  (hence a cer ta in  reluctance to put them in 
the same p i l e )  and t o g e t h e r  fo r  the ob ject ive  motion verbs 
a s s e m b l e s - c o l l e c t s - g a t h e r s , the tendency to keep them apart  may 
r e f l e c t  the d i rec t io n a l  component as well as the r e f l e x i v e -  
object ive  (or causative)  component", ( p . 358)
But the score of  the 'approach' - ' v i s i t '  p a i r  is almost the average 
of  what he gets in the p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong 'downward' group and 
corresponds exac t ly  to 50% of  the answers, although according to 
M i l l e r ' s  analysis ,  'approach' and ' v i s i t '  are nowhere near as close 
in ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  as the groups exh ib i t ing  hyponymic re la t io n s ,  the 
'downward' motion group and the near-synonyms already discussed. As 
fo r  the ' to g e th er '  group, i t  is doubtful  whether i t  contains verbs 
mainly understood as motion verbs and equal ly  doubtful whether
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' to g e th er '  is to be understood as synchronical ly re la te d  to the
purely ' d i r e c t i o n a l '  ' t o ' .
Consider f i n a l l y  the ' r o ta r y  motion' set resul ts  which get a great  
number o f  co-occurrences,  in d ic a t iv e  o f  the r e l a t i v e  sal ience ( in  my 
opinion) o f  the property of  ' r o t a t i o n '  or 'change of  o r ie n ta t io n '  
compared to other ' d i r e c t i o n a l '  propert ies  (such as those signal led  
by ' t o ' ,  'away' ,  e t c . ) :
(a) tu rnN0N_CAUS - p iv o tN0N. CAUS -> 48 
r o ta te CAUS - spinCAUS -> 47
(b) p iv o tN0N. CAUS - spinCAUS -> 30 
r o t a t e ^ u s  - PivotNON-CAUS _> 29 
turnNON-CAUS '  ™ t a t e CAUS -> 29
turnNON-CAUS '  sPin CAUS 28
I t  is again f a i r l y  c le a r  tha t  the causative/non-causative d is t in c t io n
plays a decis ive ro le ,  otherwise the d i f ferences of  the scores in (a) 
and (b) are not exp la inab le .
To sum up, M i l l e r ' s  claim that  " the d i rec t io n a l  component is  fa r  
more s a l ie n t  than the r e f l e x iv e - o b je c t i v e  one and might be said to  
dominate i t  h ie ra rc h ic a l ly "  ( M i l l e r  1969:176, 1972:358) is not well  
sustained by the evidence he provides, through th is  t e s t ,  espec ia l ly  
i f  one takes a close look at  spec i f ic  co-occurrences.  Certain  
propert ies  l inked with ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y '  are more s a l ie n t  than others.  
Combinations o f  c a u s a t iv i ty  and d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  are c le a r ly  most 
s a l i e n t .  General conclusions perta in ing to r e l a t i v e  sal ience and 
espec ia l ly  to r e l a t i v e  h ierarch ica l  order are d i f f i c u l t  to draw on 
the basis of  a ra th e r  small piece of  data.  As already pointed out,  
the organizat ion of  the domain as a whole w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  from that  
of  any s p e c i f ic  subset; and a hierarchy o f  propert ies  ( i f  d is t in c t  
from sal ience) could be b e t te r  approached in an investigation o f  a
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much la rg e r  context (a whole domain, ra the r  than any spec i f ic  
subse t ) .
I f  one wishes to check the psychological  v a l i d i t y  o f  a major (high
l e v e l )  property such as c a u s a t iv i t y ,  fo r  instance, one is obl iged to
provide a f a i r l y  large number o f  items to be sorted out. This is  
prec ise ly  what M i l l e r  (1969, 1971) does in the case o f  nouns, wishing 
to te s t  the v a l i d i t y  o f  the 'o b je c t '  - 'non ob ject '  d i s t in c t io n .  
Subjects are given 42 items to sort  out.  M i l l e r ' s  observations on 
the re su l t in g  c lusters  are very eloquent:
"Did the semantic marker [ ' o b j e c t ' ,  'non o b j e c t ' ]  tha t  was 
d e l ib e r a t e ly  introduced into the set o f  words reappear in the 
analysis? Yes and no. The c lusters  obtained did not contradict  
the hypothesis th a t  our judges were sort ing with th is  semantic 
d is t in c t io n  in mind, yet  t h e i r  data indicate  a f i n e r  analysis  
in to  at  le a s t  f i v e ,  ra the r  than only two c lu s te rs ,  so the object
marker is not completely v e r i f i e d  by these data".
( M i l l e r  1971:577)
In pra c t ic a l  terms th is  means that  subjects tend to form small 
groups, espec ia l ly  when faced with more than 10 or 20 items which are 
not governed by obvious hyponymic re la t io n s h ip s ,  and that  therefore  
high leve l  d is t in c t io n s  are somehow lo s t .  This does not mean that  
they have no psychological  r e a l i t y  or tha t  they are not 
h ie r a r c h ic a l ly  higher than other d is t in c t io n s  or proper t ies .  I t  
probably means th a t  hierarchy cannot be tested in t h is  way, but that  
r e l a t i v e  sal ience o f  combinations of  propert ies  can. Smaller  
c lusters  and subclusters provide f a i r l y  r e l i a b l e  evidence to th is  
e f f e c t .
An important issue fo r  the present study is  raised in Long (1975),  
namely the r e la t io n  between h ie rarch ica l  order (o f  propert ies)  and 
number o f  shared proper t ies .  An obvious question is which propert ies  
are taken into account (since they are not d i r e c t l y  provided by 
subjects)  and a re la te d  one is whether they correspond to a most 
general or a p a r t i c u l a r  understanding of the items tested.  Long 
makes the assumption th a t  features (propert ies )  are of  equal 
importance, which is  not accepted here and which she recognizes 
h e rs e l f  to be an o v e rs im p l i f ic a t io n .  A careful  look at her resul ts
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shows th a t  r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  cer ta in  combinations of propert ies  
provides a b e t te r  explanation of  the data than number o f  shared 
a t t r ib u te s  and t h a t ,  as in M i l l e r ' s  te s ts ,  s p ec i f ic  co-occurrences 
are worth considering in d e ta i l  (besides the overal l  HCS).
Long's study involves 15 English MVs analysed on the basis of  
M i l l e r ' s  (1972) c la s s i f i c a t i o n  but s l i g h t l y  modified and r e s t r ic te d  
to those sp ec i f ic  meanings of the verbs which corresponded to the 
actions shown to subjects on a videotape. Two groups o f  subjects are 
asked to sort the verbs out. One group has seen the videotaped 
actions,  the other one performs a purely verbal t e s t ,  i . e .  a SST 
based on the same set o f  verbs w r i t ten  on separate cards without any 
supplementary information as to how they are to be understood. The 
resu l ts  are shown on a s i m i l a r i t y  matrix (presenting the number of  
co-occurrences fo r  each p a i r  o f  items) which is f u r t h e r  transformed 
in to  c luste rs  by applying CA. The s im i l a r i t y  matrix is compared to a 
matrix o f  shared features ( f o r  each p a i r  of  verbs),  which Long has 
constructed on the basis of  the analysis already mentioned (a 
modif icat ion  of  M i l l e r ' s  1972 components and the actions presented on 
the v ideotape).
Despite the fa c t  th a t  Long's hypothesis is also very strong 
( c o r re la t io n  of  shared a t t r ib u te s  to fea tu re -h ie ra rchy)  and her own 
remark th a t  i t  is  not appropriate to te s t  the c o r re la t io n  between the 
two measures s t a t i s t i c a l l y  "since the numbers w i th in  each of the 
matrices are not completely independent" ( i b i d * :58) ,  the c orre la t ion  
is so high ( .8 0 )  th a t  Long's hypothesis cannot be r e je c te d .  This 
means th a t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  c orre la t ing  the number of  a t t r ib u te s  
arr ived  at  on the basis of  a t ra d i t io n a l  l i n g u i s t i c  analysis with the 
number o f  co-occurrences in an SST matrix cannot be ruled out. The 
corre la t ions  th a t  are of  in te r e s t  here concern the judgments of  the 
20 subjects performing the verbal SST (what Long c a l l s  the 'simple  
sort  g roup ') .  The maximum number of  co-occurrences in the SST matrix  
would be 20 ( i . e .  20 subjects ) .  The maximum number of  shared
a t t r ib u te s /p ro p e r t ie s  in Long's matrix is 4.
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Each p a i r  is fol lowed by the number o f  co-occurrences i t  gets in the 
SST matrix and then by the number of  shared propert ies  i t  has 
according to Long's analys is .  The best corre la t ions  she gets are:
jump - hop -> 18 : 4 ( -Loc,  - D i r . ,  Manner, s p ec i f ic  Manner)
push - pul l  -> 17 : 3 (S p e c ,d i re c t . ,  + D i r . ,  -P rope l len t )
Notice,  however, tha t  Long h e rs e l f  observes ( i b i d . :103) th a t  a p a i r  
of  words may d i f f e r  along several dimensions and o f fe rs  jump-hop as a 
case in po int ,  suggesting th a t  they d i f f e r  in the number of fee t
used, in 'd i r e c t io n '  ( 'up and down' fo r  ' jump' vs 'a long'  fo r  hop),  
e tc .  So even the p a i r  which gets the highest number of  co­
occurrences (and the best c o r re la t io n  with number o f  shared 
a t t r ib u te s )  is considered as a possible example of  'm u l t ip le
c o n tra s ts ' .  Compare the co-occurrences of  both items to 'dance':
jump - dance -> 14 : 3 (Manner, - D i r . ,  -Loc .)
hop - dance -> 13 : 3 (Manner, - D i r . ,  -Loc .)
I t  can be argued th a t ,  un l ike  the remaining items of  the set offered  
to subjects,  a l l  these three verbs involve a property of  ' r e l a t i v e  
absence o f  seriousness o f  purpose' (as suggested in 4 . 2 . 4 ) .  This can 
explain why over 50% of the subjects c lu s te r  them together.  Besides, 
although 'jump' and 'h op ' ,  may be said to d i f f e r  on a number of
points,  they do r e f e r  to p a r t i c u l a r l y  s im i la r  motions, espec ia l ly  
compared with the remaining verbs of  the set .  This property,  
combined with the one already mentioned is probably enough to keep 
them together  as the strongest p a i r  in th is  t e s t .  The explanation of  
'number o f  shared a t t r i b u t e s '  cannot be considered separate ly  from 
' type  of  a t t r i b u t e s '  and t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  sal ience.
To appreciate t h i s ,  compare the items already discussed with the 
'p u sh -pu l l '  p a i r ,  which is also considered to involve 3 shared 
propert ies but has almost as many co-occurrences as the 'jump-hop'  
one (said to involve 4 ) .  Antonymous pairs can be accounted for  on
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the basis o f  'one fea ture  d i f fe re n c e '  but espec ia l ly  i f  only 4 
features (p roper t ies )  are taken into  account, the d i f fe rence  in 
question becomes d ispropor t ionate ly  great .  There is strong evidence 
( to  be discussed in the SST on MGMVs) tha t  antonyms or near-antonyms 
are only separated i f  the p o s s i b i l i t y  ar ises of including e i t h e r  
member in a group marked fo r  a p a r t i c u la r l y  s a l ie n t  property (e .g .  
downward/upward motion).  Number of  shared propert ies  cannot explain  
th is  tendency of subjects '  groupings.
Long's worst corre la t ions  are also worth considering c a r e fu l ly .  In 
order to appreciate some of these,  i t  should be noticed that  both 
groups of  subjects ( the 'simple sort group' and the 'taped s o r t '  one) 
produced s im i la r  r e s u l ts ,  with the notable exceptions of  'sp in '  and 
shake . To s t a r t  w i th ,  th is  implies that subjects perform the task 
with p a r t i c u la r  and not general meanings in mind (Long 1975:63).  The 
videotaped actions corresponding to the items tested are p a r t i c u l a r l y  
'good instances'  o f  the categories in question,  as can be eas i ly  
attested in Long's descript ion of  these actions ( i b i d . : 3 5 ) . This 
const i tu tes  in i t s e l f  very good evidence in favour of  the 
proto typ ical  ra ther  than the most general understanding of  items,  
although Long is not concerned with Prototype theory.
The two exceptions are prec ise ly  's p in '  and 'shake ' ,  where the former 
action involved stepping in c i r c le s  in one place and the l a t t e r  one 
standing in one place,  holding a bal l  out in f ro n t  o f  the body with  
both hands and shaking i t  vigorously up and down. Long's analysis of  
the corresponding verbs in the form o f  features is based on the above 
understandings of these verbs.  Therefore the fac t  tha t  only these 
items in the set o ffered can be understood e i t h e r  as causatives or  
non-causatives cannot be taken into account. The ambiguity arises  
only fo r  the 'simple sor t  group' who have not seen the videotaped 
act ion s .
In th is  l i g h t ,  consider b r i e f l y  some o f  Long's worst corre la t ions :
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shake - hit -> 11 : 4 h i t  - carry  - > 9 : 3  
carry  - drop -> 14 : 1 
drop - kick - > 6 : 2
shake - spin -> 11 : 0 
shake - carry - > 9 : 3
The verbs 'shake' and 's p in '  are completely iso la ted in Long's own 
hie rarch ica l  analys is ,  which draws a l i n e  between causatives and non­
causatives and never considers int ra-group shared propert ies ,  hence 
the 0 number o f  shared propert ies ,  which p red ictab ly  does not 
corre la te  with the number of  co-occurrences (about 50%). On the 
other hand 'shake' and ' h i t '  are a t t r ib u te d  the maximum of  common 
propert ies ,  as the non-causative use of  'shake'  is ignored.  
Something s im i la r  applies to the 'shake' - ' c a r r y '  p a i r .
The verbs ' h i t '  and 'c a r r y '  are i n t u i t i v e l y  f e l t  to be ra ther  
d is s im i la r .  Even the shared element of  c a u s a t iv i t y  is less c lear  in 
the case of  ' h i t '  (see 3 . 1 ) .  Only the l a t t e r  verb is a c lear  case of  
a 'causat ive of  motion ' .  I f  ' h i t '  is also considered a causative of  
motion, then ' - P r o p e l le n t '  is erroneously included by Long as a 
common property o f  the p a i r .  On the other hand, the s im i l a r i t y  of  
' c a r ry '  and 'drop'  can be most e as i ly  explained in terms o f  frames, 
in the sense of  Brown and Yule (1983:238-47) or Verschueren' s 
(1981:338) 'p ro to typ ica l  scenes' / ' frames' .  In common terms one can 
drop something th a t  one is carry ing.  I f  number of  a t t r ib u te s  is to  
be used as a measure of  semantic s i m i l a r i t y ,  then ' -P r o p e l le n t '  
should be a common property in addi t ion to 'non -causat ive ' .  The 
proto typ ical  understanding of 'drop'  is more l i k e l y  than not be 
characterized by th is  s a l ie n t  property (contrary  to Long's ana lys is ) .  
This could also provide a b e t te r  corre la t io n  in the case o f  the la s t  
p a i r  'd r o p - k ic k ' ,  which would be shown as sharing only the causative  
element and in d i f f e r e n t  degrees at  th a t .
To sum up, Long's study provides f a i r l y  r e l i a b l e  evidence in favour  
of a prototypical  ra the r  than a general understanding of  categories  
(and of those per ta in ing  to MVs in p a r t i c u l a r ) .  I t  also raises an 
in t r ig u in g  question as to the r e la t io n  of  number of  shared a t t r ib u te s  
resu l t in g  from a t r a d i t i o n a l  l i n g u i s t i c  analysis of  MVs to semantic
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s i m i l a r i t y  judgments of  native speakers. I t  seems reasonable to 
expect tha t  such corre la t ions  are not completely impossible,  provided 
the ' r i g h t '  sort  of  a t t r ib u te s  are taken in to  account ( i . e .  
proto typ ical  ra th e r  than general ones) and the issue of  r e l a t i v e  
sal ience is allowed to play a decis ive ro le .
5 .1 .2  A semantic s i m i l a r i t y  te s t  with 34 Modern Greek motion verbs
As already pointed out in 5 . 1 . 1 ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong hypotheses 
cannot be e a s i ly  tested with c luster -analysed SSTs. On the other  
hand, i f  quite a l o t  is known about the items tes ted ,  CA need not be 
used merely as an exploratory  device, A middle-course seems 
there fore  most appropr iate.  We cannot expect to obtain resu l ts  
decisive fo r  the organizat ion of  the whole domain but can include a 
f a i r l y  large number o f  items which we consider representa t ive  of  the 
overal l  domain. The inferences th a t  can be made may involve number 
of a t t r ib u te s ,  but these a t t r ib u te s  need not be e i t h e r  homogeneous or 
independent or of  equal weight. The SST to be described in what 
fol lows was conducted with these pre l im inar ies  in mind, some of which 
are the d i r e c t  outcome o f  the preceding observations on M i l l e r ' s  and 
Long's work.
Some of  the propert ies  discussed in 4.2 are applicable  both to a most 
general and a proto typ ica l  understanding of the re levant  verbs.  At a 
number o f  points d i f fe rences  between the two understandings are 
pointed out.  Checking a l l  these propert ies would be an impossible 
task fo r  any s ingle  t e s t .  I t  seems, however, f e a s ib le  to attempt  
checking the v a l i d i t y  of  what have been posited as large  d i s t i n c t  
categories w i th in  t h is  area and t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s .  These are:
- Causatives vs non-causatives,  agentives vs non-agentives
- Change-of- location vs change-of-posit ion and 
'd is tance covering'  wi th in  the CL group
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- General motion vs 'manner' and whether a d i f fe rence  in 
'medium' plays an important ro le  or not
- V e r t ic a l  vs indeterminate d i re c t io n ,  change o f  o r ien ta t io n  
vs 'random w a l k ' , 'dependent mot ion ' , 'p a th '  (passage).
a. Choice of  data units
F i f t y  subjects were chosen, a l l  of  whom were native  speakers of  MG 
resid ing in Athens (but not necessar i ly  brought up in Athens),  aged 
between 20 and 50. P i l o t  work previously  conducted had shown that  a 
cer ta in  standard of  education was absolute ly  indispensable: subjects 
should be able to  c la s s i f y  on the basis o f  sp ec i f ic  ins truct ions  
( l i s t e d  below) and understand, fo r  instance,  the d i f fe re n c e  between 
'semantic s i m i l a r i t y '  and f ree -assoc ia t ion  (once i t  is explained to 
them). The only 'c a teg or ie s '  of  people excluded were l in g u is ts  and 
p h i lo lo g is ts  (as they could have had preconceived ideas on the 
m a te r ia l ,  or ' s p e c i a l i s t '  knowledge). Since there was no p a r t i c u la r  
scheme o f  sampling, the sample can be considered random and 
representa t ive  of  the educated part  of  the populat ion.
b. Choice of  var iables
The f i f t y  subjects were each given 34 randomly arranged cards with a 
MGMV w r i t te n  on each card.  The var iables  (terms used) were ra ther  
c a r e fu l l y  chosen so tha t  they would 'conform' to the fol lowing  
p r in c ip le s :  (a) They should be very common MVs in everyday use
presenting 'basic  l e v e l '  categor ies.  (Hyponymic re la t io n s  are 
checked in the te s t  on ' P r o t o t y p ic a l i t y '  in a subsequent sec t ion . )
(b) They should be qui te  representa t ive  of  the categories discussed 
in 4.2 (also appearing in L is t  V I I I )  and supplemented with some CL 
causatives o f  motion. Two categories were not represented as the 
materia l  they contained seemed to me less common in everyday use than 
the remaining items. These appear in L is t  V I I  as 'P a r t i a l  motion not 
re su l t in g  in d i f f e r e n t  posture'  and ' P a r t i a l  motion (which is )  
re g u la r / re p e a te d ' .  Only two genuine synonyms were included: 
' p e r i f e r o m e ' and ' t r i y i r i z o ' (roam around). The reason fo r  including
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these was to check whether morphological d is t in c t io n s  (e .g .  ' - o '  vs 
' - ome ' endings corresponding normally to act ive  vs mediopassive 
forms) would a f f e c t  the categor iza t ion  ( i . e .  subjects'  judgments).  
The p a i r  ' a n e v a z o '  - ' i p s o n o ' receive ident ica l  t ra ns la t ions  in
English ( i . e .  r a is e )  but are not genuine synonyms. They were both
included in order to check whether phonological fac tors  would a f fe c t  
subjects'  judgments (e .g .  make subjects group ' a n e v a z o '  with
' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) ra ther  than ' i p s o n o ' ) .  Two non-causative  
t r a n s i t i v e s  were also included: ' p e r n a o '  (pass) and ' h i a s x i z o '
( t raverse )  to check whether subjects would c la s s i f y  them with  
causative t r a n s i t i v e s  or non-causative i n t r a n s i t i v e s .  A number of  
phonological ly ide n t ica l  causative/non-causative pa irs  was also 
included without any ind icat ion  as to which one ( i . e .  which member of 
the p a i r )  subjects were supposed to take into  considerat ion.  The 
r e s u l t  is p a r t i c u l a r l y  in te re s t in g  concerning the d i rec t io n  of  
l e x i c a l i z a t i o n  and/or Prototype theory.
c. Instruct ions
Subjects were given the usual ins truct ions  fo r  such tasks which are 
t ra n s la ta b le  in to  English as fo l lows:
1. Put these verbs into groups ( ' c a t e g o r ie s ' )  on the basis
of  t h e i r  semantic s i m i l a r i t y .
2. Take into  account t h e i r  l i t e r a l  meaning only and not any
f i g u r a t i v e  uses they might have; also,  t h e i r  most general 
meaning, i . e .  do not th ink  of  a p a r t i c u la r  sentence or 
' im a g e ' ,
3. Each verb can belong to  only one group, the one to which
i t  is most akin.
4. You can make as many p i les  (groups) as you wish; a verb
can be the only member of  a category.
5. The time you w i l l  need fo r  sort ing these verbs into
groups is o f  no importance.
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P i lo t  work had also shown tha t  subjects had to  be given an 
explanation and an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  the d i f fe rence  between semantic 
s i m i l a r i t y  and f ree -assoc ia t ion  (see Rosch's ins truct ions  for  
p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  t e s t s ) .  This was done o r a l l y  and they were then 
asked i f  they had any questions.  Most of  them did the task 
in d iv id u a l l y ,  at  d i f f e r e n t  times and in d i f f e r e n t  places.  A f te r  
completing t h e i r  groups they were asked to comment on the groupings 
i f  they wished and a note was taken of what they had to say. The 
explanations offered fo r  some groupings are p a r t i c u l a r l y  in te res t in g  
and w i l l  be discussed separate ly .  A common complaint was t h a t  i t  was 
d i f f i c u l t  not to th ink  o f  any p a r t i c u la r  meaning, sentence or 
' p i c t u r e '  associated with a given verb.
d. Cluster analysis
A minimum of 3 and a maximum of 17 groups were formed; the mean of  
p i les  was 9 .92 .  A matrix o f  s i m i l a r i t y  was formed showing for  each 
p a i r  of  verbs the number of  subjects who placed that  p a i r  in the same 
group. The matrix  was then converted into a h ie rarch ica l  c lu ster ing  
scheme, fo l lowing Johnson (1967).  The basic p r in c ip le  of  Johnson's 
method is tha t  at each step,  a var iab le  is l inked with the closest  
c lu s te r  or (o ther )  v a r ia b le .  S ta r t ing  with 34 var iab les  in th is  
p a r t i c u la r  case we merge them step by step to one c lu s te r .  (Both the 
matr ix and the HCS are reproduced o v e r le a f . )
At point  19 o f  the HCS, six  c luste rs  can be i d e n t i f i e d ,  la b e l led  here 
A - F and including the fol lowing items:
A: items 6 to 8 
kaOome, k s a p l o n o ,  y o n a t i z o ,  s i kon om e
B: items 32 to 30 
s k a r f a l o n o , a n e v e n o , k a t e v e n o
C: items 5 to 33 
k i l a o , y l i s t r a o , v u l j a z o , sernome
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1) k sap lo no  
lie
0 11 1 38 4 1 1 0 2 1 1 3 1 9 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 26
2) f f l i s t r a o  
slip,slide
3 24 8 6 9 7 4 4 7 3 3 6 3 30 3 3 3 0 1 2 0 3 0 6 3 0 2
3) f e r n o  
bring
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 2 0 11 0 0 0 0 1 14 0 11 1 10 1 2 48 0
4) s t r i v o  
turn
9 4 6 1 8 9 10 3 6 10 8 0 15 3 15 15 8 1 0 8 1 8 1 11 8 0 2
5) k i l a o  
roll
2 22 6 6 10 6 3 3 7 2 4 6 2 26 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 5 2 2 2
6) kaOome 
sit
0 7 1 36 4 1 1 0 2 1 1 2 1 6 1 1 0 0 2 11 0 1 0 2 1 0 30
7) t i n a z o  
shake up
0 0 2 0 1 1 •0 21 3 0 2 22 0 2 0 0 0 18 31 0 20 0 17 0 0 13 1
8) sikonome  
rise
2 8 13 28 7 3 2 2 6 3 17 0 2 4 2 2 2 10 0 3 3 3 9 4 3 0 2
9) s t e l n o  
send
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 1 0 11 0 0 0 0 2 10 15 0 11 2 10 1 1 0
24) aneveno
ascend
11 3 •39 2 35 7 7 5 14
25) erxotne
come
38 4 5 1 7 13 21 3 5
26) p i f a o
jump
4 8 15 3 11 24 5 18 6
27) pe t ao  
fly,throw
2 4 7 0 3 10 3 1
28) pe rnao
pass
19 4 5 1 8 9 2
29) t r e x o
run
11 10 13 1 9 3
30) ka teveno
descend
8 5 23 9 0
31) i o n a t i z o
kneel
1 12 1 2
32) s k a r f a l o n o  
cl imb
4 11 0






34 33 32 31 30 29 28- 27 26
0 40 5 2 0 5 3
0 3 40 5 0 2
12 0 2 1 1
0 2 7 22
2 3 1
0 3
keno 19 3 7 1 11 11 17 2 6 22 10 0 17 2 12 13 20 0 0 12 0 49 0 11 0
enter
p e r p a t a o 21 9 11 2 8 35 14 7 20 16 9 0 14 2 16 16 13 0 0 16 0 11 0 0
walk
anevazo 0 0 13 0 5 0 0 10 2 0 14 20 0 2 0 0 0 48 14 0 31 0 0
take up
vj [eno 19 3 7 1 11 11 17 2 6 22 10 0 17 2 12 13 21 0 0 12 0 0
exit
kremao 0 0 6 0 3 0 0 8 1 0 6 20 0 2 0 0 0 30 18 0 10
hang
akoluQo 21 3 4 1 6 10 19 1 4 27 6 0 19 1 19 19 19 0 0 15
follow
r i x n o 0 0 0 2 2  1 0  22 3 0 0  28 0 4 0 0 0  16 2
throw
i psono 0 0  12 0 4 0 0 9 2 0  13 20 0 2 0 0 0 0
raise
f ev j f o 37 4 4 1 7 13 22 3 4 39 6 0 17 2 15 15 1
leave
p e r f f e r o m e 15 6 4 1 5 10 23 2 5 18 5 0 25 3 50 0
roam around
t r i p r i z o  15 6 4 1 5 10 23 2 5 18 5 0 25 3 0
roam around
v u l j a z o 2 15 5 10 13 3 2 1 4 2 4 11 2 3
sink
J i a s x i z o ‘ 19 4 5 1 S 9 39 2 4 IS 9' 0 4
traverse
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D: items 16 to 14 
r i x n o ,  t i n a z o , g r e m i z o , p e t a o , i p s o n o , a n e v a z o , kremao
E: items 10 to 26 
beno, p e r i f e r o m e ,  t r i y i r i z o , p e r n a o ,  S i a s x i z o ,  p i y e n o ,
erx ome,  f e v y o ,  a k o lu Q o ,  t r e x o ,  p e r p a t a o ,  p i f t a o
F: items 9 and 3 
s t e l n o ,  f e r n o
The content of  these c lusters  can be t e n t a t i v e l y  specif ied  as 
fol lows:
A (6 - 8) change-of-posture (CP) non-causatives  
B (32 - 30) v e r t ic a l  change-of- locat ion (CL) non-causatives
C (5 - 33) non-causatives,  contact of  major part  of  object  with
environment, smooth motion 
D (16 - 14) change-of- locat ion (CL) causatives
E (10 -26)  change-of- locat ion (CL) non-causatives,  indeterminate
d i rec t io n  
F (9 - 3) d e ic t i c  CL causative pa i r
One verb ' s t r i v o '  ( tu rn )  is not included in the above c lusters  as i t  
jo ins  c lusters  D - F at a very l a t e  stage (15) and c lusters  A - C at  
(8 ).
At point (27) c er ta in  subclusters can be i d e n t i f i e d :  D includes two
subclusters,  one consist ing of  items 16-23 ' r i x n o '  ( throw),  ' t i n a z o '  
(shake up),  ' g r e m i z o '  (pul l  down) and another one consist ing o f  items 
17-14 ' i p s o n o '  ( r a i s e ) ,  ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up), ' k r e m a o '  (hang). E 
includes three pa irs  and 2 more subclusters: items 10 and 13 ' b e n o '  
( e n t e r ) ,  ' v y e n o '  ( e x i t ) ,  items 19 and 20 ' p e r i f e r o m e ' , ' t r i y i r i z o '  
(roam around), 28 and 22 ' p e r n a o '  (pass),  ' S i a s x i z o '  ( t r a v e r s e ) .  The 
two la s t  pa irs  form a subcluster at a lower stage (2 5 ) .  A fu r th e r  
subcluster in E consists of  items 34-15 ' p i y e n o '  (go),  ' e r x o m e '
- 284 -
(come), ' f e v y o '  ( l e a v e ) ,  ' a k o l u Q o '  ( fo l low)  and a f i n a l  one includes 
a pa i r  o f  items 29 and 11 ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) and ' t r e x o '  ( run) which 
are joined at  a lower stage (24) by ' p i f t a o '  (jump).
The matrix  has a l l  the co-occurrences of  the 34 items tested.  As 
already noted, both the content of  the HCS and the co-occurrences of  
the matrix need to be considered c a r e fu l ly .
e. I n te rp re ta t io n  of  resu l ts
On the basis of  the c luste rs  in the HCS and subjects7 comments on the 
ind iv idual  groups they formed, i t  can be sa fe ly  argued th a t  in the 
absence of  any contextual  (or other)  information,  a l l  the verbs of
the set are mainly understood as re fe r r in g  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to human 
motion. The 'most genera l '  meaning ideal  is not opera t ive ,  in th is  
SST at l e a s t .
The fo l lowing items have both a causative and a non-causative  
i n te rp re t a t io n :  ' k s a p l o n o '  ( l i e  down), ' y o n a t i z o '  ( k n e e l ) ,  ' k i l a o '
( r o l l ) ,  ' y l i s t r a o '  ( s l id e ,  s l i p ) ,  ' v u l j a z o '  ( s in k ) ,  ' s t r i v o '  ( tu rn ) ,  
' p e t a o '  ( f l y ,  throw),  ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  (see 3 .2 )  With the notable 
exception o f  ' p e t a o ' ,  none of  the remaining items appears in the 
causatives c lu s te r .  This may imply th a t  the non-causative
understanding is the most prominent one, which const i tu tes  addit ional  
evidence in favour of  der iv ing  such causatives from t h e i r  non­
causative counterparts.  The two in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  ' p e t a o ' ,  i . e .
' f l y '  and ' th ro w ' ,  although they have in common something l i k e  'move 
in the a i r ' ,  are e v iden t ly  kept d i s t i n c t .  Almost h a l f  of  the 
subjects (18) put ' p e t a o '  together with ' p i f t a o '  ( jump), i . e .  as a 
non-causative,  while i t  also has 22 and 20 co-occurrences with  
' r i x n o '  (throw) and ' t i n a z o '  (shake up) respec t ive ly ,  i . e .  as a 
causat ive .  Besides ' p e t a o ' ,  ' s t r i v o '  ( turn) has a causative and a
non-causative i n t e r p r e t a t io n ,  which are equal ly  common. I t  is 
perhaps noteworthy tha t  i t  is almost never c lustered together  with  
the causatives of  th is  set .
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I t  seems tha t  human motion is mainly understood as ' i n t e n t i o n a l ' /  
' a g e n t iv e ' .  Within the E c lu s te r  three c h a r a c t e r is t i c a l l y  agentive  
verbs: ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) ,  'p /5ao '  (jump) jo in  the
c lu s te r  at a lower stage, but th is  can receive a number of  
in te rp re ta t io n s  not d i r e c t l y  re la te d  to a g e n t iv i ty ,  but ra ther  to 
propert ies  such as ' legs  as instrument' or 'manner'.
Another t y p i c a l l y  agentive verb,  namely ' a k o l u d o '  ( f o l lo w ) ,  is part  
of  the sub-c luster  o f  items 34-15 which are not necessar i ly  agentive.  
The most unexpected c lu ster ing  in th is  respect involves ' s e r n o m e ' 
(creep,  c raw l ) ,  which belongs to the group characterized by most 
subjects who put i t s  const i tuent items together as involving  
' a c c id e n t a l ' ,  'n e g a t iv e ' ,  'u n in te n t io n a l '  motion. As already pointed 
out, ' s e r n o m e '  cannot be 'u n in t e n t io n a l ' ,  in the sense tha t  i t  
requires ( in t e n t io n a l )  motion o f  arms, legs,  e tc .  The obvious
explanation is  th a t  i t  is  qu i te  atypical  of  human CL and is
associated with 'undesirab le '  s i tua t ions .  This,  combined with  
something l i k e  'major part  of  the body in contact with ground' can 
explain the unpredicted r e s u l t ,  i . e .  i t s  appearing together  with  
items which are very low on an a g en t iv i ty  scale,  but share the above 
propert ies  with i t .  No general ,  t r a d i t io n a l  c la s s i f i c a t i o n  th a t  I
know of ( inc luding the one attempted in 4 .2 )  accounts fo r  th is  piece 
of  information.
Notice,  fu r t h e r ,  in th is  respect, th a t  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  or 
' a g e n t i v i t y '  is not in the le a s t  ignored, and th a t  i t  is  not an
independent property .  The only verb in the whole set necessar i ly  
involving 'w a te r '  as 'medium' namely ' v u l j a z o '  ( s in k ) ,  is also part  
of the 'negative  - acc identa l '  c lu s te r  C. Unintentional  or 'non- 
agentive '  motion is l inked with propert ies l i k e  ' a c c i d e n t a l i t y '  and 
' u n d e s i r a b i l i t y '  and is often combined with 'major part  o f  the body 
in contact with environment'.  I t  can be also shown th a t  i t  is  
somehow combined with 'downward' motion.
Cluster B contains ' v e r t i c a l '  motion non-causatives.  The sal ience of  
' v e r t i c a l '  d i rec t io n  has been pointed out more than once. Notice  
th a t  there e x is t  co-occurrences of  items sharing a property of
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'upward' or 'downward' d i re c t io n  and d i f f e r in g  even in c a u s a t iv i t y ,
e .g .  ' i p s o n o '  ( r a is e )  - ' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) -> 13, ' i p s o n o '  ( r a ise )  - 
' s k a r f a l o n o ' (cl imb) -> 12, ' k a t e v e n o '  (descend) - ' g r e m i z o '  (pu l l  
down) -> 8. These scores are much lower than the ones corresponding 
to the pairs which share the property of  (non-) c a u s a t iv i t y .  This 
w i l l  not be considered here as evidence in favour of  the sal ience of  
' c a u s a t i v i t y '  vs ' v e r t i c a l i t y '  or some spec i f ic  v e r t ic a l  d i re c t io n ,  
contrary to M i l l e r ' s  (1972) pract ice  c r i t i c i z e d  in 5 . 1 . 1 .  What these 
resu l ts  show is th a t  the combination of  v e r t ic a l  CL with absence or 
presence of  c a u s a t iv i ty  is extremely s a l i e n t .  Hence: ' a n e v e n o '
(ascend) - ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb) have 39 co-occurrences although they 
d i f f e r  in the s p ec i f ic a t io n  of  'manner' and ' instrument'  and 
' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) - ' k a t e v e n o '  (descend) score 35,  although the
former is  'upward' and the l a t t e r  'downward'. S i m i l i a r l y ,  in the  
causatives c lu s te r  D, ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up) - ' i p s o n o '  ( r a is e )  have 48 
co-occurrences, ' a n e v a z o '  - ' k r e m a o '  (hang) score 31 and ' i p s o n o ' - 
' k r e m a o '  -> 30.
The la s t  2 pa irs  mentioned in connection with v e r t i c a l i t y  and 
c a u s a t iv i t y  provide a f u r t h e r  piece of  unpredicted information.  The 
verb ' k r e m a o '  (hang), f a r  from being understood in i t s  most general  
sense which involves only 'change o f  po in t -o f -suppor t '  (see L is t  
V I I ) ,  is  obviously f e l t  to involve 'upward' CL. This can be only 
explained i f  the prototyp ica l  instances of  i t s  app l ica t ion  are taken 
into considerat ion,  l inked with hanging clothes on a hat-stand and 
pictures on the w a l l .  Al l  these involve t y p i c a l l y  ra is ing  the object  
in question.  This leads i n d i r e c t l y  to the conclusion tha t  c lu s te r  A 
items are probably not understood as involving 'change of p o in t - o f -  
support'  e i t h e r ,  but ra the r  'change of  posture ' .  This is re inforced  
by subjects'  comments on the content of  A (or some part  of  i t ) ,  
character iz ing  i t  as ' d i f f e r e n t  positions o f  the human body'.  As 
already pointed out in 4.2 th is  is c e r t a in ly  not the 'most general '  
understanding o f  the verbs in question,  namely ' k s a p l o n o '  ( l i e  down), 
' k aQome '  ( s i t  down) and ' y o n a t i z o '  (k nee l ) .
The d is t in c t io n  between CP and CL is not ignored, although in the 
absence o f  any CP verbs which are not also 'change of  posture ' ,  i t  is 
impossible to decide which p a r t i c u l a r  property is taken in to  account
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when they are clustered together.  What is worse, a l l  the CP non­
causatives o f  the set of fered to subjects involve 'downward' motion 
as w e l l ,  with the exception of  ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e ) .  Now th is  l a s t  
item can be e i t h e r  CL or CP. In e i t h e r  case i t  involves 'upward' 
motion. I t  is perhaps in d ica t iv e  to notice tha t  ' s i k o n o m e '  is judged 
as much closer to the CP group, as th is  is the in te rp re t a t io n  i t  
receives when applied to human motion. Notice th a t  i t  has 30 co­
occurrences with ' k a&om e '  ( s i t  down). This is the highest score fo r  
' s i k o n o m e '  and may imply that i t  is understood as i t s  antonym. I t  
also has 28 and 26 co-occurrences with ' y o n a t i z o '  (kneel)  and 
' k s a p l o n o '  ( l i e  down) respec t ive ly .  The combination of  ' v e r t i c a l '  
motion, CP and absence o f  c au s a t iv i ty  can explain these scores. I t  
is important to notice ,  however, that  these propert ies are not in the 
lea s t  independent in th is  c lu s te r .  'Change o f  posture'  is t y p i c a l l y  
' v e r t i c a l '  and 'non-causat ive '  (since a l l  these verbs are mainly 
understood as involving 'human body p o s i t i o n ' ) .  Combinations of  
propert ies are often b e t te r  expla inable  in terms of  typ ica l  'scenes'  
or ' frames'  than in terms of most general understandings o f  iso lated  
items. In p rac t ica l  terms, ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e )  can be eas i ly  
in terpreted  as part  of  a scene where somebody who is seated, kneeling 
or lying  down, ' r i s e s '  (stands up). ' V e r t i c a l i t y '  and 'absence of  
c a u s a t i v i t y ' ,  although extremely s a l ie n t ,  as already shown, cannot 
explain the behaviour of  ' s i k o n o m e ' .  I t  has only 17 and 13 co­
occurrences with  ' a n e v e n o '  (ascend) and ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb)  
respect ive ly ,  although they a l l  share 'upward' motion (and not ju s t  
' v e r t i c a l i t y ' ) , CL and absence o f  c a u s a t iv i ty .  These d i f ferences are 
only explainable  i f  ' s i k o n o m e '  is  t y p i c a l l y  in te rpre ted  as implying 
'change of p o s tu r e ' .
There are two verbs in the set offered to subjects,  ' S i a s x i z o ' 
( t raverse) and ' p e r n a o '  (pass),  which were categorized under 'pa th '  
(or 'passage')  in 4 .2 .  They appear together 39 t imes, f o r  10 of  
which they form a separate group. In th is  sense, the re levant  
property may be said to have some psychological v a l i d i t y ,  a t  least  
when combined with absence of c a u s a t iv i t y .  What is more in te res t in g ,  
they are both c loser  to the 'random walk' verbs, i . e .  ' p e r i f e r o m e '  
and ' t r i y i r i z o '  (roam around) wi th which they have 25 co-occurrences,  
than to the remaining non-causatives in the same c lu s te r  E. This may
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be in te rpre ted  as implying that  'absence o f  d i re c t io n  and g o a l ' ,  
which is a necessary property of  the 'random walk'  group and a 
proto typica l  one of  these verbs has some v a l i d i t y .  A l te rn a t iv e  
explanations are also possible .  Notice tha t  'p e r n a o ' (pass) is often  
used as 'pass by' or 'drop i n ' .  A scene involving roaming around and 
passing by various places while doing so may be responsible fo r  
l in k in g  ' p e r n a o '  with  the 'random walk' verbs.^
There is one example o f  'change o f  o r ie n ta t io n '  or ' r o t a r y  motion' ,  
namely ' s t r i v o '  ( t u r n ) ,  which is the most iso la ted  verb o f  th is  set ,  
as i t  appears 22 times by i t s e l f .  The suggestion made in 4 .2 .3  tha t  
change of  o r ien ta t io n  may be l inked with 'random walk'  is not 
completely unwarranted on the basis of  t e s t  re s u l ts ,  as ' s t r i v o '  has 
15 co-occurrences with the 'random walk'  verbs. I t s  15 co­
occurrences with ' b i a s x i z o '  ( t r a v e r s e ) ,  however, are not expla inable  
on the basis of  the analysis in 4 .2 . 3 .
There is  f u r t h e r  one example of  'dependent motion' ,  the verb 
' a k o l u Q o '  ( fo l low )  which is  also f a i r l y  iso la ted  (15 times by 
i t s e l f ) .  This is not s u f f i c i e n t  evidence in favour o f  postulat ing  
'dependent motion' as a separate category (as suggested in 4 . 2 . 2 ) .  
Although ' a k o l u Q o '  is the only verb in th is  set which combines 
'motion a f t e r  somebody/something' l inked with strong ' i n t e n t i o n '  (as 
suggested in 4 . 4 ) ,  i t  is f a i r l y  wel l in tegrated w i th in  the sub­
c lu s te r  o f  E consist ing of  items 34-15,  namely: ' p i y e n o '  (go),
' f e v y o '  ( l e a v e ) ,  ' e r x o m e '  (come). This is not expla inable  on the 
basis o f  the analysis offered  in 4 .2 .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  in te rp re t a t io n  
seems much more p lau s ib le ,  which is based on the fa c t  th a t  ' a k o l u Q o '  
has 25 co-occurrences (the maximum score fo r  th is  verb) with ' e r x o m e '  
(come). I t  is  qui te  probable th a t  ' a k o l u Q o '  ( fo l low )  is t y p i c a l l y  
l inked with 'someone going purposeful ly a f t e r  someone e l s e ' ,  i . e .  
'going towards some other person' .  These conditions seem to involve  
d i f f e r e n t  'd i re c t io n a l  adverb ia ls '  in formal terms. Apparently the 
' towards' vs ' a f t e r '  d is t in c t io n  is not of  primary importance, while  
'having as a goal the posi t ion of  some other person' is ,  and th is  is  
prec ise ly  what ' a k o l u Q o '  and ' e r x o m e '  (come) have in common (compared 
to the remaining verbs o f  the s e t ) .  This gives an idea o f  what the 
proto typica l  understanding of both verbs may involve,  and bears
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d i r e c t l y  on the important issue of  d e ix is ,  to be discussed 
immediately below.
Within c lu s te r  E the sub-c luster  mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
includes an antonymous d e ic t i c  p a i r  ' p i y e n o '  (go) and ' e r x o m e '  (come) 
which any analysis would consider together.  The number of  co­
occurrences o f  these verbs is s ig n i f i c a n t l y  high: 39.  Notice,
however, tha t  ' f e v y o '  ( leave) also has 38 co-occurrences with  
' e r x o m e '  and 37 with ' p i y e n o ' .  We a c tu a l ly  get a t r i p l e t ,  ra ther  
than an iso la ted  antonymous p a i r ,  as is the case with  'b e n o - v y e n o ' 
(49 co-occurrences) fo r  instance.  The t r i p l e t  is  explainable  in
terms of  ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  proper t ies .  Al l  three verbs are less marked 
( involve  fewer s p ec i f ic a t io n s )  than the remaining CL non-causatives 
of  the set .  What is not explainable  in such terms is  the high number 
of  co-occurrences of  ' e r x o m e '  with ' a k o l u Q o ' .  In terms of the 
categories of  'p lace  and person d e i x i s ' ,  ' p i y e n o '  and ' e r x o m e '  would
appear to be equal ly  d e i c t i c .  I t  seems, however, c loser  to  the facts
to accept tha t  ' e r x o m e '  (come) involves t y p i c a l l y  'motion to the 
locat ion  o f  a person' unl ike  ' p i y e n o ' ,  to which the most general 
understanding o f  de ix is  involving 'place or person' is more 
appropr iate .  Indiv idual  l i s t in g s  show th a t  when ' p i y e n o '  and
' e r x o m e '  are l i s t e d  separate ly ,  the l a t t e r  verb is  grouped with
' a k o l u Q o '  ( fo l lo w )  which also involves 'movement towards a person' .  
On the other hand, ' p i y e n o '  (go) is ,  in such cases, l i s t e d  together  
with ' f e v y o '  ( leave) and ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) .  The most immediate 
i n te rp re ta t io n  o f  these data is tha t  ' p i y e n o '  i t s e l f  is sometimes 
used to imply ' f e v y o '  ( I  am le a v in g ) .  F in a l l y  the co-occurrences 
with ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) point  to the d i rec t io n  of the prototypical  
understanding o f  th is  l a s t  verb,  which although speci f ied fo r
'manner' ( instrument,  medium, e t c . ) ,  describes the most 
c h a r a c te r is t ic  way o f  CL or 'd is tance covering'  fo r  humans (c lose ly  
fol lowed by ' t r e x o '  ( r u n ) ) .  In th is  sense i t  is  closer to the
'general  motion CL non-causatives'  than other  'manner' specifying  
verbs.  The d is t in c t io n  between 'genera l '  and 'manner' specifying  
verbs is not in the le a s t  indisputable  and should be considered 
c a r e f u l l y  in connection with the SST re s u l ts .
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Some of  the verbs discussed in 4 .2 .4  under 'manner' are singled out 
by M i l l e r  and Johnson-Laird (1976:550) as describing 'main global  
locomotory motions' .  Within the set given to subjects such MGMVs 
are: 'p e r p a t a o '  (walk) ,  ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  ' s e r n o m e '  (creep,  c rawl) ,
' s k a r f a l o n o ' (c l imb) .  As can be e as i ly  attested in the HCS these 
verbs do not form a c lu s te r ,  despite the fac t  tha t  they share a 
number of  p roper t ies .  They are a l l  agentive,  non-causative, 'manner' 
specify ing,  CL and 'd is tance covering'  in p a r t i c u l a r ,  imply 'body 
involvement' ,  and 'contact with ground of extremit ies  of  l imbs ' .  
Most t r a d i t i o n a l  analyses consider them together,  including M i l l e r  
and Johnson-Laird ( i b i d . )  and 4 .2 .4  of  the present study. A look at  
indiv idual  pa ir ings  o f  verbs in the matrix reveals th a t  the closest  
p a i r  is ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) - ' t r e x o '  ( run) ,  with 35 co-occurrences.  
This is expla inable  both in t r a d i t io n a l  and proto typica l  terms. The 
next best pa ir ing  involves ' p i b a o '  (jump) which appears 24 times with  
' t r e x o '  (run) and is not included in the 'main global locomotary 
motions' set .  In 4 .2 . 4  ' p i b a o '  (jump) was considered as t y p i c a l l y  
'non-distance covering'  and as involving some element of  'energy'  or  
' f o r c e ' ,  a common property with ' t r e x o '  ( run ) .  I t  also has 20 co­
occurrences with ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) ,  however, an ind ica t ion  that  the 
m ajor i ty  o f  the propert ies mentioned as c h a ra c te r iz ing  the 'main 
global locomotory motions' set are also applicable  in th is  case and 
are not ignored. What does not show immediately in the HCS but can 
be checked in the matrix  is tha t  ' p i b a o '  has 18 co-occurrences with  
' p e t a o '  ( f l y )  and 15 with ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (c l imb) .  The conclusion tha t  
'upward' motion is also part  o f  i t s  sp ec i f ic a t io n  is f a i r l y  
i n e v i ta b le ,  as is also the recognit ion of  the fac t  th a t  in the case 
of ' p i b a o '  (jump) propert ies  other than ' v e r t i c a l i t y '  are f e l t  as 
more s a l i e n t .  Nevertheless,  the main problem with the set in 
question does not l i e  in the exclusion of  ' p i b a o '  but in the 
inclusion o f  ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb) and ' s e r n o m e '  (creep,  c raw l ) .  As 
already noted both verbs are quite removed from the ones ju s t  
discussed, as ' s k a r f a l o n o '  is  clustered together  with ' v e r t i c a l '  
motion non-causatives (c lu s te r  B) and while ' s e r n o m e '  is part  of  
c lu s te r  C, which includes non-causatives marked fo r  absence of  
i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  ( 'u ndes i rab le '  motion), 'contact of  major par t  of  body 
with environment',  and perhaps also some 'downward' element, which is 
suggested in 4 .4  to be c losely  l inked with absence o f  a g e n t iv i ty .
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The question there fore  arises to what extent the 'g enera l '  vs 
'manner' d is t in c t io n  advocated in 4.2  is at a l l  p laus ib le .  The SST 
resu l ts  show tha t  although i t  is not ignored, i t  is not very s a l ie n t  
e i t h e r ,  compared to other propert ies ,  nor is i t  independent of  
propert ies  such as 'medium', ' ins trument '  and typ ica l  CL fo r  humans. 
I f  the d is t in c t io n  were not recognized by subjects,  'p e r p a t a o ' 
(walk) ,  ' t r e x o '  ( ru n ) ,  ' p i b a o '  (jump) would not have consti tuted a 
c le a r  sub-c luster  o f  E (CL non-causatives,  ' indeterminate '  
d i r e c t i o n ) .  On the other hand, the co-occurrences o f  ' p i y e n o '  (go) 
(a most 'genera l '  motion verb) with those verbs o f  the set which 
specify  'manner' show, once again,  the inadequacy o f  general  
c la s s i f ic a t io n s  and the importance of  prototypical  images. Compare 
these co-occurrences:
These s ig n i f ic a n t  d i f fe rences  can be explained only i f  one considers 
th a t  the proto typica l  image of ' p i y e n o '  (go) involves something l i k e
' in te n t io n a l  distance covering on f o o t ' .  The la s t  and the f i r s t  part
o f  th is  rough s p e c i f ic a t io n  ( ' i n t e n t i o n a l '  and 'on f o o t ' )  are
interdependent. This s p ec i f ica t io n  is also applicable  to ' p e r p a t a o '  
(walk) ,  involv ing the most typ ica l  way of  CL fo r  humans, as well as 
to ' t r e x o '  ( run) which i s ,  however, less c h a r a c t e r is t i c / t y p ic a l  in  
th is  respect. None o f  the remaining 'manner' speci fy ing verbs of  the 
set involves typ ica l  CL or distance covering for  humans. This can 
explain the remarkably low scores they have with ' p i y e n o '  (go).  
Addit ional  data as to how these verbs are c lustered and fo r  what
reasons have been already discussed and need not be repeated.
Within c lu s te r  D, which includes CL causatives, two sub-c lusters  are 
i d e n t i f i e d  in the HCS. The one which consists of  items 17-14,  i . e .
p i y e n o
(9 0 )
p e r p a t a o  (walk) 
t r e x o  (run)  
p i b a o  (jump) 
s k a r f a l o n o  (cl imb)  
sernome  (c reep ,crawl ) 
p e t a o  ( f l y ,  throw) 
k i l a o  ( r o l l )
- >  21 




- >  2 
- >  2
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' i p s o n o '  ( r a i s e ) ,  7a n e v a z o '  ( take up),  ' k r e m a o '  (hang),  involves a 
combination o f  'upward7 motion and presence o f  'accompaniment'.  
Items 16-23, i . e .  ' r i x n o '  ( throw),  ' t i n a z o '  (shake up),  and ' g r e m i z o '  
(pul l  down) are more c lose ly  l inked to the causative understanding of 
' p e t a o '  ( throw),  with which ' r i x n o '  (throw) and ' t i n a z o '  (shake up) 
have 22 and 21 co-occurrences respect ive ly .  These involve 'absence 
of  accompaniment' and ' impetus ' ,  which are not independent propert ies  
since in the case of  CL causatives ' impetus'  implies 'absence of  
accompaniment'. I t  does not there fore  make sense to t a l k  about 
r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  a s ingle  property in th is  case e i t h e r .
The tendency of  subjects to form pairs is quite  noticeable  in the 
HCS. Some of  these pa irs  were already discussed. Of the remaining 
ones, ' beno  '  (ente r )  and ' v y e n o '  ( e x i t )  have 49 co-occurrences ( i . e .  
only one subject separated them), while 18 times they are l i s t e d  in 
i s o la t io n .  This may imply tha t  some property involving  ' two/ th ree  
dimensional area' is f a i r l y  s a l i e n t ,  provided no other property ( ies )  
of  those already mentioned as very s a l ie n t  is also involved.  This 
must be noted, in order to account fo r  the fa c t  th a t  ' v u l j a z o '  
(s in k ) ,  which also involves 'motion into a three-dimensional a rea ' ,  
has only 2 co-occurrences with ' b e n o ' .
The two pairs o f  near-synonyms o f  th is  set ,  i . e .  ' a n e v a z o '  ( take up) 
- ' i p s o n o '  ( r a is e )  and ' p e r i f e r o m e '  - ' t r i y i r i z o '  (roam around) were 
included in order to check whether the ' - o m e '  mediopassive ending 
would play a ro le  in subjects '  c la s s i f ic a t io n s  and whether ' a n e v a z o '  
would have more l i s t in g s  with i t s  non-causative counterpart  ' a n e v e n o '  
(ascend) than ' i p s o n o '  ( r a ise )  would. The re s u l ts  show that  
morphological cues ( ' ~ome' ending) played no ro le  in subjects'  
judgments and th a t  subtle d i f ferences o f  meaning { ' i p s o n o '  - 
7a n e v a z o ' )  do not a f f e c t  the overa l l  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
The fac t  tha t  ' f e r n o '  (br ing) has only 2 co-occurrences with ' e r x o m e '  
(come) could have been in te rpre ted  as implying th a t  t h e i r  common 
d e ic t i c  component is i n f i n i t e l y  less s a l ie n t  than the causative one 
(which the two verbs do not share) .  I t  seems, however, more 
plausib le  to assume tha t  i f  the property o f  c a u s a t iv i ty  (or i t s
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absence) is a shared one, subjects tend to form pa irs  of  antonyms or 
near-antonyms and do not need to bother about which p a r t i c u la r  
propert ies  are shared unless a very s a l ie n t  one is involved.  This 
explains why 1f e r n o ' (br ing) and ' s t e l n o ' (send) are such a 's trong'  
pa ir  (48 co-occurrences,  30 o f  which are unaccompanied by any other  
i tem),  although the exact antonym of ' f e r n o '  (br ing)  is ac tu a l ly  
'p/yeno^' ( take t o ) . ^  I t  also explains why ' beno  - v y e n o '  is an 
equally strong p a i r ,  while ' a n e v e n o  - k a t e v e n o '  is less strong: the
la s t  case is the only one involving the extremely s a l ie n t  propert ies  
of 'upward' and 'downward' motion; besides, the p o s s i b i l i t y  existed  
of l i s t i n g  e i t h e r  member o f  the antonymous p a i r  with other verbs of  
the set sharing th is  property while not being members of  other  
antonymous (or synonymous) pa i rs .
To sum up, i t  seems unwarranted to draw any conclusions bearing on 
the overa l l  organizat ion of  a semantic domain on the basis of  the 
data from any subset. The same applies to decisions on the exact 
nature o f  propert ies  or dimensions which seem to operate with in  the 
subset. Spec i f ic  s t ra teg ie s  o f  subjects performing SSTs, such as the 
tendency to form pa irs  of  (near) synonyms and (near) antonyms, play a 
decis ive ro le ,  as does also the actual choice of  var iab les  ( i tems).  
The p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  combinations open to subjects have to be taken 
ser ious ly  into account. A fu r th e r  important fa c to r  emerges, namely 
tha t  a number of  propert ies  are not independent. In view of  a l l  
these,  in te rp re t in g  SST resu l ts  in terms of  number of  shared 
a t t r ib u te s /p ro p e r t ie s  (e .g .  Long 1975) or r e la t i v e  sal ience between 
iso la ted propert ies  (e .g .  M i l l e r  1972) does not seem well founded.
Less strong conclusions can, however, be drawn. The most important 
among these seem to be the ro le  of  the r e l a t i v e  sal ience o f  cer ta in  
combinations of  propert ies  in semantic s im i l a r i t y  judgments and the 
psychological v a l i d i t y  of  s p e c i f i c ,  prototypical  understandings of  
categories as opposed to most general ones.
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5.2 P r o to ty p ic a l i t y  tests  with Modern Greek motion verbs
Taxonomic re la t io n s  between terms and the problems raised in 
connection with verbs, and MGMVs in p a r t i c u la r ,  are discussed at  
length in 4 .1 ,  which contains also an analysis of  such re la t io n s  in 
the f i e l d  under considerat ion.  Section 4 .1 .2  concentrates on how to 
determine which items are 'basic  l e v e l '  in th is  f i e l d  and elaborates  
on the notions of  ' l i n g u i s t i c  markedness' and ' r e l a t i v e  class 
in c lu s io n ' .  The present section focuses on the important p r in c ip le  
elaborated by Rosch and her col leagues (e .g .  Rosch and Mervis 1975, 
Mervis and Rosch 1981) tha t  subordinate categories are not 
equid is tant from the inc lus ive  category name, i . e .  th a t  a l l  members 
(o f  a category) are not equal ly  representat ive o f  t h e i r  category.  
Evidence in favour of  the non-equivalence of  category members was 
f i r s t  of fered by Ber l in  and Kay (1969) where an i l lum ina t ing  
d is t in c t io n  was drawn between focal  and non-focal colours.  The
former const i tu te  points in the colour space which speakers of  quite  
d i f f e r e n t  languages judge as most representat ive  ( i . e .  as the best 
examples) of  the 11 basic colour categories.
Rosch and her col leagues have shown th a t  gradients of  representat ives  
are also found in many semantic categories and in p a r t i c u la r  both in 
those const i tu t ing  bio logica l  taxonomies (animals,  p lants )  and in 
those belonging to non-biolo .gical ones, such as a r te fac ts
( f u r n i t u r e ,  musical instruments).  Rosch’ and Mervis (1975) 
demonstrate th a t  category members d i f f e r  in the extent  to which they
share a t t r ib u te s  with other category members. This var iab le  they
c a l l  ' fa m i ly  resemblance',  fol lowing Wit tgenstein (1953).  Examples 
which have most a t t r ib u te s  in common with other items w i th in  the same 
category share few ( i f  any) a t t r ib u te s  with members of  other 
( s im i la r )  categor ies.  These examples have the highest family  
resemblance scores and are judged as the most representa t ive  or 
prototypica l  of  t h e i r  inc lusive category.
Pulman (1983) investigates whether verb categories also show the 
prototype e f f e c t  and whether, in case they do, the same p r in c ip le  
( i . e .  family  resemblance) can be held responsible fo r  the formation
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of prototypes.  His inves t iga t ion  is of  immediate concern to the
present study, as a number o f  the observations he makes are also 
appl icable to the facts  of  MGMVs. Notice, fo r  a s t a r t ,  th a t  although 
Pulman was drawing materia l  from a l l  d i f f e r e n t  verb areas o f  English,  
he ended up with only 8 hyponymic sets consist ing o f  a hypothesized 
basic level  and six  hyponyms. His remark " i t  turned out to be quite  
d i f f i c u l t  to f ind  enough basic leve l  verbs with a s u f f i c i e n t  number 
of hyponyms" ( i b i d . : 110),  i f  appl ied to the present study o f  a single  
verb domain (MGMVs), would be something of an understatement in view 
of  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  pointed out in 4 .1 .  An addi t ional  problem, which 
has emerged at  various points throughout th is  study, is the 
p a r t i c u la r  sociol in g u is t ic  complications faced by anyone conducting 
l ex ic a l  research in MG.
In view o f  the aforementioned d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  the p i l o t  te s t  I carr ied  
out in order to see whether the prototype e f f e c t  obtained for  MGMVs 
contained 11 groups o f  verbs, some o f  which were extremely unfami l ia r  
and/or belonged to d i f f e r e n t  re g is te rs ,  const i tu ted dubious cases, 
were c ro ss -c la s s i f ie d  or were marked SI or S3. The t e s t  asked 
subjects fo r  subjective ra t ings o f  typ ica l i ty / re p re s e n ta t iv en es s  
along a 7 -point scale,  fo l lowing Rosch and Pulman. Twelve fourth  
year undergraduates of  the English Department of Athens Univers i ty  
served as subjects fo r  the p i l o t  t e s t .  They were given 11 sets of  
MGMVs, each consist ing o f  a basic leve l  term ( in  my view) and 7-10 
hypothesized hyponyms, and were asked to decide which member of  each 
category was more c h a r a c te r is t ic  or typica l  of  tha t  category.
Subjects were instructed to extend the 'standard'  ( in  Rosch and 
Pulman's te s ts )  7 -po int  scale to  10 points fo r  those sets that had 
more than 7 hyponyms, i f  they f e l t  i t  was necessary. They were also 
ins tructed to leave out items about which they had doubts ( i . e .  
because they e i t h e r  did not know t h e i r  meaning or did not know how to 
c la s s i f y  them). The idea was th a t  i f  cer ta in  items were consistently  
l e f t  out they would not be included in the f i n a l  t e s t .  Apart from 
tha t  the instruct ions were in essence the same as those given by 
Rosch and Pulman but somewhat more d e t a i l e d .  ^ The ins truct ions  are 
included below ( t ran s la ted  into English) and fol lowed by the w r i t ten  
example of  what subjects were supposed to do.
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"You have 11 groups of verbs which s ig n i fy  'movement'. Each 
group consists of  one verb which is considered the basic one of  
the group and 7 to 10 others which are considered hyponyms of the 
former, i . e .  are c la s s i f ie d  under i t  (and consequently include i t  
as part  of  t h e i r  meaning).
The f i r s t  group includes 8 members o f  the category 'p e r p a t a o ' 
(walk) ,  the second one 6 members of  the category ' v i Q i z o m e '  
( s in k ) ,  and so on. You have to decide fo r  each member of  the 
category ' p e r p a t a o ' , fo r  instance, how c h a ra c te r is t ic  
(representa t ive)  o f  tha t  category i t  i s .  The most representa t ive  
verb of  each category is to be put in box number 1, the least  
representa t ive  in number 7. Only the l i t e r a l  meaning of  these 
verbs is taken into  considerat ion,  not t h e i r  f i g u r a t i v e  uses 
(e .g .  ' m e t a f e r o '  ( t ra n s fe r ,  transport)  is to be understood as 
implying ' a n t i k i m e n a '  (objects)  and not ' t a  e k l o y i k a  mu 
b i k e o m a t a '  (my voting r i g h t s ) ) .
Notice the fo l lowing points:
1. Use, as f a r  as possible,  a l l  the boxes, th a t  is t r y  to  
c la s s i f y  the verbs using the whole scale.
2. A box may, nevertheless,  include more than one verb i f  you 
consider th a t  these verbs are equal ly  representa t ive  
of the category.
3. For those groups of verbs that  have more than 7 members you 
may extend the scale up to 10, i f  you wish.
4, I f  you are in doubt about the 'marking' o f  a member of  a 
category or about i t s  meaning, leave i t  out. "
Example: s k o t o n o  ( k i l l )
1. b o l o f o n o  2. e k t e l o  3. s f a z o  4.
murder execute massacre, slaughter
5. Q i s i a z o  6. a f t o k t o n o  7. 
s a c r i f i c e  commit suicide
Two examples were also provided and shown on the board, one of  





and one o f  p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  measurements with the MG terms for :
f u rn i tu re
1. cha i r ,  tab le  2. _____  3. chest 4. _____
5.   6. hat-stand
The groups of  verbs which fol lowed the instruct ions were random as
was also the order o f  the members wi th in  each category.  Subjects
were to ld  th a t  the experiment was a l i n g u i s t i c  and not a 
psychological one and that  the time they might need to make t h e i r  
judgments was o f  no consequence. In view o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  reported  
by the subjects who had carr ied  out the 'semantic s i m i l a r i t y '  task  
with regard to the ins t ru c t io n  th a t  they should t r y  and take into  
account a l l  possible uses o f  the verbs (provided they s t ick  to  
'physical  m ot ion ') ,  tha t  p a r t i c u la r  ins truct ion  was omitted.
A f t e r  they had completed t h e i r  answers, subjects were encouraged to 
discuss any problems they had had with the t e s t .  On the basis of  the 
discussion which fol lowed, i t  became quite  obvious tha t  a number of
hyponyms would have to be omitted in the f in a l  t e s t ,  as they were
p r a c t i c a l l y  unknown to tha t  p a r t i c u la r  and ra the r  se lect  group of  
subjects.  This meant also tha t  some whole sets o f  verbs were l e f t  
with too few hyponyms and had to be excluded. Besides i t  became 
c lea r  th a t  even sophist icated subjects were unable to  spel l  out 
s p e c i f ic  a t t r ib u te s  fo r  most verbs, although they could confidently  
agree or disagree with proposed d e f in i t io n s  and point out d i f ferences  
in the use of  re la te d  hyponyms.
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The most important points that resulted from the discussion were: (a)  
the notions ' re p re s e n ta t iv e '  and 'c h a r a c t e r i s t i c '  which were e n t i r e ly  
new to the subjects in th is  connection ( p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y )  did not 
present a problem to anybody; and (b) the term 'd is tan ce '  was used 
throughout the discussion,  confirming Pulman's ( i b i d . )  and my 
in tu i t io n s  th a t  in making p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  judgments, subjects are 
ac tu a l ly  est imating the degree of  semantic s i m i l a r i t y  between an
inc lus ive  category and each hyponym. This issue w i l l  be taken up 
again in a discussion of the f in a l  te s t  r e s u l ts .  At th is  point  a l l  
tha t  needs to be stated is tha t  the actual resu l ts  o f  the p i l o t  tes t  
were quite  encouraging concerning agreement on the best and the worst 
examples at le a s t .
Therefore,  the f in a l  t e s t  was simply a modi f icat ion o f  the p i l o t  one 
along the fo l lowing l ines :
(1) The groups/sets o f  verbs were reduced to 8, since those sets 
which presented unsurmountable problems were omitted,  except fo r  
one which appears under C in the f in a l  t e s t .  That set was
included in order to check whether i t  would y ie ld  equal ly  bad 
resu l ts  with a large number o f  subjects.
(2) Items which proved to be 'unknown' to the p i l o t  t e s t  subjects 
were omitted.  Verbs marked SI and S3 were avoided (except for
one item ' a x Q o f o r o '  (carry  baggage) in category D) but verbs
belonging to d i f f e r e n t  reg is ters  were included. An example of  a 
possible object was included fo r  the verb 'petje/ne' (go fo r  a 
short t ime) of  set E, so that  the spec i f ic  sense meant was made 
c le a r .
(3) The ins truct ions  contained only points 1 and 2 of  those which 
subjects'  a t te n t ion  was drawn fo r  the p i l o t  t e s t .  The f i r s t  one 
was phrased more simply but the s pec i f ica t ion  "the whole scale" 
was underl ined,  as the p i l o t  te s t  showed a remarkable reluctance  
of  subjects to use the whole scale i f  less than 7 hyponyms were 
included. For the same reason an addit ional  item: ' e k s o l o Q r e v o '  
(exterminate)  appeared in box 4 of  the example provided, while
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boxes 6 and 7 were f i l l e d  with the items previously  appearing in 
boxes 5 and 6 respect ive ly .
The f in a l  t e s t  was carr ied  out by 61 subjects in two separate groups. 
They were a l l  na t ive  speakers of  Greek. One group consisted of  28 
second year undergraduates of  the French Department and the other one 
of  33 f i r s t  year undergraduates of  the English Department of  Athens 
U nivers i ty .
A couple of  responses were incomplete but were not discounted.  
Despite my e f f o r t s ,  the f u l l  7 -po in t  scale was not used when only 5 
hyponyms were provided. Following Pulman ( i b i d . )  a chi-square te s t  
was used to measure goodness o f  f i t  between observed and expected 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  responses. The actual re su l t  is provided fo r  each 
verb.  Notice tha t  fo r  6 degrees of  freedom (d f  6) and .05 level of  
s ig n i f icance ,  the s ig n i f ic a n t  value of  the x^ te s t  is 12.59.  The 
vast m ajo r i ty  o f  the verbs tested were ne i ther  evenly nor randomly 
d is t r ib u te d .  A large number o f  the resu l ts  obtained showed high 
in te r -s u b jec t  agreement on what were the best and the worst examples 
of each category.
In the presentat ion of  resul ts  which fol lows immediately,  rankings 
and mean ra t ings are given,  the l a t t e r  appearing under each 
subordinate i tem. The resul ts  o f  the x^ te s t  appear in parentheses 
so tha t  an accurate p ic ture  is provided o f  the extent  to which 
subjects agreed on the ranking o f  each p a r t i c u la r  i tem.^
A. p e r p a t a o  (walk) 
ranking : 1 2
v i m a t i z o  (pace) 
mean ra t in g :  1.606













b u s u l i z o  (crawl (as of  a baby))
6.197
(114.18)
Expectedly 'p e r p a t a o '  (walk) is the category which y ie lded the best 
re su l ts ,  ( in  the sense of  in te r -s u b je c t  agreement) possibly because 
owing to the p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  o f  the a c t i v i t y ,  i t  is easy to f ind  a 
large number o f  hyponyms well-known to a l l  subjects and s u f f i c i e n t l y  
'removed' from one another.
The items holding posit ions 1, 2 and 3 in h e r i t  most o f  the a t t r ib u te s  
considered ty p ica l  o f  the category name ( in  4 . 2 . 4 ) ,  including  
' r e g u l a r i t y '  and 'c o n t in u i t y '  o f  motion. The fa c t  tha t  ' v i m a t i z o '  
(pace) does not t y p i c a l l y  involve 'reaching a d es t in a t io n '  (e .g .  
'pacing up and down' is i t s  most typica l  use) is ev idently  not 
considered important enough to remove i t  from the f i r s t  posi t ion.  
Complete absence o f  goal ,  however, appl icable to ' s u l a t s a r o '  
(saunter) ,  which is an instance o f  'random w a lk ' ,  is  probably 
responsible fo r  i t s  being f a i r l y  f a r  removed from the 2nd best 
( ' p e z o p o r o ' ) .
Dif ferences in r e g is t e r  do not seem to play an important ro le :  
' p e z o p o r o ' (walk a long distance) is high re g is te r  and ' s u l a t s a r o '  
(saunter)  low r e g is t e r .  L ingu is t ic  unmarkedness is not the most
4








important fa c to r  e i t h e r :  both ' t r i k l i z o '  (stagger)  and ' p a r a p a t a o '  
(stumble) are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked and qu ite  f a m i l i a r  items (see 
4 . 1 ) ,  yet  they are judged as poor examples of  the category name. 
What is more important, they are both more frequent than ' p e z o p o r o '  
(walk a long distance) at  le a s t .
I t  is there fore  f a i r l y  c le a r  tha t  the r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  spec i f ic  
propert ies plays the most decis ive ro le  in th is  category.  The 4th 
posit ion is occupied by ' h r a s k e l i z o '  ( s t r id e )  which is t y p i c a l l y  an 
'event '  verb (no c o n t in u i t y ) ,  the 5th and 6th posit ions have verbs 
describing ' i r r e g u l a r '  and 'd e f e c t i v e '  kinds of  walking,  while the 
leas t  typ ica l  example is  hardly an instance o f  ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) .  
The simplest way of  showing these d i f fe rences  in degree of 
p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  in th is  case is through ' s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y '  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  in a common environment:
(1) 5en p e r p a t a i  k a n o n i k a  * v i m a t i z i ,
s/he does not walk properly s/he paces
p e z o p o r i  
walks a long 
distance
? ? s u l a t s a r i  
saunters
t r i k l i z i ,  p a r a p a t a i  
staggers
(2) hen p e r p a t a i  akomi  b u s u l i z i
s/he does not (cannot) walk yet  s/he is crawling (as of  a baby)
B. v i B i z o m e  (s ink)
I  2
v u l j a z o  (s ink) k a t a p o n d i z o m e  (sink to the bottom,
1.229 3.361 become inundated)
(225.4)  (28 .9 )
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3
k a t a b i o w e  (d ive)
4






n avayo  (founder,
4.705 become ship-  
(24 .76)  wrecked)
f u d a r o  (sink to the bottom) 
4.951
(17.86)
The only reason fo r  having ' v i Q I z o m e  ra ther  than ' v u l j a z o '  as the  
inc lus ive  category here is tha t  the former can be margina l ly  used fo r  
in ten t iona l  as well as un intentional  submersion in to  water.  Quite 
expectedly ' v u l j a z o '  (s ink)  is almost unanimously judged as the verb 
nearest to the inc lus ive  category name.
One item ' k a t a b i o m e '  (d ive)  f a i l s  to reach s ign i f icance  and is  
there fore  discarded. There are also two i tems, those in posit ions 4 
and 6 barely  reach s ig n i f icance .  Their  ra t ings  are qui te  unexpected. 
The former one, ' v u t a o '  (d ive)  implies in tent iona l  and momentary 
motion unl ike  the re s t .  I t  is a very f a m i l i a r  verb which is ,  
however, only p a r t i a l l y  included in ' v i Q i z o m e '  ( s in k ) .  The l a t t e r  
one ' f u d a r o '  (s ink to the bottom) is low r e g is t e r  and ra ther  
unfa m i l ia r ,  but i t  is otherwise a very good instance o f  ' v i Q i z o m e '  
( s i n k ) .
I t  seems reasonable to assume that  the d i f ferences in 'manner' of  
motion are not very d i s t i n c t ,  ne i ther  are the corresponding verbs 
very f a m i l i a r .  Subjects are therefore  l e f t  to decide on the basis of  
presence or absence o f  ' i n t e n t i o n a l i t y '  and ' f a m i l i a r i t y '  which 
emerges here as an important fa c to r .  F a m i l i a r i t y  is not,  however, 
the only decis ive  fa c to r  here e i th e r .  Notice tha t  ' k a t a p o n d i z o m '  
(s ink  to the bottom, become inundated) is  not very f a m i l i a r ,  yet  i t  
occupies the 2nd pos i t ion .  Apparently i t s  sense which does not imply 
motion o f  the object  ( i . e .  'become inundated')  is ignored here, at  
lea s t  by some subjects;  once an item is given as a hyponym of an 
inc lus ive  category,  subjects tend to concentrate on tha t  p a r t i c u la r
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use/sense i t  has which is d i r e c t l y  associated with the given higher  
category name.
C. p i b a o  (jump)
1
s a l t a r o  ( leap)  
2
2




t i n a z o m e  (spring up/  
4.443 je rk )  
(8 .67 )(89.12)
4




i p e r p i b a o  (jump over)
4.705
( 2 2 )
As already noted, th is  set was included despite a l l  evidence to the 
contrary on the basis o f  the p i l o t  t e s t  re s u l ts .  Only 5 hyponyms are 
included in th is  ' f i n a l '  version of  C and one of them ' t i n a z o m e '  
(spring up / je rk )  f a i l s  to reach s ig n if icance ,  while i t s  near-synonym 
' p e t j e m e '  (jump u p / j o l t )  does not display  any high in te r -s u b jec t  
agreement on how i t  should be c la s s i f ie d ,  ne i ther  does ' a n a p i b a o '  
(jump up (and down)). As in the case of  the previous set,  very 
s l ig h t  d i f ferences are involved,  so i t  makes no sense to concentrate 
on sal ience of  p roper t ies .  Three cases are worth discussing,  namely 
the items occupying posit ions 1, 2 and 5.
I t  is in te res t in g  to notice that the items sharing almost a l l  
important propert ies with the category name, namely ' s a l t a r o '  ( leap)  
and ' i p e r p i b a o ' (jump over ) ,  occupy the f i r s t  and the l a s t  posit ions  
re spec t ive ly .  The former item is normally understood as not implying 
r e p e t i t io n  of  the jumping event ( i . e .  a series of  repeated jumps) and 
is used in cases l i k e  leaping over an obstacle,  fo r  instance.  I t  is  
also low r e g is te r ,  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked but qu ite  f a m i l i a r  to the 
speakers of  the age group to which the subjects belonged. The l a t t e r  
item implies c le a r ly  jumping over something, is high r e g is te r  and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  infrequent and un fami l ia r .  The importance of  
f a m i l i a r i t y  and frequency in th is  case is obvious.
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The item in posi t ion 2, ' a n a p i b a o '  (jump up (and down)) has two 
f a i r l y  d i s t i n c t  uses: one implying 'jump as a re s u l t  of  being
s t a r t l e d '  and another one implying 'jumping up and down'. The
subjects who carr ied  out the p i l o t  tes t  were mostly aware of  the 
l a t t e r  use. This explains why ' a n a p i b a o '  f igures  in the 2nd posit ion  
ra ther  than together with ' p e t j e m e '  (jump up) and ' t i n a z o m e '  (spring  
up): i t  is mainly understood as implying a series o f  repeated jumps
and not as an instance of  CP (as i t  appears in L is t  V I I ) .
D. p i y e n o  k a t i  ka pu  ( take something somewhere)^
1
















p r o s k o m i z o  ( take documents
4.590 to an o f f i c i a l )
(10 .05)
6
m e t a v i v a z o  ( t ransmit )
5.328
(29 .8 )
Only the two best and the worst examples o f  th is  category need to be 
discussed as the remaining ones do not show in te r -s u b je c t  agreement.
The f i r s t  thing to notice is tha t  the d if fe rences between subordinate 
categories do not involve types/ 'manner'  of  motion but ' type of  
object '  caused to move, fo r  which the superordinate category is not 
spec i f ied .  Otherwise, 'accompaniment' is a shared a t t r i b u t e  of  a l l  
the terms of the set .  ' I n d i r e c t  causation'  and th ere fore  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  appearing w i th in  predications which are low in 
a g en t iv i ty  is only appl icable  to the inclusive category ( ' p i y e n o ' )
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and margina l ly to the term judged as most proto typ ical  o f  i t ,  but 
none of the others.  Notice also,  th a t  ' a x Q o f o r o ' (carry  baggage) is 
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked, unfam i l ia r  and infrequent ,  whi le  'm e t a v i v a z o ' 
( t ransmit)  is scarcely replaceable by the category name, as the 
object 'caused to move' is t y p i c a l l y  abst rac t ,  e .g .  'a message', 
'g r e e t in g s ' .  In short ,  ' m e t a v i v a z o '  ( t ransmit)  involves lea s t  
ty p ica l  objects 'caused to move' and although f a m i l i a r ,  i t  is  
c e r t a in ly  of  r e s t r i c t e d  use compared to the verbs appearing in 
posit ions 1, 2 (and 3) and is also of  high re g is te r .
The best example ' m e t a f e r o '  ( t r a n s fe r )  is equal ly f a m i l i a r  with the 
second one ' k u v a l a o ' ( c a r ry ) .  They both imply th a t  the object is  
f a i r l y  ' s u b s t a n t i a l '  ( i t  cannot be a l e t t e r ,  f o r  ins tance) ,  but the 
l a t t e r  item implies also that  the act is undesirable (e .g .  the object  
is heavy or the act is executed unnecessari ly) .  In t h is  sense 
' k u v a l a o ' (carry )  is s l i g h t l y  more l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked than the 
item judged as most proto typ ical  of  th is  ca tegory .7 A fu r th er  
di f fe rence  between these two best examples is the f a c t  tha t  only the 
former one is t y p i c a l l y  understood as implying tha t  the object must 
reach a des t in a t ion ,  as does also the inc lus ive  category name. The 
verb ' k u v a l a o ' need not imply any such thing .  Evident ly  there  is no 
way of  choosing between the two a l t e r n a t iv e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  i . e .  of  
t e l l i n g  whether l i n g u i s t i c  markedness or sal ience of  propert ies  
determines the r e l a t i v e  distance of  'm e t a f e r o ' and ' k u v a l a o ' from the 
inc lus ive  category name. S im i la r ly ,  in view o f  what has already been 
noted with respect to  'm e t a v i v a z o ' ( t ra n s m i t ) ,  more than one fa c to r  
is involved in rendering i t  the leas t  typ ica l  verb of  th is  category.
E. p i y e n o  (go)
1
porevome  (go a long distance  
1.344 on foot )
(213.7)
2





p e t j e m e  ( p . x .  s t o  p e r i p t e r o )
3.377 (go fo r  a short t ime, e .g .
(77 .86) to the kiosque)
4








p a r e l a v n o  (march) 
6.229  
(97 .88)
This is another set  e xh ib i t in g  remarkable in t e r -s u b je c t  agreement, 
comparable to the ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) verbs and probably fo r  the same 
reasons. The inc lus ive  category const i tu tes  the most c h a r a c te r is t ic  
'genera l '  way of  covering distance and i t  is easy to f ind  hyponyms 
fo r  i t  which are well-known to most subjects and s u f f i c i e n t l y  
dist inct /removed from one another.
Notice, f i r s t ,  tha t  the verbs occupying posit ions 2 and 4 do not 
specify  ' instrument'  (on f o o t ) ,  l i k e  the category name and unl ike  the 
remaining items of  the set.  In view, however, o f  what has already  
been noted in the previous section (SST r e s u l t s ) ,  the inc lusive  
category ' p i y e n o '  is  probably mainly understood as involving  'going 
somewhere on f o o t ' .  I t  is  possible th a t  the same applies to 
' p r o x o r o '  (advance) and also to  ' p e t j e m e '  (go f o r  a short t ime) owing 
to the s p e c i f ic  environment ( to  the kiosque) supplied in the te s t  fo r  
the l a t t e r .  Therefore the only verb in the set which does not allow  
fo r  such an understanding (instrument « f e e t )  is ' t a k s i b e v o '  
( t r a v e l ) .  This may be the reason why there is no great in te r -s u b je c t  
agreement as to  how th is  verb is to be c la s s i f i e d .
Notice fu r th e r  th a t  although both verbs judged as most proto typica l  
of th is  category are f a m i l i a r ,  the f i r s t  one is c e r t a in ly  less  
frequent than the second one. Besides, although ' p o r e v o m e ' (go a 
long distance on fo o t )  may imply tha t  some dest in at ion  is going to be 
reached, such a s p ec i f ica t io n  is not a necessary one as i t  is fo r  the 
inc lus ive  category.  I t  is even less necessary in the case of
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' p r o x o r o '  (advance) which occupies the 2nd pos i t ion .  This means 
e i t h e r  th a t  th is  property is not at  a l l  r e lev an t ,  or tha t  i t  is 
understood as a shared property o f  a l l  three verbs in question.  In 
any case, the fa c t  th a t  i t  is necessary in the case o f  'p e t j e m e ' (go 
fo r  a short t ime) is not s u f f i c i e n t  to render i t  c loser  to the 
inc lus ive  category than the two hyponyms already discussed.
The verbs judged as le a s t  typ ica l  o f  ' p i y e n o '  (go) are expectedly 
7p r o e l a v n o ' (advance (mil i t . ) )  which is ev ident ly  o f  r e s t r i c te d  use 
and much less f a m i l i a r  than a l l  the res t  and 'p a r e l a v n o ' (march) 
commonly associated with 'walking in a parade' ,  where the process 
(and not the d e s t in a t ion )  is important. This l a s t  example is also of  
r e s t r i c te d  use ( there fo re  in frequent)  but c e r t a in ly  more f a m i l i a r  
than 'p r o e l a v n o '  which is judged as a b e t te r  instance of  ' p i y e n o ' .
In short ,  a l l  th ree fac to rs ,  i . e .  frequency, f a m i l i a r i t y  and sal ience  
of propert ies  are again shown to play a ro le  in p r o to t y p ic a l i t y  
judgments.
F- fevyo ( leave)
1




















m e t a n a s t e v o  (emigrate)
7






This is the l a s t  set e xh ib i t ing  'spectacu lar '  in te r -s u b je c t  
agreement. The reasons fo r  th is  need not be repeated.  The resul ts  
are easy to discuss,  as a l o t  of  information is supplied fo r  the 
verbs of  th is  set in 4 .1 . 2 .
A l l  three items occupying the f i r s t  three posit ions are high 
r e g is t e r .  Although the distance between the two best examples is 
s l i g h t ,  i t  is  worth notic ing th a t  i t  is  the verb judged as less  
representa t ive  than 7a p o x o r o 7 (withdraw) which a c tu a l ly  covers the 
same conceptual area as the inc lus ive  category name. This is 
probably due to the fact  tha t  7a n a x o r o 7 (depart)  is  less frequent  
than 7a p o x o r o 7 (withdraw),  since Y e v y o 7 ( leave) is  commonly used 
instead.
Notice th a t  both best examples imply tha t the act o f  going away is 
' f i n a l ' ,  unl ike  the verbs occupying the 3rd and 4th pos i t ions.  This 
'non-complete disappearance' is p a r t i c u l a r l y  c h a r a c te r is t ic  of  
' a p o m a k r i n o m e '  (move away from) and is  probably responsible fo r  i t s  
being judged so f a r  removed from the inc lus ive  category.  Otherwise,  
7a p o m a k r i n o m e 7 is probably the commonest (most frequent )  item of th is  
set o f  hyponyms and is c e r t a in ly  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked.
Notice tha t  7k s e k u b i z o m e 7 (c le a r  o f f )  covers roughly the same 
semantic area with Y e v y o 7 ( leave) and is quite f a m i l i a r  to the  
subjects.  I t  i s ,  however, ev idently  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked (strong 
negative connotat ion) and infrequent .  I t  is apparently fo r  these 
reasons th a t  i t  occupies the 5th posi t ion.
Both 7m e t a n a s t e v o 7 (emigrate) and 75 r a p e t e v o '  (escape) are f a m i l i a r  
and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked. The fa c t  that  they do not describe  
' s im p le7 physical motion but involve also (prominent) social  
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  is the obvious explanation why they are judged as the 
lea s t  ty p ica l  instances of  ' f e v y o '  ( l e av e ) .  The r is k  of  
underspecif icat ion in case they are replaced by the category name is  
much greater  than in the case o f  a l l  the remaining verbs.  
S u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  and semantic distance are obviously important in 
making p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  judgments. The sal ience o f  the spec i f ic
- 309 -
social  connotations th a t  go along with these two worst examples 
cannot be doubted.
6. aneveno  (ascend)
1 2 3
a n i f o r i z o  (go u p h i l l )  s k a r f a l o n o  (cl imb) i ps ono me  ( r i s e )
1.967 2.328 2.688
(73.26) (46.14)  (38 .28)
s i k on om e  ( r i s e ,  stand up)
4.377
(21.05)




apo y iono me  ( take o f f )  
4.672  
(49.35)
e k s f e n b o n i z o m e  (be hurled)
6.573
(163.3)
The problems o f  class inclusion ar is ing  in th is  set are discussed in 
4 .1 . 2 .  Notice tha t  ' a n i f o r i z o ' (go u p h i l l )  and ' s k a r f a l o n o '  (cl imb)  
are most e as i ly  replaceable  by the inc lus ive  category name, as they 
both imply 'contact with supporting surface'  and can r e f e r  to human 
motion. I t  is  not there fore  surpr is ing that  they occupy the 1st and 
2nd posit ions re spe c t ive ly .  The s l ig h t  distance between the l a t t e r  
verb and ' i p s o n o m e '  ( r i s e )  in the 3rd posit ion  is ra th e r  unexpected; 
as already noted ' i p s o n o m e '  is  most commonly associated with the 
motion o f  'smoke' or 'd us t '  ( ra th e r  than humans) and does not usual ly  
imply 'contact with supporting surface'  except in a f a i r l y  ' f i x e d '  
use, describing ' r a is in g  the f l a g ' .  In a l l  these cases ' i p s o n o m e ' 
( r i s e )  i s ,  however, replaceable by ' a n e v e n o '  ( the inc lus ive  category 
name), which is hardly the case with any o f  the remaining items.
The great distance between the items occupying the 3rd and 4th 
posi t ions,  which receive  s im i la r  t r a n s la t io n s ,  is hardly surpr is ing.
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As already noted in connection with the SST r e s u l ts ,  ' s i k o n o m e ' 
( r i s e ,  stand up) is t y p i c a l l y  associated with a human body assuming a 
standing pos i t ion ,  and is ,  in th is  sense, qui te  d is s im i la r  from 
/ i p s o n o m e ' ( r i s e ) .
I t  is  perhaps noteworthy tha t  ' a p o y io n o m e '  ( take o f f )  can be e as i ly  
(and is a c t u a l ly  commonly) replaced by ' s i k o n o m e '  ( r i s e ) ,  both used 
to r e f e r  to a irp lanes in such cases. I t  is  possible th a t  th is  
association brings them f a i r l y  close to one another. I t  is  of  
i n te r e s t ,  moreover, tha t  some subjects put both items in the same 
box, a f a i r l y  uncommon pract ice  in th is  p a r t i c u la r  t e s t .
The two worst examples are a great distance from the re s t  and show 
almost unanimous in te r -s u b je c t  agreement. A number of  factors  are 
involved in t h e i r  case, such as presence of  ' impetus ' ,  the fac t  tha t  
they are r a r e ly  used fo r  human motion and espec ia l ly  th a t  they are 
quite  in f requent .  Needless to say, they are hardly replaceable by 
the hypothesized inc lus ive  term.
H. p e f t o  k a t o  ( f a l l  down)
1 2 
s o r j a z o m e  (co l lapse,  come gremizome  ( f a l l  ( in  ru in s ) )
1.459 crashing down) 2.885
(203.61) (60.62)
3 4 5
t u b a r o  (overturn) k a t r a k i l a o  ( r o l l  down) k u t r u v a l a o  ( r o l l
4.574 4.820 5.016 down)
(51.42) (24 .5 )  (17 .17)
The category name here was supplemented with the s p e c i f ic a t io n  ' k a t o '  
(down), to ru le  out readings of  ' p e f t o '  ( f a l l )  which are unrelated to  
the items selected as i t s  hyponyms fo r  the present purposes. This 
was perhaps an unnecessary step,  as ' p e f t o '  is probably t y p i c a l l y  
understood as (a c c id e n ta l ly )  f a l l i n g  down, in the absence o f  any
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s p ec i f ica t io n  to the contrary  (e .g .  f a l l i n g  i n t e n t io n a l l y  on the 
enemy).
Al l  the items o f  th is  set are p r o to ty p ic a l ly  at  le a s t  understood as 
re fe r r in g  to unintent iona l  downward motion. They are a l l  f a i r l y  
f a m i l i a r .  Three of  them, ' t u b a r o ' (over turn ) ,  ' s o r j a z o m e '  (col lapse)  
and ' k u t r u v a l a o '  ( r o l l  down) are low r e g is te r .
The two best examples r e f e r  t y p i c a l l y  to CP ra ther  than CL and are 
there fore  more l i k e l y  to appear in predications characterized in 2.4  
as 'punctual occurrences' .  The motion is also v e r t ic a l  and no 
' t u rn in g '  is involved.  These propert ies  ' s o r j a z o m e '  and 'g r e m i z o m e ' 
share with the inc lus ive  category name, by which they are most 
re a d i ly  rep laceable .
Notice th a t  ' t u b a r o '  (overturn) involves ' tu rn in g '  but ra re ly  CL. In 
th is  sense i t  is half -way between the two best examples and the two 
worst ones, which imply some duration and are t y p i c a l l y  CL verbs.  
For th is  reason the two worst instances of  ' p e f t o  k a t o '  are in fac t  
only replaceable by the hypothesized inc lus ive  category when i t  is 
used in the environment ' p e f t o  ( k a t o )  apo NP{_oc'  ( f a l l  (down) from
NpL0c)-
The resu l ts  o f  th is  l a s t  set are there fore  expla inable  in a f a i r l y  
stra ight forward way in terms o f  r e l a t i v e  sal ience o f  a t t r ib u te s  and 
the re la ted  notion o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  (as i t  is used here) .
Three main points need to be discussed in r e la t io n  to p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  
t e s t  r e s u l ts .  F i r s t  of  a l l ,  i t  is qui te  evident tha t  subjects 
consis tent ly  judge some members o f  verb categories as more 
representa t ive  of  the category than others.  There can be l i t t l e  
doubt th a t  the prototype e f f e c t  holds fo r  the verbs te s ted .  S imi lar  
evidence is also provided by Pulman (1983) fo r  d i f f e r e n t  English verb 
categor ies.
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The second point was already mentioned in preceding sections; i t  
concerns the p r in c ip le ( s )  responsible fo r  the formation of  prototypes 
in verb domains. The p r in c ip le  of  ' fa m i ly  resemblance',  which Rosch 
and her col leagues have shown to be responsible fo r  the formation of  
prototypes in the domains they have investigated,  cannot even be 
checked in the case of  the sets of verbs tested,  at  lea s t  fol lowing  
Rosch's method. Reasons fo r  th is  are offered here in 1 .3 .2 ,  4 .1 .1  
and 4 .1 . 2 .  Pulman (1983:111-22) has shown exper imental ly tha t  the 
' f a m i ly  resemblance' p r in c ip le  is not a causal fa c to r  in the 
formation of  prototypes of  verbs,  even i f  a t t r ib u te s  are provided and 
analysed by the in v es t ig a to r  (since they cannot be d i r e c t l y  obtained 
by subjects ) .
Pulman makes a number of  correct observations concerning the 
d i fferences between noun and verb a t t r ib u te s ,  noun and verb 
taxonomies, and how p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  tests involving verbs are not
amenable to the same sort  of  analysis as are items belonging to noun
domains. Surpr is ing ly  enough what seems to me a most crucia l  point  
i s ,  however, l e f t  out.  Unl ike the tests  of  Rosch and her col leagues,
which usual ly  involve basic leve l  and superordinate categor ies,  the
verb taxonomies tested (both Pulman's and mine) involve basic leve l  
and subordinate c a teg o r ie s .8 At such a low leve l  (subordinate) ,
d i f ferences are not h a l f  as e a s i ly  d iscern ib le  as a t  higher le v e ls .  
This explains why "the members o f  categories in question have few i f  
any features in common other than those which they a l l  i n h e r i t  from 
the containing category i t s e l f "  (Pulman i b i d . : 1 2 1 ) .
The r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  combinations of  a t t r ib u te s  is  shown in the 
SST resu l ts  to play an important ro le  in subjects '  judgments when
they are asked to 'count '  semantic distance.  Notice,  however, tha t  
the items used fo r  the SST reported in the previous section are
probably 'basic  l e v e l ' .  They are at least  very common words in every
day use, p e r fe c t ly  f a m i l i a r ,  frequent and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked. 
Discussing in terms o f  shared propert ies is ,  in t h e i r  case, f a i r l y  
l e g i t im a te .  On the other hand, in the p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  tes ts  on the 
verbs mentioned here,  in order to secure hyponymic re la t ions h ips ,  
subordinate items of  the above 'basic  l e v e l '  categories are involved.  
This implies tha t  a number of  these items are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked,
- 313 -
r e l a t i v e l y  un fa m i l ia r ,  ra th e r  infrequent and, in some cases, only 
p a r t i a l l y  included in the hypothesized inc lus ive  term. I t  would be 
at leas t  u n r e a l i s t i c  to expect such factors  not to play a ro le  in 
subjects judgments.
The above remarks lead to the f in a l  and most important point  
concerning the appreciat ion of  the p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  t e s t  re s u l ts ,  i . e .  
what a l te rn a t iv es  to the ' fa m i ly  resemblance' p r in c ip le  may be 
responsible fo r  the formation of  prototypes in verb domains. Rosch 
and Mervis (1975:559) consider the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  ' f requency'  playing  
a ro le  and the perceptua l ,  social  or memorial sal ience o f  p a r t i c u la r  
a t t r ib u te s  or p a r t i c u la r  members of  the categor ies.  Pulman 
(1983:120-36) observes th a t  in the absence of  an independent account 
of  sal ience,  saying th a t  proto typ ical  categories are the most s a l ie n t  
ones is tautologous. He also proves experimental ly tha t  the 
p ro to t y p ic a l i t y  judgments he obtained corre la ted  with semantic 
s i m i l a r i t y  judgments.
There is l i t t l e  doubt th a t  subjects a c tu a l ly  count semantic distance  
of  hyponyms from the inc lus ive  term and perhaps between co-hyponyms 
as w e l l ,  in view also of  the remarks of  subjects who car r ied  out the 
p i l o t  t e s t  reported here. Notice also tha t  Rosch and Mervis (1975) 
observe tha t  p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  ra t ings predict  the extent  to which a 
member can be subst i tu ted fo r  the category name in a sentence. In 
short ,  semantic s i m i l a r i t y  is ,  in the case of  hyponymic re la t io n s ,  
almost d i r e c t l y  in te rp re tab le  in terms of  r e l a t i v e  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y .  
There is a l o t  o f  evidence fo r  th is  in the tests  reported here, both 
concerning categories which y ie ld  very r e l i a b l e  re s u l ts ,  i . e .  great  
i n te r -s u b je c t  agreement on the posi t ion of  'genuine hyponyms' which 
are s u f f i c i e n t l y  removed from one another and from the superordinate  
- (e .g .  category A),  as well as categories y ie ld in g  less r e l i a b l e  
resu l ts  (e .g .  categories  G and H).  The l a t t e r  categories  involve  
'dubious cases' which are ca l led  here instances o f  ' p a r t i a l  
inc lus ion '  and o f f e r  poor s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 9
Not ice,  fu r th e r ,  th a t  w i th in  a taxonomy one does not need to spel l  
out a l l  the propert ies  shared, but simply to i d e n t i f y  points of
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departure { d i s s i m i la r i t y  from the category name). In the case of  
re la te d  low-level  categories  (subordinates),  such a task is c e r t a in ly
more fe a s ib le  than counting number o f  a t t r ib u t e s .  I t  is  also more
r e a l i s t i c  and does not presuppose th a t  each indiv idual  a t t r i b u t e  is
recognized as such, i . e .  i t  is equal ly  compatible wi th a ' h o l i s t i c '
as well  as with a 'componential ' understanding of categor ies.  This 
is f a i r l y  ea s i ly  done in the case of  sets including items a l l  of  
which are almost equal ly  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked and f a m i l i a r .  Take 
as an example category A, i . e .  'p e r p a t a o ' (walk) and i t s  hyponyms. 
'Perceptual sa l ience '  o f  a t t r ib u te s  and categories can be re ad i ly  
in te rpre ted  in terms of  semantic s i m i l a r i t y  and s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  in 
t h i s  case. I f  some act of  'walk ing '  is somehow 'd e f e c t i v e ' ,  we 
expect i t  to be judged as an atypical  act of  'walk ing '  and th is  is 
c le a r l y  the case with ' t r i k l i z o ' (stagger) and 'p a r a p a t a o ' (stumble) .
I f ,  however, semantic s i m i l a r i t y  and notions re la te d  to i t  were the 
only factors responsible fo r  the formation of  prototypes in the case 
of  verbs, a number o f  ra t ings would have been d i f f e r e n t ,  e . g . :
(a) ' f u d a r o ' (s ink  to the bottom) would never be judged the 
worst instance o f  ' v i B i z o m e ' (s ink)  in category B.
(b) ' i p e r p i S a o '  (jump over) would never appear as the worst 
example o f  'p /5ao '  (jump) in category C.
(c) ' a x B o f o r o '  (carry  baggage) could receive a s im i la r  ra t ing  
to 'k u v a l a o ' ( c a r ry ) ,  i . e .  appear in the 2nd ra th e r  than 
the penult imate pos it ion  wi th in  set  D ( 'p /ye n o ^ '  and i t s  
hyponyms).
(d) 'p r o e l a v n o '  (advance ( m i l i t . ) )  would be much c loser  to  
'p r o x o r o ' (advance) in category E ( inc luding 'p /y e n o j '  (go) 
and i t s  hyponyms).
(e)  ' k s e k u b i z o m e ' (c le a r  o f f )  would not have taken the 5th 
posi t ion in category F, i . e .  ' f e v y o '  ( l e a v e ) ,  as i t
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c e r t a in ly  has fewer ' e x t ras '  by comparison with the 
inc lus ive  category than the items taking up the 1st ,  2nd and 
3rd pos i t ions.
In short ,  other fac tors  are also involved,  the most obvious of which 
have already been mentioned, namely f a m i l i a r i t y ,  frequency and 
l i n g u i s t i c  markedness, which are not completely d i s t i n c t  from one 
another,  but do not amount to the same thing e i t h e r ,  as I have t r i e d  
to demonstrate in the presentat ion of  the te s t  re s u l ts .
Notice f i r s t ,  th a t  high or low re g is te r  items may, however, be 
unfam i l ia r ,  in frequent  and/or l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked. This s i tua t ion  
is less l i k e l y  to a r ise  in the case of  items which do not belong to a 
marked r e g is t e r ,  f o r  the obvious reason th a t  s o c io l in g u is t i c a l ly  
marked words are usual ly  of  more r e s t r ic te d  use, i . e .  less frequent.  
Nevertheless, frequency and f a m i l i a r i t y  do not coincide e n t i r e l y  
e i t h e r .  Consider, fo r  instance,  the best examples of  category E, 
namely ' p o r e v o m e '  (go a long distance on fo ot )  and 'p r o x o r o ' 
(advance). They are equal ly well-known to speakers, i . e .  qu ite  
f a m i l i a r ,  but the f i r s t  one is c e r t a in ly  much less frequent than the 
second. Within the same category,  the worst examples, ' p a r e l a v n o '  
(march) and 'p r o e l a v n o ' (advance (mil i t . ) )  are probably equal ly  
in frequent ,  but the former one is c e r t a in ly  much b e t te r  known (more 
f a m i l i a r )  than the l a t t e r .
F a m i l i a r i t y  and frequency,  understood in the suggested way, are shown 
to play a ro le  in p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  judgments. They are also d is t in c t  
to some extent  from l i n g u i s t i c  markedness, which also plays a ro le  in 
such judgments. Consider the verb ' k s e k u b i z o m e ' ( c le a r  o f f ) ,  which 
is c e r t a in ly  f a m i l i a r  to the subjects and f a i r l y  frequent but 
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  marked. I t  is suggested in the discussion o f  category 
F th a t  th is  fa c to r  ( l i n g u i s t i c  markedness) is reponsible fo r  the fa c t  
th a t  the item in question is not judged a proto typica l  instance of  
' f e v y o '  ( leave) with which i t  covers the same conceptual area.
Notice,  f i n a l l y ,  th a t  i f  only f a m i l i a r i t y  was the decis ive fa c to r  fo r  
such judgments, a number o f  ra t ings would have been d i f f e r e n t ,  e .g . :
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(a)  ' s a l t a r o '  (jump, leap) would never be judged the best 
instance of  ' p i b a o '  (jump).
(b) 'p a r a p a t a o '  (stumble) would never be judged almost the worst 
instance o f  ' p e r p a t a o '  (walk) .
(c)  ' k a t a p o n d i z o m e '  (sink to the bottom) would not be judged the 
2nd best example of  ' v i Q i z o m e '  ( s in k ) .
(d) ' t a k s i b e v o '  ( t r a v e l )  would be judged c loser  to the category 
name ( ' p i y e n o j '  (go)) than ' p o r e v o m e '  (go a long way on 
f o o t ) .  The exact opposite is a c tu a l ly  the case.
(e) ' b r a p e t e v o '  (escape) and even ' m e t a n a s t e v o '  (emigrate)  
with in  the Greek social  context are more f a m i l i a r  than 
' a n a x o r o '  (depart )  and ' a p o x o r o '  (withdraw) and would not be 
judged the le a s t  typ ica l  of  the inc lusive category of  which 
the l a t t e r  p a i r  o f  verbs are judged as the best examples.
The p ic ture  which emerges concerning the in te rp lay  o f  the factors  
discussed and exempl if ied above has the fol lowing c h a ra c te r is t ic s :
Hyponyms are ranged along d i f f e r e n t  dimensions and each category has 
c h a ra c te r is t ic s  special  to i t .  To qu a l i fy  as a proto typ ica l  instance
of  a category,  a member must be e as i ly  replaceable by the inc lus ive  
category name, and convey a s im i la r  p ic ture  to the one conveyed by 
the inc lus ive  category ( i . e .  not be 'd e fe c t iv e '  in any way). This 
may be also explained in terms of a t t r ib u te s ;  proto typ ica l  members 
d i f f e r  from the inc lus ive  category at  few and r e l a t i v e l y  unimportant 
points.  In addi t ion to t h i s ,  prototypical  members are normally
f a i r l y  f a m i l i a r ,  frequent and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  unmarked. The l a t t e r  
set of  propert ies  seems to play a less decis ive  ro le  than semantic
distance represented in terms of s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  and r e la t i v e
sal ience of  p roper t ies .
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Notes on Chapter 5
1. I am re fe r r in g  mainly to Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971),  M i l l e r
(1969, 1971, 1972),  Long (1975),  Rosch and Mervis (1975),  Rosch
et a l .  (1976),  Pulman 1983).
2. This does not expla in  why ' b i a s x i z o '  ( t raverse)  is also l inked to
the 'random walk'  verbs. I t  must be appreciated,  though, tha t
while forming c luste rs  subjects often group two items together  
(e .g .  ' p e r n a o '  and ' b i a s x i z o ' )  as most c lose ly  re la te d  in meaning 
and then add other  items to the 'nucleus'  of  the c lu s te r ,  which 
may be l inked wi th only one of  the two f i r s t  members. In short ,  
they are aware of  cer ta in  a t t r ib u te s  as connected with cer ta in  
items and may then over-extend t h e i r  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  to cover a 
whole set,  although the a t t r i b u t e ( s )  in question may not be
present in the whole set .  This may also be the case with c lu ste r
C and the inc lusion of  ' s e r n o m e ' (creep,  c raw l ) ,  already  
discussed. There is some evidence th a t  th is  procedure was 
fol lowed, from those l i s t i n g s  of  items which were w r i t t e n  down on 
paper (by the subject who had formed the corresponding clusters  
and decided to 'ease'  my ta s k ) .  Some obvious pa irs  come f i r s t ,
and these are fol lowed by less c le a r ly  re la ted  i tems.
3. In view of the fa c t  th a t  'p/yeno,?' ( take to )  and ' f e r n o ' (br ing)  
co-ex is t  also in a compound word 'p i y e n o f e r n o '  ( take  and br in g ) ,  
one could expect some l i s t in g s  of  ' f e r n o '  with ' p i y e n o ' .  This is  
never the case, because c r o s s -c la s s i f i c a t io n  is not allowed and 
' p i y e n o '  is always in te rpre ted  as 'g o ' ,  as already noted. Notice  
also th a t  ' f e r n o '  (br ing) d i f f e r s  from ' s t e l n o '  (send) not only 
in terms o f  presense vs absence of 'accompaniment' but also in 
the sense th a t  only the former implies tha t  the object  caused to 
move reaches i t s  d e s t in a t ion .  The l a t t e r  verb is analysed in 3.2  
as implying only th a t  the object is caused to ' s t a r t  moving away 
from the causer ' .  Despite these d i f fe rences ,  which are also  
present in the equivalent  English verbs, 'send' is often used
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p a ra l le l  to ' t a k e '  as the causative counterpart  o f  'go'  and t h e i r  
d i f fe rence  is re f le c te d  in c a l l in g  'send' an instance of  
' b a l l i s t i c '  and 'b r in g '  an instance o f  'c o n t r o l le d '  causation 
(e .g .  Clark 1974:322).
4. Rosch's ins truct ions  are usual ly  of  the form: "Rate on a 7-point  
scale the extent  to which instances o f  common superordinate  
categories represent your ' id e a '  or 'image' o f  the meaning of  the 
category name". The equivalent MG paraphrase seemed to me 
extremely e l l i p t i c  to be used with Greek students, who are 
accustomed to more e x p l i c i t  ins truct ions .
5. Since 'expected'  here is 'random' ( tes t ing  the nul l  hypothesis) ,  
the more removed the 'observed' re s u l t  is from the 'expected ' ,  
the stronger the assumption tha t  the d is t r ib u t io n  is not random. 
In short ,  great in te r -s u b je c t  agreement is represented by a 
number (much) higher than 12.59.  Anything lower than 12.59 
implies not reaching s ign i f icance .
6. The inc lus ive  term here is 'p/yeno^'  understood as a causative  
and marked as such in the tes t -book lets  ( ' t a k e  something 
somewhere'), as the 'semantic s i m i l a r i t y '  t e s t  showed tha t  
although extremely common th is  understanding is secondary to the 
non-causative 'p /y e n o j '  (go).
7. The d i f fe rence  in l i n g u i s t i c  markedness is s l i g h t ,  because except 
fo r  the ' a f f e c t i v e  overtone'  of  ' u n d e s i r a b i l i t y ' ,  the verb is 
otherwise extremely common, f a m i l i a r  and of  every-day use.
8. A large number o f  Rosch's tests  on p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  are reported 
in Rosch and Mervis (1975:573-605).  The types examined involve  
only superordinate categories ( f u r n i t u r e ,  v eh ic le ,  f r u i t ,  weapon, 
vegetable,  c lo th ing)  and 'bas ic  l e v e l '  items which are hyponyms 
of the categories  ju s t  mentioned. Al l  the experiments reported 
ask subjects f o r  l i s t i n g s  o f  a t t r ib u te s  of  such categor ies,  the 
' lowest '  leve l  ones being: car,  truck,  a i rp la n e ,  ch a i r ,  ta b le ,  
i . e .  basic l e v e l ,  common concrete nouns.
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In Rosch et  a l . (1976:382-439) where the inves t ig a t io n  concerns 
id e n t i fy in g  the 'basic  leve l  of  a b s t r a c t io n ' ,  and not 
p r o t o t y p i c a l i t y ,  ob ject names are given (as v ar iab les )  belonging 
to a l l  three leve ls  of  abstraction ( i . e .  including also 
subordinates).  Notice,  however, tha t  only two subordinates are 
provided fo r  each hypothesized basic level  category,  e .g .  ' f l o o r  
lamp' and 'dress lamp' fo r  ' lamp',  ' c i t y  bus ' ,  'cross country 
bus' fo r  ' b u s ' .
9. Pulman (1983:135) claims tha t  category membership (and class  
inc lusion)  is an a l l  or nothing matter and provides examples in 
support o f  th is  claim. Notice,  however, tha t  Pulman focuses on 8 
categories drawn from the whole verbal vocabulary o f  English and 
comes up with sets including only genuine hyponyms. 'R e la t ive  
class inc lus ion '  is discussed here,  because 'semi-hyponyms' had 
to be included i f  a s u f f i c i e n t  number of  sets was to be tested.  
I t  seems to be the case th a t  'bad' examples of  hyponymic sets are 
almost equal ly informative with 'good' ones. A un i f ied  
explanation can be based on both kinds o f  sets.
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CONCLUSIONS
Motion verbs have been extens ive ly  analysed wi th in  the framework of  
t r a d i t i o n a l  semantic theor ies such as semantic f i e l d  theory and 
componential ana lys is .  They c onst i tu te  a w e l l -es ta b l is hed  semantic 
f i e l d ,  highly structured and exh ib i t in g  a number o f  propert ies  also 
re levant  to other verb domaims. MG verbs o f  motion, which have never 
previously  been investigated,  e x h ib i t  cer ta in  id iosyncras ies,  owing to 
the aspectual system o f  Modern Greek and to  s o c io l in g u is t ic  fac tors .  
Nevertheless, they r e f l e c t  on the whole a semantic s tructure  s im i la r  to  
tha t  of  most Indo-European languages.
Prototype theory was adopted as the most su i tab le  method of
inves t iga t ion  of  th is  domain, because i t  rests on some basic assumptions 
on word meaning which are i n t u i t i v e l y  more convincing than those of
t r a d i t i o n a l  semantic theor ies .  The most important of  these assumptions 
is th a t  word meaning is not a matter o f  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t
conditions but a graded phenomenon, and th a t  th e re fo re ,  semantic 
categories have b lu r ry  edges and allow fo r  degrees o f  membership. The 
v a l i d i t y  o f  such a working hypothesis needs to be demonstrated by being 
tested in as many d i f f e r e n t  areas as possible ,  as well as by having i t s  
resu l ts  compared against those of  a l t e r n a t i v e  methods o f  inves t iga t ion .
In examining analyses o f  MVs c ar r ie d  out w i th in  the framework of
componential analysis and semantic f i e l d  th eor ies ,  i t  became obvious 
th a t  one of  t h e i r  most important shortcomings was the obl igat ion  which 
they imposed to construct symmetrical tables and/or neat formulae 
u t i l i z i n g  the smallest  number o f  fe a tures .  Such economical and/or  
contrast based solut ions were shown to re s u l t  in d e f in i t io n s  which 
involved propert ies  not necessary fo r  the sp ec i f ica t io n  of  c er ta in  items 
and l e f t  out important information which was not amenable to the desired  
fo rm a l iza t io n .  I t  was demonstrated tha t  descript ions o f  MVs carr ied  out 
w ith in  the framework o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  le x ic a l  semantic theor ies  were 
lacking in d e scr ip t ive  adequacy.
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In the course of  the analysis o f  MGMVs, a d is t in c t io n  was establ ished  
between 'major c la s s i f i c a t o r y  p roper t ies '  and 'minor proper t ies '  
re levant to the s p e c i f ic  f i e l d  under in ves t ig a t io n .  The former type of 
propert ies was analysed f i r s t .  The categor ia l  frameworks which involve  
the notions o f  's ta tes -p roce sses -e vents ' , ' c a u s a t i v i t y '  and 'a g e n t i v i t y '  
were understood as re levant  to a categor izat ion  of  many d i f f e r e n t  areas 
of the verbal vocabulary,  re la ted  to grammatical categories such as 
'aspect '  and ' t r a n s i t i v i t y ' ,  appl icable  to a charac te r iza t ion  of  whole 
predicat ions - and indiv idual  verbs through predications  - and 
analysable into c luste rs  o f  sca lar  proper t ies .  I t  was also shown that  
such propert ies  are on the whole paradigmatical ly  re la te d  to one 
another.
The 's ta tes-processes-events '  (S-P-E) d is t in c t io n  was examined in some 
d e ta i l  in Chapter 2. I t  was demonstrated th a t  S-P-E is  best understood 
as a continuum, the focal  points of  which are i d e n t i f i a b l e  on the basis 
of  the in te rac t io n  of  a number of  factors  such as 'a s p e c t ' ,  spat io -  
temporal s p e c i f ic a t io n s ,  inherent verb propert ies such as 'd u ra t io n '  and 
q u a l i t i e s  o f  the 'theme' such as 'count '  vs 'mass' and s ingular  vs 
p l u r a l .  On the basis of  such considerations i t  has been possible to 
i d e n t i f y  what const i tu tes  central  instances of  a ' s t a t e '  a 'process ' ,  a 
'development' and a 'punctual occurrence' w ith in  the f i e l d  under 
inv es t iga t ion  and construct ' tes t - f ram es '  in order to check the r e la t i v e  
degree o f  'p ro ce ss u a l i ty '  and 'e v e n t - l i k e  nature '  of a number of  MGMVs. 
S im i la r  d is t in c t io n s  are expected in other languages where the continuum 
is probably cut at  points i d e n t i f i a b l e  with the help o f  d i f f e r e n t ,  to 
some extent ,  l i n g u i s t i c  means.
Causat iv i ty  and a g e n t iv i ty  were discussed in Chapter 3 where i t  was 
suggested tha t  the re levant  fac ts  perta in ing to them could be b e t te r  
approached i f  the two notions were kept d i s t i n c t ,  to some extent ,  and 
the analysis o f  the former concentrated on the q u a l i t i e s  of  the caused 
event,  while the inves t iga t ion  o f  the l a t t e r  focused on the type of 
causing event.  Both notions were also understood as involving  continua.
The degree o f  c a u s a t iv i ty  o f  t r a n s i t i v e  verbs was shown to depend mainly 
on the degree of  dev ia t ion  from the prototype of  the pa t ie n t .  The
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degree of  a g e n t iv i ty  o f  both t r a n s i t i v e  and in t r a n s i t i v e  verbs was shown 
to depend mainly on the degree o f  deviat ion from the prototype of  the 
agent. I t  was demonstrated th a t  factors  posited by a l t e r n a t i v e  
approaches as crucia l  fo r  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  causative verbs such as 
1e x ic a l i z a t io n  o f  the re su l t ing  cond i t ion /pos i t ion  o f  the causee were 
not s ig n i f i c a n t  on the basis o f  the data examined. I t  was also shown 
tha t  in the case o f  phonological ly  identica l  causat ive /non-causative  
pairs  of  MG Vs, the non-causative member is more basic.
The d is t in c t io n  between d i r e c t / i n d i r e c t  causatives was considered 
inadequate. Both w i th in  the manipulat ive and the non-manipulat ive type 
of  causation d i f f e r e n t  grades could be id e n t i f i e d  and the phenomenon was 
analysed in terms o f  a l i n e  leading from e x p l i c i t  causatives to  
proto typ ical  instances o f  d i r e c t  causation.  The degree of  affectedness  
of  the object  o f  MG t r a n s i t i v e  constructions was re la ted  to  
p a s s i v i z a b i l i t y ;  the borders between MG ' - o m e '  i n t r a n s i t i v e s  and 
passives were shown to be indeterminate;  passives were t rea ted  along 
with in t r a n s i t i v e s ,  and i t  was shown th a t  even 'genuinely '  passive-form  
verbs can be more agentive than c er ta in  act ive-form i n t r a n s i t i v e s .
The r e la t io n  between the MVs under examination and t h e i r  propert ies were 
discussed in Chapter 4. I t  was f i r s t  demonstrated tha t  verb taxonomies 
d i f f e r  s ig n i f i c a n t l y  from noun taxonomies of  the type extensive ly  
analysed in e th n o s c ie n t i f ic  studies.  In most cases, only two leve ls  are 
safe ly  i d e n t i f i a b l e ,  generic and s p e c i f ic ;  a number o f  taxons 
p a r t ic ip a te  in competing taxonomies; many instances o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
are a t t r ib u t a b le  to p a r t i a l  ra th e r  than proper class inc lus ion ,  so that  
with in  any s p e c i f ic  verb domain, few c le a r  cases of  genuine hyponyms can 
be id e n t i f i e d .  Besides, since verbs involve on the whole more abstract  
and complex categor ia l  frameworks than most types o f  nouns, i t  is  
v i r t u a l l y  impossible to obtain l i s t in g s  o f  a t t r ib u te s  d i r e c t l y  from 
native  speakers.
Owing to the above arguments, Rosch's method of  id e n t i fy in g  the basic 
level  of  abstraction is inapplicable  in the case o f  verbs and an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  method was t e n t a t i v e l y  proposed which involved taking into  
considerat ion factors  such as r e l a t i v e  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  (and class
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in c lu s io n ) ,  l i n g u i s t i c  markedness, frequency and f a m i l i a r i t y .  The same 
fa c to rs ,  as well as the r e l a t i v e  sal ience of  a t t r ib u te s  were considered 
per t inen t  to the formation of  prototypes of  verb categor ies.  Within the 
area of  MGMVs, 'minor'  propert ies  (category a t t r ib u t e s )  were id e n t i f i e d  
and a t ten t io n  was drawn to the interdependence o f  'manner',  
' i n s t r u m e n ta l i t y '  and 'medium', and the in te r r e la t io n s  between 'manner' 
and ' d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ' .  Besides, a number of  other combinations of  
propert ies  was shown to be n on-a rb i t ra ry  such as ' inward '  with  
'downward' or 'downward' with 'u n i n t e n t i o n a l ' .
In order to te s t  the v a l i d i t y  of  some o f  the above observations against  
the in t u i t io n s  of  na t ive  speakers, as well as to check whether the 
p r in c ip le  of  the non-equivalence o f  category members and the 
p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  e f f e c t  obtained f o r  verbs,  a semantic s i m i l a r i t y  sorting  
task (SST) and a p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  te s t  were carr ied out involving MG 
verbs of  motion.
The SST resu l ts  (reported in Chapter 5) provided some evidence in favour  
of  the proto typica l  ra th e r  than the 'most general '  understanding of  verb 
categor ies,  and the sal ience of  spec i f ic  combinations o f  propert ies  
(such as v e r t i c a l i t y  and c a u s a t i v i t y ) ,  which is shown to c onst i tu te  a 
more p lausib le  explanation of  semantic s i m i l a r i t y  judgments than number 
of  shared a t t r ib u te s  and hierarchy of  individual  and independent 
proper t ies .
The p r o t o t y p ic a l i t y  t e s t  resu l ts  showed th a t  the p r in c ip le  of  non­
equivalence of  category members was v a l id  f o r  the verbs tes ted ,  despite  
the horrendous complications inherent in the materia l  investigated  
(owing to the pecu l ia r  s o c io l in g u is t ic  s i tu a t io n  o f  MG). I t  was 
demonstrated th a t  the items consis tent ly  judged as the most proto typ ical  
instances o f  t h e i r  inc lus ive  category were the ones which could be most 
ea s i ly  replaced by the category name and which conveyed the most s im i la r  
pic ture  to i t ,  i . e .  had the smallest  semantic distance from t h e i r  
superordinate.  Semantic s i m i l a r i t y  being already equated with r e la t i v e  
sal ience of  combinations of  proper t ies ,  the l a t t e r  emerges as the most 
crucia l  fa c to r  in the formation o f  prototypes in the area under
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in v es t ig a t io n .  L in g u is t ic  markedness, frequency and f a m i l i a r i t y  were 
also shown to play an important, though less decis ive ,  ro le .
The r e la t io n  between a t t r i b u t e  c luste rs  and the formation o f  categories  
remains a most in te res t in g  issue, in need of fu r t h e r  research.  
Addit ional  empirical  corroboration fo r  the ex is t in g  hypotheses on 
le x ic a l  meaning needs to be accumulated and properly evaluated before 
such hypotheses can be reformulated and incorporated w i th in  a model of  
grammatical descr ip t ion  which can claim psychological r e a l i t y .
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APPENDIX
LIST I ;  Modern Greek verbs of  motion and posit ion
A a g iz i  B A
A akoluBi B A
A akoluQjete A
A akubai2 se C A
A akubaig B se C A
A anakatevi B A
A anakatevete A
A anapibai A
A a n a p o b o y i r iz i j A
A anapoboy i r iz i% B A
A anapoboyir izete A
A aneveni A
A anevazi B (se C) A
A anevokateveni A
A anevokatevazi B A
A apoyioni  B A
A apoyionete A




A bazi  B se C A
A beni se C A
A b i z i  B se C A
A b iz e te  se C A
A b u s u l i z i A
A bjaveni  ( C) A
A b r a s k e l i z i  (C) A
A eksfenboniz i  B A
A eksfenbonizete A
A ektoksevi  B A
touches B 
fol lows B 
is fol lowed 
leans on C 
puts B on C 
s t i r s  B
is s t i r r e d ,  churns
jumps up (and down}, bounces
overturns, turns upside down
overturns B, turns B upside down
is turned upside down,
is overturned
ascends, goes up
takes B up, raises B (to /on C)
goes up and down
takes B up and down
causes B to take o f f
takes o f f
takes B away, removes B
moves away, is taken away/removed
s a i ls  o f f
sa i ls  about
puts B in C
gets in /enters  C
sticks B in C
is s tuck/s t icks  i t s e l f  in C 
crawls (as o f  a baby) 
passes through/crosses (C) 
str ides  (over C) 
h u r ls / f l i n g s / s l i n g s  B 
throws i t s e l f ,  is  hurled  
launches B
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A ektoksevete A is launched
A e p ip le i A f lo a ts
A e p i s t r e f i A comes back, returns
A erxete A comes
A f e r n i  B (se C) A brings B (to C)
A fe v y i A goes away, leaves,  departs
A f t a m ' i  ( se C) A arr ives  at /reaches C
A f tam '2  B se C A causes B to reach C
A gremiz i  B A pulls  B down (a prec ip ice)
A gremizete A f a l l s  down/is caused to f a l l  down 
(a p re c ip ic e ) ,  col lapses
A y l i s t r a i j A s l ides ,  s l ips
A y l i s t r a i ' 2  B A causes B to s l ide
A y i r i z i i A goes around, turns
A y i r i z i ' 2  B A turns B
A \1 i r iz i3  ( e p i s t r e f i ) A goes back (re turns)
A y i r iz i / j .  B se C A returns B to C
A y o n a t i z i j A kneels
A \ 0 n a t i z i 2  B A causes B to kneel
A ipoxo r i A gives way, goes down under 
pressure, recedes, subsides
A ipson i  B A raises B
A ipsonete A r is e s ,  is raised
A kadetej  (se C ) / ine  ka ismenos A is seated (on C)
A kaBete2 se B A s i t s / i s  s i t t i n g  on B 
(assumes a s i t t i n g  posi t ion)
A kaQizi  B A causes B to s i t
A ka lpaz i A gallops
A ka ta b io k i  B A chases B
A kataf t iokete A is chased/pursued
A kateveni A goes down, descends
A katevaz i  B (se C) A takes B down (to /on C)
A k a t r a k i l a i A r o l l  down
A k i k l o f o r i j A c i rc u la te s ,  goes around
A k i k l o f o n ' 2  B A c irc u la te s  B
A k i l a i j A r o l l s
A k i l a i ' 2  B (se C) A causes B to r o l l  ( to  C)
A k i l j e t e A wallows
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A k i n i y a i  B 
A k o l i b a i  
A kremai B se C
A kremete (se C ) / ine  kremasmenos 
A kremjete  
A k s a n a y i r i z i  (se C)
A ksana(e )rxe te  (se C)
A ksap lom' j  (se C ) /  
ine ksaplomenos 
A ksaplom'2 (se C)
A ksap lon i^  B (se C)
A ksek ina i  
A kun je te  (kuna i2)
A kunai2 B 
A k u t ru v a la i  
A kuva la i  B 
A k u v a l je te  
A m eta fe r i  B 
A metaferete  
A metakomizi1 
A metakomizi2 B 
A ine meteoros
A obi  y i  B 
A o b i y i t e  
A paramer iz i  2 
A paramer iz i2 B 
A paramerizete  
A parapata i  
A p e f t i  (se C)
A p e r i f e r i  B
A p e r i f e r e t e  
A p e r i k i l o n i  B 
A p e r i k i k lo n e te  
A p e r ip ia n je t e  
A p e rn a i j
A hunts/chases/runs a f t e r  B 
A swims
A hangs B on C
A is hanging/hangs/is hung (on C) 
A hangs i t s e l f ,  is hung 
A goes/comes back/returns (to  C)
A comes back (to  C)
A l i e s / i s  ly ing  down (on C)
A is ly ing  down (on C)
(assumes a ly ing  pos i t ion )
A causes B to l i e  down (on C)
A s ta r ts  o f f  
A moves, s t i r s
A causes B to move, shakes B 
A r o l l s  down 
A carr ies  B 
A is carr ied  
A transports B 
A is transported  
A moves house 
A moves B ( f u r n i t u r e )
A is (suspended) in the a i r ,  
is dangling 
A leads B 
A is led
A moves aside /over  
A puts B aside 
A is put aside 
A stumbles 
A f a l l s  (on C)
A carr ies  B about, causes B to 
go about
A roams around, is carr ied  about 
A encirc les B 




A perna iz  B 
A perpa ta i  
A p e t a i j  
A p e t a i2 B 
A p e t j e t e j / p e t a y e t e j  
A pe t je te2 /pe taye te2  (se C)
A p i y e n i j  se C 
A piyem'2 B se C 
A piyenoerxete  
A p iyeno fe rn i  B 
A p ib a i  (B)
A p l e i
A p l i s i a z i j  B 
A p l i s i a z i ' 2  B se C 
A porevete 
A p rosy ion i  B 
A prosy ionete  
A prosperna i2 B 
A r i x n i  B 
A r i x n e te  (se C)
A sa lev i  
A s e r j a n i z i  
A s e m i  B 
A sernete  
A s i i  B 
A s ie te  
A s ik o n i  B 
A sikonete  
A sir tobevi B 
A sinobevete 
A s k a r fa lo n i  (B)
A s k i v i  
(A sproxni  B)
A s taz i
A s te k i / s te k e te
A cause's B to pass 
A walks 
A f l i e s  
A throws B 
A is thrown (away)
A dashes/goes fo r  a short time 
( to C ) , jumps up 
A goes to C 
A takes B to C 
A comes and goes
A takes B s.wh. and brings i t  back 
A jumps (over B)
A s a i ls
A approaches B 
A causes B to approach C 
A goes/walks (a long distance)
A lands B 
A lands
A overtakes/passes by B 
A throws B
A throws i t s e l f / i s  thrown t o / f a l l s  
(on C)
A moves s l i g h t l y / s t i r s  
A walks around 
A drags B
A drags, is dragged, creeps, crawls 
A shakes B 
A shakes
A r a i s e s / l i f t s  B 
A r ise s ,  gets up, is  l i f t e d  
A accompanies B 
A is accompanied 
A climbs (up B)
A bends 
A pushes B 
A drips  
A stands
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A s t i n i  B A causes B to stand
A s t in e t e A is  caused to stand, assumes a 
standing posit ion
A s t r i v i ' 2  (B) A turns (around B)
A s t r i v i ' 2  B A turns B
A s t r i f o y i r i z i j A twists  and turns
A s t r i f o y i r i z i 2 B A causes B to t w is t  and turn
A s u la t s a r i A s t r o l l s ,  saunters
A taks iS ev i A tra v e ls
A ta landev i  B A causes B to o s c i l la te /s w in g
A talandevete A o s c i l l a t e s ,  swings
A tarakuna i  B A shakes / jo l ts  B
A ta rakun je te A shakes, is shaken/ jo lted
A t a ra z i  B A shakes/agita tes B
A tarazete A shakes, is shaken/st ir red
A t i n a z i  B A shakes B up, throws B abruptly
A t inaz e te A shakes/ jumps/springs up, je rks ,  
is  shaken up
A t rad az i  B A shakes B
A tradazete A shakes, is shaken/ jo lted
(A t ra v a i  B) A pul ls  B
A tremi A trembles
A t r e x i  2 A runs
A t re x i '2 B A causes B to run
A t r i y i r n a i j / t r i y i r i z i j A roams around, goes here and there
A t r i y i r n a i 2  B / t r i y i r i z i 2 A causes B to go here and there
A t s u l a i  2 A r o l l s ,  s l ides
A tsu la i '2  B A causes B to r o l l / s l i d e
A vazi  B se C A puts B i n /o n /a t  C
A vyazi  B (apo C) A takes B out (o f  C)
A vyeni (apo C) A goes out (o f  C)
A v i B i z i  B A sinks B
A v iB ize te A sinks,  is sunk
A v o l t a r i A walks about
A v r is k e te  se C A is (found) i n / o n / a t  C
A vul jazi '2 A sinks
A v u l j a z i 2 B A sinks B
A vu ta i2  B se C A immerses/dips B in C
- 330 -
A v u t a i j  (kan i  v u t ja )  
A v u t je t e  se C 
A x a m i lo n i j  
A xamilom'2 B 
A x i n i  B 
A x in e te  (se C)
A xoni  B se C 
A xonete se C
A xo rop iba i  
A x o r e v i j
A dives
A gets immersed in to  C 
A lowers, stoops 
A lowers B 
A pours B
A is poured /sp i l led ,  flows ( in to  C) 
A sticks  B i n ( t o )  C 
A s t i c k s / i s  stuck in ( t o )  C, 
gets stuck/engulfed in ( t o )  C 
A hops, jumps about 
A dances
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LIST I I :  Five t e s t  frames for  Modern Greek verbs o f  motion
(a) A 
A
(B) ( j a )  10 metra /  pontus /  x i l j o m e t r a
(B) ( f o r )  10 metres /  centimetres /  ki lometres
akoluBo, akoluBjeme; aneveno, anevazo; apomakrino, apomakrinom;  
busu l i zo ;  y i r i z o j ^ ;  y l i s t r a o j  kalpazo; katabioko, katabiokome; 
katevazo, kateveno; k a t r a k i l a o ;  k i k l o f o r o ; k i l a o j k i l j e m e ;  
k in iy a o ;  ko l iba o ;  ku t ruva lao ;  kuvalao, kuval jeme; meta fe ro , 
metaferome; obiyo,  obiyume; paramerizo, paramerizome; perpatao;  
p e ta o j ;  p iyeno;  prospernao; v iB izo ,  viBizome; v u l j a z o j 2* vutaoj  2
(b) A ________ (B) apo a f to  to s imio mexri ekino
A ________  (B) from th is  point  up to tha t  one
akoluBo, akoluBjeme; aneveno, anevazo; anevokateveno, anevokatevazo; 
busu l izo ;  eksfenbonizo, eksfenbonizome; ektoksevo, ektoksevome; 
erxome; fe rno ;  ( f t a n o ) ;  gremizo, gremizome; y i r i z o j  2* y l i s t r a o j  2> 
ipoxoro;  ipsono, ipsonome; kalpazo; ka tab ioko , katabiokome; katevazo , 
kateveno; k a t r a k i l a o ;  k i l a o j  2> k i l je m e ;  k o l iba o ;  ksanaerxome; 
ksana y i r izo ;  ku t ruva lao ;  kuva lao, kuval jeme; metafero,  metaferome; 
obiyo, obiyume; p e r i k i k lo n o ,  per ik ik lonome;  perpatao; piyeno;  pibao;  
p leo ;  p l i s i a z o ;  r i x n o ,  rixnome; (para)serno, (para)sernome; sikono,  
sikonome; s inobevo, sinobevome; skar fa lono;  (sproxno) ;  s t r i v o j  2» 
taks ibevo;  t inazo ,  t inazome; t ravao,  t ravjeme; t r e x o j ^ i  t s u la o j  2: 
vazo; v iB izo ,  viBizome; v u l j a z o j v u t a o j ^ ;  xami lonoj  2* x ino ,  
xinome; xono, xonome
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(c) A   (B) apo a f to  to s imio se ekino
A _______  (B) from th is  point to that one
akoluBo, akoluBjeme; (akubao2); aneveno, anevazo; anevokateveno, 
anevokatevazo; (bazo, beno);  busu l i zo ;  eksfenbonizo, eksfenbonizome; 
ektoksevo, ektoksevome; erxome; fe rno ;  f t a n o j ^ S  gremizo, gremizome; 
Y i r i z o j t 2 33 i  Y? i s t r a o j  2* ipoxoro;  ipsono, ipsonome; kalpazo;  
katabioko, katabiokome; katevazo, kateveno; (kaBome, kaB izo) ;  
k a t r a k i l a o ;  k i k l o f o r o ;  k i l a o j k i l j e m e ;  k in iy a o ;  k o l ib a o ;  (kremao, 
kremome); ksanaerxome; ksanay i r izo ;  ksaplono; ku t ruva lao ;  kuvalao,  
kuval jeme; metafero,  metaferome; metakomizoj 2* obiyo,  obiyume; 
parapatao; p e f t o ;  p e r i k i k lo n o ,  per ik ik lonome;  pernaoj  perpatao;  
p e t a ° j }2> pet jeme/petayomej 2* piyeno;  piyenoerxome; p iyenoferno;  
pibao;  p leo ;  p l i s i a z o ;  r i x n o ,  r ixnome; serno, sernome; s ikono,  
sikonome; s inobevo, sinobevome; skar fa lono ;  (sproxno) ;  ( s t i n o ,  
st inome);  s t r i v o j ^ :  taksibevo; t inazo ,  t inazome; ( t r a v a o ) ;  t re x o j  £» 
t s u l a o j ^ » (vazo) ;  vyazo, vyeno; v iB izo ,  viBizome; v u l j a z o ; vutaoj  
xamilonoj  2> x ino ,  xinome; (xono, xonome); (xorevo);  xoropibao
(d) A ________ (B) apo a f to  to s imio
A ________ (B) from th is  point
akoluBo, akoluBjeme; aneveno, anevazo; anevokateveno, anevokatevazo; 
apoyiono, apoyionome; apomakrino, apomakrinome; apopleo; armenizo; 
bazo, beno; b usu l i zo ;  eksfenbonizo, eksfenbonizome; ektoksevo,  
ektoksevome; erxome; fe rno ;  fevyo;  f tan o ;  gremizo, gremizome; 
y i r i z o 3; y l i s t r a o j  2* ipoxoro;  ipsono, ipsonome; kalpazo; katabioko,  
katabiokome; katevazo, kateveno; k a t r a k i l a o ;  k i l a o j  2> k i l je m e ;  
k in iy a o ;  k o l ib a o ;  kremao, kremjeme; ksekinao; kunjeme, kunaoj ;  
ku t ruva lao ;  kuvalao, kuval jeme; metafero,  metaferome; metakomizoj 2: 
obiyo, obiyume; paramerizo,  paramerizome; parapatao; p e f t o ;  p e r i f e r o ,  
per i ferome;  p e r i k i k lo n o ,  per ik ik lonome;  per ip lan jeme;  pernaoj  2S 
perpatao; pe tao j  2* pet jeme/petayomej 2:  p iyeno;  piyenoerxome; 
piyenoferno;  p ibao;  p leo ;  p l i s i a z o ;  r i xno ,  r ixnome; (sa levo ) ;
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s e r j a n i z o ; ( p a r a ) s e r n o ,  ( p a r a ) s e r n o m e ,  p a r a s i r o m e ;  s i k o n o ,  s i k o n o m e ;  
s i n o b e v o ,  s i n o b e v o m e ;  s k a r f a l o n o ;  ( s k i v o ) ;  ( s p r o x n o ) ;  s t r i v o j  
s u l a t s a r o ;  t a k s i b e v o ;  t i n a z o , t i n a z o m e ;  ( t r a v a o ) ;  t r e x o j  2Z 
t r i y i r n a o / t r i y i r i z o j ^ Z  tsulaoj  2Z v y a z o ,  v y e n o ;  v i B i z o , v i B i z o m e ;  
v u l j a z o ;  v u t a o j ;  x a m i l o n o j  x i n o , x i n o m e ;  x o n o ,  xonome;  ( x o r e v o ) ;  
x o r o p i b a o
(e)  A ________  (B )  se  a f t o  t o  s i m i o
A ________  (B) t o / o n / a t / i n  th is  point
akoluBo, akoluBjeme; akubao j^Z anakatevo, anakatevome; 
anapoboy ir izo,  anapoboyir izome; aneveno, anevazo; anevokatevazo, 
anevokateveno; (apoyiono, apoyionome); armenizo; bazo, beno; bizo,  
bizome; busu l izo ;  eksfenbonizo, eksfenbonizome; ektoksevo,  
ektoksevome; erxome; fe rn o ;  fevyo;  f ta n o ;  gremizo, gremizome; 
y i r i z o j  £ 3; Yl i s t r a o j ^ Z  y ona t i z o ;  ipoxoro;  ipsono, ipsonome; 
kalpazo; katab ioko,  katabiokome; katevazo, kateveno; kaBome, kaBizo;  
k a t r a k i l a o ;  k i k l o f o r o ;  k i l a o j  k i l j e m e ;  k in iy ao ;  k o l iba o ;  kremao, 
kremjeme; ksanaerxome; k sana y i r izo ;  ksaplono2f 3Z kunaoj 2 > kunjeme; 
ku t ruva lao ;  kuvalao, kuval jeme; metafero,  metaferome; metakomizo; 
obiyo,  obiyume; parapatao; p e f to ;  p e r i f e r o ,  per i ferome;  p e r ik i k lo n o ,  
per ik ik lonome;  per ip lan jeme;  perpatao; petao j  £, pet jeme/petayomej 2: 
piyeno; piyenoerxome; p iyenoferno;  p ibao;  p leo ;  p l i s i a z o j ^ Z  
prosy iono, prosyionome; prospernao; r i xno ,  rixnome; salevo;  
s e r ja n iz o ;  serno, sernome; s ikono, sikonome; sinobevo, sinobevome; 
(s iome);  ska r fa lono ;  sk ivo ;  (sproxno);  s t i n o , stinome; s t r i f o y i r i z o ;  
s t r i v o j s2'» s u la tsa ro ;  taks ibevo;  tarakunao, tarakunjeme; tarazo,  
tarazome; t inazo ,  t inazome; t radazo, tradazome; ( t r a v a o ) ;  tremo;  
t r e x o j  2* t r i y i r n a o / t r i y i r i z o j ^ Z  t s u l a o j ^ Z  vazo; vyazo, vyeno; 
v iB izo ,  viBizome; v u l j a z o j ^ Z  vutao j  2* vutjeme; xami lono j  ^Z x ino,  











II : R| 
III: ■
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tremo x in o
tremble pour
xinome
p e r i f e r o
carry around S iasx izo
per ife rom e traverse
go around
xorevo
k i k l o f o r o dance
circulate
xoropiSao f
t r i p r i z o hop/jump
roam around about

















k i l a o
roll
k a t r a k i l a o  
roll down
p e tao j
fly





















v u l j a z o j  2 
sink '







p e r ik i k lo n o
encircle
p e r ik ik lo nom e
skar fa lo no  
cl imb
m e t a f e r o  
transport/ 
carry over 





















pernao j 2 
pass ’
p e f to
fall
p iy e n o ,  2
go, take to
e p i s t r e f o
return






















pernao j 2 
pass ’






k i l a o
roll
k a t r a k i l a o  
roll down
p e t a o 1 
fly

























ta landevo  
oscillate 
talandevome












v g a z o  
take out

















r ix n o  
throw




s t r i v o j  2 
turn ’











































LIST IV: Relative agentiv ity  of selected causative Modern Greek
verbs of motion
VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL CAUSE
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC DC IC NC
SM NSM
V NF
m t a k o m i z o 2
move
( f u r n i t u r e )
+ - - - - + + +
y l i s t r a o 2  
si ide
+ - - - - “ + + +
s t r i v o 2
turn
+ + - - - + + +
*  The scales are as described in section 3 . 3  following GivoVs ( 1 9 8 4 ) 
c i r e r ia ,  ' In te n t io n '  stands fo r  'v o l i t io n '  and the scale is: 
SI=strong in ten t,  WI=weak in tent (which I ca ll  'simple in te n t ' )  and 
NI=non-intent (instead of Givon's 'non-voluntary')
The 'co n tro l'  scale is :
CC=clear control, WC=weak control, NC=no control 
The 'causation' scale is:
DC=direct cause, IO in d i r e c t  cause and NC=non-cause 
'Cause' is used instead of 'causation'
*  HUM=human, AN=animacy, INAN=inanimacy
*  SM=self-moving object, NSM=non-self-moving object
*  V=vehicle (or conveyance), NF=natural force or natural phenomenon
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL CAUSE
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC DC IC NC
SM NSM
V NF




+ + - - - + +
e p i s t r e f o £ 
return,  
bring back
+ X - - - + + +
t inazo  
shake up
+ + + - - + + +
paramerizo2 
put aside
+ X - X - + + X + X
metafero
transport
+ + + X - + +
y i r i z o 2
turn
+ + + - X + + +
ipsono 
ra i se
+ + X - - ~ + ~ +
kunao2
move
+ + + + - + + + - -
xamilono j
lower
+ + X X - + + +
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL CAUSE









+ + + + X +  X +  X + - -
epanafero 
bring back
+ - - - - + + + + +
k i l a o 2 
ro l l
+ X - - - + + X +
t radazo 
shake, j o l t
+ + - X X + + - - +
tarazo  
shake, s t i r
+ X - X X + + +
bizo  
s t ic k /  
engulf into
+ + + - - + + +
viQizo
sink
+ X + + - + + +
vu l jazo2
sink
+ X - X - + + +
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL CAUSE
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC DC IC NC
SM NSM
V NF
k i k l o f o r o 2 
c ircu la te
+ X - - - + + x - + -
a p o s i  r o  
withdraw
+ X - - - + ~ + + + + -
anevazo  
ra ise ,  
take up
+ + + - X + + + + + -
k a t e v a z o  
take down
+ + + - X + + + + + -
s i k o n o
l i f t
+ + X + - + + + + + -
p e r i f e r o  
carry about
+ + X - - + + + + + -
a p o m a k r i n o  
take away, 
remove
+ + - + X + + + + + -
x o no
stick  into
+ + + - - + + x + x -
s e r n o
drag
+ + + + - + + + + + -
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL CAUSE





+ + - - - + + + + X
ferno
bring
+ + + + - + + + + X
vazo
put
+ + + - X + + + + +
vyazo 
take out
+ + + - X + + + + + -
piyeno2  
take to
+ + + - - + + + + +
trexo2  
make s .o .  
run
+ X - - - + + +
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LIST V: Re la t ive  a g e n t iv i ty  o f  selected non-causative Modern Greek
verbs of  motion
VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
k a t a b i o k o  
chase, pursue
+ + + - - + -  - +
k i n i y a o  
chase, hunt,  
run a f t e r
+ + + - - + +
s k a r f a l o n o  
cl imb
+ + - - - x + +
k o l i b a o
swim
+ + - - - X + +
ormao  
dash, f a l l  
v io le n t l y  on
+ + + - X + +
x o r e v o
dance
+ X - - - X + +
*  The notations used here are the same as those used in L is t  IV
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
v a S i z o  
walk, march
+ - - - - -j- + - -
po revome  
walk (a long 
distance)
+ X - - - + +
p e z o p o r o  
walk, go on 
foot
+ - - - - + + -
s u l a t s a r o  
s t r o l l ,  saunter
+ - - - - + +
s e r j a n i z o  
walk around
+ - - - - + +
b u s u l i z o  
crawl (as of  
a baby)
+ - - - - + +
p e r p a t a o  
wal k
+ + - - - + +
p e r i  p i  an j  erne 
wander
+ + - - - +  X +
\ o n a t i z o j
kneel






l i e  down
pibao
jump, leap





s t i r ,  move 
s l i g h t l y
s t r i v o j
turn















SI WI NI CC WC NC
+ x + x





VERBS AN I MACY INTENSION CONTROL





+ + + - - + + +
petao j
f l y
X + + - - + + + .
p 7 Ye/?o
go
+ + + - + + + +
beno
get in to ,  
enter
+ + + + + + + +
vyeno 
go out
+ + + + + + + +
k i k l o f o r o j  
c i r c u la te
+ + + - + + + +
aneveno
ascend
+ + + + + + + +
kateveno
descend
+ + + + + + + +
Siasx izo
traverse
+ + + + + + + +
fevyo
leave
+ + + + + + + +  X
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VERBS AN I MACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
p l i s i a z o j  
approach
+ + + + + + X + + X
y i r i z o ^  (p iso)  
return
+ + + - + + X + + X
epi s t r e f o j  
return
+ + + - + + X + + X
ipoxoro
recede, subside
+ + X + - + + + + X
sikonome 
r i s e ,  get up
+ + + + + + +
j
i psonome  
r i  se,
be e levated /  
raised
X X + + + + + +
x a m i l o n o  
stoop, lower
+ + + + + + + +
pe ta yom ep  
jump up, be 
thrown up
+ + X + + X + +
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN . SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
t i n a z o m e  
shake/jump up, 
be shaken up, 
j e r k
+ + + X + + X + +
apoma kr in om e  
move away, be 
removed
+ + + + X + + + + X
e p i s t r e f o m e  
be returned
X X X - + + - +
sernome
crawl
+ + + - + X x + X X -f
ob iyum e  
be led /d r iven
+ + + - - + + - + +
metaferome 
be transported,  
change premises
+ + + - - + + - X +
erxome
come
+ + + - + + + + + +
xonome 
get stuck/  
engulfed
+ + + X + + +
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
p e f t o
f a l l
+ + + + + x + X +
v i B i z o m e
sink
+ + + - + x + x +
y7 i s t r a o j  
s l i p ,  s l ide
+ + - - + x + X +
anevazome  
be ra is e d /  
taken up
+ + + - + + +
ka te va zom e  
be taken down
+ + + - + + - +
k u v a l j e m e  
be carr ied
+ + - - + + +
k u t r u v a l o  
r o l l  down
+ + X - - + +
v u l j a z o
sink
+ + + - + + +
t r em o
tremble
+ + + + + + +
t r a n d a z o m e  
be shaken/ jo l te
+
d
+ + - + + +
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VERBS ANIMACY INTENSION CONTROL
HUM AN I NAN SI WI NI CC WC NC
SM NSM
V NF
t a r a k u n j e m e  
be shaken
+ + + - + + +
k a t r a k i l a o  
r o l l  down
X X X - + + +
ta ra z o m e  
s t i r ,  be 
s t ir re d
- - - + + + +
b iz o m e  
get s tuck/ 
engulfed
- - - - + + +
k i l a o j
r o l l
- - - X + + +
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LIST VI: Taxonomic sets and natural classes of Modern Greek verbs
of motion
1 kun jem e  = move [p a r t ia l  motion]
2 kunao  = cause to  move [p a r t ia l  motion]
3 p i y e n o j  /  e rxome  = go /  come
4 p e r p a t a o  /  v a b i z o  = walk
5 f e v y o  /  a n a x o r o  = leave , depart
6 aneveno /  ane rxome  = ascend [upward motion]
7 anevazo  = ra is e , c a rry /ta k e  up
8 s i k o n o  = ra is e , l i f t
9 k a t e v e n o  /  k a t e r x o m e  = descend [downward motion]
10 k a t e v a z o  = b rin g /ta k e  down
11 p e f t o  = f a l l
12INTR spevbo  /  [move ra p id ly ] = hasten
12TR [cause something to  move fa s t]
13INTR [move slow ly]
13TR [cause something to move slowly]
14 r i x n o  /  p e t a o 2 = throw
15 f e r n o  /  p i \ / e n o 2 = bring /  take to
16 s t r i v o j  /  y i r i z o j  = turn  [ro ta ry  motion]
17 s t r i v o 2 /  \ i r i z 02 ~ cause to turn
18 [roam around]
19 v iQ i z o m e  ~ s in k j^ jp
20 s t e l n o  = send
21 beno  = get in to , en ter
22 vyeno -  go out/come out
23 p i b a o  = jump
24 p e r n a o  = pass
25 [CL - o b je c t's  main p a rt or a l l  limbs in contact w ith  ground] 
26INTR [ r o l l ,  s lid e ]
26TR [ r o l l ,  s lid e ]
27 (nav ig ation  terms)
28 [take  away]
29 [b r in g /ta k e  back]
30 [go back]
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31 [cause something to  change lo c a tio n  - o b je c ts  main p art or a ll  
limbs in contact w ith  ground]
32 p e t a o j  = f l y
33 v i Q i z o  = cause to  sink
34 [take  someone or something here and th ere ]
35 p r o x o r o  = advance
35 o p i s Q o x o r o  = r e t r e a t ,  move backwards
37 vya zo  = ta k e /b r in g  out
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CHANGE OF POSITION STATIVE
PARTIAL MOTION PARTIAL MOTION MOTION RESULTING IN
NOT RESULTING REGULAR/REPEATED DIFFERENT POSTURE/POINT
IN DIFFERENT OF SUPPORT
POSTURE
k i I j e m e ta landevome s t i n om e s t e k o ,  stekome ( ime s t im e n o s )
wallow oscillate assume a standing stand
position
kun jeme, palome kaBomej ( ime kaBismenos)
kunaoy vibrate kaBomeg s i t ,  be seated
move, s t ir s i t  down
t  re/no k s a p l o n o j
s a le v o tremble k s a p lon og ( ime ksap lom eno s )
s t ir 1 ie down l ie ,  be lying down
k l i b o n i z o m e
tradazome ro ll  and pitch kremjeme kremome ( ime kremasmenos)
shake, jerk hang hang, be hanging
s 7 o/ne
anaoevome, shake \ernc>2 yernoj ( ime yermenos)
anakatevome, lean on lean, be leaning
( ana ) ta raso me 1ikn izome
st i r ,  churn, swing, rock s ikonome eorume , meteor i zome ( ime meteoro
shake up stand up be dangling, hanging above
k i m a t i z o
anap ibao wave anakaQome e p i p l e o
jump up s it  up f lo a t ,  be afloat
y o n a t i z o j ime akubismenos
kneel be leaning on, be on
s k i  vo
bend
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